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Preface 
 
Companies face risks every day, they are part of normal business life. There are many 
risks — both threats and opportunities — which may impact on a company‘s 
resources, projects and profitability. Risk means different things to different businesses 
and organizations. Undoubtedly, the risk represents both a potential threat and 
potential opportunity for businesses. 
Every business and decision involves a certain amount of risk. Risk might cause a loss 
to a company. This does not mean, however, that businesses cannot take risks. As 
disengagement and risk aversion may result in missed business opportunities, which 
will lead to slower growth and reduced prosperity of a company. In today‘s 
increasingly complex and diverse environment, it is crucial to find the right balance 
between risk aversion and risk taking. To do this it is essential to understand the 
complex, out of the whole range of economic, technical, operational, environmental 
and social risks associated with the company’s activities. However, risk management 
is about much more than merely avoiding or successfully deriving benefit from 
opportunities. Risk management is the identification, assessment, and prioritization of 
risks. Lastly, risk management helps a company to handle the risks associated with a 
rapidly changing business environment. When risk management does receive 
attention, it is often in response to unforeseen (and usually negative) events. 
The impact of the global economic crisis has varied from one country to another: not 
all countries, sectors and organizations were affected in the same hard way by it. Even, 
the impact of the financial crisis is varying widely across companies within the same 
sector. In today’s post-crisis economy effective risk management is a critical 
component of any successful management strategy. In complex and rapidly changing 
situations, as today’s supply chains and partnership arrangements tend to be, 
management needs to consider all risks within the enlarged business connections. 
Understanding of the risk management is vital for both practitioners and researchers. 
The emergence of new insights into approaches and models can help address 
multifaceted risk management issues. 
There are five parts in this book of 23 chapters. The papers are organized according to 
theoretical, methodological and practical issues and areas of risk management: Part 1 
X Preface 
 
provides new insights into theoretical approaches and models for risk management, 
Part 2 deals with risk and supply chain management, Part 3 focuses on specific aspects 
of enterprise risk management, Part 4 examines risk management practice across 
different projects and industries, and Part 5 discusses emerging issues related to 
climate change and climate risk management. The authors touched on a wide range of 
risk management issues. Consequently, in the context of the thematic classification 
scheme, some papers fall into more than one category. 
I consider it an honour and privilege to have had the opportunity to edit this book. I 
am particularly grateful to all the authors for their outstanding contributions, and to 
Mirna Cvijic, the publishing process manager at InTech, for her kind assistance in 
publishing this book. 
Dr. Nerija Banaitiene 
Department of Construction Economics and Property Management, 
Faculty of Civil Engineering, 
Vilnius Gediminas Technical University, 
Lithuania 
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Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits 
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. 
Biometric Solvency Risk for Portfolios of General  
Life Contracts (II) The Markov Chain Approach 
Werner Hürlimann 
Additional information is available at the end of the chapter 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/48374 
1. Introduction 
The main theoretical goal of the present exposé is to extend the results presented in 
Hürlimann [1] to the Markov chain model of life insurance, which enables modeling all 
single life/multiple life traditional contracts subject to biometric risk with multiple causes of 
decrement. In particular, a complete risk modeling of single-life insurance products with 
mortality and disability risks requires the specification of a Markov model with three states. 
As novel illustration we offer to the interested practitioner an in-depth treatment of 
endowment contracts with waiver of premium by disability. 
The present investigation is restricted to biometric risks encountered in traditional insurance 
contracts within a discrete time Markov chain model. The current standard requirements for 
the Solvency II life risk module have been specified in QIS5 [2], pp.147-163. QIS5 prescribes 
a solvency capital requirement (SCR), which only depends on the time of valuation (=time at 
which solvency is ascertained) but not on the portfolio size (=number of policies). It accounts 
explicitly for the uncertainty in both trends (=systematic risk) and parameters (=parameter 
risk) but not for the random fluctuations around frequency and severity of claims (=process 
risk). In fact, the process risk has been disregarded as not significant enough, and, in order 
to simplify the standard formula, it has been included in the systematic/parameter risk 
component. For the purpose of internal models and improved risk management, it appears 
important to capture separately or simultaneously all risk components of biometric risks. A 
more detailed account of our contribution follows. 
As starting point, we recall in Section 2 the general solvency rule for the prospective liability 
risk derived in [1], Section 2, which has resulted in two simple liability VaR & CVaR target 
capital requirements. In both stochastic models, the target capital can be decomposed into a 
solvency capital component (liability risk of the current period) and a risk margin 
component (liability risk of future periods), where the latter must be included (besides the 
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best estimate liabilities) in the technical provisions. This general decomposition is in 
agreement with the current QIS5 specification. The proposed approach is then applied to 
determine the biometric solvency risk capital for a portfolio of general traditional life 
contracts within the Markov chain model of life insurance. For this, we assume that the best 
estimate liabilities of a general life contract coincide with the so-called “net premium 
reserves”. After introduction of the Markov chain approach to life insurance in Section 3, we 
recall in Section 4 the ubiquitous backward recursive actuarial reserve formula and the 
theorem of Hattendorff. Based on this we determine in Section 5 the conditional mean and 
variance of a portfolio’s prospective liability risk (=random present value of future cash-
flows at a given time of valuation) and use a gamma distribution approximation to obtain 
the liability VaR & CVaR solvency capital as well as corresponding solvency capital ratios. 
These first formulas include only the process risk and not the systematic risk. To include the 
latter risk in solvency investigations we propose either to shift the biometric transition 
probabilities, as done in Section 6.2, or apply a stochastic model, which allows for random 
biometric transition probabilities, as explained in Section 6.3. Section 7 illustrates 
numerically and graphically the considered VaR & CVaR solvency capital models for a 
cohort of endowment contracts with waiver of premium by disability and compares them 
with the current Solvency II standard approach. Finally, Section 8 summarizes, concludes 
and provides an outlook for possible alternatives and extensions. 
2. A general prospective approach to the liability risk solvency capital 
Starting point is a multi-period discrete time stochastic model of insurance. Given is a time 
horizon T  and a probability space  , ,F P  endowed with a filtration   0Tt tF   such that  0 ,F     and TF F . Let  tL F  be the space of essentially bounded random variables 
on  , ,F P  and B  the space of essentially bounded stochastic processes on  , ,F P  
which are adapted to the filtration   0Tt tF  . The basic discrete time stochastic processes are 
,t tA L : the assets and actuarial liabilities at time t  
In a total balance sheet approach, their values depend upon the stochastic processes in B , 
which describe the random cash-in and cash-out flows of any type of insurance business: 
1tP  : loaded premiums to be paid at time 1t   (assumed invested at time 1t  ) 
tX : insurance costs to be paid at time t  (includes insurance benefits, expenses and bonus 
payments paid during the time period  1,t t  ) 
tR : accumulation factor for return on investment for the time period  1,t t   
We assume that tX  is tF -measurable and tR  is 1tF  -measurable. The random cumulated 
accumulation factor for return over the period  , , 0 ,s t s t T     is denoted by ,
1
t
s t j
j s
R R
 
  . 
Since tR  is 1tF  -measurable ,s tR  is 1tF  -measurable, and therefore  , ,s tR t s  is a 
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predictable stochastic process. The quantity 1, ,s t s tD R
  is called random discount rate. 
Consider the 1t jF   -measurable discrete time stochastic process  , 0,1,..., 1t jCF j T t     of 
future insurance cash-flows defined by 
 , 1 1 0,1,..., 1.t j t j t j t j t jCF D X P j T t             (1) 
The actuarial liabilities at time t , also called time- t  prospective insurance liability, coincide 
with the random present value of all future insurance cash-flows at time t  given by 
 
1
,
0
, 0,1,..., 1.
T t
t t t j t j
j
L D CF t T
 
 

    (2) 
Using (1)-(2) and the relationship , 1 , 1 1, 1t t k t t t t kD D D       , one obtains the recursive 
equation  1 1 1 , 1,..., 1t t t t tL L P R X t T        . On the other hand, the random assets over 
the time horizon 0,T    satisfy by definition the recursive equation  1 1 1 , 1,..., 1t t t t tA A P R X t T        . Through subtraction it follows that 
 1 1 1( ) , 1,..., 1,t t t t tA L A L R t T         (3) 
which implies the following equivalent probabilistic conditions (use that trivially 0TL  ) 
  0 1 ,T tP A F     (4) 
  , 1,2,..., 1 1 ,t t tP A L T t F           (5) 
   1 .t t tP A L F     (6) 
Given a default probability 0  , the liability VaR solvency criterion (6) says that at time t  the 
initial (deterministic) capital requirement tA  should exceed the random present value of 
future cash-flows with a probability of at least 1  . By (4)-(5) this criterion automatically 
implies that assets will exceed liabilities with the same probability at each future time over 
the time horizon T . Let 1
VaR
t t tA VaR L F      be a minimum solution to (6), and assume 
that the best estimate insurance liabilities at time t  coincide with the net premium reserves (in 
the sense defined later in (35), that is let Zt t tE L F V    . Then, the liability VaR solvency capital 
1
VaR VaR Z Z
t t t t t tSC A V VaR L F V        represents the capital available at time t  to meet 
the insurance risk liabilities with high probability. A risk margin is added to this capital 
requirement (recall that in Solvency II the sum of the best estimate insurance liabilities and 
the risk margin determines the Technical Provisions). The liability VaR target capital is the 
sum of the liability VaR solvency capital and the risk margin defined by 
 .VaR VaR VaRt t tTC SC RM   (7) 
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The cost-of-capital risk margin with cost-of-capital rate 6%CoCi   is defined by 
 
1
,
T t
VaR k VaR
t CoC f t k
k
RM i v SC



     (8) 
where T  denotes the time horizon, and fv  is the risk-free discount rate. For comparison 
with other solvency rules, one considers the VaR solvency capital ratio at time t  defined by 
 / .VaR VaR Zt t tSR SC V   (9) 
Alternatively, let 1 1 ,t t t t t t tCVaR L F E L L VaR L F F             be the conditional value-at-
risk of the random present value of future cash-flows at the confidence level 1   given the 
information available at time t . The liability CVaR target capital 
1
CVaR Z CVaR CVaR CVaR
t t t t t t tTC CVaR L F V RM SC RM         also meets the insurance risk 
liabilities and it defines the CVaR solvency capital ratio at time t : 
 / .CVaR CVaR Zt t tSR SC V  (10) 
3. The Markov chain approach to general life contracts 
Consider the Markov chain model of a general life insurance (GLIFE) contract with state space 
S  and arbitrary payments. The state space S is the finite set of states a contract can be during 
its lifetime. Payments are induced by two kinds of events: 
Type 1: payments induced by being in a certain state 
Type 2: payments induced by a jump of state 
The payment function vector of a contract at time 0,1,2,...k   is expressed as a vector 
 ( ) ( ), ( )i ija k a k a k i j S   , where the payment functions are defined by 
Type 1: ( ),ia k i S , is the payment if the contract at time k  is in state i . 
Type 2: ( ), , 1ija k i j S k   , is the payment if the contract was in state i  at time 1k   and is 
in state state j  at time k . For convenience set (0) 0ija   for i j S   and ( ) 0ija k   for 
i j S  . 
For better interpretation one splits the payment ( )ia k  into a benefit part and a premium part 
such that ( ) ( ) ( ), , 0,1,2,...i i ia k b k k i S k    , where ( ) 0i k   denotes the non-negative 
premium paid at time k  when the contract is in state i . Note that in most applications one 
has ( ) 0i k   if the state i  is different from the state of being “active” (premiums are only 
paid in this situation). Restricting the attention to biometric risk only, we assume 
throughout a flat term structure of interest rates with annual interest rate i  and discount 
factor 1 / (1 )v i  . The state of a GLIFE contract over time is described by the discrete time 
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stochastic process   0,1,2,...k kX   with values in S . The event  kX s  means that the contract 
at time k  is in state s . We assume that   0,1,2,...k kX   is a Markov chain, which implies that the 
joint distributions of the random states can be represented in terms of the one-step transition 
probability matrix     ,( )ij i j Sp k p k  , which is defined by 
    1 , 0,1,2,...ij k kp k P X j X i k     (11) 
The set  , ( ), , 0,1,2,...kS a k X k   defines the Markov chain model widely discussed in life 
insurance (Amsler [3]; Hoem [4], [5]; Koller [6]; Milbrodt & Helbig [7]; Wolthuis [8]; etc.). 
Now, using the indicator function ( )I  , consider the random cash-flow of the GLIFE contract 
in year  , 1k k    valued at time 0,1,2,...k  , which is defined by 
      1( ) ( ) ( 1) .k i i k ij k k
i S i j S
C b k k I X i v a k I X i X j 
  
             (12) 
The insurance loss random variable of a GLIFE contract is defined by 
 
0
.k k
k
L v C


   (13) 
This identifies the insurance loss with the random present value of all future cash-flows. 
Furthermore, for an arbitrary non-negative integer 0,1,...  , one defines the time-  
prospective loss random variable 
  1 ,k k
k
L i v C



    (14) 
whose (conditional) expected value defines the time-  actuarial reserve 
 , .k k
k S
V E L X V V E L X k      

           (15) 
The quantity kV  is called state- k  time-  actuarial reserve. In particular, one has 0L L  and 
0V E L     is the initial actuarial reserve, which is not assumed to vanish. 
4. Backward recursive reserve formula and the theorem of Hattendorff 
In a first step, we derive a recursion formula for the actuarial reserves. Recall the recursion 
formula for the random prospective loss 
 1.L C vL      (16) 
Assume that the contract is in state . k S  at time  . Inserting (16) into (15) yields 
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 1 .
kV E C X k v E L X k                (17) 
Using (12) the first expectation in (17) can be rewritten as 
     1( 1) ( ) ( )
( 1) ( ) ( ) ( ).
ij i i
i j S i S
kj kj k k
j k S
v a P X i X j X k b P X i X k
v a p b
       
    

  
 
           
     
 
  
The second expectation equals 
 1 1 1 1 1 ( ).j kj
j S j S
E L X k E L X j P X j X k V p           
 
                
Inserting both expressions into (17) and using the made convention ( 1) 0kka     as well as 
the relationship ( ) 1kj
j S
p 

 , one obtains the backward recursive reserve formula 
  1( ) ( 1) ( ) ( ).jk kj kj k k
j S
V p v V v a b     

         (18) 
The actuarial reserve at time   given the contract is in state k S  equals the one-year 
discounted sum over all possible states of the 
 actuarial reserves at time 1  , 
 payments at time 1   due to a jump in states, 
 payments at time   due if being in a certain state, 
which is weighted by the one-step transition probabilities and reduced by the premium paid 
at time   when the contract is in state k . The representation (18) is a discrete version of 
Thiele’s differential equation. Thiele's differential equation is a simple example of a 
Kolmogorov backward equation, which is a basic tool for determining conditional expected 
values in intensity-driven Markov processes, e.g. Norberg [9]. 
Let us rearrange (18) in order to obtain the Markov chain analogue of the classical 
decomposition of the premium into risk premium and saving premium (Gerber [10], [11]), 
Section 7.5, equation (5.3), and [1], equation (19). 
Theorem 4.1 The premium ( )k   at time   if the contract is in state k S  is the sum of a 
saving premium ( )Sk   and a risk premium ( )Rk  , which are defined as follows: 
 1( )
S k k
k v V V       (19) 
  1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1) jR kk k kj kj
j S
b v V v p a V      

         (20) 
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Proof. Making use of the recursion (18) and the relationship ( ) 1kj
j S
p 

 , one obtains 
 
 
1 1 1
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1)
( ) ( 1) ( ) ( ),
jS R k k k
k k k kj kj
j S
jk
kj kj k k
j S
v V V b v V v p a V
V p v a v V b
   
 
      
    
  



           
         

  
which shows the desired decomposition. ◊ 
The saving premium represents the expected change in actuarial reserve at time   for a 
contract in state k  while the risk premium is the expected value at time   of a contract in 
state k  needed to cover the insurance risk in time period  , 1    . Rewrite the latter as 
  1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1) .jR kk k kj kj
j S
b v p a V V       

        (21) 
This is the sum of the benefit payment at time   for a contract in state k  and the probability 
weighted sum of the sums at risk  1 1( 1) j kkja V V       due to transitions from state k  to 
state j  at time 1  . The sum at risk is the amount credited to the insured’s contract upon a 
transition, namely the lump sum payable immediately plus the adjustment of the actuarial 
reserve. The obtained results constitute a discrete time version of those mentioned in 
Norberg [12], p.10. 
To evaluate the mean and variance of the random insurance loss (13) of a GLIFE contract, 
we follow the martingale approach to the Theorem of Hattendorff (Bühlmann [13]; Gerber [14]; 
Gerber et al. [15]; Hattendorff [16]; Kremer [17]; Patatriandafylou & Waters [18]; etc.). For 
this consider the set of 1   contract states  , 0,1,...,S X      at time   and the 
sequence of random variables 
 0 0, 1,2,..., .Y E L S Y E L V            (22) 
The discrete time stochastic process  Y  is a martingale with respect to  S . The 
martingale differences 1 , 0,1,2,...Y Y v

        , represent the discounted one-year 
insurance losses and form a sequence of uncorrelated random variables such that 
 
0
0
0, , 0, 0 , .E Cov L V v   

 


                  (23) 
Through detailed calculation one obtains the following result. 
Theorem 4.2 The variance of the random insurance loss of a GLIFE contract is determined 
by the following formulas 
 2
0
,Var L v Var C 



         (24) 
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  2 2( ) , ( ) ( ),S S Sk
k S k S
Var C E C X k P X k         
 
              (25) 
 
22 ( ) ( )
( 1) ( ) ( ) ( 1) ( ).
k k
kj k k kj kj
j S
E C X k b
va b va p
    
     

       
          (26) 
Proof. Similarly to Gerber et al. [15], formula (89), one has 
 
1
0
.j j
j
Y v C v E L S
 
  


      (27) 
Using (15) one obtains 
 
 
   
1 1 1
1 1 ( ) ,
S
k S
v Y Y v C vE L S E L S
v C vE L X k E L X k v C
 
       
 
       
  
 

           
               
 (28) 
 ( ).SC       (29) 
Since 0E      one gets ( )SE C        and further 
  22 2 2( ) ,S
k S
Var Var C E C E C E C X k P X k        

                          (30) 
which is (25). To obtain (26) one uses (12) and the convention ( 1) 0iia     to get 
 
 
 
22
1
,
( ) ( )
( 1) ( ) ( ) ( 1) ,
i i
i S
ij i i ij
i j S
C b I X i
va b va I X i X j
 
 
  
    



     
           

  (31) 
which implies that 
 
22 ( ) ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( ) ( 1) ( ).k k kj k k kj kj
j S
E C X k b va b va p          

                     (32) 
Remark 4.1 In the single life case, the variance formulas in Theorem 4.2 should be compared 
with the ones for the GLIFE contract with one and multiple causes of decrement in [1], 
formulas (24)-(26). One can ask if the formula (25) is equivalent to the following one (at least 
in the single life case) 
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    2 2 21 1( 1) ( ) ( ) .j k Rkj kj k
k S j S
Var C a V V v p P X k       
 
 
             
   (33) 
5. The liability VaR & CVaR solvency capital for portfolios of GLIFE 
contracts 
We begin with risk calculations for a single GLIFE contract, and use them to determine the 
liability VaR & CVaR solvency capital for a portfolio of GLIFE contracts. 
5.1. Risk calculations for a single GLIFE contract 
Given is a single GLIFE contract with random future cash-flows  kC  defined by (12). We 
assume that the state space contains a unique distinguished “void” state  kX   
meaning that the contract has terminated at time k . We assume contract survival, i.e. a 
contract is still alive at time of valuation t , which implies that the conditional event 
 t tE X    is fulfilled. We note that the random present value of future cash-flows at 
time t  defined by 
 
0
, 0,1,...,jt t j
j
Z v C t



   (34) 
coincides with the time- t  prospective loss defined in (14), that is , 0,1,...t tZ L t  . 
Therefore, the expected value given contract survival equals 
      .tZ k kt t t t t t tk S k S t
P X k
V E Z E V P X k E V
P E 
           (35) 
In contrast to (15) the reserve defined in (35) is state independent and called net premium 
reserve, see Bowers et al. [19], Chap.17.7, p. 500, for a special case. Following Section 2, this 
value can been chosen as best estimate of the contract liabilities. 
Remarks 5.1 (i) The motivation for state-independent reserves is second-to-die life 
insurance, where during lifetime the insurer may not be informed about the first death. An 
endowment with waiver of premium during disability, which is our illustration in Section 7, 
seems to contradict this concept because it cannot be argued that the insurer is unaware of 
the state occupied while the premium is being waived. However, at a given arbitrary time of 
valuation (including starting dates of contracts) future states of contracts are unknown, and 
therefore it is reasonable in a first step to assume state independent reserves for the design 
of a general method. Later refinement might be necessary to cover all possible cases. 
(ii) State independent reserves have been introduced by Frasier [20] for the last-survivor 
status, see also The Actuary [21] and Margus [22]. The choice between state independent 
and state dependent reserves depends upon loss recognition in the balance sheet 
(recognition or not of a status change). With state independent reserves, the insurance 
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company administers the contract as if it had no knowledge of any decrements, as long 
as the contract is not terminated. Only the latter situation is considered in the present 
work. 
In a first step, we determine the mean and variance of the conditional distribution of tZ  
given tE . Similarly to [1], Section 5.1, the variance formulas (24)-(26) generalize to an 
arbitrary discrete time 1,2,...t  . Formula (23) generalizes as 
   k tt t t k
k t
L V I E v
 

    . (36) 
Noting further that , 0,1,...t tZ L t  , one obtains from (36) the following conditional 
variance formulas (conditional version of Theorem 4.2). 
Theorem 5.1 The conditional variance is determined by the following formulas 
  
22
2 2
2
0 0
2 2
22
( )
,
( )
, ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
t t t
t t t t
t
S S
t t t t t k
k S k S
t t k k
kj
E C P E E C
Var Z E v Var C E v
P E
E C E C X k P X k E C t t
E C X k b t t
va
  

 
    
 
   
  
   

 
    
 
 
                      
                
         

 
 
( 1) ( ) ( ) ( 1) ( ).k k kj kj
j S
t b t t va t p t     

            
 (37) 
As shown in the next Subsection, these formulas can be used to determine the target capital 
and solvency capital ratio of a portfolio of GLIFE contracts using appropriate 
approximations for the distribution of the random present value of future cash-flows 
associated to this portfolio under the condition that the contracts are still alive. 
5.2. Solvency capital and solvency capital ratio for a portfolio of GLIFE contracts 
Towards the ultimate goal of solvency evaluation for an arbitrary life insurance portfolio, 
we consider now a set of n  policyholders alive at time t . From Section 3 one knows that the 
i -th contract  1,...,i n  is characterized by the following data elements: 
 contract duration it  at time t  
 state space ( )iS  
 states  ( )
0,1,2,...
i
k k
X

 of the contract over time with values in ( )iS  
 condition for contract survival  ( ) ( )
i i
i i
t tE X    at time t  
 one-step transition probabilities    ( ) ( ) ( )1 , 0,1,2,...i i irs k kp k P X s X r k    , defining the 
Markov chain model of the contract 
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 payment function vector  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ), ( )i i i ir rsa k a k a k r s S    of the contract at time 
0,1,2,...k   with the two types of payment: 
Type 1: ( ) ( )( ),i ira k r S , is the payment if the contract at time k  is in state r . 
Type 2: ( ) ( )( ), , 1i irsa k r s S k   , is the payment if the contract was in state r  at time 1k   
and is in state state s  at time k  
 splitting ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ), , 0,1,2,...i i i ir r ra k b k k r S k     into a benefit & premium part 
To the i -th contract one associates its random future cash-flows  ( )ikC  as defined in (12), 
the corresponding ( )
i
i
tL  time- it  random prospective loss (14) and time- it  net premium 
reserve ,( ) ( ) ( )
i i i
Z i i i
t t tV E L E
      obtained from (35). The random present value of future cash-
flows of the portfolio is obtained by summing (34) over all contracts and is given by 
 ( ) ( )
1 0 0 1
, 0,1,... .
i i
n n
j ji i
t t j t j
i j j i
Z v C v C t
 
 
   
      
    (38) 
Similarly, summing the individual net premium reserves, one gets the portfolio reserve 
 ,( )
1
.
i
n
Z iZ
t t
i
V V

   (39) 
Following Section 2, one defines the portfolio VaR solvency capital 
 ( )1 , 1,..., ,i
iVaR Z
t t ttSC VaR Z E i n V
       (40) 
as well as the portfolio CVaR solvency capital 
 ( )1 , 1,..., ,i
iCVaR Z
t t ttSC CVaR Z E i n V
       (41) 
and the corresponding solvency capital ratios 
 / , / .VaR VaR Z CVaR CVaR Zt t t t t tSR SC V SR SC V   (42) 
To determine these quantities it is necessary to determine the distribution of tZ  conditional 
on contract survivals at time t , and under the assumption that the remaining lifetimes of all 
contracts are independent of each other. From Theorem 5.1 we have 
 
( ) ( ) ( )2
0 1
2( ) ( ) ( )2
2
( ) 2
0 1
, 1,..., , , 1,...,
( ) ( )
,
( )
i i i
i i i
i
n
i i iZ
t t tt t t
i
i i i
n t t t
i
i t
E Z E i n V Var Z E i n v Var C
E C P E E C
v
P E



 



 
  
 
                 
        
 
 
 (43) 
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 
( )
( )
( ) ,( ) ,( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2
2( ) ( )2 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ),
( ) ( ) ,
( ) ( ) ( )
( 1) ( )
i i
i i i ii
i i
i S i S i
i k it
k S
i i i i
t t t t
k S
i i i i
k i k it t
i i
kj i k i
E C t t
E C E C X k P X k
E C X k b t t
va t b t

   
 
   
  
  


   

 
      
          
           
     


( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( 1) ( ).
i
i i i
k i kj i kj i
j S
t va t p t  

       
  (44) 
Based on the conditional mean and variance we approximate the distribution function of tZ  
by a gamma distribution as in [1], Section 5. Denote this approximation by  ( )( ) Pr , 1,...,iit t tF x Z x E i n   . Then, recalling the gamma distribution function, one has 
 1
2 2
0
1 1 1( ) ( ; ) , , ,
( )
t
t
x
t
t t t t t
t t t t
F x G x t e dt
k k

    
        (45) 
where ,t tk  are the conditional mean and coefficient of variation of tZ  (obtained from (43)-
(44)). In this setting, the solvency capital ratio formulas (42) take the forms 
  2 21 1,VaRt t tSR z k k        2 212 21 ; ,t tCVaRt t t g z k kSR z k k  
 

    (46) 
where 11 ( ) : (1 ; )z G       denotes the (1 ) -quantile of the standardized gamma 
( ; )G x   and ( ; ) '( ; )g x G x   denotes its probability density. The limiting results for a 
portfolio of infinitely growing size are similar to those in [1], Remark 5.1. If the coefficients 
of variation tend to zero, the gamma distributions converge to normal distributions and the 
solvency capital ratios converge to zero. This holds under the following assumption. 
Whenever insured contracts are independent and identically distributed, and if the portfolio 
size is large enough, then the ratio of observed state transitions to portfolio size is close to 
the given rates of transition with high probability. This assumption is related to the process 
risk, which describes the random fluctuations in the biometric transition probability matrix. 
However, if the ratio of observed state transitions to portfolio size is not close to the given 
rates of transition, even for large portfolio sizes, systematic risk exists, e.g. Olivieri & Pitacco 
[23], Section 2.1. In this situation, the rates of transition are uncertain and assumed to be 
random, and we consider stochastic models that include the process and systematic risk 
components. This is the subject of Section 6.3. 
6. Comparing the standard approach with variants of the stochastic 
approach 
Since the present Section has some overlap with [1], Section 6, it is treated more briefly, but 
can be read independently. Facts peculiar to the Markov chain approach are added 
whenever felt necessary. Recall that biometric risks in QIS5 accounts for the uncertainty in 
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trends and parameters, the so-called systematic/parameter risk, but not for the process risk. We 
note that the solvency capital models of Section 5.2 only apply to the process risk. For full 
coverage of the process and systematic risk components, these solvency models are revised 
and extended. For this, we either shift the biometric transition probability matrix (see 
Section 6.2) or apply a stochastic biometric model with random biometric rates of transition 
(see Section 6.3). For completeness we briefly recall the QIS5 standard approach. 
6.1. Solvency II standard approach 
To value the net premium reserves a biometric “best estimate” life table is chosen. In the 
Markov chain model the life table is replaced by the one-step transition probabilities 
   1 , 0,1,2,...ij k kp k P X j X i k    . Given is a single life policy at time of valuation t  
with net premium reserve ZtV . Denote by 
,Z
tV
  the value of the reserves subject to a 
biometric shock  . The one-year solvency capital requirement (SCR) for this single policy is 
 , .Z Zt t tSCR V V
   (47) 
Similarly to the decomposition (7) the Solvency II target capital (upper index S2 in quantities) 
is understood as the sum of the SCR and a risk margin defined by 
 2 .St t tTC SCR RM   (48) 
 
1
,
T t
k
t CoC f t k
k
RM i v SCR



   6%,CoCi   (49) 
where T  denotes the time horizon, which may depend on the life policy, and fv  is the risk-
free discount rate. Since Solvency II uses a total balance sheet approach, the defined single 
policy quantities must be aggregated on a portfolio and/or line of business level. For 
comparison with internal models it is useful to consider the solvency capital ratio at time t  
under the Solvency II standard approach defined by the quotient 
 2 / .S Zt t tSR SCR V  (50) 
By using a matrix of transition shocks  ij   , we obtain formulas for the Markov chain 
model. Consider the shifted biometric transition probabilities defined by 
   ,ijijp k  (51) 
which is associated to  ijp k , for a permanent shift of amount ij  over all contracts and 
years 0,1,2,...k  . In the current specification one has 0.15AD   (permanent 15% increase 
in mortality rates at each age for jumping from the alive state “A” to the dead state “D” for 
the mortality risk), 0.20AD    (permanent 20% decrease in mortality rates at each age for 
jumping from “A” to “D” for the longevity risk), and 0.35AJ   respectively 0.25AJ   
(increase of 35% in disability rates for the next year, respectively a permanent 25% increase 
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in disability rates at each age in following years for jumping from “A” to the disability state 
“J” for the disability risk). To calculate the portfolio reserve ZtV  in (39) and the 
corresponding shifted value ,ZtV
  under a matrix of transition shocks  ij   , we use (34) 
and the backward recursion formula (18) to get 
 
 
 
,( ) ,( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
,( ),( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
,
( ) ( 1) ( ) ( ),
i i i i
i i
n n
Z i k i i iZ
t t t t t
i i k S
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  


   
       
 
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 (52) 
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
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   
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 (53) 
Similarly to (47)-(50) and using (52)-(53) we obtain the risk capital formulas 
  
, 2
max ( )
2
1
, ,
, .
i i
Z Z S
t t t t t t
x t
k S t
t CoC f t k t Z
k t
SCR V V TC SCR RM
SCR
RM i v SCR SR
V


 


   
    (54) 
6.2. Stochastic approach: Shifting the biometric transition probability matrix 
Following the Sections 5.2 and 6.1, we consider the “shifted” random present value tZ
  of 
future cash-flows of the portfolio at time t  with conditional mean and variance 
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 (56) 
The distribution of tZ
  conditional on contract survivals at time t  is again approximated by 
a gamma distribution denoted by 
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 2 2( ) ( ; ), ( ) , ( ) / ,t t t t t t t tF x G x k k                 (57) 
where the conditional mean and coefficient of variation ,t tk   of tZ  are obtained from the 
formulas (55)-(56). Making use of (46) and (47) one sees that the portfolio VaR & CVaR 
solvency capitals under the shifted biometric transition probability matrix are given by the 
expressions 
 
2 2( ),, , ,
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                          
 (59) 
The observations in [1], Section 6.2, hold for the Markov chain model. By small coefficients 
of variation the gamma distributions converge to normal distributions, and the 
corresponding solvency capitals converge to those of normal distributions such that 
 
1
, 1 , , ,
(1 )
(1 ) , .VaR Z CVaR Zt t t t t t t tSC SCR k V SC SCR k V
 
 

      
          (60) 
Asymptotically, the solvency capital ratios tend to the following minimum values 
 , ,
0 0
lim lim .
t t
VaR CVaR t
t t Zk k t
SCR
SR SR
V 
 
 
   (61) 
By vanishing coefficients of variation the VaR & CVaR solvency capital ratios converge to 
the Solvency II solvency capital ratio. In this situation, the process risk has been fully 
diversified away, and, as expected, only the parameter/systematic risks remain. 
6.3. Stochastic approach: Poisson-gamma model of biometric transition 
For simplicity let us fix the states ,i j  of the transition probabilities   , 0,1,2,...ijp k k  . In 
case the ratio of observed state transitions to portfolio size is not close to the given rates of 
transition, even for large portfolio sizes, systematic risk exists. In this situation, the 
transition rates are uncertain and assumed to be random. This situation is modelled 
similarly to [1], Section 6.3. We assume a Bayesian Poisson-Gamma model such that the 
number of transitions is conditional Poisson distributed with a Gamma distributed random 
transition probability, which results in a negative binomial distribution for the 
unconditional distribution of the number of transitions. Then, we consider a Poisson-
Gamma model with time-dependence of the type introduced in Olivieri & Pitacco [23], 
which up-dates its parameters to experience. Given is a fixed time t  and biometric 
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transition probabilities   , 0,1,2,...ijp k k  , for the given fixed states, which is based on an 
initial cohort of size t  at time t . Let 1tD    denote the random number of transitions 
produced by the cohort in the time period  1, , 1,2,...t t      . For the first time period 
1  , we assume that there is no experience available and that the random number of 
transitions is conditional Poisson distributed such that 
  ~ , ~ , .
( )t t t t ij
D Po Q Q Gamma
p t

    
  (62) 
It follows that the unconditional distribution of the number of transitions in the first time 
period is negative binomially distributed such that 
 1 1
1
~ , , .
1 ( )t ij
D NB
p t
  
     
 (63) 
In contrast to the expected number of transitions ( )t ijp t  predicted by the biometric 
transition probability matrix, one has 
 ( ).t t ijE D p t

      . (64) 
To model a systematic deviation from the expectation, one assumes that the quotient /    
is different from one, for example greater than one for transitions produced by the 
mortality and disability risks and less than one for those produced by the longevity risk. 
Suppose that at time 1t  , the number of transitions td  observed in the cohort over the 
first time period is available, and let 1t t td     be the up-dated cohort size. A calculation 
shows that the posterior distribution of tQ  conditional on the information t tD d  is 
Gamma distributed 
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~ , ,
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t t t
ij
p t
Q d Gamma d
p t

    

 (65) 
which shows that the initial structural systematic risk parameters are up-dated as follows: 
    , , ( ) .t t ijd p t        (66) 
Passing to the second time period  1, 2t t    , we assume similarly to the first period that 
  1 1 1 1 ( )~ , ~ , .( 1)
t ij
t t t t t t t
ij
p t
D d Po Q Q d Gamma d
p t
   
    
  (67) 
This implies a so-called predictive distribution of negative binomial type 
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 21 2
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  
     

  (68) 
Iterating the above Bayesian scheme, one generalizes as follows. At time 1, 2t     , 
having observed the annual number of transitions 1 2, , ...,t t td d d    , the up-dated cohort 
size for the next time period  1,t t       is obtained from the recursion 
1 2 2 ,t k t k t kd         2,3,...,k  . The corresponding predictive negative binomial 
distribution of the number of transitions is then given by 
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   (69) 
The conditional expected number of transitions compares with the given expected number 
as follows: 
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 (70) 
If biometric experience is consistent with what is expected, the quotient of both expected 
values remains constant over time. On the other hand, if experience is better (worse) than 
expected, the same quotient will increase (decrease) over time. 
In practice one proceeds as follows. Given a fixed time t , consider for each pair of fixed 
states the Poisson-Gamma transition probabilities obtained from (64) and (70) defined by 
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   (71) 
Replacing everywhere in the formulas (55)-(59) the superscripts ij  by the superscript PG  
for the relevant transition probabilities and using (71) in calculations, we obtain portfolio VaR 
& CVaR solvency capital formulas under the Poisson-Gamma model of biometric transition 
similar to (58) and (59). Similar limiting results apply. An implementation requires a detailed 
specification. To be consistent with the Solvency II standard approach, one can assume that 
future transitions deviate systematically from the biometric life table according to the 
prescribed shock ij    for the given fixed states, such that 
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 1 1 1 1 1, (1 ) , 1,2,... .s t k s t k s t k s t k s t k s t kd d q k                          (72) 
This choice is consistent with the expected number of transitions in the first period 
s t s tE D d      if in (64) one sets (1 )    . Assume further that 100  , which implies a 
coefficient of variation for s tD   equal to 10%. One shows that the choice (72) with 
(1 )     implies that the transition probabilities (71) coincide with the corresponding 
shifted entries in the biometric life table. In this special case, we observe that the stochastic 
model of Section 6.3 provides the same results as the shift method of Section 6.2. In general, 
the stochastic model of Section 6.3 is more satisfactory and flexible because it allows the use 
of effective observed numbers of transitions as time elapses. 
7. The endowment contract with waiver of premium by disability 
For a clear and simple Markov chain illustration we restrict the attention to a single cohort 
of identical n -year endowment contracts with waiver of premium in the event of disability 
and fixed one-unit of sum insured payable upon death or survival at maturity date. The 
treatment of other similarly complex disability contracts is left to future research. For some 
further possibilities consult Example 2.1 in Christiansen et al. [24]. 
7.1. Markov model for mortality and disability risks 
A complete risk model for single-life insurance products with mortality and disability risks 
requires the specification of a Markov model with three states. A policyholder aged x  at 
contract issue changes state at time 0t   according to the following diagram 
 
Figure 1. Markov chain states and their jump probabilities 
The possible state changes occur with the following probabilities 
x ti  : one-year probability of disability at time t  
a
x tq  : one-year probability of active mortality at time t  
i
x tq  : one-year probability of disabled mortality at time t  
x tr  : one-year probability of recovery at time t  
The states are    1,2,3 , ,S a i d  . The one-step transition probabilities are given by 
a i
d
active disabled
dead
txi 
txr 
a
txq  i txq 
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1
( ) 1 ,
0 0 1
a a
x k x k x k x k
i i
ij x k x k x k x k
i q i q
p k r r q q
   
   
   
      
 , 1,2,3 , 0,1,2,...i j k   (73) 
For a n -year endowment contract with waiver of premium by disability without recovery 
from disability, one has 0, 1,2,..., 1x kr k n    . This simplifying assumption is sometimes 
made in practice and justified in economic environments with a small number of disabled 
persons, for which the probability of recovery can be neglected. For example, the Swiss 
Federal Insurance Pension applies such a model and uses a biometric life table called “EVK 
Table”, where EVK is the abbreviation for “Eidgenössische VersicherungsKasse“, e.g. Koller 
[6], p.129, or Chuard [25] for a detailed historical background. 
7.2. State dependent actuarial reserves and net level premiums 
The net level premium of the n -year endowment with waiver of premium and one unit of 
sum insured for a life in the active state at age x  is denoted by ( : )a aP P x n , where the 
upper index indicates that the premium is only due if the contract remains in the active life 
state. In our notations the payment functions of this contract are defined by 
Type 1: 
1( )a k
 
, 0,1,..., 1
1,
aP k n
k n
  
 2, ( )a k
 
0, 1,2,..., 1
1,
k n
k n
 
 3, ( ) 0a k   
Type 2: 
12( )a k
 
0, 1,2,..., 1
1,
k n
k n
 
 13, ( ) 1, 1,2,..., ,a k k n  21( ) 0.a k   
To describe the state and time dependent actuarial reserves  , 1,2,3 , 0,1,...,ikV i k n  , one 
needs the survival probabilities of staying in the active or disabled state. Denote by   the 
maximum attainable age. Then, the active survival probabilities (probability a life in the active 
state at age x  will attain age x k  in the active state without disablement) are given by 
  1 1 1 01 , 1, 1, ..., .a a a ak x k x x k x k xp p q i p k x            (74) 
Similarly, the disabled survival probabilities (probability a life in the disabled state at age x  
will attain age x k  in the disabled state without recovery) are given by 
  1 1 01 , 1, 1, ...,i i i ik x k x x k xp p q p k x         (75) 
Corresponding to these survival probabilities one associates n -year life annuities for a life 
aged x  being in the active or disabled state whose actuarial present values are defined by 
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1
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    n year active life annuity  (76) 
 
1
0
( : ) ,  for the
n
i k i
k x
k
a x n v p


    n year disabled life annuity  (77) 
The actuarial present value (APV) of future benefits for the n -year endowment with waiver 
of premium and one unit of sum insured for a life in the active (respectively disabled) state 
at age x  is denoted by ( : )aA x n  (respectively ( : )iA x n ). Using the backward recursive 
formulas for the state dependent actuarial reserves let us determine formulas for the 
evaluation of the introduced APVs. In particular, an explicit formula for the net level 
premium is derived. The backward recursive reserve formulas are given by 
 
 
 
1 1 2 1
1 1
2 2 2
1
, 0,1,..., 1, 1,
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  
       
     
 (78) 
One has 20 0V   because the life is in the state “a” at contract issue, 21 0V   because the life 
can only be in the state “i” after at least one year and then no actuarial reserve is available, 
and 3 0, 0,1,...,kV k n  , because no actuarial reserve is required in case the insured life 
has died. Since actuarial reserves represent differences between APVs of future benefits and 
future premiums one has further the relationships 
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2
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a a a
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V A x k n k k n
        
    
 (79) 
On the other hand the APVs of the active life annuities in (79) satisfy the recursions 
 ( : ) 1 ( 1 : 1), 0,1,..., 1.a a ax ka x k n k v p a x k n k k n             (80) 
Inserting (79) and (80) into (78) one obtains the backward recursions for APVs 
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 (81) 
with the starting values ( 1 : 1) ( 1 : 1)a iA x n A x n v      . One sees that the second 
relationship in (81) is satisfied by the formula 
 ( : ) 1 ( : ), 1,2,..., 1,i iA x n k k d a x n k k k n          (82) 
which reminds one of the usual formula for an endowment insurance with disability as 
single cause of decrement, e.g. Gerber [10], formula (2.15), p.37. Inserting (77) and 
rearranging one obtains the corresponding explicit sum representation 
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Using these results and proceeding through backward induction, one obtains the following 
explicit formula for the evaluation of the APV of future benefits for a life in the active state 
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 (84) 
The net level premium is determined by the actuarial equivalence principle, which states 
that at contract issue 10 0V  . Using (79) one obtains the explicit formula (use (76), (84)) 
 ( : ) ( : ) / ( : ).a a aP x n A x n a x n  (85) 
7.3. Conditional mean and variance of the prospective insurance loss 
We determine the conditional mean and variance given survival of the time- t  prospective 
insurance loss 
1
0
, 0,1,..., 1.
n t
k
t t k
k
Z v C t n
 


   Besides the state dependent actuarial 
reserves (79), we consider the net premium reserve (35), which coincides with the 
conditional mean 
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Furthermore, a calculation based on Theorem 5.1 yields the following conditional variances 
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where the savings premiums are determined by the formulas 
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and the probabilities ( )kP E  are defined in (87). Neglecting the probabilistic terms of second 
order 1 1
i i
x k x x ki p q   , one obtains the following simpler approximations to (88): 
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 (90) 
7.4. Numerical illustration 
The Markov chain parameterization of the present contract type has been given at the 
beginning of Section 7.2. We assume that all the policyholders are aged x  at time 0t  . Our 
construction of the biometric life table with mortality and disability risk factors is based on 
the classical textbook Saxer [26], Section 2.5. Besides the one-year probabilities introduced in 
Section 7.1, one considers further the partial or independent rates of decrement, see Saxer 
[26], Section 2.4, or Bowers et al. [19], Section 9.5, denoted by 
* a
x tq  : one-year independent rate of active mortality at time t  
*
x ti  : one-year independent rate of disability at time t  
The independent rates of decrement are linked to the probabilities of active mortality and 
disability through the relationship, e.g. Saxer [26], formulas (2.5.1) and (2.5.2), 
    * *1 1 1 .a ax t x t x t x tq i q i         . (91) 
For the purpose of illustration only and by lack of another reference, we base our 
calculations on Table 1, which is obtained by combining the Tables 4 and 5 in Saxer [26], 
p.240. The entries * ax tq  , 
*
x ti   and 
i
x tq   are taken from the “EVK Table 1950” and the entry 
x ti   is taken from the “VZ Table 1950”, where VZ stands for “Versicherungskasse Zürich“. 
The missing entries between the 5-year ages are linearly interpolated. 
While the standard solvency capital ratio does not depend on the initial cohort size, this is 
the case for the stochastic approaches. The age at contract issue is either 30x   or 40x   
and the contract duration is 20n  . We compare the stochastic approach with the standard 
approach for the contract times  0,1,2,3,4,5,10,15,18t . We use the shifted biometric life 
table with Solvency II standard like specifications, namely at each age 20% decrease for the 
probability to die as active (longevity risk) respectively 15% increase for the probability to 
die as disabled (mortality risk), 35% increase for the first year probability to disable and then 
25% increase at each future age (disability risk). The interest rate and the risk-free interest 
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rate is 3%. Table 2 displays shifted coefficients of variation under varying cohort sizes. The 
values are sufficiently small so that the normal approximation to the gamma distribution 
can be applied. Table 3, which is based on (60), displays the cohort size dependent solvency 
capital ratios and their limiting values (61) for a portfolio of infinitely growing size. The 
chosen confidence level is 99.5% for VaR and 99% for CVaR (the accepted level, which 
corresponds to a 99.5% Solvency II calibration). 
Table 1. One-step transition probabilities for the mortality and disability Markov chain 
In the present case study, we observe that for all cohort sizes and contract times, the 
current standard approach prescribes almost negligible solvency capital ratios. For 
small cohort sizes and early contract times, the discrepancies between the stochastic and 
standard approach increase with age and contract duration attaining solvency capital 
ratios above 200% for small cohort sizes with 100 insured lives. In fact, as already 
explained, the current QIS5 specification neglects the process risk. Moreover, we note 
x *qax qax *ix ix qix
30 0.183% 0.106% 0.064% 0.141% 4.348%
31 0.181% 0.097% 0.064% 0.148% 4.324%
32 0.178% 0.087% 0.064% 0.154% 4.300%
33 0.176% 0.078% 0.063% 0.161% 4.276%
34 0.173% 0.069% 0.063% 0.167% 4.252%
35 0.171% 0.060% 0.063% 0.174% 4.228%
36 0.174% 0.059% 0.072% 0.186% 4.204%
37 0.177% 0.059% 0.080% 0.198% 4.180%
38 0.180% 0.059% 0.089% 0.210% 4.156%
39 0.183% 0.058% 0.097% 0.222% 4.132%
40 0.186% 0.058% 0.106% 0.234% 4.108%
41 0.207% 0.079% 0.129% 0.257% 4.084%
42 0.227% 0.099% 0.153% 0.280% 4.061%
43 0.248% 0.120% 0.176% 0.304% 4.037%
44 0.268% 0.141% 0.200% 0.327% 4.014%
45 0.289% 0.161% 0.223% 0.350% 3.990%
46 0.335% 0.218% 0.285% 0.401% 3.966%
47 0.382% 0.275% 0.347% 0.452% 3.942%
48 0.428% 0.331% 0.408% 0.504% 3.919%
49 0.475% 0.388% 0.470% 0.555% 3.895%
50 0.521% 0.444% 0.532% 0.606% 3.871%
51 0.586% 0.532% 0.694% 0.743% 3.848%
52 0.650% 0.620% 0.856% 0.881% 3.824%
53 0.715% 0.708% 1.019% 1.018% 3.801%
54 0.779% 0.795% 1.181% 1.156% 3.777%
55 0.844% 0.883% 1.343% 1.293% 3.754%
56 0.909% 0.892% 1.765% 1.766% 3.731%
57 0.974% 0.900% 2.187% 2.240% 3.707%
58 1.040% 0.908% 2.609% 2.713% 3.684%
59 1.105% 0.916% 3.031% 3.187% 3.660%
60 1.170% 0.923% 3.453% 3.660% 3.637%
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that the chosen results for the normal distribution are only approximate, especially for 
small cohort sizes. In this respect, we think that the displayed figures are most likely 
lower bounds due to the fact that often a normal approximation rather underestimates 
than overestimates risk. A more detailed analysis of this point is left as open issue for 
further investigation (however, the use of the gamma approximation makes no big 
difference). On the other hand, solvency capital ratios of cohort sizes exceeding 10’000 
policyholders and late contract times tend more and more to the lower limiting bound 
as expected from the central limit theorem. Fig. 2 visualizes these findings. In virtue of 
the made confidence level calibration, the VaR & CVaR solvency capital ratios are of the 
same order of magnitude. Finally, the considered example points out to another 
difficulty. Though almost negligible in absolute value, we note that the standard 
solvency capital ratios change their signs repeatedly over the time axis. In this respect, 
one can ask whether fixed transition shifts are the “crucial scenarios”. As a response  
to this “biometric worst- and best-case scenarios” are proposed in Christiansen  
[27], [28]. 
 
Table 2. Coefficients of variation of the shifted prospective insurance loss 
 
Table 3. VaR solvency capital ratios for the endowment with waiver of premium 
Cohort size
0 1 2 3 4 5 10 15 18
(x,n)=(30,20)
100 53.815% 26.466% 17.602% 13.150% 10.483% 8.714% 4.628% 2.525% 1.464%
500 24.067% 11.836% 7.872% 5.881% 4.688% 3.897% 2.070% 1.129% 0.655%
1'000 17.018% 8.369% 5.566% 4.158% 3.315% 2.756% 1.463% 0.798% 0.463%
10'000 5.381% 2.647% 1.760% 1.315% 1.048% 0.871% 0.463% 0.252% 0.146%
100'000 1.702% 0.837% 0.557% 0.416% 0.332% 0.276% 0.146% 0.080% 0.046%
(x,n)=(40,20)
100 91.895% 45.158% 30.663% 23.298% 18.838% 15.846% 8.844% 5.223% 3.176%
500 41.097% 20.195% 13.713% 10.419% 8.425% 7.087% 3.955% 2.336% 1.421%
1'000 29.060% 14.280% 9.696% 7.368% 5.957% 5.011% 2.797% 1.652% 1.004%
10'000 9.190% 4.516% 3.066% 2.330% 1.884% 1.585% 0.884% 0.522% 0.318%
100'000 2.906% 1.428% 0.970% 0.737% 0.596% 0.501% 0.280% 0.165% 0.100%
Contract Time
Cohort size
0 1 2 3 4 5 10 15 18
(x,n)=(30,20)
100 138.7% 68.9% 45.7% 34.1% 27.1% 22.5% 11.8% 6.4% 3.8%
500 62.0% 31.1% 20.6% 15.3% 12.2% 10.1% 5.2% 2.8% 1.7%
1'000 43.9% 22.1% 14.6% 10.9% 8.6% 7.1% 3.7% 2.0% 1.2%
10'000 13.9% 7.3% 4.8% 3.5% 2.8% 2.3% 1.1% 0.6% 0.4%
100'000 4.4% 2.6% 1.7% 1.2% 0.9% 0.7% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1%
Limiting QIS5 ratio SCRt/VZt 0.0% 0.5% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% -0.1% -0.1% 0.0%
QIS5 TC ratio = (SCRt + RMt)/VZt -0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% 0.0%
(x,n)=(40,20)
100 235.6% 117.2% 79.3% 60.1% 48.5% 40.7% 22.7% 13.4% 8.1%
500 105.2% 52.6% 35.5% 26.9% 21.7% 18.2% 10.1% 6.0% 3.6%
1'000 74.3% 37.4% 25.2% 19.0% 15.3% 12.8% 7.1% 4.2% 2.5%
10'000 23.3% 12.1% 8.1% 6.0% 4.8% 4.0% 2.2% 1.3% 0.8%
100'000 7.1% 4.1% 2.7% 1.9% 1.5% 1.2% 0.7% 0.4% 0.2%
Limiting QIS5 ratio SCRt/VZt -0.3% 0.4% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
QIS5 TC ratio = (SCRt + RMt)/VZt -0.7% 0.2% 0.0% -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Contract Time
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Figure 2. Time evolution of VaR solvency capital ratios, ( , ) (40,20)x n   
8. Conclusions and outlook 
Let us summarize the present work. We have derived a general solvency rule for the 
prospective liability, which has resulted in two simple liability VaR & CVaR target capital 
requirements. The proposed approach has been applied to determine the biometric 
solvency risk capital for a portfolio of general traditional life contracts within the Markov 
chain model of life insurance. Our main actuarial tools have been the backward recursive 
actuarial reserve formula and the theorem of Hattendorff. Based on this we have 
determined the conditional mean and variance of a portfolio’s prospective liability risk 
and have used a gamma approximation to obtain the liability VaR & CVaR solvency 
capital. Since our first formulas include only the process risk and do not take into account 
the possibility of systematic risk, we have proposed either to shift the biometric transition 
probabilities, or apply a stochastic model, which allows for random biometric transition 
probabilities. 
Similarly to [1], Section 8, the adopted general methodology is in agreement with 
several known facts as (i) the process risk is negligible for portfolios with increasing 
size and has a small impact on medium to large insurers (ii) all else equal, process risk 
will increase (decrease) with higher (lower) coefficients of variation (aggregated effect 
of both decrement rates and sums at risk). Another interesting observation has been 
made at the end of Section 6.3 that the model with shifted biometric transitions can be 
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
0 5 10 15
so
lv
en
cy
 c
ap
ita
l r
at
io
contract time
Normal approximation to VaR SR with varying cohort size
lower bound
100 lives
500 lives
1'000 lives
10'000 lives
100'000 lives
 
Risk Management – Current Issues and Challenges 28 
viewed as a sub-model of the model with Poisson-Gamma time dependent biometric 
transitions. 
Moreover, a detailed analysis for a single cohort of identical endowment contracts with 
waiver of premium by disability has been undertaken in Section 7. Besides a complete 
Markov chain specification, which seems to be missing in the literature, the numerical 
illustration has shown, as expected, that the cohort size is a main driving factor of process 
risk. Due to the statistical law of large numbers, the larger the cohort size the less solvency 
capital is actually required. In contrast to the life annuity “longevity risk” study in [1], the 
stochastic approach penalizes almost all insurers (except the very large ones) because the 
current standard approach prescribes almost negligible solvency capital ratios and does not 
measure explicitly the process risk effects. 
The interested actuary might challenge the proposed approach with alternatives from 
other regulatory environments than Solvency II. Moreover, it is important to point out 
that a lot of technical issues remain to be settled properly. They are not only regulatory 
specific but also related to the complex mathematics of related software products and go 
beyond the Markov chain model. Today’s life insurance contracts include many 
embedded options and are henceforth even more complex. A challenging issue is the 
definition of capital requirements for unit-linked contracts without and with guarantee 
and variable annuities with guaranteed minimum benefits (so-called variable GMXB 
annuities). 
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1. Introduction
This work deals with the Dirichlet problem for some PDEs of second order with non-negative
characteristic form. One main motivation is to study some boundary-value problems for
PDEs of Black-Scholes type arising in the pricing problem for financial options of barrier
type. Barrier options on stocks have been traded since the end of the Sixties and the market
for these options has been dramatically expanding, making barrier options the most popular
ones among the exotic. The class of standard barrier options includes ’in’ barriers and ’out’
barriers, which are activated (knocked in) and, respectively, extinguished (knocked out) if the
underlying asset price crosses the barrier before expiration. Moreover, each class includes
’down’ or ’up’ options, depending on whether the barrier is below or above the current asset
price and thus can be breached from above or below. Therefore there are eight types of
standard barrier options, depending on their ’in’ or ’out’, ’down’ or ’up’, and ’call’ or ’put’
attributes. It is possible to include a cash rebate, which is paid out at option expiration if
an ’in’ (’out’) option has not been knocked in (has been knocked out, respectively) during
its lifetime. One can consider barrier options with rebates of several types, terminal payoffs
of different forms (e.g. power options), more than one underlying assets and/or barriers,
and allow for time-dependent barriers, thus enriching this class still further. On the other
hand, a large variety of new exotic barriers have been designed to accommodate investors’
preferences. Another motivation for the study of such options is related to credit risk theory.
Several credit-riskmodels build on the barrier option formalism, since the default event can be
modeled throughout a signalling variable hitting a pre-specified boundary value (See [3],[8]
among others). As a consequence, a substantial body of academic literature provides pricing
methods for valuating barrier options, starting from the seminal work of [18], where an exact
formula is offered for a down-and-out European call with zero rebate. Further extensions
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are provided - among others - in [22] for the different types of standard barrier options,
in [16] for simultaneous ’down’ and ’up’ barriers with exponential dependence on time, in
[10] for two boundaries via Laplace transform, in [12] and [7] for partial barrier and rainbow
options, in [17] for multi-asset options with an outside barrier, in [5] in a most comprehensive
setting employing the image solution method. Many analytical formulas for barrier options
are collected also in handbooks (see [11], for example).
For analytical tractability most literature assumes that the barrier hitting is monitored in
continuous time. However there exist some works dealing with the discrete version, i.e.
barrier crossing is allowed only at some specific dates -typically at daily closings. (See [1] and
[15], for a survey). Furthermore, a recent literature relaxes the Brownian motion assumption
and considers a more general Lévy framework. For example, [4] study barrier options of
European type assuming that the returns of the underlying asset follows a Lévy process
from a wide class. They employ the Wiener-Hopf factorization method and elements of
pseudodifferential calculus to solve the related boundary problem. This book chapter adopts
a classical Black-Scholes framework. The problem of pricing barrier options is reducible to
boundary value problems for a PDE of Black-Scholes type and with pre-specified boundaries.
The value at the terminal time T is assigned, specifying the terminal payoff which is paid
provided that an ’in’ option is knocked in or an ’out’ option is not knocked out during its
lifetime. The option holder may be entitled or not to a rebate. From a mathematical point
of view, the boundary condition can be inhomogeneous or homogeneous. While there are
several types of barrier options, in this work we will focus on ’up’ barriers in view of the
relationships between the prices of different types of vanilla options (see [25]). Moreover, the
case of floating barriers of exponential form can be easily accommodated by substitution of the
relevant parameters (see [25], Chapter 11), thus we confine ourselves to the case of constant
barriers. On the other hand, we work within a general framework that allows for multi-asset
options, a generic payoff and rebate. Furthermore, we tackle some regularity questions and
the problem of existence of generalized solutions. In Section 2 the (initial) boundary value
problem is studied in a multidimensional framework generalizing the Black-Scholes equation
and analytical solutions are obtained, while a comparison principle is provided in Section
4. Section 3 presents some applications in Finance: our general setting incorporates several
known pricing expressions and, at the same time, allows to generate new valuation formulas.
Section 5 and the Appendix study the existence and regularity of generalized solutions to the
boundary value problems for a class of PDEs incorporating the Black-Scholes type. We build
on the approach of Oleinik and Radkevicˇ and adapt the method to the PDEs of interest in the
financial applications.
2. Generalizations of the Black-Scholes equation in the multidimensional
case: (initial) boundary value problems
Consider in R1t × Rnx the following generalization of the Black-Scholes equation:
Lu = ut +
n
∑
i,j=1
aijxixjuxixj +
n
∑
i=1
bixiuxi + cu = f (t, x), (1)
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where 0 ≤ t ≤ T and xj ≥ 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
This is the Cauchy problem: �
Lu = f (t, x),
u|t=T = u0(x) , (2)�
xj ≥ 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ n
0 ≤ t ≤ T
and this is the boundary value problem:⎧⎨⎩
Lu = f
u|t=T = u0(x)
u|xj=aj = gj(t, x)|xj=aj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
(3)
⎧⎨⎩
0 ≤ t ≤ T
0 ≤ xj ≤ aj, aj > 0
1 ≤ j ≤ n
In (1) aij = aji = const, bi = const, c = const and
n
∑
i,j=1
aijξiξ j ≥ c0|ξ|2, c0 = const > 0. (4)
Our first step is to make in the non-hypoelliptic PDE L the change of the space variables:
yj = lnxj, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, τ = T − t ⇒ ∂u∂t = −
∂u
∂τ
, yj ∈ R1 (5)
∂u
∂xi
= e−yi ∂u∂yi ,
∂2u
∂xi∂xj
= e−yi−yj [ ∂2u∂yi∂yj − δij ∂u∂yi ], δij being the Kronecker symbol.
Thus, (1) takes the form:
L˜u = − ∂u
∂τ
+
n
∑
i,j=1
aij
∂2u
∂yi∂yj
+
n
∑
i=1
∂u
∂yi
(bi − aii) + cu = f , (6)
i.e.
∂u
∂τ
=
n
∑
i,j=1
aij
∂2u
∂yi∂yj
+
n
∑
i=1
b˜i
∂u
∂yi
+ cu− f ; b˜i = bi − aii
In the case (2) we have �
L˜u = f , 0 ≤ τ ≤ T
u|τ=0 = �u0(y) = u0(ey1 , . . . eyn), y ∈ Rn, (7)
while in the case (3) ⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
L˜u = f , 0 ≤ τ ≤ T
u|τ=0 = �u0(y)
u|yj=a˜j = gj|yj=a˜j
(8)
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Denote D = {0 ≤ τ ≤ T,−∞ < yj ≤ lnaj = a˜j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n}, xj = eyj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n⇒ f (t, x) =
f (T − τ, ey1 , . . . , eyn).
In (6) we make the change of the unknown function u : u = v(τ, y)e∑ αiyi+βτ in (τ, y) ∈ D.
Thus, after standard computations we get:
vτ + βv =∑
i,j
aijvyiyj +∑
i,j
aij(αivyj + αjvyi)+ (9)
+
n
∑
i=1
b˜ivyi +
n
∑
i,j=1
aijαiαjv+
n
∑
i=1
b˜iαiv+ cv− f e−∑ αiyi−βτ.
Let us take
β =∑
i,j
aijαiαj +∑
i
b˜iαi + c (10)
and put f1 = − f e−∑i αiyi−βτ. Put A = (aij)ni,j=1, A∗ = A, α = (α1, . . . , αn). Then the scalar
product (Aα,∇yv) = ∑i,j aijαj ∂v∂yi = ∑i,j ajiαi
∂v
∂yj
= ∑i,j aijαi
∂v
∂yj
, i.e. we assume that
2(Aα,∇yv) + (b˜,∇yv) = 0 ⇐⇒ (11)
2Aα+ b˜ = 0,
where b˜ = (b˜1, . . . , b˜n) is given, detA �= 0.
In conclusion we solve the algebraic system (11): α = − 12A−1(b˜) and then we define β by (10).
This way (9) takes the form:
vτ =
n
∑
i,j=1
aijvyiyj + f1(τ, y) (12)
The Cauchy problem (12) has initial condition
v0(y) = v|τ=0 = u˜0(y)e−∑i αiyi ; u˜0 ≡ u0(ey1 , . . . , eyn), y ∈ Rn.
To find a formula (Poisson type) for the solution of the Cauchy problem (12), v|τ=0 = v0(y)
we must use some auxiliary results from the linear algebra. So let Mu = ∑ni,j=1 aijvyiyj . Then
the change of the independent variables y = Bz ⇐⇒ z = B−1y, B−1 = (βli)nl,i=1 leads to
∂2
∂yi∂yj
= ∑nk,l=1 βliβkj
∂2
∂zk∂zl
, i.e.
Mu =
n
∑
k,l=1
(∑
i
(∑
j
aijβkj)βli)
∂2u
∂zk∂zl
.
One can easily guess that∑i(∑j aijβkj)βli = c˜kl are the elements of thematrix B−1A(B−1)∗ and
of course (B−1)∗ = (B∗)−1. On the other hand consider the elliptic quadratic form (Ax, x) =
(C∗ACy, y) after the nondegenerate change x = Cy. As we know one can find such a matrix
C that
C∗AC = In, (13)
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In being the unit matrix. Put now C = (B−1)∗ ⇒ C∗ = B−1. Then C∗AC = In ⇒
B−1A(B−1)∗ = In ⇒ Mu = ∑nk=1 ∂
2u
∂z2k
.
This way the change y = (C−1)∗z⇒ z = B−1y transforms the Cauchy problem (12) to:⎧⎨⎩
∂v
∂τ = ∑
n
k=1
∂2v
∂z2k
+ f˜1(τ, z), 0 ≤ τ ≤ T
v|τ=0 = v0((C−1)∗z) ≡ v˜0(z), z ∈ Rn.
(14)
The solution of the Cauchy problem (14) is given by the formula
v(τ, z) =
1
(2
√
πτ)n
�
Rn
v˜0(λ)e
− |z−λ|24τ dλ+ (15)
+
�
Rn
� τ
0
f˜1(Θ,λ)
[2
�
π(τ−Θ)]n e
− |z−λ|24(τ−Θ)dλdΘ,
z ∈ Rn, λ ∈ Rn ⇒ |z− λ|2 = ∑ni=1(zi − λi)2 (see [6] or [21]).
Going back to the old coordinates (τ, x) and the old function u = ve∑ αiyi+βτ, we find
u(t, x)-the solution of (2); t = T − τ, yj = lnxj, z = B−1y = B−1(lnx1, . . . , lnxn); u =
vxα11 . . . x
αn
n eβ(T−t).
We shall concentrate now on (3), n = 2.
Remark 1. To simplify the things, consider the quadratic form (elliptic) Q = a11ξ2 + 2a12ξη+
a22η2, a11 > 0, a22 > 0, a212 − a11a22 < 0, Q = (A(
ξ
η
), (
ξ
η
)).
Then Q = 1a11 (a11ξ + a12η)
2 + bη2; b = a22 − a
2
12
a11
> 0. The change�
x
y
�
=
�√
a11
a12√
a11
0
√
b
��
ξ
η
�
(16)
leads toQ = x2+ y2. Moreover, the first quadrant ξ ≥ 0, η ≥ 0 is transformed under the linear
transformation with matrix D =
�√
a11
a12√
a11
0
√
b
�
, D−1 =
⎛⎝ 1√a11 − a12a11√b
0 1√
b
⎞⎠ into angle between
the rays (straight lines ) l1 :
����� x ≥ 0y = 0 and l2 :
����� x =
a12√
a11
η
y =
√
bη ≥ 0
with opening ϕ0. Evidently,
(D−1)∗AD−1 = I2.
Consequently, the transformation D is not orthogonal for a12 �= 0.
Let us now consider the boundary value problem (8). The above-proposed procedure yields:
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⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
vτ = ∑2i,j=1 aijvyiyj + f1(τ, y)
v|τ=0 = v0(y) = u0(ey1 , ey2)e−∑ αiyi
v|y1=a˜1 = g1(T − τ, ey1 , ey2 )|y1=a˜1e−βτa−α11 e−α2y2 ≡ g˜1(τ, y2)
v|y2=a˜2 = g2(T − τ, ey1 , ey2 )|y2=a˜2e−βτa−α22 e−α1y1 ≡ g˜2(τ, y1)
(17)
�
−∞ < yj < lnaj = a˜j
0 ≤ τ ≤ T
The change
�
λj = a˜j − yj ≥ 0, j = 1, 2
τ = τ
in (17) yields:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
v˜τ = ∑2i,j=1 aijv˜λiλj + f˜1(τ,λ)
v˜|τ=0 = v˜0(λ) = v0(a˜1 − λ1, a˜2 − λ2)e−∑2i=1 αi(a˜i−λi)
v˜|λ1=0 = g˜1(τ, a˜2 − λ2)
v˜|λ2=0 = g˜2(τ, a˜1 − λ1),
(18)
Ω = {0 ≤ τ ≤ T, λj ≥ 0, j = 1, 2}, Ω is a wedge with opening π2 .
Now we use the linear transformation described in Remark 1, that maps the first quadrant
λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0 onto the angle between the rays l1 and l2 in the plane 0z1z2 and we obtain:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
wτ = wz1z1 + wz2z2 + f (τ, z)
w|τ=0 = w0(z)
w|z1=0 = g˜1(τ, z1), (τ, z) ∈ Ω˜
w|l2 = g˜2(τ, z1, z2)|(z1,z2) ∈ l2,
(19)
l1 :
�
z1 = 0
z2 =
λ2√
b
, l2 :
�
z1 =
λ1√
a11
z2 =
−a12√
ba11
λ1
, Ω˜ is a wedge with opening ϕ0, i.e. Ω˜ = [0, T] × Γ, Γ
being the interior of the angle between l1, l2.
In fact, λ = Bz ⇐⇒ z = B−1λ and B−1A(B−1)∗ = I2 implies that ∑2i,j=1 aij ∂
2
∂λi∂λj
is
transformed in ∂
2
∂z21
+ ∂
2
∂z22
. According to Remark 1: (D−1)∗AD−1 = I2. Taking B−1 = (D−1)∗,
i.e. B = D∗ we obtain that {λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0} is mapped onto the angle ϕ0 between the rays
l1, l2. Of course, there are three possibilities: ϕ0 = π2 , 0 < ϕ0 <
π
2 ,
π
2 < ϕ0 < π.
From now on we shall make polar coordinates change in (19):
�
z1 = rcosϕ
z2 = rsinϕ
and to fix the
ideas let 0 < ϕ0 < π2 ,
�
r ≥ 0
π
2 − ϕ0 ≤ ϕ ≤ π2
, ϕ0 is the angle between l2 and l1.
The new change Φ = ϕ− (π2 − ϕ0) ⇒ 0 ≤ Φ ≤ ϕ0 and ∂∂Φ = ∂∂ϕ . To simplify the notation
we shall write again (r, ϕ) instead of (r,Φ), 0 ≤ Φ ≤ ϕ0. Thus we have a wedge type
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initial-boundary value problem for (19) with unknown function w(τ, r, ϕ):⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
wτ = ∂
2w
∂r2 +
1
r
∂w
∂r +
1
r2
∂2w
∂ϕ2
+ f (τ, r, ϕ)
w|τ=0 = w0(r, ϕ)
w|ϕ=0 = ˜˜g1(τ, r)
w|ϕ=ϕ0 = ˜˜g2(τ, r)
(20)
r ≥ 0, 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ ϕ0, l1 : {ϕ = 0, r ≥ 0}, l2 : {ϕ = ϕ0, r ≥ 0}, r ↔ ξ, ϕ ↔ η, 0 ≤ Θ ≤ τ,
0 ≤ ξ ≤ ∞, 0 ≤ η ≤ ϕ0, 0 < ϕ0 < π. Then
w(τ, r, ϕ) =
� τ
0
� ϕ0
0
� ∞
0
f (Θ, ξ, η)G(r, ϕ, ξ, η, τ−Θ)ξdξdηdΘ+ (21)
+
� τ
0
� ∞
0
˜˜g1(Θ, ξ)
1
ξ
[
∂
∂η
G(r, ϕ, ξ, η, τ−Θ)]η=0dξdΘ−
−
� τ
0
� ∞
0
˜˜g2(Θ, ξ)
1
ξ
[
∂
∂η
G(r, ϕ, ξ, η, τ−Θ)]η=ϕ0dξdΘ+
+
� ϕ0
0
� ∞
0
w0(ξ, η)G(r, ϕ, ξ, η, τ)ξdξdη,
where G(r, ϕ, ξ, η, τ) = 1ϕ0τ e
− (r2+ξ2)4τ ∑∞n=1 I nπϕ0 (
rξ
2τ )sin
nπ
ϕ0
ϕsin nπϕ0 η and the modified Bessel
function w = Iν(z) satisfies the equation:
z2
d2w
dz2
+ z
dw
dz
− (z2 + ν2)w = 0, ν ≥ 0, (22)
Iν(z) = ∑∞m=0
( z2 )
2m+ν
m!Γ(m+ν+1) (see [2]).
Remark 2. One can see that limτ→+0
� ϕ0
0
� ∞
0 w0(ξ, η)G(r, ϕ, ξ, η, τ)ξdξdη = w0(r, ϕ), i.e.
formally limτ→+0ξG(r, ϕ, ξ, η, τ) = δ(r − ξ, ϕ − η) in the sense of Schwartz distributions
D
�
(R1+ × [0, ϕ0]), R+ = {ξ ≥ 0}. G is the corresponding Green function.
Formula (21) is given in [21], pages 182 and 166 or in [6], pp.498. The proof of (21) is based on
the properties of the Bessel functions and Hankel transform.
Remark 3. In the special case when a12 = 0 in (16) we obtain (18) and after the change τ = τ,
λj =
√ajjzj, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2 (18) takes the form:������������
∂ ˜˜v
∂τ =
∂2 ˜˜v
∂z21
+ ∂
2 ˜˜v
∂z22
+ ˜˜f1(τ, z)
˜˜v|τ=0 = ˜˜v0(z)
˜˜v|z1=0 = ˜˜g1(τ, z2)
˜˜v|z2=0 = ˜˜g2(τ, z1)
(23)
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0 ≤ τ ≤ T, zj ≥ 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2. Certainly, ϕ0 = π2 .
According to [21]:
˜˜v(τ, z) =
∫ τ
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
˜˜f1(Θ, ξ, η)G(τ−Θ, z1, z2, ξ, η))dξdηdΘ+ (24)
+
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
˜˜v0(ξ, η)G(τ, z1, z2, ξ, η)dξdη+
+
∫ τ
0
∫ ∞
0
˜˜g1(Θ, η)[
∂
∂ξ
G(τ−Θ, z1, z2, ξ, η)]ξ=0dηdΘ+
+
∫ τ
0
∫ ∞
0
˜˜g2(Θ, ξ)[
∂
∂η
G(τ−Θ, z1, z2, ξ, η)]η=0dξdΘ,
where the Green function G(τ, z1, z2, ξ, η) = 14πτ [e
− (z1−ξ)24τ − e− (z1+ξ)
2
4τ ]× [e− (z2−η)
2
4τ − e− (z2+η)
2
4τ ].
3. Applications to financial options and numerical results via CNN
Here the analysis of Section 2 is applied to some problems arising in option pricing theory.
Some known pricing formulas are revisited in a more general setting and some new results
are offered. We apply Cellular Neural Networks (CNN) approach [24] in order to obtain some
numerical results. Let us consider a two-dimensional grid with 3× 3 neighborhood system as
it is shown on Figure 1.
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Figure 1. 3× 3 neighborhood CNN.
[htb] One of the key features of a CNN is that the individual cells are nonlinear dynamical
systems, but that the coupling between them is linear. Roughly speaking, one could say
that these arrays are nonlinear but have a linear spatial structure, which makes the use of
techniques for their investigation common in engineering or physics attractive.
We will give the general definition of a CNNwhich follows the original one:
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Definition 1. The CNN is a
a). 2-, 3-, or n- dimensional array of
b). mainly identical dynamical systems, called cells, which satisfies two properties:
c). most interactions are local within a finite radius r, and
d). all state variables are continuous valued signals.
Definition 2. An M×M cellular neural network is defined mathematically by four specifications:
1). CNN cell dynamics;
2). CNN synaptic law which represents the interactions (spatial coupling) within the neighbor cells;
3). Boundary conditions;
4). Initial conditions.
Now in terms of definition 2 we can present the dynamical systems describing CNNs. For
a general CNN whose cells are made of time-invariant circuit elements, each cell C(ij) is
characterized by its CNN cell dynamics :
x˙ij = −g(xij, uij, Isij), (25)
where xij ∈ Rm, uij is usually a scalar. In most cases, the interactions (spatial coupling) with
the neighbor cell C(i+ k, j+ l) are specified by a CNN synaptic law:
Isij = Aij,klxi+k,j+l + (26)
+ A˜ij,kl ∗ fkl(xij, xi+k,j+l) +
+ B˜ij,kl ∗ ui+k,j+l(t).
The first term Aij,klxi+k,j+l of (26) is simply a linear feedback of the states of the neighborhood
nodes. The second term provides an arbitrary nonlinear coupling, and the third term accounts
for the contributions from the external inputs of each neighbor cell that is located in the Nr
neighborhood.
It is known [24] that some autonomous CNNs represent an excellent approximation to
nonlinear partial differential equations (PDEs). The intrinsic space distributed topology
makes the CNN able to produce real-time solutions of nonlinear PDEs. There are several
ways to approximate the Laplacian operator in discrete space by a CNN synaptic law with an
appropriate A-template:
- one-dimensional discretized Laplacian template:
A1 = (1,−2, 1),
- two-dimensional discretized Laplacian template:
A2 =
⎛⎝ 0 1 01 −4 1
0 1 0
⎞⎠ .
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Example 1 (Single-asset inside barrier options) The case of single-barrier zero-rebate
down-and-out options was already priced in [18], while the case with rebate is found in [22]. A
simple method for obtaining analytical formulas for barrier options is the reflection principle
that has a long history in Physics and is commonly used in Finance. Here we write down
the pricing formula for a general payoff and rebate and study its analytical properties. Let us
consider the following boundary value problem:⎧⎨⎩
Lu = 0 in Ω = {(t,S); 0 < t < T, 0 < S < S∗}
u|t=T = u0(S), 0 ≤ S ≤ S∗
u|S=S∗ = g(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T
where L = ∂t + rS∂S + 12σ
2S2∂2S − r , u0 and g are continuous and u0(S∗) = g(T). Using the
notation of Section 2 and taking α = 12 − rσ2 , β = −r
�
1
2 +
r
σ2
�
, C =
√
2
σ we straightforwardly
obtain the following pricing formula (after changing to variables σ√
2
λ = ln S∗ − ξ):
u(t,S) =
�
S
S∗
�α eβ(T−t)√
2πσ
[
1�
(T − t)
� +∞
0
u0(S
∗e−ξ)eαξ× (27)
×[exp(− [ln(S/S
∗) + ξ]2
2σ2(T − t) )− exp(−
[ln(S/S∗)− ξ]2
2σ2(T − t) )]dξ+
+ ln
S∗
S
� T−t
0
g(T − s)
(T − t− s)3/2 e
− βσ2s2 exp(− ln
2(S/S∗)
2σ2(T− t− s) )ds]
Let us study the properties of u(t,S) analytically. Without loss of generality we can assume
S∗ = 1 and therefore e−β(T−t)u(t,S) = �u(t, S) is written in the form I1 + I2 + I3 with:
I1(τ, y) =
−yeαy
2
√
π
� τ
0
g(T− 2γ
σ2
)
(τ−γ)3/2 e
−βγ exp(− y24(τ−γ) )dγ
I2(τ, y) = e
αy
2
√
πτ
� +∞
0 u0(e
−ξ)eαξ exp(− [y+ξ ]24τ )dξ
I3(τ, y) = − eαy2√πτ
� +∞
0 u0(e
−ξ)eαξ exp(− [y−ξ ]24τ )dξ
where y = ln S and τ = σ
2
2 (T − t). We shall examine the asymptotics of �v(τ, y) = �u(t, S) for
0 < τ < σ
2
2 T (i.e. 0 < t < T) fixed and for y −→ −∞ (i.e. S → 0+). Put h(ξ) = u0(e−ξ), ξ ≥ 0.
Then:
I2(τ, y) = e
τα2
2
√
πτ
� +∞
0 h(ξ) exp(− [y+ξ−2ατ]
2
4τ )dξ =
eτα
2
√
π
� +∞
y−2ατ
2
√
τ
h(−y+ 2aτ + 2η√τ)e−η2dη.
According to Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem, since limy−→−∞h(−y + 2aτ +
2η
√
τ) = u0(0) for each fixed η and τ, one has limy−→−∞ I2(τ, y) = eτα
2
u0(0). On the other
hand:
|I3(τ, y)| ≤ const2√πτ
� +∞
0 e
α(y+ξ)(− (ξ−y)24τ )dξ =
=const.eτα
2 � +∞
−y+2ατ
2
√
τ
exp[−μ2 + 2αy− 4τα2 + 2αμ√τ]dμ =
=const.e2αy−2τα2
� +∞
−y
2
√
τ
e−ε2dε.
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Thus, for fixed τ, 0 < τ < σ
2
2 T, and y << −1, we have
|I3(τ, y)| ≤const.e2αy−2τα2
√
τ
−y e
− y24τ , which implies that limy−→−∞ I3(τ, y) = 0. Finally, we
observe that:
|I1(τ, y)| ≤ max|g|2√π |y| eαy
� τ
0
e−βτ
(τ−γ)3/2 exp(−
y2
4(τ−γ) )dγ as β ≤ 0 implies 0 ≤ −βγ ≤ −βτ. The
change θ = −y2√τ−γ yields
|I1(τ, y)| ≤const.eαy
� +∞
−y
2
√
τ
e−θ2dθ, that is
|I1(τ, y)| ≤const.eαy 2
√
τ√
π|y| e
− y24τ for y −→ −∞, τ fixed. Therefore we get:
limS−→0+u(t,S) = u0(0)e−r(T−t), 0 < t < T.
Remark 4. Assume that u ∈ C2(Ω). Then, putting S = 0, U(t) = u(t, 0), we get U�(t) = rU,
U(T) = u0(0). Evidently, U(t) = u0(0)e−r(T−t) is the only solution of that Cauchy problem.
So u |Σ0 , with Σ0 =
�
0 < t < T, S = 0+
�
, is uniquely determined by u0(0).
For this example our CNN model is the following:
dSij
dt
+ rSijA1 ∗ Sij + 12σ
2S2ijA2 ∗ Sij − r = 0, (28)
where ∗ is the convolution operator [24], M ≤ i, j ≤ M. We shall consider this model with
free-boundary conditions:
uij(x, t) = x− k,
∂uij(x, t)
dt
= +1,
uij(x, t) = k− x,
∂uij(x, t)
dt
= −1.
These are classical first-order contact free-boundary conditions for obstacle problems.
Based on the above CNN model (28) we obtain the following simulations for different values
of the parameters:
Example 2. (Multi-asset optionwith single barrier)Analytic valuation formulas for standard
European options with single external barrier have been provided in Heynen-Kat (1994),
Kwok-Wu-Yu (1998) and Buchen (2001). Here we give a slightly more general formula in that
we allow for any payoff and for both an internal and an external barrier. We confine ourselves
to the case of an upstream barrier and zero rebate for simplicity of exposition. Consider the
following boundary value problem in Ω = {(t, S1, S2); 0 < t < T, 0 < S1, 0 < S2 < S∗}:⎧⎨⎩
Lu = 0
u|t=T = u0(S1, S2) 0 ≤ S2 ≤ S∗
u|S2=S∗ = 0 0 ≤ t ≤ T
where L = ∂t + ∑2i=1
σ2i S
2
i
2 ∂
2
Si
+ ρσ1σ2S1S2∂2S1S2 + r∑
2
i=1 Si∂Si − r , u0 is continuous and
u0(S1, S∗) = 0. Assume that σ1, σ2 > 0, ρ2 < 1. Using the notation of Section 2 and
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(a) (b)
Figure 2. CNN simulations for Example 1. (a) r = 1, 1 ≤ t ≤ 30, σ = 1; (b) r = 0.5, 1 ≤ t ≤ 30, σ = 1.5 .
taking μi = r − σ
2
i
2 for i, j = 1, 2, we have αi =
−μi+ρμjσi/σj
σ2i (1−ρ2)
for i, j = 1, 2 and i �= j,
β = ∑i,j=1,2
σiσj
2 αiαj +∑i=1,2 μiαi − r. Then we have the following pricing formula:
u(t, S1, S2) = S
α1
1 S
α2
2
eβτ
4πτ
∫
R2 w0(λ1, λ2) exp[−
∣∣∣∣ √2 ln S1σ1√1−ρ2−ρ
√
2 ln S2
σ2
√
1−ρ2
−λ1
∣∣∣∣2
4τ ]{
exp[− (
√
2 ln S2/σ2−λ2)2
4τ ]− exp[− (
√
2 ln S2/σ2+λ2)2
4τ ]
}
dλ1dλ2
where
w0(λ1, λ2) = exp[− α1σ1√2 (λ1
√
1− ρ2 + ρλ2) − α2σ2√2 λ2]u0(
σ1√
2
(λ1
√
1− ρ2 + ρλ2), σ2λ2√2 )1λ2 <√
2 ln S∗
σ2
.
Splitting the integral into two integrals and changing to variables η1 =
λ1
√
1−ρ2+ρλ2−
√
2 ln S1
σ1
√
2τ
,
η2 =
λ2−
√
2 ln S2
σ2
√
2τ
(η2 =
λ2+
√
2 ln S2
σ2
√
2τ
) in the first (second) integral, one gets:
u(t, S1, S2) = I1 − I2
where
I1 =
eβτ
2π
√
1−ρ2
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ ln(S∗/S2)
σ2
√
τ
−∞ exp[−(α1σ1η1 + α2σ2η2)
√
τ]u0(S1eσ1
√
τη1 , S2eσ2
√
τη2 )
exp[− (η1−ρη2)22(1−ρ2) −
η22
2 ]dη1dη2
I2 =
S2eβτ
2π
√
1−ρ2
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ ln(S∗/S2)
σ2
√
τ
−∞ exp[−(α1σ1η1 + α2σ2η2)
√
τ]u0(S1eσ1
√
τη1 , S−12 e
σ2
√
τη2 )
exp[− (−η1+ρη2−2ρ ln S2/(σ2
√
τ))2
2(1−ρ2) −
η22
2 ]dη1dη2.
Note that (β+ r)(1− ρ2) + μ212σ21 +
μ22
2σ22
− ρ μ1μ2σ1σ2 = 0. Then the first integral (after changing to
variables X1 = −η1 + μ1σ1
√
τ, X2 = η2 − μ2σ2
√
τ) is written in the form:
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I1 = e
−rτ
2π
√
1−ρ2
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ − ln(S2/S∗)+μ2τ
σ2
√
τ
−∞ exp[− 12(1−ρ2) (X21 + X22 + 2ρX1X2)]u0(S1eμ1τ−σ1
√
τX1 ,
S2eμ2τ+σ2
√
τX2 )dX1dX2.
Changing to the variables X1 = −η1 + μ1σ1
√
τ − 2ρ ln S2
σ2
√
τ
, X2 = η2 − μ2σ2
√
τ, the second integral
becomes:
I2 = e
−rτ
2π
√
1−ρ2 (S2)
− 2μ2
σ22
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ ln(S2S∗)−μ2τ
σ2
√
τ
−∞ exp[− 12(1−ρ2) (X21 + X22 + 2ρX1X2)]
u0(S1S
−2ρ σ1σ2
2 e
μ1τ−σ1
√
τX1 , S−12 e
μ2τ+σ2
√
τX2 )dX1dX2.
In the special case of standard options one has: u0(S1, S2) = max(ω(S1 − K), 0), ω = ±1.
Then I1 can be written in the form:
ωS1N2(ωd+, e+;−ρω)−ωKe−rτN2(ωd−, e−;−ρω)
where N2 is the bivariate cumulative normal distribution function, d± =
ln( S1K )+(r±
σ21
2 )τ
σ1
√
τ
, e− =
− ln(
S2
S∗ )+μ2τ
σ2
√
τ
, e+ = e− − ρσ1
√
τ. Similarly I2 is written in the form:
ωe
−2 μ2
σ22
ln( S2S∗ )
[e−2ρ
σ1
σ2
ln( S2S∗ )S1N2(ωd̂+, ê+;−ρω)− Ke−rτN2(ωd̂−, ê−;−ρω)
where d̂± = d± − 2ρ
σ2
√
τ
ln( S2S∗ ), ê
± = e± + 2
σ2
√
τ
ln( S2S∗ ).
Simulating CNN for multi-asset option with single barrier model, we obtain the following
figure with different values of the parameter set:
(a) (b)
Figure 3. CNN simulations for Example 2. (a) r = 1, T = 60 days, σ = 1, ρ = 0.05; (b) r = 0.5, T = 120
days, σ = 1.5, ρ = 0.06 .
Example 3. (Two-asset barrier optionswith simultaneous barriers)While single-asset barrier
options have received substantial coverage in the literature, multi-asset options with several
barriers have been discussed only in some special cases (e.g. sequential barriers, radial
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options, etc.). Here we show how the case of two simultaneous barriers can be valued
straightforwardly from the arguments in Section 2. Let us confine ourselves to zero-rebate
options for simplicity’s sake, although Section 2 deals with the general case too. Then the
boundary value problem takes the form:⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
Lu = 0 in Ω
u|t=T = u0(S1, S2)
u|S1=S∗1 = 0 and, u|S2=S∗2 = 0 0 ≤ t ≤ T
where L = ∂t + ∑2i=1
σ2i S
2
i
2 ∂
2
Si
+ ρσ1σ2S1S2∂2S1S2 + r∑
2
i=1 Si∂Si − r, Ω = {(t, S1, S2); 0 < t <
T, 0 < S1 < S∗1, 0 < S2 < S∗2}. Arguing as in the last part of Section 2 and taking
D =
�
σ1 ρσ2
0
�
1− ρ2σ2
�
, ρ2 < 1, σ1 > 0, σ2 > 0
and ϕ0 as the opening of the angle between
�
x ≤ 0
y = 0
and
�
x = ρσ2η, η ≥ 0
y =
�
1− ρ2σ2η , from (21) we
have
w(τ, r, ϕ) =
� ϕ0
0
� ∞
0
w0(ξ, η)G(r, ϕ, ξ, η, τ)ξdξdη, (29)
where G(r, ϕ, ξ, η, τ) = 1ϕ0τ e
− (r2+ξ2)4τ ∑∞n=1 I nπϕ0 (
rξ
2τ )sin
nπ
ϕ0
ϕsin nπϕ0 η and Iv is the modified Bessel
function satisfying (22). Here w0(r, ϕ) = �v0(D∗z) |z1=r cos ϕ,z2=r sin ϕ where �v0(λ) =
u0(S∗1e
−λ1 , S∗2e−λ2)e−Σαi(lnS
∗
i −λi). Changing back the variables one obtains u(t, S1, S2).
Simulating CNN for two-asset barrier options with simultaneous barriers model, we obtain
the following figure with different values of the parameter set:
(a) (b)
Figure 4. CNN simulations for Example 3. (a) r = 1, T = 120 days, σ = 1, ρ = 0.05; (b) r = 0.5, T = 180
days, σ = 1.5, ρ = 0.06 .
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4. Comparison principle for multi-asset Black-Scholes equations
For the sake of simplicity consider
ut +
2
∑
i,j=1
aijxixjuxixj +
2
∑
i=1
bixiuxi + cu = f , (30)
where (aij)∗ = (aij), (aij) > 0, aij, bi, c are real constants and c < 0 in the domain
D :
{
0 < t < T
0 < xj < aj,
j = 1, 2
}
, aj = const > 0. The boundary of the parallelepiped D is split
into two parts: Parabolic Γ = {x1 = a1, 0 < x2 < a2, 0 < t < T} ∪ {x2 = a2, 0 < x1 < a1, 0 <
t < T} ∪ {t = T, 0 < xj < aj, j = 1, 2} and free of boundary data part Γ1 = I ∪ I I ∪ I I I,
where I = {0 < xj < aj, j = 1, 2; t = 0}, I I = {x1 = 0, 0 < x2 < a2, 0 < t < T},
I I I = {x2 = 0, 0 < x1 < a1, 0 < t < T}. The Dirichlet data are prescribed on Γ:
u|Γ = g (31)
Theorem 1. (Comparison principle)
Assume that u is a classical solution of (30), (31), i.e. u ∈ C2(D ∪ Γ¯1) ∩ C0(D¯). Let v be another
solution of (30), (31) belonging to C2(D ∪ Γ¯1) ∩ C0(D¯). Suppose that u|Γ ≤ v|Γ. Then u ≤ v
everywhere in D¯.
Proof. Put w = u− v. Assume that max w = w(t0, x0) = M > 0, P0 = (t0, x0) ∈ D¯. Evidently,
(t0, x0) ∈ D ∪ Γ1 as w|Γ ≤ 0.
Case a). (t0, x0) ∈ D. Having in mind that ∑ aijxixjwxixj is a strictly elliptic operator in
the open rectangle {0 < xj < aj, j = 1, 2} we shall apply the interior parabolic maximum
principle ( see A.Friedman, Partial Differential equations of parabolic type, Prentice Hall, Inc.
(1964), Chapter II). To do this we shall work in the domain D1 :
{
0 < t < T
0 < ε j < xj < aj, j = 1, 2
}
,
such that x0 ∈ Π = (ε1, a1) × (ε2, a2), 0 < t0 < T. Then Th1 from Chapter II of the above
mentioned book gives: w ≡ M > 0 for T ≥ t ≥ t0, x ∈ Π¯ and this is a contradiction with
w ≤ 0 on t = T.
Case b). (t0, x0) ∈ I ⇒ t0 = 0, (1)
{
0 < x10 < a1
0 < x20 < a2
, (2)
{
0 < x10 < a1
x20 = 0
, (3)
{
x10 = 0
x20 = 0
and
a similar case with respect to x20 ∈ [0, a2), x10 = 0. Thus,
b). (1) x0 is interior point of (0, a1) × (0, a2) and therefore ∂w∂xj (P0) = 0, j = 1, 2, while
∑2i,j aijxi0xj0
∂2w
∂xi∂xj
(P0) ≤ 0 as it is shown in Friedman book. Obviously, wt(P0) ≤ 0, as
w(0, x0) = M = maxD¯w. As we know, (30) is satisfied on I⇒ ∑21 aijxi0xj0 ∂
2w
∂xi∂xj
(P0)+ cw(P0)+
wt(P0) = 0 -contradiction with c < 0, w(P0) > 0.
b). (2) Again wt(P0) ≤ 0 and wx1(P0) = 0, wx1x1 (P0) ≤ 0 as P0 is interior point for the interval
(0, a1). According to (30) : a11x210
∂2w
∂x21
(P0) + b1
∂w
∂x1
(P0) + cw(P0) +wt(P0) = 0→ contradiction.
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b). (3) Then (30) takes the form: cw(P0) + wt(P0) = 0 - contradiction.
Case c). (t0, x0) ∈ I I ⇒ 0 ≤ t0 < T, x10 = 0; (1)
{
0 < t0 < T
0 < x20 < a2
, (2)
{
t0 = 0
0 < x02 < a2
,
(3)
{
t0 = 0
x02 = 0
, (4)
{
T > t0 > 0
x02 = 0
.
Certainly, wt(P0) ≤ 0 in each case (1) -(4).
c). (1) As P0 is interior point in the rectangle {0 < t < T} × {0 < x2 < a2} ⇒ wt(P0) = 0,
wx2(P0) = 0, wx2x2 (P0) ≤ 0. According to (30) a2x220wx2x2(P0) + b2x20wx2(P0) + cw(P0) +
wt(P0) = 0 - contradiction.
c). (2) As x02 ∈ (0, a2)⇒ wx2(P0) = 0, wx2x2(P0) ≤ 0. The contradiction is obvious.
c). (3) The equation (30) takes the form:
cw(P0) + wt(P0) = 0 (32)
and again a contradiction.
c). (4). Then wt(P0) = 0 and according to (30) cw(P0) + wt(P0) = 0 - contradiction.
We conclude that M = supD¯w ≤ 0⇒ u− v ≤ 0 in D¯ ⇒ u ≤ v in D¯.
The comparison principle is proved.
Remark 5. The operator
Lu = ut +
n
∑
i,j=1
aijxixjuxixj +
n
∑
i=1
bixiuxi + cu
is non-hypoelliptic. The constants aij, bi, c are arbitrary. To verify this we recall that the
function sa+ =
{
sa, s > 0
0, s ≤ 0 considered as a Schwartz distribution in D
�
(R1) satisfies for Re a >
1 the following identities:
ssa+ = s
a+1
+ ,
d
ds
sa+ = as
a−1
+ ,
d2
ds2
sa+ = a(a− 1)sa−2+ .
Consider now the distribution u = eλtu1(x1)
⊗
. . .
⊗
un(xn), where λ = const, uj(xj) = x
dj
j ∈
D
�
(R1xj ), Redj > 1. Then u ∈ D
�
(Rn+1) satisfies in distribution sense Lu = 0 if
λ+
n
∑
i �=j
aijdidj +
n
∑
i=j
aiidi(di − 1) +
n
∑
i=1
bidi + c = 0
Of course, sing supp u = ∂{x ∈ Rn : xj ≥ 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ n}, i.e. sing supp u is the boundary of
the first octant of Rnx multiplied by R
1
t . The nonhypoellipticity is proved. Evidently, under (4)
L is hypoelliptic in the open domain {xj > 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ n} as it is strictly parabolic there.
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5. The approach of Fichera-Oleinik-Radkevicˇ
In this section we revise the results of [9] and [20] for the Dirichlet problem for PDEs of second
order having non-negative characteristic form; then the method is applied to some PDEs of
Black-Scholes type.
To begin with consider the following equation in a bounded domain Ω ⊂ Rm with piecewise
smooth boundary Σ:
L(u) = ∑
k,j=1,...,m
akj(x)uxkxj + ∑
k=1,...,m
bk(x)uxk + c(x)u = f (x) (33)
where ∑k,j=1,...,m akj(x)ξkξ j ≥ 0 , ∀x ∈ Ω, ∀ξ ∈ Rm; akj(x) = ajk(x), ∀x ∈ Ω. Moreover,
akj ∈ C2(Ω), bk ∈ C1(Ω), c ∈ C0(Ω). Denote the unit inner normal to Σ by −→n = (n1, ...,nm)
and let Σ3 =
{
x ∈ Σ;∑k,j=1,...,m akj(x)nknj > 0
}
be the non-characteristic part of Σ. Define
Σ0 =
{
x ∈ Σ;∑k,j=1,...,m akj(x)nknj = 0
}
, i.e. Σ = Σ0 ∪ Σ3 and Σ0 is the characteristic part of
Σ. Following Fichera (1956) we introduce on Σ0 the Fichera function:
β(x) = ∑
k=1,...,m
(bk(x)− ∑
j=1,...,m
akjxj (x))nk, x ∈ Σ0 (34)
Then we split Σ0 into three parts, namely
Σ1 =
{
x ∈ Σ0; β(x) > 0},
Σ2 =
{
x ∈ Σ0; β(x) < 0},
Σ0 =
{
x ∈ Σ0; β(x) = 0}.
As it is proved in Oleinik and Radkevicˇ (1971) the sets Σ0, Σ1, Σ2, Σ3 are invariant under
smooth non-degenerate changes of the variables. More precisely, let L(u) = f in Ω; after the
change y = F(x) it takes the form L˜(u˜) = f˜ in Ω˜. Denote the Fichera function for L˜(u˜) = f˜ by
β˜. Then β˜ = β.A where A > 0 and A is continuous.
Assume now that u ∈ C2(Ω) and v ∈ C∞0 (Ω). Then∫
Ω L(u)vdx =
∫
Ω uL
∗(v)dx,
where
L∗(v) = ∑
k,j=1,...,m
akj(x)vxkxj + ∑
k=1,...,m
b∗k(x)vxk + c∗(x)v (35)
and b∗k = 2∑j=1,...,m a
kj
xj − bk, c∗ = ∑k=1,...,m(∑j=1,...,m akjxkxj − bkxk) + c. One can easily see that
if we denote the Fichera function for L∗(v) by β∗, then β∗ = −β and β is defined by (34).
Assume now that u ∈ C2(Ω), u = 0 at Σ2 ∪ Σ3, and define the following set of test functions:
V = {v ∈ C2(Ω); v = 0 at Σ1 ∪ Σ3}. In view of the Green formula for L we get:∫
Ω
(L(u)v− L∗(v)u)dx = 0⇔
∫
Ω
L(u)vdx =
∫
Ω
uL∗(v)dx (36)
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for any u and v ∈ V . Let us now recall the definitions of generalized solution.
Definition 3. The function u ∈ Lp(Ω), p ≥ 1, is called a generalized solution of the boundary value
problem {
L(u) = f in Ω
u = 0 at Σ2 ∪ Σ3 (37)
if for each test function v ∈ V the following integral identity holds:∫
Ω
f vdx =
∫
Ω
uL∗(v)dx. (38)
Theorem 2. (See [20],Th.1.3.1).
Suppose that c < 0, c∗ < 0 in Ω and p > 1. Then for each f ∈ Lp(Ω) there exists a generalized
solution u ∈ Lp(Ω) of (37) in the sense of (38) and such that
inf
u0∈Z
�u+ u0�Lp(Ω) ≤ K � f �Lp(Ω) (39)
K = const > 0. The set Z =
{
u0 ∈ Lp(Ω) :
∫
Ω u0L
∗(v)dx = 0, ∀v ∈ V} .
Theorem 3. (See [20], Th. 1.3.2).
Let c < 0 in Ω, 1p +
1
q = 1 and −c+ (1− q)c∗ > 0 in Ω. Then for each f ∈ Lp(Ω) there exists a
generalized solution u of (37) satisfying the a-priori estimate (39).
Theorem 4. (See [20], Th. 1.3.3).
Let c∗ < 0 in Ω and −c+ (1− q)c∗ > 0 in Ω, 1p + 1q = 1. Then for each f ∈ Lp(Ω) there exists a
generalized solution u of (37) satisfying the estimate (39).
Conclusion. Assume that c < 0. Then (37) is solvable in the sense of Definition 1 for p >> 1
as p → +∞⇒ q → 1. On the other hand, c∗ < 0 implies the solvability of (40) for p ≥ 1, p ≈ 1
as p → 1⇒ q→ +∞.
We shall now discuss the problem for existence of a generalized solution of (37) in the Sobolev
space H1(Ω) with an appropriate weight. Define the following set of test functions:
W = {v ∈ C1(Ω); v |Σ3= 0}
and equipW with the scalar product: (u, v)H =
∫
Ω(∑k,j a
kjuxj vxk + uv)dx+∫
Σ1∪Σ3 uv |β| dσ. The completion of W with respect to the norm �u�H is a real Hilbert space
denoted by H. For each two functions u, v ∈ W we consider the bilinear form B(u, v) =
− ∫Ω[∑k,j akjuxj vxk + ∑k(u�kvxk + (�kxk − c)uv)]dx − ∫Σ1 uvβdσ, where lk = bk − ∑j akjxj .
According to the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality |B(u, v)| ≤ const[�v�H1(Ω) + �v�L2(Σ1)] �u�H .
Therefore, B(u, v) is well defined for v ∈ W and u ∈ H.
Definition 4. Let f ∈ L2(Ω). We shall say that the function u ∈ H is a generalized solution of (37)
if for each v ∈ W the following identity is satisfied:
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∫
Ω
v f dx = B(u, v). (40)
Theorem 5. (See [20], Th. 1.4.1).
Assume that f ∈ L2(Ω) and 12 ∑k(bkxk − ∑j a
kj
xkxj ) − c ≥ c0 > 0 in Ω. Then the boundary value
problem (37) possesses a generalized solution u ∈ H (i.e. a weak solution) in the sense of (40).
Finally we propose the existence of a generalized solution of (37) in the space L∞(Ω). To fix
the ideas we assume that the coefficients of L and L∗ belong to C1(Ω) and Σ is thrice piecewise
smooth (i.e. Σ can be split into several parts and each of them is C3 smooth). Consider the
boundary value problem: {
L(u) = f in Ω
u = g on Σ2 ∪ Σ3 (41)
If u ∈ C2(Ω) is a classical solution of (41) and v ∈ V then according to the Green formula∫
Ω
L∗(v)udx =
∫
Ω
f vdx−
∫
Σ3
g
∂v
∂−→ν dσ+
∫
Σ2
βgvdσ, (42)
where −→ν = (ν1, . . . , νm), νk = ∑j akjnj, ∂∂−→ν = ∑k νk ∂∂xk .
Definition 5. We shall say that the function u ∈ L∞(Ω) is a generalized solution of (41) if for each
test function v ∈ V the identity (42) is fulfilled.
We point out that f ∈ L∞(Ω) and g ∈ L∞(Σ2 ∪ Σ3).
Theorem 6. (See [20], Th. 1.5.1).
Assume that the coefficient c(x) of L is such that c(x) ≤ −c0 < 0 in Ω, f ∈ L∞(Ω), g ∈ L∞(Σ2 ∪
Σ3) and β(x) ≤ 0 in the interior points of Σ2 ∪ Σ0. Then there exists a generalized solution of (41) in
the sense of Definition 5. Moreover, |u(x)| ≤ max(sup | f |c0 , sup |g|).
Remark 6. In Th.6 it is assumed that ∑k,j=1,...,m akj(x)ξkξ j ≥ 0 in an m−dimensional
neighbourhood of Σ0, ∀ξ ∈ Rm.
Theorem 7. (See [20], Th. 1.5.2).
Suppose that g is continuous in the interior points of Σ2 ∪ Σ3. Then the generalized solution u of (41)
constructed in Th. 6 is continuous at those points and, moreover, u = g there.
As we shall deal with (degenerate) parabolic PDEs we shall have to work in cylindrical
domains (rectangles in R2). Therefore Σ = ∂Ω will be piecewise smooth. Consider now the
bounded domain Ω having piecewise C3 smooth boundary Σ. The corresponding boundary
value problem is: {
L(u) = f in Ω,
u = 0 on Σ2 ∪ Σ3 (43)
We shall say that the point P ∈ Σ is regular if locally near to P the surface Σ can be written
in the form xk = ϕk(x1, ..., xk−1, xk+1, ..., xm), (x1, . . . , xk−1, xk+1, . . . , xm) describing some
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neighborhood of the projection of P onto the plane xk = 0. The set of the boundary points
which do not possess such a representation will be denoted by B.
Definition 6. The function u ∈ L∞(Ω) is called a generalized solution of (43) for f ∈ L∞(Ω) if for
each function v ∈ C2(Ω), v = 0 at Σ1 ∪ Σ3 ∪ B the following identity holds:∫
Ω uL
∗(v)dx =
∫
Ω f vdx.
Theorem 8. (See [20], Th. 1.5.5).
Suppose that the boundary Σ of the bounded domain Ω is C3 piecewise smooth, f ∈ L∞(Ω), g = 0,
c(x) ≤ −c0 < 0 in Ω and β ≤ 0 in the interior points of Σ0 ∪ Σ2. Then there exists a generalized
solution u of (43) in the sense of Definition 6 and such that |u| ≤ sup | f |c0 .
We shall not discuss here in details the problems of uniqueness and regularity of the
generalized solutions. Unicity results are given by Theorems 1.6.1.-1.6.2. in [20]. For
domains with C3 smooth boundary under several restrictions on the coefficients, including
c(x) ≤ −c0 < 0, c∗ < 0 in Ω, β ≤ 0 in the interior points of Σ0 ∪ Σ2, β∗ = −β < 0 at Σ1, the
maximum principle is valid for each generalized solution u in the sense of Definition 5:
|u| ≤ max
{
supΩ
| f |
c0 , supΣ3∪Σ2 |g|
}
.
In Th. 1.6.9. uniqueness result is proved for the boundary value problem (43) in the class
L∞(Ω). The existence result is given Th. 8. Regularity result is given in the Appendix.
Remark 7. Backward parabolic and parabolic operators satisfy the conditions: akm = 0, k =
1, ...,m, and bm = ±1 if x = (x1, ..., xm−1, t), i.e. t = xm. Put now u = veαt in (33). Then
L1(v) = ∑k,j=1,...,m akjvxkxj +∑k=1,...,m b
kvxk + (c+ α)v = f e
−αt
and
L∗1(w) = ∑k,j=1,...,m a
kjwxkxj +∑k=1,...,m b
∗kwxk + c∗1w
where c1 = c+ α, b∗k = 2∑j=1,...,m a
kj
xj − bk, c∗1 = ∑k,j=1,...,m akjxkxj −∑k=1,...,m bkxk + c+ α.
Having in mind that |c| ≤ c˜ = const we conclude that for bm = ±1 and α → ∓∞ then
c1 → −∞, c∗1 → −∞ uniformly in (x1, ..., xm−1, t) ∈ Ω. So for parabolic (backward parabolic)
equations the conditions of Theorems 2, 5 are fulfilled.
We shall illustrate the previous results by the backward parabolic equations:
L(u) =
∂u
∂t
+
1
2
σ2x2
∂2u
∂x2
+ rx
∂u
∂x
− ru = f (t, x) (44)
which is the famous Black-Scholes equation, and
M(u) =
∂u
∂t
+ x2
∂2u
∂x2
+ b(x)
∂u
∂x
+ c(x)u = f (t, x) (45)
We shall work in the following rectangles: Ω1 = {(t, x) : 0 < t < T, 0 < x < a1}, Ω2 =
{(t, x) : 0 < t < T, a2 < x < 0}, Ω = {(t, x) : 0 < t < T, a2 < x < a1}. Under the previous
notation for Ω we have: Σ1 = {t = 0}, Σ2 = {t = T}, Σ3 = {x = a1} ∪ {x = a2}. Certainly,
for Ω1, Ω2 another part of the boundary appears, Σ0 = {x = 0}.
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As we know from [20] there exists an Lp(Ω1) solution of the boundary value problem{
L(u1) = f ∈ Ω1
u1 = 0 on Σ
(1)
2 ∪ Σ(1)3
(46)
According to the Definition 3:
∫
Ω1
u1L∗(v1)dx =
∫
Ω1
f v1dx for each test function v1 ∈
C2(Ω1), v1 |Σ(1)1 ∪Σ(1)3 = 0.
In a similar way there exists u2 ∈ Lp(Ω2) such that{
L(u2) = f in Ω2
u2 = 0 on Σ
(2)
2 ∪ Σ(2)3
(47)
Therefore:
∫
Ω2
u2L∗(v2)dx =
∫
Ω2
f v2dx for each test function v2 ∈ C2(Ω2), v2|Σ(2)1 ∪Σ(2)3 = 0.
Certainly, there exists u ∈ Lp(Ω) such that ∫Ω uL∗(v)dx = ∫Ω f vdx for each test function
v ∈ C2(Ω), v |Σ1∪Σ3= 0. Evidently, v ∈ C2(Ω), v |Σ1∪Σ3= 0 ⇒ v ∈ C2(Ωi), v |Σ(i)1 ∪Σ(i)3 = 0,
i = 1, 2. Consequently,
∫
Ω1
u1L∗(v)dx =
∫
Ω1
f vdx and
∫
Ω2
u2L∗(v)dx =
∫
Ω2
f vdx, and thus
the function
W =
{
u1 in Ω1
u2 in Ω2
∈ Lp(Ω) (48)
satisfies the identity
∫
Ω f vdx =
∫
Ω1
f vdx+
∫
Ω2
f vdx =
∫
ΩWL
∗(v)dx, i.e. W is a generalized
Lp(Ω) solution of {
L(W) = f in Ω
W = 0 on Σ2 ∪ Σ3 (49)
We conclude as follows: (a) If ui satisfies{
L(ui) = f in Ωi
ui = 0 on Σ
(i)
2 ∪ Σ(i)3
(50)
i = 1, 2, then (48) satisfies (49).
(b) In the special case when f ∈ L∞(Ω), ui ∈ L∞(Ωi), i = 1, 2, u ∈ L∞(Ω), u satisfies the
identity
∫
Ω f vdx =
∫
Ω uL
∗(v)dx, we have a uniqueness theorem and therefore u = W.
The set Σ0 is called interior boundary of Ω.
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Appendix
One can find results concerning regularity of the generalized solutions of degenerate parabolic
operators in cylindrical domains in [14] and [19]. For the sake of simplicity we shall consider
only one example from Il’in as the conditions are simple and clear. Consider
N(u) =
∂u
∂t
+ h(t, x)
∂2u
∂x2
+ g(t, x)
∂u
∂x
+ c(t, x)u = F(t, x) (51)
in the rectangle Q = {(t, x) : 0 < t < T, a2 < x < a1} and h, g, c, F ∈ C3(Q¯). Moreover, we
assume that in some domain
(i) Q� ⊃ Q¯ the function h ≥ 0 and h ∈ C2(Q�).
(ii) Suppose that if h(t, a1) = 0 (h(t, a2) = 0), 0 ≤ t ≤ T, then g(t, a1) > 0 (g(t, a2) < 0).
Moreover, we assume that the following compatibility conditions hold:
(iii) Dαt,xF(T, a1) = D
α
t,xF(T, a2) = 0, |α| ≤ 2.
Define now the following parts of the boundary ∂Q:
I = {(t, x) : 0 < t < T, x = a2}, I I = {(t, x) : 0 < t < T, x = a1),
I I I = {(t, x) : a2 < x < a1, t = 0} and IV = {(t, x) : a2 < x < a1, t = T}.
One can easily see that: Σ3 = {(t, x) ∈ I ∪ I I : h(t, x) > 0}, Σ0 = {(t, x) ∈ I ∪ I I : h(t, x) = 0}
∪ {(t, x) ∈ I I I ∪ IV}, β = gn1 + n2 − ∂h∂x n1, i.e. (t, x) ∈ Σ0, (t, x) ∈ I ∪ I I ⇒ h(t, x) = 0 ⇒
∂h
∂x = 0 and
−→n = (1, 0) on I, −→n = (−1, 0) on I I. Thus β |I∩Σ0= gn1 = g < 0, while β |I I∩Σ0=
−g < 0. Therefore, I ∩ Σ0 ⊂ Σ2, I I ∩ Σ0 ⊂ Σ2. Evidently, β |I I I= n2 = 1 ⇒ I I I ⊂ Σ1, while
IV ⊂ Σ2; Σ0 = ∅.
In conclusion, I I I is free of data as it is of the type Σ1; (I ∪ I I) ∩ Σ0 and IV are of the type Σ2,
while Σ3 = (I ∪ I I) ∩ {h > 0}. Part of I ∪ I I is non-characteristic, part of I ∪ I I is of Σ2 type.
Data are prescribed on Σ2 ∪ Σ3, i.e. on I ∪ I I ∪ IV.
Theorem 9. (see [14]).
There exists a unique classical solution u of (51), u |I∪I I∪IV= 0 under the conditions (i), (ii), (iii).
More specifically, there exists Lipschitz continuous derivatives: u, ∂u∂t ,
∂u
∂x ,
∂2u
∂x2 ∈ C0,α(Q), 0 < α < 1.
In [19] it is mentioned that under several restrictions on the coefficients the boundary value
problem {
N(u) = 0
u |I∪I I∪IV= 0 (52)
possesses a unique generalized bounded solution which is Lipschitz continuous in Q. The
proof relies on the method of elliptic regularization.
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Remark 8. If a2 < x < a1, a2 < 0, a1 > 0, the Black-Scholes equation (44) is with h(t, x) =
σ2
2 x
2 > 0 on I ∪ I I, i.e. Σ3 = I ∪ I I and the equation{
L(u) = f in Q
u |I∪I I∪IV= 0
possesses a unique classical solution. As we know, u |x=0= U(t) satisfies in classical sense the
ODE:
U�(t)− rU(t) = f (t, 0), U(T) = 0. Therefore, we can consider the restrictions: u |x>0, u |x<0
and conclude that they are classical solutions of the respective boundary value problemswith
0 data at Σ(1)2 ∪ Σ(1)3 , respectively at Σ(2)3 ∪ Σ(2)2 .
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1. Introduction 
Usually project risk management plans deal with identifying, assessing and planning 
adequate responses to risks. The main problem is that there are many types of response 
plans, and we must be able to select the optimal one. The usual approach is to first handle 
the most “dangerous” risk (the risk with the maximum expected damage). However, 
handling this risk may also be very expensive and beyond the limitations of the allocated 
risk budget. The dilemma is how to select the right risks to be handled within a limited 
budget.   
2. Risk management methodology 
Risk management methodology was first described in detail by Wideman in [1]. The 
methodology was then improved by the PMI [2], adding details based on users’ experience. 
Project Risk management involves the following steps: 
1. Planning Risk Assessment, which includes selecting an assessment team, setting up 
rules, and determining the supporting risk management tools. The risk assessment team 
should include representatives from all areas related to the project. 
2. Risk Identification is a process of defining future events that should be considered as 
risk events. The list is usually generated by a brain-storming session conducted by the 
projects’ experts. The list is then reduced to the most important risks. This step is 
sometimes subjective, but this issue is not relevant to this paper. 
3. Risk Assessment is the quantification of identified risks, conducted in order to define 
priorities among the possible risk events. It usually includes the probability of the event 
and the severity of the damage. Later, the ranking of risks is based on these two 
parameters. One possible method is the Borda [3] methodology for ranking alternatives.  
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4. A Risk Response plan includes answers to the threats that are identified in the risk 
assessment phase. There are a number of ways to address these threats.  
a. Avoidance - generate a course of action that eliminates the risk.  
b. Transfer – transfer responsibility for the particular risk to a third party, either by 
utilizing insurance or, in the international arena, by forming treaties and international 
agreements. 
c. Acceptance - a rational decision to accept a known risk without taking any action to 
prevent its outcome or deal with its consequences. The risk is usually dealt with when it 
is recognized as a risk. An acceptance of risk is recommended in situations where the 
consequences of the risk are less costly or less traumatic than the effort required 
preventing the risk. 
d. Mitigation - refers to action taken to reduce either the probability of occurrence of an 
unfavorable event or the impact of this event. Mitigation is usually executed in the form 
of a plan designed to handle high-threat possible events. 
e. Contingency Planning – refers to specific actions to be taken when a potential risk event 
occurs. In general, contingency plans should be developed in advance in preparation 
for the moment when risk events are realized. 
Out of the five responses, only three (avoidance, transfer and mitigation) involve a real 
investment and require budget allocation.  
5. A Control Plan is a series of course adjustments within the project’s main objectives. These 
adjustments include scheduling and tracing the advance of risk situations. The control 
plan defines indicators that provide warnings regarding the realization of specific risks. 
Continuously assessing program risks is the implementation of the control plan by checking 
any changes in the assessment of risks, and conducting a continuous search for warning 
signs that indicate any realization of known risks.  
This part of the project plan includes the updating of the risk management plan.  
The current study concentrates on allocating a budget to the response plan in an optimal 
manner.  
This paper includes a literature review, problem definition, algorithms’ definition, an 
example that is solved by all algorithms, and a comparison among the algorithms by 
simulation results. The research is quantitative and presents simulation results. Since the 
difference among the algorithms for different budgets are so big, statistical analysis is 
unnecessary. 
The simulation and algorithms were verified by solving known problems and their 
solutions. 
3. Literature review 
Project risk management literature commonly describes the need to rank and prioritize 
project risks in order to focus the risk management effort on the higher risks. Baccarinia et 
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al. in [4] describe the use of a methodology for the risk ranking of projects by some 
subjective judgment; this method has been implemented in construction projects and multi-
project environments. Engert from MITRE [3] wrote a user’s manual for an Excel application 
for risk management. The application includes a ranking method of risks based on Borda’s 
method. The Borda method is more quantitative than the subjective judgment method, but 
still includes some fuzzy ranking when it combines the rank of risk probability with the 
rank of impact. Ochsner [5]  emphasizes the limited attention to risk-based priorities and the 
growing consensus among industries that risk considerations need to be better integrated 
into decisions. He agrees that although money is not always the best way to measure risks, 
no better alternative has thus far been suggested.  His ranking method is based on 
discussions with consultants and experts, assigning scores from 1 to 10 for each category. Li 
et al. [6] present a ranking method for multiple hazard risks; the method is based on 
screening all the risks with experts and weighting the risks according to frequency, severity, 
availability of warning, awareness, etc. 
In [7] the author presents the difficulties involved in ranking risks. He utilizes the following 
framework: Risk = Threat×Vulnerability×Consequence, which is usually used in military 
operations research. The Threat×Vulnerability framework actually reflects the probability to 
damage a target, when the consequence is the damage impact. Our study is important in 
that for some qualitative measures, it presents counter examples that highlight the limitation 
of this measurement type. Klein [8] developed a conceptual model for analyzing alternative 
risk mitigation responses, while accounting for the possibility of trade-off risk among the 
three main success criteria: cost, duration and scope (or quality). He showed that, given the 
numerical estimates of risks probabilities and impacts, of all the relevant responses, 
mathematical techniques - such as dynamic programming or integer programming - could 
be applied to find the best combination of responses that minimizes project uncertainty. This 
approach analyzes trade-off among success criteria. 
Ben-David et al. [9] analyzes a problem that is similar to the current one, but takes a 
different approach. Assuming that several risk mitigation responses can be implemented 
with different costs and different expected results, a selection of the best combination of 
responses is needed. All of the responses are broken down to their work elements, so that each 
risk can belong to several of them. The Total Risk Cost (TRC) is minimized by two heuristic 
algorithms; the greedy and the naïve, after which a comparison is presented. The current 
manuscript does not take into account the budget limitation, and assumes that as long as risk 
can be mitigated and it is worthwhile from the budget point of view – it will be done.    
There are many studies that use subjective judgment to rank risks in different areas, 
industries, projects and programs. However, none of these ranking methods take into 
account the response capability to risks. There might be a huge difference between two risks 
that have the same probability to occur and the actual impact, when one of the risks occurs. 
However, for the first risk there is a mitigation plan that reduces its effect substantially and 
costs $1,000, while for the second risk, any type of mitigation plan costs more than $100,000. 
The study of Gonen et al. [10] proposes an additional criterion for the assessment of risks – 
that of controllability. The introduction of this criterion adds a third dimension to the risk 
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evaluation process, in addition to its probability and impact. The controllability of a given 
risk reflects the ability to control it, mitigate it, or even prevent it. Assessing controllability 
may reduce the efforts and spending of managerial time and expenses on non-controllable 
risks and, in the end, direct the attention of management solely to controllable risks. 
Controllability adds a new criterion that takes into account the response capability, but still 
does not propose a method to quantitatively rank the risks. In the current paper, we 
overcome the problem of ranking risks by utilizing a method of selecting the optimal 
mitigation plan for a given budget, and therefore, the risks to be mitigated or transferred.  
Kutsch et al. [11] have investigated the type of risks that can be deliberately ignored. In the 
current study, we deal with risks that are not supposed to be ignored.   
4. Defining the problem 
The problem we will address in this study is the allocation of a risk management budget among 
the possible responses. The solution to this problem is not only ranking the risks to be dealt 
with, but also recommending the best risk response investment.  
As was mentioned in Section 2, Part 4, responses to identified risks can be divided into two 
groups: Responses that include a real money investment - like transfer, avoidance and 
mitigation - and the other responses, which do not require any investment - like accepting the 
risk  or preparing a contingency plan. Our study concentrates on the responses that require an 
investment and examines how to select the right set of responses when we are limited by a well-
defined budget. In order to clarify these issues, let us look at the following theoretical example: 
Assume there are two risks in a project - R1 and R2. R1 will occur with probability P1 and the 
damage in this case will be D1.  R2 will occur with probability P2 and the damage in this case will 
be D2. In order to overcome these risks, we can either transfer the risk R1 (by purchasing 
insurance), which will cost C11 and the policyholder's participation D11 or respond to risk R1 
with a mitigation plan that will cost C12.  After its application, the remaining probability to occur 
is P12 with damage when it occurs of D12. For risk R2, we have one mitigation plan that costs C21; 
after its application, the remaining probability to occur is P21 with damage when it occurs of D21. 
We have a risk mitigation budget of B that we can invest to handle these risks and we would 
like to know what our best policy is (B is usually determined by the project’s customer).  
In this study, we assume a linear utility function. This means that we will choose the policy 
that will reduce our expected cost to a minimum.  The following table presents a numeric 
example of the dilemma described above: 
 
Risk P D Expected Damage Response Cost Pij Dij
Expected 
Damage+Cost 
R1(*) 0.2 1000 200 Transfer 80 0.2 50 90 
    Mitigation 50 0.1 500 100 
R2(*) 0.3 700 210 Mitigation 50 0.3 200 110 
Table 1. Numeric Example of the Dilemma 
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Let B=50. In this case, we can either choose the second or the third row. If we choose the 
second row, we reduce the expected damage of Risk 1 to 100 and stay with Risk 2 at an 
expected damage of 210. All together, the expected damage of both risks is 310. The same 
is true if we choose to handle Risk 2 and reduce the expected damage to 110. Since the 
expected damage of Risk 1 is 200, the total is 310.  Let B=80. In this case, we can choose the 
first row or the previous option of B=50. Choosing Row 1 derives the total expected 
damage to 90+210=300 (the 210 is from R2). If we choose the second row (mitigating R1), 
our total expected damage will be 310, and the third row (mitigating R2) will be the same - 
310. However, in both mitigation plans we only invest 50, while in the transfer policy  
we invest a minimum of 80. People who are risk-averse will prefer this option, while 
others who are attracted to risk might prefer the second or third row. If B=100, then an 
additional option is open which allows us to choose Rows 2 and 3 and reduce the 
expected damage to 210. If B=130 and up, we can choose Rows 1 and 3 and reduce the 
expected damage to 200. 
If we try to minimize the expected damage when B=80, then transferring R1 would be 
optimal, although usually risk management methods will rank R2 higher and recommend 
treating it first.  
In order to define the optimal response problem, we will use the following terminology and 
symbolization: 
There are n risks R1,…,Rn. For each risk Ri, the probability of its occurrence is Pi and the 
damage when it occurs is Di. Therefore, for each risk Ri, the expected damage is Qi = Pi·Di. 
Index i will be used for risks. 
For each risk Ri, there are k responses (some can be empty; others can be transfer or 
mitigation) out of which we can choose, at most, one. This can be done by combining 
mitigation plans together. Index j will be used for a response plan. 
The response j to risk Ri costs Cij; after its implementation, the probability of its occurrence is 
Pij and the corresponding damage is Dij. The expected damage after its implementation is  
Qij= Pij·Dij.  
A response plan is defined as “worthwhile” only if 
 ܳ௜ ൒ ൫ܥ௜௝ ൅ ܳ௜௝൯݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ ͳǡǥ ǡ ݊ (1) 
(Only if the investment + the expected damage after the implementation are lower than the 
original expected damage). A response plan that is not worthwhile will not be included in 
the list of possible responses. Actually, the savings in selecting response j to risk Ri is: 
ܳ௜ െ ൫ܥ௜௝ ൅ ܳ௜௝൯. 
Let us now define the decision variables Xij as 1, if response j is selected for risk Ri, and 0, 
otherwise.  
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Only one response can be selected (if the user wants to enable selecting two responses to 
risk Ri, he can combine both responses into one plan with the accumulated cost). From the 
definition of Xij, the expected value of all the risks will be: 
 	∑ ��� − ∑ ���)�� +	�������� 	∑ ������� + ���)	���� �	 (2) 
After opening the equation, it is clear that the expected value of all the risks (that we would 
like to minimize) is: 
 	∑ �� −���� ∑ ∑ ������ − ���� + ����)�������� 	 (3) 
Since ∑ ������  does not depend on the selection of risks to be handled, the problem can be 
defined as an integer programming problem, as follows: 
 	����∑ ∑ ������ − ���� + ����)�������� � (4) 
s.t.  
 		∑ ��� 	� �																								���	� � ��� � �����  (5) 
 	∑ ∑ ������ � ���������         (6) 
(budget constraint) 
And ��� can be either 0 or 1 for i=1,…,n and j=1,…, k. 
5. Solving the problem  
The problem can be solved by Integer Linear Programming (ILP), as was mentioned in [9, 
12]. In this paper, we compare 3 heuristic algorithms that solve this ILP. The algorithms are 
as follows: 
1. The Most Dangerous Risk (MDR) method (PMI, 2008) is used to show the “naïve” 
solution. In the current case, the first risk to be handled is the one with maximum Qi. 
For the selected risk, the most effective response is selected and the accumulated budget 
is increased by Cij.  
For each selected risk, the response with the maximum savings (Qi-(Cij+Qij)) will always be 
selected.  The algorithm that is used is as follows: 
1. Sort the risks according to Qi from higher to lower. 
2. For each risk, select the response j with the higher (Qi-(Cij+Qij)). 
3. Calculate the accumulated cost of applying the responses according to the sorted list. 
4.  Calculate the accumulated savings. 
5. If the accumulated cost of risk responses is less than the budget, go back to Step 1.  
2. The Most Profitable Response (MPR) method is defined as follows: 
1. Sort the responses according to (Qi-(Cij+Qij)) from higher to lower. 
2. Choose the upper risk in the sorted list that was not selected yet. 
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3. Calculate the accumulated cost of applying the responses according to the sorted 
list. 
4. Calculate the accumulated savings. 
5. If the accumulated cost of risk responses is less than the budget, go back to Step 1.  
In this algorithm, the response savings plays a major role and the decision is made 
according to the possible savings. 
3. The Best Saving Ratio (BSR) method is defined as follows: 
Definition: The ratio between the savings in expected damage and the cost of the response 
will be called the savings ratio. Mathematically, it is defined as (ܳ௜ െ ൫ܥ௜௝ ൅ ܳ௜௝൯ሻȀܥ௜௝. The 
economic meaning of this ratio is the amount of savings in expected damage per each unit of 
investment in the response. 
The algorithm will be as follows: 
1. Sort the responses according to the savings ratio (Qi-(Cij+Qij))/Cij from higher to lower. 
2. Choose the upper risk in the sorted list that was not selected yet. 
3. Calculate the accumulated cost of applying the responses according to the sorted list. 
4. Calculate the accumulated savings. 
5. If the accumulated cost of risk responses is less than the budget, go back to Step 1.  
In order to clarify the three algorithms, let us demonstrate them by an example: 
In the following table (Table 2) there are 6 risks; for each risk there are three possible 
response plans. The table includes the Pi, Di, Qi, Cij, Pij, Dij, Qij, and both the savings in 
expected damage + cost and the savings ratio.  
 
Table 2. Numeric Example to compare the three algorithms 
Risk # Pi Di (in K $) Qi Respo
nse# 
Rank Cij Pij Dij Qij Cij+Qij Qi-
(Cij+Qij)
Xij Saving 
Ratio
1 0.29 133.37 39.20 1 4 35.81 0.02 118.17 2.70 38.50 0.70 X11 0.02
0.29 133.37 39.20 2 4 20.02 0.08 32.41 2.54 22.57 16.64 X12 0.83
0.29 133.37 39.20 3 4 0.67 0.04 116.92 4.20 4.87 34.34 X13 51.35
2 0.85 170.91 144.68 1 1 31.06 0.25 70.48 17.31 48.37 96.31 X21 3.10
0.85 170.91 144.68 2 1 22.28 0.74 149.28 110.87 133.15 11.53 X22 0.52
0.85 170.91 144.68 3 1 120.89 0.11 137.49 14.88 135.77 8.91 X23 0.07
3 0.83 155.09 129.23 1 2 25.79 0.65 136.71 89.54 115.33 13.90 X31 0.54
0.83 155.09 129.23 2 2 14.02 0.73 77.06 56.45 70.47 58.76 X32 4.19
0.83 155.09 129.23 3 2 4.11 0.80 117.19 93.55 97.66 31.57 X33 7.68
4 0.83 19.44 16.10 1 6 12.21 0.54 6.03 3.25 15.46 0.64 X41 0.05
0.83 19.44 16.10 2 6 4.83 0.03 8.48 0.28 5.11 10.99 X42 2.27
0.83 19.44 16.10 3 6 3.85 0.81 2.29 1.84 5.69 10.41 X43 2.71
5 0.19 168.04 31.15 1 5 13.03 0.00 11.51 0.02 13.05 18.11 X51 1.39
0.19 168.04 31.15 2 5 8.00 0.12 30.92 3.76 11.76 19.40 X52 2.43
0.19 168.04 31.15 3 5 1.54 0.06 111.67 7.21 8.76 22.40 X53 14.51
6 0.58 101.83 58.83 1 3 46.87 0.00 2.99 0.01 46.89 11.94 X61 0.25
0.58 101.83 58.83 2 3 37.98 0.30 23.31 6.90 44.88 13.94 X62 0.37
0.58 101.83 58.83 3 3 6.46 0.56 86.35 48.06 54.52 4.30 X63 0.67
 
Risk Management – Current Issues and Challenges 62 
The numeric example is generated by a simulation that will be described later. Table 2 
includes all the information needed for applying the algorithms MDR, MPR and BSR. 
Tables 3, 4, 5 present the MDR, MPR and BSR solutions accordingly.  
In Table 3, the ranked risk =1 means the first risk to respond. The first risk that is handled is 
Risk number 2, since its Qi is 145 (from Table 2). The response is selected as the highest 
savings solution. Total handling of the 6 risks requires a budget of 90.1 and saves 236.7 in 
expected damages, plus the cost of applying the responses.   
Table 4 shows that the selection order is different from MDR. However, the accumulated 
savings converges to the same amount, since at the end both algorithms use the same 
response plans. The difference is in the selection order. 
 
Most Dangerous Risk (MDR) 
Ranked 
Risk 
Risk 
Number 
Response 
Number 
Cost
Accumulated 
Budget 
Savings
Accumulated 
Savings 
1 2 1 31.06 31.06 96.31 96.31 
2 3 2 14.02 45.08 58.76 155.07 
3 6 2 37.98 83.06 13.94 169.01 
4 1 3 0.67 83.72 34.34 203.35 
5 5 3 1.54 85.27 22.40 225.75 
6 4 2 4.83 90.10 10.99 236.73 
Table 3. Solution of the example using the MDR algorithm 
 
Most Profitable Response (MPR) 
Ranked 
Risk 
Risk 
Number 
Response 
Number 
Cost
Accumulated 
Budget 
Savings
Accumulated 
Savings 
1 2 1 31.06 31.06 96.31 96.31 
2 3 2 14.02 45.08 58.76 155.07 
3 1 3 0.67 45.75 34.34 189.40 
4 5 3 1.54 47.29 22.40 211.80 
5 6 2 37.98 85.27 13.94 225.75 
6 4 2 4.83 90.10 10.99 236.73 
Table 4. Solution of the example using the MPR algorithm 
Table 5 shows that the BSR uses different response options and therefore converges to 
different accumulated savings. In this example, the BSR is the worst option out of the 3 
algorithms, although this result does not represent the most common situation, as will be 
seen later. 
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Best Savings Ratio (BSR) 
Ranked 
Risk 
Risk 
Number 
Response 
Number 
Budget 
Accumulated 
Budget 
Savings 
Accumulated 
Savings 
1 1 3 0.67 0.67 34.34 34.34 
2 5 3 1.54 2.21 22.40 56.73 
3 3 3 4.11 6.32 31.57 88.30 
4 2 1 31.06 37.38 96.31 184.61 
5 4 3 3.85 41.22 10.41 195.02 
6 6 3 6.46 47.69 4.30 199.32 
Table 5. Solution of the example using the BSR algorithm 
6. Comparison of the three algorithms 
In order to compare the three algorithms, a scenario simulation was generated with 15 risks 
and 3 responses per risk.  The simulation draws the probabilities and damages according to 
the following rules: 
1. Draw Pi distributed U(0.01.0.9) (uniform between 0.01 and 0.9) 
2. Draw Di distributed U(10,200) 
3. Draw Pij distributed U(0,Pi) 
4. Draw Dij distributed U(0,Di) 
5. Draw Cij distributed U(0.1, Qi-Qij) where Qi = Pi·Di and Qij=Pij·Dij 
For all i=1,….15,     j=1,…,3 
The following chart (Figure 1) shows an example of the behavior of the three algorithms, 
while the budget increases, step by step. 
Figure 1 is an example of a typical situation in which, for a limited budget the BSR is the 
best algorithm, while for an unlimited budget, the other algorithms can produce better 
results. This phenomenon holds in most of the simulation examples, but there are cases 
where the BSR is better for all budgets and cases.  
In order to compare the three algorithms, 100 simulations were generated. For each 
simulation, the maximum needed budget was  calculated. (Since the Cij are drawn, the 
required budget is stochastic and different in each simulation). For each simulation, the 
savings was calculated for an investment of 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% and 100% of the budget.  
For each percentage investment, the savings was calculated for each algorithm. Later, the 
best algorithm was defined as the successor, for each specific budget, and the frequency of 
its success was calculated. The following table (Table 6) summarizes the number of 
successes of each algorithm  
Table 6 shows that for a low budget (20 to 60 percent) the BSR is the best algorithm, while 
for an unlimited budget the MPR behaves better. In many cases, the MPR and MDR behave 
the same and reach the same savings.  
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Figure 1. The savings of each algorithm regarding the limited budget 
The main conclusion from Table 6 is that there is no optimal heuristic algorithm. Moreover, 
if only part of the risks budget can be handled, it is recommended to use the BSR algorithm.  
 
Algorithm 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
MDR 0 0 0 0 1
MPR 4 3 7 23 97
BSR 96 97 93 77 2
Percentage of budget investment
 
Table 6. Distribution of success of each algorithm 
7. Discussion 
1. Findings 
The paper presented three heuristic algorithms for risk response selection. In many cases, 
the ranking of risks is not enough for project managers and they need to know how to invest 
their risk management budget among the possible responses. We observe that for a limited 
budget the BSR algorithm is better than the MDR or MPR method, while for a budget that 
can cover all the risks, the MDR or MPR are better. Currently, in most projects, the customer 
asks to see the risk management plan. The above method adds the selection method of risks 
to be mitigated. It should be an essential part of the risk management plan.  
A stronger result is that risk ranking is no longer needed. This saves the effort of ranking risks, 
which is usually subjective.    
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2. Limitations 
One limitation of the current paper is that estimating the probabilities and damages for each 
risk and response is usually considered to be a very difficult task. However, it is required by 
most of the risk management standards. Tools, like mathematical models and simulations, 
are available for this task and there are already many projects that include these estimations.  
Another limitation is that we assume that responses with a negative expected savings cannot 
be selected. However, in reality, there are responses, like insurance, that are based on negative 
expected savings (otherwise, insurance company would not sell insurance policies).    
A third limitation is the dependencies among risks. It might be that a delay in one task is not 
critical, while a delay in a second task, together with delay in the first task, might prove to 
be a severe problem.   
8. Conclusion 
In this article, we describe a method for how to allocate a risk management budget among 
the possible mitigation or transfer plans. In most of today’s literature, the risk management 
plan usually ranks the risks and recommends handling those with high rankings. Almost no 
consideration is given to either response plans or response feasibility. This study proposes 
three heuristic algorithm approaches to budget allocation, and demonstrates the method, 
including a sensitivity analysis of the budget constraint. The results are encouraging and 
help define rules about risk management budgeting.   
The model is based on the expected damage, and assumes we will always prefer to reduce 
expected damages plus their cost. It does not discuss the question of risk taking. 
A simulated scenario with 15 risks and 45 response plans was demonstrated. The most 
important lesson learned from the example tested in the study is that the solution is mainly 
influenced by the response plan, and not only by the expected damage of the risk, as all of 
the ranking methods recommend. Moreover, for a limited budget, the BSR is usually the 
best algorithm, while for an unlimited budget the MDR or MPR algorithms are more 
preferable.. 
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1. Introduction 
Projects may be conceived as temporary endeavors with a finite completion date aimed at 
generating unique products or services [1]. Today’s marketplace characterised by fierce 
competition requires increased accuracy and reduced time and costs in running projects [2]. 
In such a context, the variability of actual quality, time, and cost performance compared to 
the expected one crucially impacts on the success of a project and makes risk a central issue 
in project management [3]. It has been demonstrated that failure to deal with risk is a main 
cause of budget exceeding, falling behind schedule, and missing performance targets [4,5]. 
Additionally, in several industries, such as the construction and information and 
communication technology ones, the growing level of complexity, due to increased size and 
scope, huger investments, longer execution processes, more required resources, an 
augmented number of stakeholders, instable economic and political environments, and 
changing regulations, exacerbates the degree of risk in projects [6]. Therefore, these aspects 
ask for assessing and controlling risk throughout all the phases of a project. Before going 
into detail about project risk management, it is beneficial to recall the notions of uncertainty 
and risk. Uncertainty arises from either the natural variability or randomness of a system or 
an incomplete information or knowledge of some of its characteristics. In the first instance, 
uncertainty cannot be reduced by increasing data collection or knowledge, though they are 
valuable for assessing it, while in the second case a more accurate data collection and 
understanding are able to decrease the level of uncertainty [7-9]. Project risk is defined as an 
uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, has either a positive or a negative effect on 
project objectives [1,10].  
The management of risk is currently one of the main topics of interest for researchers and 
practitioners working in the field of project management. Different perceptions, attitudes, 
values regarding risk, needs, project sectors, specifications, geographical, social, economic, 
 
Risk Management – Current Issues and Challenges 68 
and political environments have led to a variety of definitions, concepts, terms, and 
approaches, all highlighting the need for systematically addressing uncertainty.  
Since the Nineties, most of the contributions have focused on the establishment of a risk 
management process: significant examples are the Project Uncertainty MAnagement 
(PUMA) process [11],the Multi-Party Risk Management Process (MRMP)[12],the Shape, 
Harness and Manage Project Uncertainty (SHAMPU) process [13], the Two-Pillar Risk 
Management (TPRM) process [14],the risk management process developed by the Project 
Management Institute [1], the Project Risk Analysis and Management (PRAM) process [15], 
the Risk Analysis and Management for Projects (RAMP) process [16], and The Active Threat 
and Opportunity Management (ATOM) Risk Process [10].   
An effective application of risk management processes is not disjointed from sound enabling 
instruments. So, another research stream is running parallel to that focusing on the overall 
risk management structure: the development, implementation, and evaluation of 
operational means to put in practice risk management [17].  
However, in literature there is a scarce systematisation of the actual capabilities of such 
practices. In addition, there is a lack of frameworks categorising them based on a 
comprehensive set of the peculiar characteristics of a project, of its management process, 
and of its surrounding business environment, as well as on the attitude of an organisation 
towards risk. 
In order to contribute to fill this gap, the present work puts forward a taxonomy supporting 
the selection of the most suitable risk management techniques in any given project scenario, 
with the aim of fostering knowledge creation about how to treat risky events. The research 
mainly focuses on projects characterised by the achievement of a final work product not 
completely defined at the beginning of the project itself, such as in the construction, 
engineering, and information and communication technology industries.        
After discussing the value of communication and knowledge in risk management, a set of 
dimensions reflecting the most important managerial and operational conditions 
characterising a project is developed starting from a review of pertinent literature. Widely 
applied techniques to support project risk management are presented and classified 
according to the framework. Finally, implications, ramifications, and future research 
directions are elaborated and conclusions drawn.     
2. Communication and knowledge creation in risk management 
Identifying and assessing risk sources and their impacts on project activities as well as 
developing responses to risk rely on a heterogeneous knowledge basis made up of past 
experiences, skills, and perspectives of involved people. However managing data, 
information, and in general the knowledge generated during the life cycle of a project is a 
difficult task and an inappropriate way of doing that may be a cause of failure. In particular, 
communication about risk is often very poor, even if the interactive process of exchanging 
information and opinions among all the concerned parties is a critical condition in the risk 
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management process to effectively support decision-making [18]. Projects are often 
organised and managed in ways that create information and communication disconnects. 
Decisions about risk are made independently from one another according to the different 
nature of possible risky events (e.g. business, technical, operation, and country-specific) and 
the interactions among them are not taken into account. Participants in a project do not 
share a comprehensive understanding of the risks that may affect it and a life cycle view of 
uncertainty is usually uncommon. This brings compartmentalisation of risks because they 
are identified, assessed, and controlled by using only one perspective [19]. A structured 
communication of the objectives, instruments, and findings of the risk management process 
as well as of the required actions as a result of its output is strongly needed, being 
organisational and individual learning increasingly important when dealing with risk [20].  
Communication among project parties generates awareness of risk and supports knowledge 
creation about both drivers and effects of uncertainty and approaches to cope with it.     
A variety of practices exists to deepen the understanding of causes and consequences of 
uncertainty [4,21-23]. However, their application is still limited because several 
organisations do not systematically track past data and performance for this purpose. When 
there is a substantial lack of explicit information an important source of knowledge is 
represented by the implicit information held by the so called “experts”. The term expert 
refers to those people to whom special knowledge about specific issues is attributed and 
from whom it is possible to obtain information that is useful for risk investigation. The 
process of extracting information from experts is named elicitation, which is defined as 
formulating a person's knowledge and beliefs about one or more uncertain quantities into a 
probability distribution for these quantities [24].  Elicitation of implicit expert knowledge is 
a core component of qualitative risk assessment, by means for instance of Delphi analysis or 
SWOT analysis, where it is used to define probability distributions for the occurrence and 
the impact of risky events.  
Another relevant issue in knowledge creation about risk is related to the guidelines on how 
to approach it. As mentioned, literature offers a wide range of frameworks to identify risk 
sources, evaluate their probabilities and impacts in both a qualitative and a quantitative 
way, and set up risk response strategies. Also, there are some attempts to categorise these 
practices according to the nature of the data they rely on, the phase of the risk management 
process, the kind of project, or the purpose of the analysis [1,25-27]. However, existing 
contributions usually focus on just one single aspect and there is a lack of taxonomies that 
simultaneously look at all the relevant dimensions that should be taken into account when 
choosing an appropriate means of treating risk. In addition, the terminology used to address 
risk management practices is somewhat confused. The most common words that can be 
found in literature are tool, technique, and method but there is no widely accepted 
definition of these concepts and of the relationships among them in the field of risk 
management. Sometimes a same practice is referred to with different terms. For instance, 
while Delphi is generally classified as a technique [1,26], the Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA) is defined as either a tool [4] or a method [25]. However, determining the 
exact nature of risk instruments and creating a hierarchy among them help to recognise their 
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scope and range of application and allow a more appropriate use at various risk 
management levels.  
How to select the correct practices and capture their actual potentialities is of paramount 
importance to enhance the knowledge that is necessary to manage in an effective and 
efficient manner the risk and the associated information throughout the development of a 
project. Such understanding facilitates a clear view of the critical conditions of a project, thus 
fostering performance improvement and enhancing trust within the project team [28]. 
The developed framework focuses on the need for a comprehensive perspective on the 
factors affecting risk investigation and proposes a taxonomy based on the most significant 
elements characterising the scenario in which project risk is approached. The aim is assisting 
in the choice of the appropriate practices according to the level and the purpose of the risk 
management effort. Since the distinction among the different terms to address risk 
management practices is not the purpose of this work, they are all referred to as 
“techniques”.     
3. Dimensions for selecting techniques to support project risk 
management 
There are multiple aspects that can be considered when facing the decision about the 
appropriate techniques to be applied for the purpose of risk identification, assessment, or 
control. They will be widely explained in the following sections.   
3.1. A review of classification criteria 
A commonly used criterion suggests looking at the nature of information that is available in 
a project. Qualitative and quantitative techniques are two fundamental groups applied to 
risk management. In the qualitative techniques risk assessment is connected with the 
determination of qualitative scales for evaluating the frequencies of occurrence of risky 
events and their impacts. They do not operate on numerical data but present results in the 
form of descriptions and recommendations basically according to opinions and risk 
tolerance boundaries collected from experts. The qualitative techniques are adopted to 
prioritise the identified risks for subsequent further action, such as quantitative risk analysis 
or response planning [1]. Moreover, they are used for determining highly risky areas in a 
short time, cheaply, and easily. At the other hand of the spectrum, quantitative techniques to 
support project risk management numerically analyse the effects of risks on overall project 
objectives in order to elaborate future trends [1,29]. They are applied to give an accurate 
image of risk that facilitates the cost and benefit analysis during the selection of reduction 
measures. However, the implementation of quantitative techniques is generally more 
expensive and requires greater experience than the application of qualitative techniques 
[30].  
Another criterion is choosing techniques to support risk management according to the 
degree of knowledge about risk and the goal of the analysis. Kmec [27] discusses 
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approaches to risk identification for the following situations: the majority of risks are 
known, the risks have been prioritised, the risk list is short, risks are classified according to 
some criteria, risks are broken down to build a hierarchy, relationships among risk are 
investigated, and risk evolution is studied overtime. Also, techniques for risk management 
differ according to whether the main aim is monitoring economic and financial outcomes, 
checking quality variance, tracking time delays or estimating the probability of the overall 
success or failure of a project.     
In addition, risk management practices can be distinguished based on how the investigation 
is performed. Gidel and Zonghero [31] focus on selected techniques and suggest when they 
are suitable depending whether an analogical, heuristic, or analytic approach is applied to 
risk identification. With an analogical approach the study of risk mainly relies on the 
experience coming from the management of previous and similar projects. The heuristic 
approach uses the project team creativity or expertise through for instance brainstorming 
sessions. Finally, the analytic approach is typically based on FMEA and Fault Tree Analysis 
and aims to decompose a system to identify risky events for each sub-system together with 
their causes and effects. 
Also, the nature, size, and phase of the life cycle of a project as well as the kind of associated 
consequences determine which techniques to support risk management should be used. 
Some authors highlight that, although risk management should assist in the entire life cycle 
of a project, it is particularly crucial in the planning stage and its scope and depth increase 
as the project moves towards the execution phase, while they decrease in the termination 
phase [13,32]. As a matter of fact, the earlier the risks are identified, the more realistic the 
project plan and the expectation of results and the more effective the contingency plans both 
during the development of the project and beyond [1,33].  
Other works focus on the strong correlation between the risk profile of a project and its 
organisation: for instance, different procurement schemes require different risk practices 
[22]. 
Furthermore, every single step of managing risks, whether identifying or assessing them, 
developing response plans, or monitoring their execution, implies a different level of 
information and detail, thus it requires the application of different techniques. Literature 
reports numerous classifications of techniques according to the phase of risk management 
for which they are most suitable [1,34,35]. 
Finally, the project risk management capabilities of an organisation improve as its risk 
culture increases. A scarce awareness towards risk drives occasional applications of 
informal risk techniques to specific projects and problems are dealt with only when they 
show up. Recognising the relevance of risk, instead, is the condition for proactively 
managing uncertainty [33,36,37]. As a consequence, techniques supporting risk 
management require different levels of corporate risk maturity in order to yield the 
expected benefits and this constitutes a criterion according to which risk techniques may be 
classified [25].     
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3.2. Three dimensions to characterise project risk management techniques  
Based on a careful analysis of the characteristics of the techniques supporting risk 
management proposed in literature and applied in business practice, the authors believe 
that among the discussed criteria   
 the phase of the risk management process; 
 the phase of the life cycle of a project; 
 the corporate maturity towards risk;   
are the three dimensions that encompass the most relevant aspects for understanding and 
choosing among project risk management techniques. In fact, the focus is on “risks” that 
occur in “projects” which are in turn run by “companies”. Moreover, such dimensions 
adequately reflect the crucial concept that risk practices can only be selected once a problem 
is structured and well understood and the application of these instruments depends on the 
circumstances of the problem, hence on the need to fully comprehend it. 
Every specific risky event in a project has its own escalation process characterised by one or 
more sources or causes, an occurrence, and one or more consequences [35]. Each of these 
phases requires its own approach to be studied. Sources of risk are analysed by 
concentrating on their identification, description, and classification (e.g. internal and 
external causes), the occurrence is defined by the probability and the impact of the risky 
event, and the consequences are described in terms of time, cost, and quality variance 
against the expected performance.  
Additionally, no practice is perfectly tailored to deal with every risk occurring in the 
course of a project [22]. Each of the risks faced during a project has its own specificity 
depending on its position within the project life cycle. For example, throughout the 
feasibility study, when the main issue is making appropriate strategic choices, the 
probabilities of occurrence of risks are difficult to be defined because of the still scarce level 
of information associated with that phase. By contrast, in the following phases risks are 
mainly related to the consequences of decisions made in the previous steps of the project 
and their sources, manifestation, and effects can be characterised in a more accurate way. 
Also, in the late phases of a project a risk may be the effect of other risks that manifested 
themselves in previous phases.    
Besides the phases of the risk management process and the life cycle of a project, a third 
pillar constitutes the foundation of a sound selection of techniques supporting risk 
treatment: the reference context of the organisation that develops a project. In particular, this 
work is interested in the maturity towards risk, that is basically achieved through risk 
awareness, the consideration that the risk management activity is on the same level as cost, 
time, and scope management tasks, commitment to high quality of data, systematic 
implementation of instrument to deal with risk, development of responses to risk, and 
assessment of the obtained results [38]. The extent to which a company possesses these 
features represents that cultural bedrock that enables the application of specific techniques 
to prevent, accept, mitigate or exploit risky events and their effects. In particular, a high 
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level of risk awareness, together with appropriate availability of knowledge, make possible 
to obtain that objective information allowing the quantification of risk.  
A selection of support techniques based on the above dimensions represents a strength 
inside the risk management process because it stimulates the achievement of improved 
outcomes in terms of time, cost, and quality performance [39].  
3.3. Phases of the risk management process 
According to Hillson [40], risk management is about finding an answer to six simple 
questions such as “What do we want to achieve?”, “What might affect us?”, “Which of the 
things that might affect us are most important?”, “What should we do about them?”, “Did 
our actions work?”, and “What has changed in the new scenario?”. These questions 
represent the main issues of the risk management process, which is generally recognised as 
the process concerned with conducting the following phases: risk management planning, 
risk identification, risk analysis, risk response, and risk monitoring and control [1].     
In risk management planning the objectives and the approach to carry out risk treatment 
tasks are decided together with assigning resources and time to these activities, with the aim 
of allowing a smooth conduction of the subsequent phases. Risk identification defines the 
risks to which the project is exposed and describes their causes and characteristics. The goal 
of the risk analysis phase, sometimes named risk assessment, is giving an importance 
priority to the identified risks to enable managerial actions and establishing the overall level 
of risk exposure of the project. In particular, qualitative risk analysis is focused on 
determining the probabilities of occurrence of risky events and the associated impacts on 
project outcomes, the time periods when the risks could affect the project, when it is possible 
to influence them, and the relationships between risks and cost, schedule, scope, and quality 
constraints. Quantitative risk analysis operates on those risks that substantially impact the 
project and numerically evaluates their effects. Risk response starts from the previously 
identified risks and their significance to develop actions to increase opportunities and 
decrease threats. Resources and activities are inserted into the budget, schedule, and project 
management plans. The final phase, risk monitoring and control, is the on-going 
identification and management of new risks that become known during a project, the 
tracking of already identified risks, the monitoring of residual risks, the implementation of 
planned responses as well as the review of their effectiveness, the development of additional 
actions, if needed, and the formalisation of lessons learned about risk [1,35].   
The importance of the dimension of the risk management process phases for selecting 
techniques to support the treatment of risk is witnessed by the many works discussing 
instruments for each phase existing in literature. Some of them have been already presented 
in Section 3.1.            
3.4. Phases of the project life cycle 
In a similar way as when the risk management process is approached, undertaking a project 
means tackling some basic questions: “Who are the parties ultimately involved?”, “What do 
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the parties want to achieve?”, “What is it the parties are interested in?”, “How is it to be 
done?”, “What resources are required?”, and “When does it have to be done?”. These 
questions are answered during the life cycle of a project, which is defined as a systematic 
way of conceptualising the generic structures of projects into a number of phases that assure 
better management control [1,13,41]. 
The project life cycle is domain specific and, because of the complexity and diversity of 
projects, its breakdown into phases is different based on several factors such as the size (e.g. 
small or large-scale projects) and the type (e.g. engineering and construction projects or new 
product development projects) of the project. Four general phases can be associated to the 
kinds of projects that are considered by this work: conceptualisation, planning, execution, 
and termination [1,13].The conceptualisation phase regards identifying an opportunity or a 
need, clarifying the purpose of the project by defining the relevant performance objectives 
and their importance, formalising the concept of the project, and evaluating its feasibility. 
The planning phase includes undertaking the basic design, developing performance criteria, 
formulating a base plan together with targets and milestones, and allocating internal and 
external resources to achieve the plan. With the execution step of a project action begins: the 
main tasks here are coordinating and controlling the performing of planned activities, 
monitoring progress, and changing targets, milestones, and resource allocation as required. 
Finally, the termination phase involves commissioning and handover, reviewing the lessons 
learned during the project, and assuring the necessary support to the product of the project 
until it is discarded or disposed.          
It is widely recognised that a structured view of the project life cycle provides a proper 
frame for understanding major sources of uncertainty, as well as their occurrence timing 
and impacts, during all its phases [13]. Also, the project life cycle is a natural setting for 
distinguishing among approaches to risk management. As the life cycle evolves, different 
information becomes available about the aspects and components of both a project and its 
environment, such as stakeholders, scope, time, and cost as well as corresponding 
assumptions and constraints. Therefore, there are more risks at the beginning of a project, 
while they decrease as the project progresses towards its termination. As a consequence, the 
greatest opportunity to risk reduction resides in the early project stages. In general, during 
the conceptualisation phase, decision makers should focus on different sources of 
uncertainty, such as technological, cultural, social, and economical ones, to make sure about 
the feasibility of the project [42]. The identified uncertainties should be then taken into 
account during the planning phase of the project. The risk management process should 
monitor the changes as well as the new risks emerging in the execution phase and manage 
the appropriate actions to reduce or eliminate them [1]. Finally, the typical risks in the 
termination phase are related to the proper maintenance, improvement, and changing needs 
in light of evolving societal, demographic, operational, or economic conditions. 
Since the sources of uncertainty change during the project life cycle, it is vital to understand 
how the risk management process has to vary accordingly. This consideration supports the 
need to enable project managers to focus on specific sources of uncertainty in each stage of 
the project by means of appropriate practices to identify, assess, and treat such uncertainty 
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in order to optimise its impacts. In addition, a project life cycle-oriented view of risk 
management techniques helps to avoid compartmentalisation in approaching risk, which 
occurs when each participant looks at risks with a single, specific perspective and based on 
his own goals, irrespective of the other project parties [19].  
3.5. Corporate maturity towards risk 
The concept of maturity indicates an evolution from an initial state to a more advanced one 
through multiple intermediate states corresponding to different levels of awareness towards 
risk and capability to deal with it. The degree of maturity towards risk of an organisation 
depends on its risk culture, which is stimulated by the available informational context and 
the type and size of the organisation itself. All these factors also impact on the maturity of 
the project management process, that may go from basic project management, to the 
systematic planning and control of a single project, to the integrated planning and control of 
multiple projects, to the continuous improvement of the project management process [43], 
which in turn influences how risk management is applied.  
Hillson [37] proposes a risk maturity model made up of four stages: Naïve, Novice, 
Normalised, and Natural. Naïve means that an organisation has not yet captured the need 
for managing risks and no structured approach is in place for this purpose. Novice defines 
an organisation that recognises the benefits of managing risk and is actually implementing 
some form of risk governance but it lacks a formalised process to perform this task. 
Normalised is the degree of maturity characterised by a formalised risk process included in 
routine business activities whose benefits, however, are not consistently achieved in every 
project. Finally, the Natural maturity level denotes an organisation that is completely aware 
of risk and proactively manages opportunities and threats through consistent risk 
information. A similar organisation will benefit from improved corporate planning, more 
transparent relationships with stakeholders, and better global performance [44].    
Moving from one level to the upper one in this maturity scale implies that an organisation is 
willing to perform a more thorough and systemic analysis of the escalation processes of 
project risks. In order to do that, not only different but also more sophisticated and detailed 
techniques have to be applied [33,38]. Based on this, it can be stated that the more mature is 
an organisation towards risk, the more the phases of the risk management process it will 
implement. Companies with a low maturity degree only limit themselves to risk 
identification or qualitative risk analysis, while organizations with a higher level of maturity 
deal with all the stages of the risk management process, including collecting past data to 
carry out quantitative analysis. Thus, the maturity of a company towards risk and its 
response to possible consequences are strictly related to the development of the risk 
management phases.  
4. Classifying techniques supporting project risk management 
The three defined dimensions characterising the choice of project risk management 
techniques are here applied to a selection of practices that can be commonly found in both 
literature and practice.  
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First, the focus techniques are briefly described and their strengths and weaknesses 
highlighted (Table 1).  
 
No. Technique Description Strengths Weaknesses 
1 Brainstorming 
[1,13] 
An effective way to generate lots 
of ideas on a specific issue and 
then determine which idea–or 
ideas–is/are the best possible 
solution. Ideas about project risk 
are generated under the 
leadership of a facilitator. 
• Improves problem 
analysis by providing 
more possible 
solutions and unusual 
approaches to a 
problem. 
• Increases the 
chances of obtaining 
an excellent idea. 
• Involvement of 
individuals with a 
variety of 
backgrounds. 
• Utilises the 
thoughts of others. 
• Attempts to view 
situations from an 
unfamiliar 
perspective. 
• Prone to the negative 
effects of personality 
excesses. 
• Difficult to create a 
criticism-free 
atmosphere. 
• Not much 
structured.  
• The smaller 
problems that can 
have severe 
consequences on the 
project success are not 
identified. 
• Reduced 
participation due to 
dominant 
personalities. 
• Inhibited 
participation due to 
inequalities in 
expertise [13].  
 
2 Cause and 
effect diagram 
or 
Cause 
Consequence 
Analysis (CCA)
[1] 
It identifies the set of unwanted 
effects and goes backwards to 
trace the causal chain.                       
It is also known as Ishikawa or 
fishbone diagram and is useful 
for identifying causes of risks. 
• Helps to determine 
the root causes of a 
problem or of a 
quality characteristic 
in a structured way. 
• Increases 
knowledge of a 
process by helping 
everyone to learn 
more about the 
relevant factors and 
how they relate to 
each other. 
 
• Not particularly 
useful for extremely 
complex problems 
where many causes 
and problems are 
interrelated. 
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No. Technique Description Strengths Weaknesses 
3 Change 
Analysis (ChA)
[18] 
 
It is used to systematically 
investigate the possible risks and 
to identify the appropriate risk 
management strategies and 
measures in changing situations. 
• Predictive and 
proactive risk 
analysis technique. 
• Can be used as a 
root cause analysis. 
[18] 
• Relies on the 
comparisons between 
two or more systems 
or activities. 
• Does not 
traditionally involve 
the quantification of 
risk. 
• Depends very much 
on expert judgements. 
• Limited to the 
analysis of system 
changes. 
[18] 
4 Checklist 
[1,13,20] 
It is a detailed aide-memoire for 
the identification of potential 
risks. It can be developed based 
on historical information and 
knowledge that have been 
accumulated from previous 
similar projects. 
• Systematically 
assesses the 
experience 
accumulated by an 
industry. 
• Can be prepared by 
a single analyst or a 
small group. 
• Uses high-level or 
detailed analysis [18].
• Simple to use at the 
basic level. 
• Useful as a memory 
jogger. 
• A guide to the 
existing risk and 
opportunity 
knowledge. 
• Limited to previous 
experience only. 
• Traditionally it only 
provides qualitative 
information [18]. 
• Individual 
technique. 
• Useful only for the 
early stages of the 
selection of an idea.  
• Risk drivers are 
assumed to be 
independent. 
• Can become   
intimidating. 
• Length may 
discourage a more 
selective analysis of a 
subset of risk drivers. 
5 Decision Tree 
Analysis 
[32] 
It is usually structured using a 
decision tree diagram that 
describes a situation and the 
implications of each of the 
• Many application 
possibilities in 
different areas. 
• Enables a detailed 
• Must be careful 
when assigning 
probabilities. 
• Individual 
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No. Technique Description Strengths Weaknesses 
available choices and possible 
scenarios. It incorporates the cost 
of each available choice, the 
probabilities of each possible 
scenario, and the rewards of each 
logical path. 
insight into the 
decision making 
process. 
• Appropriate for 
solving complex 
problems. 
• Often supported by 
statistics. 
• Can be computer 
assisted. 
technique. 
6 Delphi 
[1] 
The purpose is to elicit 
information and judgments from 
participants to facilitate problem-
solving, planning, and decision-
making.  A facilitator uses a 
questionnaire to solicit ideas 
about the important project risks 
and the experts participate 
anonymously. 
• Group technique. 
• Mainly used as a 
forecasting technique.
• Helps to reduce 
bias. 
• Keeps any person 
from having undue 
influence on the 
outcome. 
• Elimination of 
direct social contact. 
• Provision of 
feedbacks. 
• Opportunity to 
revise opinions. 
• Very complex. 
• The quality of results 
depends on the 
competencies of 
experts and on the 
content of the 
questionnaire. 
• Time consuming and 
expensive. 
• No opportunity for 
verbal clarification or 
comment. 
• Conflicts not 
resolved. 
 
7 Event and 
Causal Factor 
Charting 
(ECFCh) 
[18] 
 
It consists of a graphical 
description of the sequence of 
events and conditions associated 
with an accident. The chart 
provides a logical progression of 
events. 
• An effective 
technique for 
understanding the 
sequence of 
contributing events 
[18]. 
 
• Does not necessarily 
ensure that the root 
causes have been 
identified. 
• Can overwork simple 
problems that may not 
require an extensive 
investigation [18]. 
8 Event Tree 
Analysis (ETA) 
[18] 
It is an analysis technique that 
models the range of possible 
outcomes of one or a category of 
initiating events. 
• Highly effective in 
determining how 
various initiating 
events can result in 
accidents. 
• Usually limited to 
one initiating event; 
multiple event trees 
may be needed. 
• Dependencies 
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No. Technique Description Strengths Weaknesses 
• Shares similar 
strengths with Fault 
Tree Analysis [18]. 
among system 
elements can be 
overlooked [18]. 
9 Expected 
Monetary Value 
(EMV) 
[1] 
The EMV analysis is a statistical 
concept that calculates the 
average outcome when the future 
includes scenarios that may or 
may not happen. 
• The EMV of 
opportunities is 
generally expressed 
as a positive value, 
while that of risks as 
a negative value. 
• Requires a great 
availability of 
historical data. 
10 Expert 
Judgement 
[1] 
Technique based on the experts’ 
opinion. It is useful for the 
evaluation of the failure rate and 
the success chances of the overall 
project. 
• Uses experiences on 
past projects to assess 
factors about a new 
project. 
• Adapt to 
exceptional 
circumstances. 
• The estimation can 
be biased. 
• No better results 
than those provided 
by the expertise of 
estimators. 
• May be repeated 
multiple times in order 
to get more accurate 
information. 
11 Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) 
[45] 
An approach that starts from a 
particular event, known as the 
top event, in an attempt to 
identify all the possible event 
sequences giving rise to it. 
• Highly effective in 
determining 
combinations of 
events and failures. 
• Systematic, logical, 
and detailed system 
approach. 
• Applicable to any 
kind of complicated 
system or activity. 
• Quantification is 
possible [18]. 
• Usually employed to 
examine only one 
specific event at a 
time; multiple fault 
trees may be 
developed. 
• The levels and the 
organisation of the tree 
vary from analyst to 
analyst. 
• Quantification 
requires a high level of 
expertise [18]. 
12 Failure Mode 
and Effects 
Analysis 
(FMEA) 
[46] 
An analysis technique used in 
high-risk organizations to 
identify failure modes in 
systems/processes and work out 
response strategies. 
• Effective for 
collecting the 
information that is 
needed. 
• Widely used/ 
understood, provides 
a great understanding 
• Examination of 
human errors is 
limited. It is focused 
on technical failures 
and operational errors 
may be overlooked. 
• Complex 
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No. Technique Description Strengths Weaknesses 
of a system. 
• Systematic and 
comprehensive [18]. 
 
interactions resulting 
from more than one 
failure are often 
omitted [18]. 
• Not appropriate for 
selecting single ideas. 
• Very complex. 
13 Failure Mode 
and Effects 
Criticality 
Analysis 
(FMECA) 
[46] 
An analysis technique used in 
high-risk organizations to 
identify and assess failure modes 
in systems/processes and work 
out response strategies. 
Like FMEA 
 
Like FMEA 
 
14 Fuzzy Logic 
[47] 
Useful approach to address the 
problems associated with 
imprecision, uncertainty, and 
subjectivity of data. 
• Permits different 
kinds of data to be 
manipulated 
simultaneously using 
a standardised 
methodology and a 
common scale for 
expressing the 
significance of 
impacts. 
• Offers no significant 
benefits in the case of 
simple projects. 
• Characterized by 
mathematical 
complexity. 
15 Hazard and 
Operability 
(HAZOP) 
[48] 
It is a hazard identification 
technique that uses a structured 
and systematic team review of a 
system or process to identify the 
possible deviations from normal 
operations and their causes and 
consequences. It uses a standard 
list of guidewords (e.g. "more," 
"less," "no") combined with 
process conditions to 
systematically consider all the 
possible deviations from the 
normal conditions. For each 
deviation, possible causes and 
consequences are identified as 
well as whether additional 
safeguards should be 
recommended. 
• Uses the experience 
of operating 
personnel. 
• Systematic and 
comprehensive. 
• Effective for 
technical faults and 
human errors. 
• Employs a team 
approach requiring 
the interaction of 
several disciplines or 
organisations [18]. 
• Depends very much 
on expert judgements. 
• Optimised especially 
for sequential 
operations or 
procedures. 
• Requires the 
development of 
procedural descriptions 
that are often not 
available in detail. 
• Documentation is 
lengthy. 
• One of the most time 
consuming and 
expensive techniques 
[18]. 
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No. Technique Description Strengths Weaknesses 
16 Hazard Review 
(HR) 
[18] 
The Hazard Review, also known 
as Hazard Survey or Safety 
Review, is mainly a qualitative 
review of an activity or system to 
identify the hazards and to gain 
qualitative understanding of their 
significance. 
• Makes use of the 
existing experience 
taken from a wide 
range of sources. 
• Can be performed 
by a single analyst at 
a low cost [18]. 
• A lack of structure 
makes it difficult to 
audit. 
• Limited to previous 
experience and thus 
with a limited value 
for novel installations. 
• Does not produce a 
list of failure cases for 
a quantitative risk 
assessment [18]. 
17 Human 
Reliability 
Assessment 
(HRA) 
[49] 
It is especially used for a detailed 
evaluation of human operations 
in procedural tasks. It is a special 
form of FTA and ETA, designed 
for modelling and analysing the 
range of possible accidents that 
may happen while performing a 
procedure. 
• Provides useful 
information about the 
cost and value of 
human resources. 
• Helps an 
organisation to make 
the best utilisation of 
human resources. 
• Focused on specific 
human reliability 
issues. 
• The evaluation of 
human assets is based 
on the assumption that 
the employees are 
going to remain with 
the organisation for a 
specified period. 
However, this 
assumption is wrong 
because employee 
mobility is very high. 
18 Incident 
Reporting (IR) 
[50] 
A structured mode for accident, 
incident, and near miss signalling 
collection. 
• IR forms identify 
the barriers that 
prevent adverse 
situations. 
• IR schemes provide 
a means of 
encouraging staff 
participation in safety 
improvement. 
• It can be difficult 
both to set up and to 
maintain. 
 
 
19 Interviews 
[1] 
The list of risks is produced by 
interviewing project managers or 
experts on the applications of the 
project. 
The risks are identified and 
• Simple to use at the 
basic level. 
• Systematically 
assesses the 
experiences 
• Limited to previous 
experience only. 
• Gives few insights 
into the nature of the 
hazards, may miss 
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No. Technique Description Strengths Weaknesses 
defined and a risk management 
capability score can be 
determined from a five-point 
scale. 
accumulated by an 
industry. 
• Can be prepared by 
either a single analyst 
or a small group. 
some potential 
problems. 
• Individual risk 
drivers may be 
described in 
insufficient detail to 
avoid ambiguity. 
• Can be limiting. 
20 Monte Carlo 
[1] 
A type of spreadsheet simulation 
that randomly and continuously 
generates values for uncertain 
variables to simulate a model. 
• Allows to work in 
terms of real units. 
• Allows models to 
be firmly rooted in 
the plans of a project.
• Makes the 
relationship between 
the output of models 
and real-world 
decisions relatively 
straightforward. 
• No statistically 
sound basis to specify 
distributions. 
• No basis for 
estimating the most 
likely values. 
• No basis to create 
custom tailored 
distributions when 
real world data are 
missing. 
21 Pareto Analysis 
(PA) 
or 
ABC analysis 
[51] 
It is a technique that is used to 
identify and prioritise the most 
significant items, for example 
causes and contributing factors or 
effects of accidents. This 
technique employs the Pareto 
rule (or 80-20 rule),which says 
that about 80 percent of the 
effects are generated by about 20 
percent of the causes.  
• Provides 
quantitative results 
[18]. 
• Many application 
possibilities in 
different areas, from 
the activity or 
operations level to the 
system level, such as 
ranking activities or 
system accidents and 
their causes. 
• Can also be used to 
evaluate changes in 
risks after 
modifications in a 
system or activity. 
• Simple to use. 
• Individual or group 
technique. 
• Focuses only on the 
past. 
• Produces 
considerable 
variability in the levels 
of risk assessment 
resolution. 
• Dependent on 
availability and 
applicability of data 
[18]. 
• Must be careful 
when setting 
importance criteria. 
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22 Preliminary 
Hazard 
Analysis (PHA)
[52] 
It is used to identify hazards, 
assess the severity of potential 
accidents that may happen, and 
identify measures for reducing or 
eliminating the risks associated 
with the hazards. 
• Used as a proactive 
technique because it 
identifies the 
weaknesses of a 
system at the early 
stages of its life, thus 
saving time and 
money [18]. 
• May be applied to 
any kind of risk 
analysis and to any 
activity or system. 
• Requires additional 
analysis to understand 
more in depth and 
evaluate hazards and 
potential accidents. 
• Relies heavily on the 
knowledge of subject 
matter experts [18]. 
23 Risk 
Breakdown 
Matrix (RBM) 
[23] 
An activity and threat matrix 
where the value of risk associated 
with each activity and the most 
frequent overall risks are 
evaluated. 
• Many application 
possibilities in 
different areas. 
• Individual or group 
technique. 
• Very detailed. 
 
• Must be careful 
when setting scoring 
criteria. 
• Enables a more 
detailed analysis of 
vital factors. 
• Very complex, 
requires training. 
24 Risk 
Breakdown 
Structure (RBS)
[53] 
 
It is a source-oriented grouping 
of project risks that defines the 
total risk exposure of a project. 
Each descending level represents 
an increasingly detailed 
definition of sources of risk to the 
project. 
• Help the 
project/risk manager 
to better understand 
recurring risks and 
concentrations of 
risks which would 
lead to issues that 
affect the status of the 
project. 
• The level of detail 
depends on the 
available information. 
25 Risk Mapping, 
Risk Matrix, 
Probability and 
Impact Matrix 
[1,13] 
It is a qualitative technique that 
can be used to evaluate and 
prioritise a group of risks which 
could significantly impact on a 
project. 
• Allows to 
brainstorm the most 
likely project risks 
and to apply simple 
formulas to them. 
• Communicative. 
• Aids the creation of 
a shared 
understanding of the 
importance of various 
risks to the project. 
• Simple. 
• Shortcomings result 
from a checklist 
approach (see 
Checklist). 
• Ratings have no 
absolute meaning. 
• Danger of 
prematurely defining 
high and low risks 
with no further 
considerations. 
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No. Technique Description Strengths Weaknesses 
26 Risk 
Probability and 
Impact 
Assessment, 
Risk Ranking/ 
Risk Index 
[1] 
 
It investigates the likelihood that 
each specific risk will occur and 
the potential effects on the 
objectives of a project, such as 
time, cost, scope, or quality. 
• Provides a high-
level assessment [18].
• Identifies both 
negative effects for 
threats and positive 
effects for 
opportunities. 
• Results can be 
difficult to link to 
absolute risks. 
• Appropriate ranking 
tools may not exist. 
• Does not account for 
unique situations [18]. 
27 Sensitivity 
analysis 
[1,13] 
It helps to determine which risks 
have the most potential impact 
on a project. 
• Useful for 
comparing the 
relative importance of 
variables that have a 
high degree of 
uncertainty to those 
that are more stable. 
• Requires a great 
availability of 
historical data. 
28 Strengths, 
Weaknesses, 
Opportunities, 
and Threats 
(SWOT) 
[54] 
The SWOT analysis provides a 
good framework for reviewing 
strategies, positions and business 
directions of a company or an 
idea. 
• Individual or group 
technique. 
• Very broad areas of 
application. 
• Easy to use. 
• Not very applicable 
to general idea 
selection. 
• Mainly used in the 
business field. 
29 SWIFT Analysis
[18] 
It is a more structured form of the 
“What-if Analysis” technique and 
it is used to identify hazards 
based on brainstorming and 
checklists. 
• Possible problems 
and combinations of 
conditions that can be 
problematic are 
described. 
• Possible risk-
reducing measures 
are identified. 
• Requires a great 
variety of 
competencies of the 
analysis team. 
30 What-if 
Analysis 
[18] 
It is a brainstorming technique 
that uses a systematic, but broad 
and not very structured, 
questioning procedures to 
generate descriptive information.
• Highly effective to 
identify system 
hazards. 
• A simplistic 
approach that offers 
great value for 
minimal investment 
[18]. 
• Loose structure and 
reliance on 
judgements, likely to 
miss some potential 
problems. 
• Difficult to audit for 
thoroughness. 
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No. Technique Description Strengths Weaknesses 
• The danger in this 
technique lies in the 
unasked questions 
[18]. 
31 “5 Whys” 
Technique 
[18] 
It is a qualitative brainstorming 
technique that attempts to 
identify root causes of accidents 
by asking “why” these events did 
occur or conditions did exist, in 
order to help to get to the true 
causes of problems. 
• Used as an effective 
technique for 
identifying  root 
causes of accidents 
and determining 
causal factors. 
 
• Mainly based on 
brainstorming that is 
often time consuming. 
• The brainstorming 
process is very 
difficult to duplicate 
and the results may 
not be reproducible or 
consistent. 
• It does not ensure 
that all the root causes 
can be identified. 
Table 1. Project risk management techniques 
The selected project risk management techniques are now classified according to the three 
proposed dimensions (Table 2). It is worth remarking that the techniques have been 
matched with the dimensions based on their most frequent applications as documented by 
literature and on the authors’ experience. Different categorisations may be possible 
according to the peculiar characteristics of specific project settings.   
During the entire project life cycle and in every stage of the risk management process, 
the nature and the quantity of available information influence the choice of the 
techniques that should be applied. In the conceptualisation phase decision-makers have 
a high degree of freedom in defining project goals and how to achieve them. However, 
owing to the lack of project specifications on the ways to meet the set objectives in that 
stage of the project, all the necessary information for a complete investigation of risk is 
not always available. Then, we are in an uncertain scenario characterised by a limited 
amount of information or in a context where the source of information is subjective. 
Therefore, it is necessary to build a systematic framework that can be used by decision-
makers to obtain subjective judgements from experts in a clear and straightforward 
manner. This can be accomplished by applying “extractors” of information like 
Interviews or the so called “group techniques” such as Brainstorming, Delphi, and 
Expert Judgment. At the same time, it is also necessary to train the experts so that they 
can make good judgements. Moreover, this context may just allow to define the strengths 
and weaknesses of the project and the decision-makers may stop their risk investigation 
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at the identification phase by means of a SWOT analysis. However, if we are in the case 
of repetitive projects, the greater availability of information could allow the use of 
detailed tables, such as FMEA [25], and makes possible to define occurrence probabilities 
and economic and/or time impacts for every alternative event. In this situation, decision-
makers could move on to a quantitative analysis of risks through the use of FMECA 
tables, Decision Trees, and Event Tree Analysis. As a consequence, the quantity and kind 
of information in the conceptualisation phase usually allow risk identification and they 
seldom enable also risk analysis. Coming to the planning phase, the ways and means to 
achieve the project objectives become clearer thanks to a considerable increase in the 
available information, which allows a complete investigation of risks. All the techniques 
for risk management can be used in this project stage based on the phases of 
identification, analysis, and response to risk and on the type of information available. In 
general, the degree of knowledge and the ability to influence the course of a project are 
inversely proportional to each other as the project develops overtime. Therefore, in the 
execution phase there will be a high level of knowledge about project constraints but a 
low ability to influence events because all the most important project and risk 
management choices have been already made in the previous phases. The result is that in 
this phase the time and economic performance resulting from the project choices and the 
actions undertaken to either mitigate or exploit risk can be mainly controlled and 
monitored. Therefore, in the execution phase the outputs obtained from the techniques 
applied in risk identification, analysis, or response will be revised and the results of the 
implementation of designed actions will be monitored by means of careful and sensible 
human action. In addition, in this project stage the risk management techniques used in 
the planning phase can be applied again to unveil new risks that have not emerged 
before. The termination phase is not considered by the classification in Table 2 because 
the risk management effort is more relevant in the previous stages of the project life 
cycle. Also, the risk management planning phase is not included being less operational 
in nature than the subsequent phases and more focused on the strategy to deal with risk 
and the project goals.   
Finally, the level of maturity is very linked with the level of communication in the 
organisation and the availability of data/information about the project. The higher the 
maturity towards risk management of the project team the more common the use of 
various techniques, especially the quantitative ones, during the entire risk management 
process. For example, the Monte Carlo simulation technique, that can be applied in the 
phase of quantitative risk analysis, is basically used by companies with a high level of 
maturity towards data and information management and hence project risk. The last 
column of Table 2 refers to the maturity levels proposed by Hillson [37]: the Naïve stage is 
not taken into account because it is not characterised by the use of any risk management 
technique. Also, the following notation has been used in Table 2: I = “risk Identification”, 
QlA = “Qualitative risk Analysis”, QtA = “Quantitative risk Analysis”, and R = “risk 
Response”.   
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 Dimensions 
No. Technique Risk Management 
Phase 
Project Life Cycle Phase Level of 
Corporate 
Maturity 
1 Brainstorming I [1,32,55-58], QlA 
[29] 
Conceptualisation [25], 
Planning, Execution 
Novice [25], 
Normalised, 
Natural 
2 Cause and –effect diagram or 
Cause Consequence Analysis 
(CCA) 
I [1,22], QlA[11] Planning, Execution Normalised, 
Natural 
 
3 Change Analysis (ChA) I [59], QlA, R [18] Planning, Execution Normalised [18], 
Natural 
4 Checklist I [1,15,32,56], QlA 
[11] 
Conceptualisation, 
Planning [25]  
Novice  [18], 
Normalised, 
Natural 
5 Decision Tree Analysis QtA[1,11,26,32], R 
[55] 
Conceptualisation,  
Planning 
Normalised, 
Natural 
6 Delphi I [1,22], QlA [29,60] Conceptualisation [25], 
Planning 
Novice  [25],  
Normalised, 
Natural 
7 Event and Causal Factor 
Charting (ECFCh) 
I [18] Planning  Normalised  [18], 
Natural 
8 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) I [61], QlA [11], QtA 
[11,18,61] 
Conceptualisation, 
Planning 
Normalised, 
Natural [18] 
9 Expected Monetary Value QtA[1,11,32], R [55] Planning, Execution Natural 
10 Expert Judgement I, QlA, QtA[1], R 
[55] 
Conceptualisation, 
Planning  
Normalised, 
Natural 
11 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) I [22,45], QlA [11], 
QtA [18,11] 
Conceptualisation [25], 
Planning 
Normalised, 
Natural [18] 
12 Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA) 
I, R[46,62] Conceptualisation [25],  
Planning 
Normalised [18] 
13 Failure Mode and Effects I, QlA, QtA, R Conceptualisation [25], Normalised [18], 
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 Dimensions 
No. Technique Risk Management 
Phase 
Project Life Cycle Phase Level of 
Corporate 
Maturity 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) [30,46,50,62] Planning, Execution Natural 
14 Fuzzy Logic QtA [11,47,63] Planning Natural 
15 Hazard and Operability 
(HAZOP) 
I [29,32,48], R [18] Planning  Normalised [18], 
Natural 
16 Hazard Review (HR) I [18] Planning Novice, 
Normalised [18], 
Natural 
17 Human Reliability 
Assessment (HRA) 
I, QlA,QtA, R[18,49] Planning, Execution Normalised, 
Natural 
18 Incident Reporting  I[50], QtA Planning Normalised, 
Natural 
19 Interviews I [1,22,58], QlA 
[57],QtA[1], R[15] 
Conceptualisation, 
Planning, Execution 
Novice, 
Normalised, 
Natural 
20 Monte Carlo QtA [1,11,26,29,32] Planning Natural 
21 Pareto Analysis (PA) 
or ABC analysis 
QtA [18,51] Planning Natural 
22 Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
(PHA) 
I [52], QlA[52], P[52] Planning Novice, 
Normalised [18], 
Natural 
23 Risk Breakdown Matrix 
(RBM) 
I,QlA,QtA [23] 
 
Planning Normalised, 
Natural 
24 Risk Breakdown Structure 
(RBS) 
I [35] Conceptualisation,  
Planning 
Normalised, 
Natural 
25 Risk Mapping, Risk Matrix, 
Probability and Impact 
Matrix 
I, QlA [1,11,64,65] 
 
Planning Normalised, 
Natural 
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 Dimensions 
No. Technique Risk Management 
Phase 
Project Life Cycle Phase Level of 
Corporate 
Maturity 
26 Risk Probability and Impact 
Assessment, Risk Ranking/ 
Risk Index 
QlA [1], QtA Planning Normalised [18], 
Natural 
27 Sensitivity analysis QtA [1,11,26,32], R Planning, Execution  Natural 
28 Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities, and Threats 
(SWOT) 
I [54,58], QlA [29], R Conceptualisation, 
Planning 
Normalised, 
Natural 
29 SWIFT Analysis I, R[18] Planning Normalised, 
Natural 
30 What-if Analysis I, R[18] Conceptualisation, 
Planning 
Normalised [18], 
Natural 
31 “5 Whys” Technique I [18] Planning Natural 
Table 2. Classification of project risk management techniques 
Table 2 allows to characterise each technique based on the risk management phases, the 
project life cycle phases, and the degree of corporate maturity towards risk for which it is 
most suitable. However, it does not provide a global view of how all the analysed 
techniques fit into the dimensions. In order to overcome this limitation, two bi-dimensional 
charts are built. On the one hand, Figure 1 places the techniques on a Cartesian plane 
according to the phases of the risk management process (x-axis) and phases of the project 
life cycle (y-axis) for which they can be used. On the other hand, Figure 2 compares the 
same techniques but against the risk management phases (x-axis) and the corporate 
maturity towards risk (y-axis).     
These charts are intended to be a valuable mean to communicate and to stimulate 
knowledge creation about risk. They may be used by an organisation to select a set of 
techniques, discuss when they are appropriate, and decide which of them could be used, 
how, and in which part of the project and risk management processes. Also, such 
representations allow to make further considerations about the appropriateness of each 
technique. Figure 1 highlights that in the Planning phase of a project there are a lot of 
techniques that can be used. In fact, in this stage more time can be spent on strategic issues 
such as risk managing than in the Conceptualisation stage, which has usually a quite limited 
duration, and in the Execution stage, which is mainly focused on the achievement of the 
project objectives from an operational point of view. Figure 2 graphically proves the 
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relationship between the maturity towards risk and the phases of the risk management 
process that are carried out by a company. By considering the maturity model proposed by 
Hillson [37], a Novice level of maturity usually implies performing just risk identification. A 
Normalised maturity also involves a qualitative risk analysis and, in some limited cases, 
also risk response and monitoring and control. Finally, a Natural maturity is associated with 
undertaking the complete risk management process, from identification to monitoring and 
control, including the quantitative risk analysis. Therefore, the quantitative analysis of risk 
distinguishes companies with a Natural maturity level from companies having a 
Normalised maturity level. Additionally, in the Natural maturity level there is a complete 
integration between the project management and the risk management processes that allows 
a regular revision of the outputs of the applied risk techniques. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Risk technique mapping: risk management and project life-cycle phases 
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Figure 2. Risk technique mapping: risk management phases and corporate maturity levels 
5. Discussion 
Communication, information, and hence knowledge are the cardinal points for an attitude 
towards project risk management that goes beyond an informal approach limited to 
qualitative investigation. A systematic acquisition and organisation of information is a 
necessary step in order to move from a subjective knowledge about risk, that has to be 
elicited from experts, to an objective and easily accessible knowledge forming the condition 
for a quantitative risk analysis. The framework proposed in this chapter aims to help such 
transition by generating knowledge about the potentiality of application of common risk 
techniques.  
Some advantages can be identified. First of all, the developed taxonomy helps to understand 
how the project environment relates to risk techniques. Also, the suggested scheme provides 
guidelines about the most relevant dimensions that should be taken into account 
simultaneously in a risk management process, thus making it more comprehensive, even if 
it can never be complete because of the limited amount of available resources and the 
bounded rationality of human beings [66]. This generates knowledge based on the degree of 
maturity towards risk of the organisation running the project and such knowledge in turn 
increases the level of corporate awareness towards the instruments to tackle risk. 
Furthermore, the proposed framework benefits from being quite general, so that it can be 
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easily adapted to reflect the requirements of different industries. Finally, it is suitable to 
both small-scale and large-scale projects.   
Tangible and intangible benefits can be derived from the application of the framework. 
Tangible advantages are associated with decision-making and include an improved 
understanding of projects, giving as a consequence a better control over resources, the 
provision of a structured support to develop and implement monitoring strategies, and a 
better use of means to identify and assess risk with an inherent positive impact on the 
evaluation of contingencies. Among intangible benefits, facilitation of a rational risk taking 
and improvement of communication can be mentioned. The developed framework also 
encourages a more proactive approach to risk as a result of a well planned management 
process. All these characteristics ultimately emphasise the integration among project and 
risk management.   
However, the criteria and the classification of the techniques to support risk management 
have been derived exclusively from the available literature and from the authors’ 
experience. Empirically testing the outcomes of this study by applying them to real projects 
would be of great value to validate and refine the framework.  
Therefore, future research efforts will be directed towards the implementation of the 
framework in multiple project settings in representative industries. Enhancing the taxonomy 
by introducing further dimensions, such as the complexity level of a project and the degree 
of innovation of its product, will be considered. The degree of innovation of the product of a 
project is particularly interesting because it may be connected with the phases of the project 
life cycle. In fact, the more innovative is the outcome, the more the risk management process 
will be concentrated in the planning phase. Conversely, the less innovative the product the 
more the focus on risk in the execution phase. Additional evolutions will be concerned with 
a systematic analysis of the concepts of method, technique, and tool together with the study 
of the relationships among them, and with extending the framework to include new 
practices to support risk management. Finally, a further research line could deal with the 
integration of the proposed framework into a global project management process with the 
aim of overcoming the traditional separation between running a project and identifying, 
assessing, and controlling the associated risks.        
6. Conclusion 
The extreme importance of information and associated knowledge to ensure an effective 
management of risk demands paying greater attention both to the understanding of the 
effects of randomness in projects and to the learning of available means to capture this 
variability. The present work focuses on the second issue and introduces a framework to 
classify techniques supporting project risk management based on their purpose and the 
context for which they are most suitable. The main aim is incrementing communication and 
knowledge enabling a quantification of risk. The scheme is general and can be applied to 
very diverse projects in numerous industries.   
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1. Introduction 
Investors can potentially improve the risk-adjusted performance of their portfolios by 
investing internationally and thereby take advantage of the associated return and 
diversification benefits. The potential gains provided by emerging markets have attracted 
significant investor attention which, in turn, has led to substantial capital inflows to these 
economies. Local currency-denominated sovereign bonds have been the fastest growing 
market in emerging market space in the past few years. More recently, the global quest for 
yield in a context of accommodative monetary policies in the advanced economies has 
created a positive external environment for emerging market bonds. In addition, the 
secondary market for emerging market local currency debt has also been supported by high 
interest and amortisation payments. Emerging market bonds are also benefiting from a track 
record of strong risk-adjusted returns and low correlations with other asset classes. Such 
characteristics are attractive from a portfolio optimisation perspective. These attributes have 
also seen considerable attention devoted to analysis of the various risk-return attributes of 
these markets. In particular, recent empirical literature has focused on the characterisation of 
the volatility profile of emerging market bond returns. Indeed, the accurate estimation of 
volatility plays a central role in many applications in finance, including optimal portfolio 
selection (e.g., diversification strategies), valuation of derivatives (e.g., option pricing) and 
risk management (e.g., value-at-risk calculation). These applications have motivated an 
extensive empirical literature on volatility modelling.  
While recent empirical literature has focused on the characterisation of the volatility profile 
of a variety of asset classes; in particular, the long memory properties of these assets, 
surprisingly little attention has been devoted to the analysis of fixed income markets, 
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especially in emerging markets. The empirical literature on long memory dynamics of fixed 
income volatility and its implications for portfolio and risk management appears to be 
limited. Most of the extant literature appears concentrated in the advanced economies. For 
example, several authors have examined the various aspects of long memory behaviour in 
interest rates and yield spreads. [1-3] The purpose of this chapter is to augment this line of 
analysis concerning the long memory attributes of fixed income volatility in emerging 
market local currency debt market in light of investor interest in the potential alpha 
generation of these markets, amid wider capital inflows into emerging market bonds as 
investors search for yield. 
This study will focus on government bond markets from Hong Kong, Mexico and South 
Africa. According to the most recent survey from the Emerging Markets Trading 
Association (EMTA) these three local currency debt markets are among the most vibrant 
and actively traded in emerging markets. [4] As a result of their (comparatively high) 
liquidity, developed institutional frameworks and credible monetary policies, these markets 
are therefore of interest to investors. Indeed, local currency bond markets have emerged as 
an important asset class in many emerging markets; a point which becomes salient in the 
current low-yield environment, where investors targeting high returns and diversification 
benefits have channelled capital to emerging bond markets such as these. 
As a result of regulatory initiatives and various reforms, emerging market local currency 
sovereign debt markets have has grown rapidly in size and sophistication. According to [4], 
emerging market debt trading volumes were at USD1.8 trillion in the third quarter of 2011. 
This represents a 3 percent increase from the USD1.7 trillion reported for the second quarter 
of 2011. Turnover in local market instruments was at USD1.3 trillion in the third quarter of 
2011, (i.e., 76 percent of total reported volume). Mexican and Hong Kong securities were the 
first and second most frequently traded emerging market debt in the third quarter of 2011 at 
USD282 billion and USD176 billion, respectively compared to USD136 billion and USD201 
billion a year earlier. The next most frequently traded local markets debt were those from 
Brazil (USD160 billion), South African (USD113 billion) and Turkey (USD69 billion).1 
Domestic institutional investors are typically the largest investors in local currency bond 
markets. For example, pension funds tend to have long-term liabilities which are typically 
funded by investments in long-term investment grade securities that provide a prudent risk-
return profile. As a result, the examination of long memory in volatility would appear to be of 
interest to institutional and other long-term investors. Furthermore, it has been shown that it is 
important to model the long memory volatility structure when pricing derivative contracts 
with long maturity. [5] In addition, in order to assess future returns from both active and 
passive investment strategies or the need for policy intervention, especially over long horizons, 
it is important to forecast volatility. These applications have motivated an extensive empirical 
literature on modelling long memory dynamics in asset return data. Analysis of the long-term 
volatility dynamics of emerging market local currency bonds appear limited. Therefore, this 
                                                                 
1 Analysis is on Hong Kong, Mexico and South Africa due to the availability of data.   
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study attempts to help fill this gap by addressing a range of issues relating to the estimation 
and forecasting of fixed income return volatility especially over long horizons. 
Against this background, this paper has three objectives. First, evidence of long memory in 
volatility within leading emerging fixed income markets is investigated. In particular, the 
existence of long memory behaviour in the volatility of returns from Hong Kong, Mexico 
and South Africa are examined which appears to have little or no previous research 
establishing the existence of its long memory properties. In order to estimate the long 
memory parameter d, this study makes use of methods based on wavelets, which have been 
recently used to capture the fractal structure of high frequency data.[6] Second, the existence 
of long memory dynamics in bond volatility data (i.e., a fractal structure in the data) will be 
further investigated in order to test if the extraction of this long-run component can be 
exploited for purposes of generating improved volatility forecasts especially over long 
horizons. The long memory property is examined in order to determine if it helps deliver 
more accurate forecasts over a long(er) horizon. Third, an important and topical area of 
research concerns the calculation of value-at-risk (VaR) in financial markets. This 
methodology is widely used by financial institutions and regulatory agencies to measure, 
monitor and manage market risk. This analysis compares whether long memory volatility 
estimates can help deliver more accurate VaR estimates relative to standard models (i.e., 
GARCH and RiskMetrics). 
In total, the findings of this investigation will provide a range of volatility estimates and 
forecasts which could potentially inform portfolio management strategies and guide 
policymaking. In particular, while most empirical studies focus on the United States and 
other developed markets, recent research has begun to look at emerging markets, however, 
limited evidence exists with respect to these markets. This analysis contributes to the 
empirical literature by focusing on various aspects of long memory behaviour in local 
currency debt markets. The findings from this research complement those in previous 
studies and may provide an interesting comparison to existing studies. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section II presents a description of long 
memory in time series. Section III introduces the data. Section IV presents the empirical 
methodology and associated results. In particular, this starts with a presentation of the 
standard GARCH model which is often used to present initial evidence of long memory 
behaviour. Then the wavelet method and the estimator employed is introduced, along with 
the relevant findings. This includes a discussion on wavelet analysis, the discrete wavelet 
transform, the estimator employed and the relevant findings. Section V provides the forecast 
evaluation techniques used and the out-of-sample forecast results. Section VI considers the 
evaluation of value-at-risk in the context of the Basle adequacy criteria. Section VII 
concludes and identifies topics for further research. 
2. Long memory in time series 
Interest in long memory (or long range dependent) processes can be traced to the 
examination of data in the physical sciences. Formal models with long memory initially 
pertained to hydrological studies investigating how to regularise the flow of the Nile river 
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in view of its nonperiodic (flooding) cycles. [7] This feature was described as the “Joseph 
effect” alluding to the biblical reference in which seven years of plenty where to be followed 
by seven years of famine. [8] In this sense, long memory process concern observations in the 
remote past that are highly correlated with observations in the distant future.  The 
implications of long memory in financial markets was related to the use of Hurst’s ‘rescaled 
range’ statistic to detect long memory behaviour in asset return data. [9] It was observed 
that if security prices display long memory then the arrival of new market information 
cannot be arbitraged way, which in turn means that martingale models for security prices 
cannot be derived through arbitrage. As such, long memory processes can be 
characterised as having fractal dimensions, in the form of non-linear behaviour marked by 
distinct but nonperiodic cyclical patterns and long-term dependence between distant 
observations. [10] 
A variety of measures have been used to detect long memory in time series. For example, in 
the time domain, long memory is associated with a hyperbolically decaying autocovariance 
function.  Meanwhile, in the frequency domain, the presence of long memory is indicated by 
a spectral density function that approaches infinity near the zero frequency; in other words, 
such series display power at low frequencies. [11] Finally, a pattern of self-similarity in the 
aggregated sequences of a time series is an indicator of long memory (this refers to the 
property of a self-similar process, in which, different time aggregates display the same 
autocorrelation structure). These notions have led several authors to develop stochastic 
models that capture long memory behaviour, such as the fractionally-integrated I(d) time 
series models. [12-13] In particular, fractional integration theory asserts that the fractional 
difference parameter which indicates the order of integration, is not an integer value (0 or 
1) but a fractional value. Fractionally integrated processes are distinct from both 
stationary and unit-root processes in that they are persistent (i.e., they reflect long 
memory) but are also mean reverting and as a consequence provide a flexible alternative 
to standard I(1) and I(0) processes. [14] Specifically, the long memory parameter is given 
by  0, 0.5d  while when d > 0.5  the series is nonstationary and when  0.5, 0d   the 
series is antipersistent.   
Since, non-zero values of the fractional differencing parameter imply dependence between 
distant observations, considerable attention has been directed to the analysis of fractional 
dynamics in financial time series data. Indeed, long memory behaviour has been reported in 
the returns of various asset classes. [15] Against this background, a rapidly expanding set of 
models has been developed to capture long memory dynamics is asset return data.  
3. Data description 
The data analysed in this study are obtained from the global bond index (GBI) series for 
emerging markets (EM) compiled by JP Morgan. In particular, the fixed income data used 
comprise of daily total returns for Hong Kong, Mexico, and South Africa from December 31, 
2001 to April 9, 2012, representing 2571 observations.  
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More formally, the change in the local bond index ˆ can be expressed as: 
 1ˆ ˆ 1t t t       (1) 
where   is the local currency return and   is the currency return. 
 1 01t t t t tyield yield DV coupon return      and   11 1t t t tFX FX     and the 
coupon return is the return derived from the interest payment made on the fixed income 
product. Therefore, when an investor buys a local market index, equation (1) suggests that 
fixed income returns can be decomposed into its predictable coupon return, FX changes, and 
changes in local yields. Furthermore, in order to compute return volatility, this analysis 
focuses on squared daily returns, as a proxy for the volatility of the selected emerging 
markets. In addition, the volatility series is standardised prior to further analysis.  
4. Empirical methodology and results 
4.1. Preliminary observations 
Table 1 presents the time series properties of the data using some basic methods. The results 
of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test offer evidence in favour of stationary 
fixed income returns. While this test may be deficient in terms of its ability to capture an order 
of integration that may not be an integer, the finding of stationary bond returns is consistent 
with those of many previous studies. [15] However, based on the standard normality and 
Lagrange Multiplier ARCH tests, fixed income return data exhibit non-normality and ARCH 
effects. [16-17] These non-white noise characteristics of the data motivate estimation of 
GARCH(1,1) model using the assumption of the Student t distribution.  
 
 Mexico South Africa Hong Kong 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Normality test 
ARCH (5) test 
ARCH (10) test 
ADF unit root test: 
  Constant 
  Constant & Trend 
0.040496 
0.339043 
0.538071 
20.74158 
33829** 
64.97** 
42.23** 
 
-46.72** 
-46.81** 
0.040533 
0.381478 
-0.220239 
8.738281 
3546** 
92.71** 
53.92** 
 
-33.53** 
-32.88** 
0.017929 
0.186277 
-0.008431 
6.603305 
1390** 
72.38** 
47.92** 
 
-61.55** 
-61.57** 
Note:  
1/ ‘**’ and ‘*’ indicate statistical significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
2/ Normality test follows a Chi-squared distribution 
3/ ARCH (x) test follows an F-statistic with parameters (x, n-x)  
Table 1. Description of the Data 
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4.2. GARCH(1,1) model 
The GARCH (1,1) specification comprises a return (or mean) and a variance equation. In 
particular, the returns generating process can be described by:  
  1where 0,t t t t tr N h        (2) 
where tr  denotes the returns process, which may include autoregressive and moving 
average components, and εt is the error term, which is assumed to be normally distributed 
with zero mean and variance th , given the information set 1t . The conditional variance is 
modelled as: 
 2 1 1t t th h       (3) 
For th to be well-defined, , ,  and   are constrained to be non-negative. In addition, the 
unconditional variance is given by 2 / 1       and for a finite unconditional variance 
to exist α+β < 1. Furthermore, in the GARCH model the effect of a shock on volatility decays 
exponentially over time and the speed of decay is measured by the extent of volatility 
persistence (which is reflected in the magnitude and significance of the summation of the α 
and β parameters).   
The GARCH (1,1) model estimates are reported in Table 2. The results confirm the previous 
findings on the importance of GARCH effects by showing that the GARCH and ARCH 
terms are all statistically significant.  The parameters of the conditional variance equations 
are all positive and statistically significant. Furthermore, they satisfy the positivity 
constraint for the GARCH(1,1) model. Furthermore evidence of persistence in variance as 
measured by the GARCH model is reflected in the magnitude and significance of the ARCH 
and GARCH terms (indeed, as this sum approaches unity the greater the degree of 
persistence). Therefore, in order to have an indication of long memory in fixed income 
return volatility the level of volatility persistence (i.e., α+β) is assessed. 
The results indicate that volatility in these markets is very persistent, with the level of 
volatility persistence being 0.9775 for Mexico, 0.9782 for South Africa and 0.9912 for Hong 
Kong, which underscores the highly persistent nature of shocks to volatility, which also in 
turn is suggestive of a long memory component to volatility behaviour in these fixed income 
markets. The models’ appropriateness has also been checked by applying the Box-Pierce Q 
statistic test to standardised and squared standardised residuals. Basic diagnostics indicate 
that the GARCH models are well-specified. 
4.3. Wavelet analysis 
To estimate the long memory parameter d of emerging market local currency debt of Hong 
Kong, Mexico and South Africa this study considers methods based on the discrete wavelet 
transform. Wavelet analysis, plays an important role in the characterisation of time series, 
by detecting scaling structures in data. More precisely, since wavelets are localised both in 
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time and frequency, they provide a means to collect information on both the frequency and 
time characteristics of a time series. In fact, wavelets are already widely used as detectors of 
patterns in areas as diverse as digital signal processing and exploration geophysics. In the 
empirical finance literature they have recently been used to determine time-dependence in 
asset return data by comparing the scale decompositions of observations that exhibit 
significant autocorrelation between observations widely separated in time. [18] In this 
manner, the scaling properties of daily returns of emerging market government bonds are 
analysed in order to capture temporal dependencies in the volatility process.  
 
 Mexico South Africa Hong Kong 
ω 
α 
β 
Q(5) 1/ 
Q(5) 2/ 
Sign bias test 
Negative size bias test
Positive size bias test 
Joint test 
0.0029 [0.0006]** 
0.1245 [0.0166]** 
0.8530 [0.0170]** 
1.2197 
1.8322 
1.1775 
1.3357 
3.1661** 
7.7588** 
0.0031 [0.0007]** 
0.0756 [0.0118]** 
0.9026 [0.0123]** 
4.0842 
5.4248 
2.1147 
1.4692 
3.3072** 
8.3955 
0.0003 [0.0001]* 
0.0510 [0.0089]** 
0.9402 [0.0095]** 
1.0838 
1.3785 
2.6833 
2.2911 
5.6812** 
11.3702** 
Notes: 
1/ The Ljung-Box Q test applied to standardized residuals. 
2/ The Ljung-Box Q test applied to squared standardised residuals 
3/ The numbers in () and [] refer to lag lengths and standard deviations 
4/ ‘**’ and ‘*’ indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels 
Table 2. GARCH Estimates 
A wavelet is defined as a wave-like function with an amplitude that oscillates around zero 
and has a finite or quickly decreasing time support. These functions are well suited to locally 
approximating variables in time or space as they have the ability to be manipulated by being 
either ‘stretched’ or ‘squeezed’ so as to mimic the series under investigation. [19] The power of 
wavelet analysis is that it makes it possible to decompose a time series into its high- and low-
frequency components, which are localised in time. Wavelets, also allow the selection of an 
appropriate trade-off between resolution in the time and frequency domains, while traditional 
Fourier analysis stresses resolution in the frequency domain at the expense of the time domain. 
[20] Wavelets therefore provide a convenient and efficient method to analyse complex signals. 
[21] Wavelet theory is applicable to several subjects. They are especially useful where a signal 
(e.g. long memory) lasts for a finite time or shows markedly different behaviour in different 
time periods. These methods, have emerged as a useful tool in the empirical finance literature 
where long-run and short-run relationships can be distinguished. [22]  
4.4. The discrete wavelet transform 
A discrete wavelet transform (DWT) is any wavelet transform for which the wavelets are 
discreetly sampled, as is often the case in econometric analysis. A wavelet transform is a 
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scaling function used to transform a signal into a father    and mother    wavelet, 
where the former, are representations of a signal’s trend component (i.e., the approximation 
coefficients) and the latter represent the deviations from the trend component (i.e., the detail 
coefficients). The discrete wavelet series approximation to a continuous signal f(t) is given 
by 
        , , , , 1, 1, 1, 1,( )j k J k j k J k j k J k k k
k k k k
f t a t d t d t d t             (4) 
where j is the number of multi-resolution scales, and k ranges from 1 to the number of 
coefficients in the corresponding scale and the coefficients , , 1,, , ,J k J k ka d d are the wavelet 
transform coefficients. Applications of wavelet analysis with respect to time series analysis 
make use of a DWT. The DWT maps the vector f =  '1 2, , , nf f f  to a vector of wavelet 
coefficients, which contains ,j ka and , ,j kd  j = 1, 2, . . . , J, which are the approximation and 
detail coefficients, respectively.  
In the empirical literature, Haar and Daubechies wavelets represent typical wavelets and 
have been used in the characterisation of the time series properties of asset return data. The 
Haar wavelet is the simplest wavelet and provides a basis for studying more complex 
wavelets.2 Since a wavelet is used to decompose a given function into different scale 
components, it follows that each scale component can then be studied with a resolution that 
matches its scale. [23] 
The data used in this study are discreetly sampled, accordingly, the discrete wavelet 
transform is used, which permits the generation of the approximation coefficients,  ,j ka , 
which capture the trend of a time series and the detail coefficients,  ,j kd , reflecting the 
deviations from the trend at each scale. Because the original function can be represented in 
terms of a wavelet expansion, data operations can be performed using the corresponding 
wavelet coefficients. This leads to a continuum of time-scale representations of the signal, all 
with different resolutions. Hence, multi-resolution analysis, which allows the computation 
of the coefficients corresponding to the wavelet transform of the observed time series. 
The analysis of fractionally integrated processes through the use of wavelets is based on the 
result that the detail coefficients of a zero mean long memory process are asymptotically 
normally distributed with variance 2( )2 2 J j d   , where 2 is a finite constant, j is the scaling 
parameter and d measures long memory in the relevant volatility series. [24] To estimate d 
using wavelet theory, the logarithmic variance transformation regression estimator is 
widely used. This procedure is based on the exploitation of the variance of the detail 
coefficients at each scale, which generates a statistically consistent estimator of the long 
memory parameter. The estimator of the parameter of the fractional integration, d, is based 
on the following least squares regression: 
                                                                 
2 The Haar transform assumes a discrete signal and decomposes the signal into two sub-signals of half its length 
reflecting the trend process and fluctuations from the trend process. 
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   2( )2,ln ln ln 2 J jj kVar d d      (5) 
where  ,j kVar d  is the variance of the detail coefficients associated with the value of the 
scaling parameter j, where, j =1, . . ., J, and  is a random error term. Since the variance of 
the detail coefficients decomposes the variance of the initial time series over different scales, 
this permits an analysis of the dynamics of the series at each scale.  
To estimate d , this study uses multi-resolution analysis via the Haar wavelet to generate the 
respective detail coefficients of each volatility series at each dimension of scaling parameter. 
From here, the variance of the detail coefficients at each scale are computed and then the 
regression specified in equation (5) is performed, where the slope coefficient provides an 
estimate of d . To check for the robustness of the results, and, therefore, avoid spurious 
conclusions of long memory dynamics the Daubechies 4 (D4) wavelet is also examined.  
The regression results of this analysis are presented in Table 3 and 4. The slope coefficient of 
the regression given in equation (3) provides an estimate, d. Table 3 shows that, when the 
Haar wavelet is used, this study is able to find evidence of long memory across the three 
volatility measures used. The long memory parameter, d, ranges from 0.2363 (Mexico) to 
0.3423 (Hong Kong). Furthermore, the evidence obtained is significantly different from zero 
for all the fixed income markets. These results indicate that volatility realisations have a 
predictable component insofar as distant observations in the volatility series are associated 
with each other, albeit over long lags. The significant size of d obtained from this model 
illustrates the importance of modelling long memory in fixed income data. Furthermore, the 
result of d   (0, 0.5) from these models is in contrast to the findings from the unit root tests 
that led to a conclusion of d = 0.  
 
Volatility series Identifier Parameter Estimate Standard Error 2R  
Hong Kong Intercept 
Slope (d) 
1.4167** 
0.3423 
0.1288 
0.0310 
 
0.9396 
Mexico Intercept 
Slope (d) 
1.0344* 
0.2363** 
0.2958 
0.0281 
 
0.9164 
South Africa Intercept 
Slope (d) 
1.0151* 
0.2679** 
0.1989 
0.0664 
 
0.9172 
Notes: To estimate the long memory parameter d, the following regression is performed on the respective volatility 
series:    2,ln ln 2 ,J ji kVar d d      where  ,i kVar d  is the variance of the detail coefficients 
corresponding to the value of the scaling parameter       j = 1,. . . , J, and ε is the error term. ‘**’and ‘*’ indicate statistical 
significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
Table 3. Estimates of the Long Memory Parameter using the Haar Wavelet 
In econometric analysis, it is important to perform diagnostic checks in order to assess the 
validity of the initial estimates of d . Therefore, to avoid spurious evidence of long memory 
(due to the choice of wavelet employed) in the volatility process of the time series, equation 
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(4) is re-estimated using the Daubechies 4 (D4) wavelet. These results are presented in Table 
4. The results are broadly similar in magnitude to those obtained using the Haar wavelet. 
The noticeable exception relates to the case of South Africa where the long memory 
parameter falls from 0.2679 (when the Haar wavelet is used) to 0.1784 (when the D4 wavelet 
is used). This notwithstanding, the results are all statistically significant. In sum, the results 
of this analysis suggest that bond return volatility in emerging markets is characterised by 
stochastic processes which have a long memory component.  
 
Volatility series Identifier Parameter Estimate Standard Error 2R  
Hong Kong Intercept 
Slope (d) 
1.0822** 
0.3577** 
0.0105 
0.0887 
 
0.8953 
Mexico Intercept 
Slope (d) 
1.5824** 
0. 2611* 
0.1996 
0.1083 
 
0.9076 
South Africa Intercept 
Slope (d) 
1.6585** 
0.1784** 
0.2210 
0.1575 
 
0.9412 
Notes: To estimate the long memory parameter d, the following regression is performed on the respective volatility 
series:    2,ln ln 2 ,J ji kVar d d      where  ,i kVar d  is the variance of the detail coefficients 
corresponding to the value of the scaling parameter       j = 1,. . . , J, and ε is the error term. ‘**’ and ‘*’ indicate statistical 
significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
Table 4. Estimates of the Long Memory Parameter using the Daubechies 4 Wavelet 
The analysis indicates robust evidence of long memory behaviour in the return volatility of 
emerging market debt. Further, wavelet methods provide a robust fit for the data as 
evidence by the 2R readings presented in the final columns of both Table 3 and 4. If fixed 
income data exhibit long memory, then it displays significant autocorrelation between 
distant observations. This, in turn, implies that the series realisations may have a predictable 
component; and, perhaps, past trends in the data can be used to predict future volatility. 
Therefore, attention now turns to an exploration of the forecast performance of models with 
long memory relative to the standard volatility models. 
5. Volatility forecasting  
The evidence accumulated so far suggests that fixed income return volatility in emerging 
markets follows a long memory process. This, in turn, implies the existence of fractional 
dynamics in the data which may be exploited to potentially construct improved volatility 
forecasts, especially over longer forecasting horizons. In order to evaluate the forecasting 
performance of long memory models (especially over long(er) horizons) versus short 
memory models (i.e., the GARCH model), the respective data sets are simply split in half 
and then each model is estimated for all series covering the first part of the sample and then 
these estimates are used to forecast volatility over the sample period covered by the second 
half of the data. In this manner, out-of-sample forecast accuracy is evaluated. In addition to 
calculating the daily forecasts, this study also calculates monthly forecasts using the well-
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known property that volatility forecasts are additive, such that the sum of five daily 
volatility forecasts produces the weekly forecasts. And, the summation of weekly forecasts 
produces monthly forecasts. 
In addition to the GARCH and long memory model the RiskMetrics model is also 
considered for comparative purposes. The RiskMetrics model was popularised by the 
investment bank JP Morgan and is widely used by financial institutions to model and 
forecast volatility, especially in the context of the Basle Committee adequacy criteria. This 
model is essentially an exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA). Under the 
EWMA, the fitted variance from the model, ,th  which provides the multi-step ahead 
volatility forecast, is a weighted function of the immediately preceding volatility forecast 
and actual volatility is given below: 
  1 1ˆ1t t th h h      (6) 
where 0 1  is the smoothing parameter, such that when  = 0 the model reduces to a 
random walk process and when  =1 the model is equivalent to the prior period forecast of 
volatility. The value of  is determined empirically by the value that minimizes the ‘in-
sample’  sum of squared prediction errors. In this study  is set to 0.94 following standard 
market practice, which is also consistent with previous research which indicates that this 
value produces accurate forecasts. [25] 
5.1. Standard forecast evaluation 
Two standard symmetric measures are used to evaluate forecast accuracy, namely, the mean 
absolute error (MAE) and the root mean square error (RMSE). They are defined below:  
 2
1
1 T f
t t
t T
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


 
   (7) 
  22
1
1 T f
t t
t T
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


 
    (8) 
where  is the number of forecast data points and 2tr is the proxy for volatility . Both the 
MAE and RMSE assume the underlying loss function to be symmetric. Furthermore, under 
these evaluation criteria the model which minimises the loss function is preferred.  
Table 5 reports out-of-sample performance of the estimated models based on the MAE and 
RMSE forecast error statistics. At the daily level, the results are not unexpected. That is, the 
GARCH model dominates forecast accuracy for South Africa on the basis of both the MAE 
and RMSE. For Mexico, the GARCH model dominates forecast performance on the basis of 
the MAE while the RiskMetrics models delivers the most accuracy when the RMSE is used 
as a criterion. For Hong Kong the GARCH process is preferred on the basis of the MAE, 
which surprisingly, the long memory model delivers the best performance when the RMSE 
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is used as a reference. However, in some cases the forecast accuracy of all the models are 
close; for instance at the daily level the forecast MAE statistics for the GARCH, RiskMetrics 
and FIGARCH models are virtually indistinguishable. More generally, the findings of 
GARCH superiority at the daily level are consistent with a wide empirical literature 
attesting to the forecast superiority of the GACH model at forecasting volatility over daily 
frequencies or short horizons.  
 
Model GARCH RiskMetrics FIGARCH 
Forecast Error
Statistic 
MAE RMSE MAE RMSE MAE RMSE 
Hong Kong 1.84e-05* 2.82e-04 3.36e-05 8.09e-04 2.73e-04 1.92e-05* 
Mexico 1.91e-04 3.18e-04* 4.49e-05* 5.72e-04 6.22e-05 6.73e-04 
South Africa 2.63e-05* 1.83e-04* 2.82e-04 1.95e-04 2.88e-05 2.31e-04 
Notes: ‘*’ indicates the preferred model. 
Table 5. Daily Forecast Results 
At the monthly level (i.e., at a longer horizon) the GARCH model also delivers the most 
accurate results. This finding is surprising. Long memory implies that widely separated 
observations are associated with each other which in turn suggests that volatility 
realizations are connected over long lags. The results shows that at even comparatively 
longer horizons the GARCH model still delivers the most accurate volatility forecasts. 
Indeed, Table 6 shows that the forecast MAE statistics for Mexico and South Africa are 
3.13e-03 and 3.92e-03, respectively, which are smaller than those from long memory 
models. The same results holds true for the forecast RMSE error statistics. For Hong Kong 
fixed returns This result appears to suggest that long memory models while theoretically 
appealing are not particularly helpful in deriving accurate volatility forecast especially 
over long horizons.  
 
Model GARCH RiskMetrics FIGARCH 
Forecast Error 
Statistic 
MAE RMSE MAE RMSE MAE RMSE 
Hong Kong 4.27e-04 2.26e-03* 2.35e-03* 4.09e-03 4.39e-04 4.17e-03 
Mexico 3.13e-03* 4.66e-03 5.72e-03 4.31e-03* 4.58e-03 6.30e-03 
South Africa 3.92e-03* 4.23e-03* 4.89e-03 4.82e-03 4.27e-03 4.31e-03 
Notes: ‘*’ indicates the preferred model. 
Table 6. Monthly Forecast Results 
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6. Value-At-Risk evaluation 
VaR is a widely used measure to capture the exposure of a portfolio to market risk. The VaR 
of a position describes the expected maximum loss over a target horizon within a given 
confidence interval due to an adverse movement in the relevant fixed income yield (or 
price). VaR is now widely used as an internal risk management tool by financial institutions 
and as a regulatory measure of risk exposure. [26] In addition, the VaR method is the 
cornerstone of the 1996 market risk amendment to the Basle Accord (Bank of International 
Settlements, (BIS), 1996). The Basle Accord prescribes the VaR method in order that financial 
institutions can meet the capital requirements to cover the market risk they incur in the 
process of their daily business operations. Under this framework, operational evaluation 
takes the form of backtesting volatility forecasts and exception reporting.  
In particular, the Basle Accord stipulates that for the purpose of calculating regulatory 
market risk capital it is required that VaR estimates be calculated at the 99 percent 
probability level using daily data over a minimum sample period of at least one business 
year (equivalent to 250 trading days) and that these estimates be updated at least every 
quarter (i.e., 60 trading days). Against this background, the well-known delta-normal 
specification is employed: 
 3fVaR N h V  (9) 
where N is the appropriate standard normal deviate, 
fh is the volatility forecast, the 
number three represents the minimum regulatory Basle multiplicative factor and V  is the 
initial portfolio value. While Basle Accord prescribes a 99 percent probability the 97.5 
percent and 95 percent confidence level is also examined for greater comprehensive and 
consistency with previous studies. The validity of such VaR calculations are assessed or 
‘backtested’ by comparing actual daily trading (net) losses with the estimated VaR and 
noting the number of ‘exceptions’, in the sense of days when the VaR estimate was 
insufficient to cover actual trading losses. Regulatory scrutiny is therefore triggered where 
such exceptions occur frequently, and in practice this leads to a range of penalties for the 
financial institution concerned. [27]  
In line with the rolling window approach to VaR evaluation mandated by the Basle 
Committee rules initial volatility forecasts and VaR measures are constructed over intervals 
of 60 trading days, with the initial estimation sample then rolled forward and the models 
updated every 60 observations before the next set of volatility forecasts are produced. The 
first 3-years of data (representing 752 observations) are used for initial model parameter 
estimation, leaving 1819 observations for volatility forecasting and the construction and 
evaluation of VaR measures. Specifically, this provides 30 sub-samples of 60 trading days 
length over which VaR is assessed. This assessment is conducted through appraisal of the 
out-of-sample VaR failure rates associated with VaR measures constructed using the 
forecast values of those volatility measures. The assessment of VaR performance is 
conducted through appraisal of the ‘out-of-sample’ VaR failure rates associated with VaR 
measures constructed using the forecast values derived from the GARCH, RiskMetrics and 
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long memory model. The focus on the ‘out-of-sample’ failure rates is motivated by the 
requirements of risk managers, who obtain VaR estimates in real time and must use 
parameters obtained from an already observed sample in order to evaluate the risks 
associated with current and future random movements in risk factors. As a result, credible 
test of VaR construction methods under alternative volatility forecasting models is their 
performance outside the sample used to estimate the underlying parameters. 
Table 7 reports the out-of-sample VaR failure rates. The results are very diverse and 
highlight that in many of the markets considered the forecasting model that minimises the 
percentage number of daily VaR exceedances is sensitive to the specification of the 
probability level. When the Basle Committee rules are applied (i.e., the 99 percent 
probability level) the results indicate that the GARCH and RiskMetrics that provide the 
exceedance-minimising method for the fixed income markets considered. At the 99 percent 
probability level the long memory model is the generally the weakest performer. However, 
in the case of Hong Kong and South Africa the long memory model is second best model in 
terms of delivering accurate VaR measures. In addition, it is important to note that in many 
cases is level of accuracy between the various models is close as reflected by the closeness of 
the VaR failure rates.  At the 97.5 and 95 percent probability levels model performance is 
more varied with all models demonstrating varied degrees of accuracy. As a generalization, 
these results are mixed but the evidence suggests that at the Basle prudential level the 
simpler models help in providing improved VaR estimates that minimise occasions when 
the minimum capital requirement identified by the VaR methodology would have fallen 
short of actual trading losses.  
 
 Hong Kong Mexico South Africa 
model 99% 97.5% 95% 99% 97.5% 95% 99% 97.5% 95% 
RM 
GARCH 
FIGARCH 
0.0178* 
0.0192 
0.0185 
0.0347 
0.0256* 
0.0391 
0.0224* 
0.0536 
0.0493 
0.0154 
0.0152* 
0.0179 
0.0326 
0.0312 
0.0297* 
0.0378 
0.0356* 
0.0521 
0.0224 
0.0192* 
0.0222 
0.0311 
0.0286* 
0.0303 
0.0218* 
0.0261 
0.0323 
Notes: 
1. VaR is value-at-risk 
2. RM is the RiskMetrics model, GARCH is the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity and 
FIGARCH is the fractionally integrated GARCH. 
3. Model failure rates are the number of exceptions divided by the number of observations. 
4. ‘*’ (asterisks) denote the preferred model. 
Table 7. VaR Failure Rates – Out-of-Sample 
7. Conclusions 
Recent empirical evidence concerning the nature of volatility dynamics in fixed income 
markets suggests the existence of a long memory component. Since volatility in fixed 
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income returns is an important aspect of portfolio management it is essential to accurately 
characterise the time series properties of fixed income volatility especially in the context of 
emerging markets where local currency-denominated sovereign bonds have been the fastest 
growing market in recent years.  Accordingly, the objective of this analysis was to examine 
the existence of long memory behaviour in the volatility structure of total return indices for 
the local currency bond markets of Hong Kong, Mexico and South Africa. Against this 
background, the long memory parameter is estimated using methods based on wavelets, 
which have gained prominence in recent years. Furthermore, this study has compared and 
evaluated the performance of a long memory model versus a standard volatility models (the 
ubiquitous GARCH and RiskMetrics processes) in order to evaluate their power in 
delivering accurate volatility forecasts over long(er) horizons in an out-of-sample setting. 
This endeavour is motivated by recognition of the importance of accurate volatility forecasts 
in a wide range of applications, including tactical and strategic decision making and the 
limited empirical evidence available to date for emerging fixed income markets. Then, the 
performance of the standard GARCH, RiskMetrics and FIGARCH models are evaluated in 
the context of value-at-risk (VaR) estimation given the Basle regulatory framework.  
The main findings of this research are threefold. First, evidence of long memory is 
conclusively demonstrated in emerging market local currency sovereign debt markets. In 
addition, to counteract the possibility of finding spurious evidence of long memory a variety 
of wavelet forms are considered. The findings from these tests are complementary and 
therefore suggest that the finding of long memory is not spurious. Second, the presence of a 
long memory structure in the volatility of these fixed income markets suggests volatility 
observations in the recent past and the remote past are associated with each other. Since the 
series realisations are not independent over time then past volatility may potentially be 
exploited to predict future volatility, especially over long horizons. Accordingly, the out-of-
sample forecasting performance of the long memory model and the standard GARCH and 
RiskMetrics models are compared. While, none of the estimated models consistently 
outperforms the others, a key generalisation can be made. In particular, on the basis of the 
forecast MAE and RMSE statistics it is shown that the information content of long memory 
models does not consistently generate improved volatility forecasts, especially over long 
horizons, relative to the standard GARCH model. Indeed, the GARCH model generally 
provides the most accurate forecasts at the monthly horizon. With respect to VaR 
estimation, the results show that both the standard GARCH and RiskMetrics models 
generally deliver more accurate VaR measures relative to the long memory process.  
These findings have three important implications. First, the exploitation of long memory 
models based on wavelet analysis may not have great relevance in the context of emerging 
market debt in terms of delivering superior forecast performance. Second, the existence of a 
long memory structure in volatility is not an essential condition for the derivation of 
accurate volatility forecasts at any time horizon, especially over a long horizon. Indeed, this 
research suggests that long memory models appear to be of limited practical forecast value, 
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especially over long horizons, for Hong Kong, Mexico and South Africa. Put differently, the 
computational complexity of long memory modelling is not commensurate with the benefits 
(in terms of forecast power). Third, the results of the VaR estimation may provide guidance 
on more effective prudential standards for operational risk measurement and, as result, may 
help ensure adequate capitalisation and reduce the probability of financial distress. The 
results highlight the importance of using out-of-sample forecasting techniques and the 
stipulated probability level for the identification of methods that minimise the occurrence of 
VaR exceptions. Standard models – RiskMetrics and GARCH – that are already widely used 
by market participants are generally shown to outperform the more computationally 
intensive wavelet-derived FIGARCH model in estimating VaR across the probability levels 
considered. 
In sum, this research has evaluated the long memory properties of return volatility in fixed 
income markets. This paper also complements the literature on long memory models and 
the forecast performance of these models that has attracted interest in other asset classes. In 
addition, the results of this study may potentially be used to inform portfolio and risk 
analysis. In particular, it is shown that in the context of VaR estimation existing models 
based on the GARCH and/or RiskMetrics process are more accurate (and simpler) than their 
long memory counterpart. Some caveats to these results exist, however. First, squared 
returns provide a noisy proxy for the ‘true’ volatility. In the case of this analysis, data 
constraints limited alternative options. However, future research may find that the 
application of realised variance may produce more accurate forecasts. Second, future 
research may also consider exploring the relevance of other long memory models, for 
example, models with asymmetric effects given that market volatility is often reported as 
being ‘directional’, i.e., volatility is higher in a down – than an upmarket.  
Author details 
Pako Thupayagale 
Bank of Botswana, Botswana 
8. References 
[1] McCarthy J, Pantolon C, Li HC.  Investigating long memory in yield spreads. J Fixed 
Income. 2009; 19(1) : 73-81. 
[2] Schotman PC, Tschernig R, Budek J. Long memory and the term structure of risk. J 
Financ Econ. 2008; 6: 459-97. 
[3] McCarthy J, DiSario R, Saraoglu H, Li H. Tests of long-range dependence in interest 
rates using wavelets. Q Rev Econ & Financ. 2004; 44: 180-9. 
[4] Emerging market trading association. Third quarter 2011 debt trading volume survey 
supplementary analysis.  2011. EMTA. 
Long Memory in the Volatility of Local Currency Bond Markets:  
Evidence from Hong Kong, Mexico and South Africa 113 
[5] Bollerslev T, Mikkelsen HO. Modelling and pricing long memory in stock market 
volatility. J Econometrics. 1996; 73: 151-84. 
[6] Gencay R, Selcuk F, Whitcher B. Scaling properties of foreign exchange volatility. Phys 
A, 2001; 249-66. 
[7] Hurst HE. Long-term storage capacity of reservoirs. Transactions of the  American 
Society of Civil Engineers. 1951; 116: 770-99. 
[8] Mandelbrot BB, Wallis J. Noah, Joseph and operational hydrology. Water Resources 
Research. 1968; 4: 909-18. 
[9] Mandelbrot BB. When can price be arbitraged efficiently? A limit to the validity of the 
random walk and martingale models. Rev Econ Stat. 1971; 53: 225-236. 
[10] Mandelbrot BB. Fractals: form, chance and dimensions. New York: Free Press. 1977. 
[11] Lo A. A long-term memory in stock market prices. Econometrica. 1991; 59(5): 1279-1313. 
[12] Granger CWJ, Joyeux R. An introduction to long-memory time series models and 
fractional differencing. J Time Series Analysis. 1980; 1(1), 15-29. 
[13] Hosking JRM. Fractional differencing. Biometrika. 1981; 1(1), 165-76. 
[14] Baillie RT. Long memory processes and fractional integration in econometrics. J 
Econometrics. 1996; 73(1): 5-59. 
[15] Poon SH. A practical guide to forecasting financial market volatility. John Wiley & Sons 
Ltd: Chichester; 2005. 
[16] Jarque CM, Bera AK. A test of normality of observations and regression residuals. Int 
Stat Rev. 1987; 55:163-72. 
[17] Engle RF. Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity with estimates of the variance 
of United Kingdom inflation. Econometrica. 1982; 50: 987-1007. 
[18] DiSario R, Li H, McCarthy J, Saraoglu H. Long memory in the volatility of an emerging 
equity market: the case of Turkey. J International Financial Markets Instittions &  
Money. 2008; 18: 305-12. 
[19] Jensen M. Using wavelets to obtain a consistent ordinary least squares estimator of the 
fractional differencing parameter. J Forecasting. 1999; 18: 17-32. 
[20] Gencay R, Selcuk F, Whitcher B. An introduction to wavelets and other filtering 
methods in finance and economics. Academic Press: San Diego; 2002. 
[21] Ramsey JB. Wavelets in economics and finance: past and future. Stud Nonlinear Dyn E. 
2002; 6(3): 1-27. 
[22] Aussem A, Campbell J, Murtagh F. Wavelet-based feature extraction and 
decomposition strategies for financial forecasting. J Computational Intelligence Financ. 
1998; March/April: 5-12.  
[23] Mallat, SG. A theory for multiresolution signal decomposition: the wavelet 
representation. IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence.  1989; 
11: 674-693. 
[24] Jensen M. An alternative maximum likelihood estimator of long-memory processes 
using compactly supported wavelets. J Econ Dyn Control. 2000; 24: 361-387. 
 
Risk Management – Current Issues and Challenges 114 
[25] Fleming J, Kirby C, Ostdiek B. The economic value of volatility timing. J Financ. 2001; 
56: 329-455. 
[26] Jorion P. Value at risk. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill; 2007. 
[27] Saunders A, Cornett MM. Financial institutions management: a risk management 
approach. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill; 2003. 
Chapter 0
Risk Management in Collaborative Systems
Marius Ioan Podean and Dan Benta
Additional information is available at the end of the chapter
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/50844
1. Introduction
Many domains reached a point in which the knowledge required for skillful, professional
practice can no longer be acquired in a decade, factor that generates increased specialization
[2]. This increased specialization makes collaboration crucial because complex problems
require more knowledge than any particular person possesses. The relevant information
required to solve complex problems is normally distributed among different persons or
stakeholders. In order to create insight, new ideas or new artifacts it is considered a
prerequisite to bring different and often controversial points of view together, and create a
shared understanding among stakeholders. It is generally considered that insight moments
for creative individuals are the result of working in isolation, but it has been proven that the
role of interaction and collaboration is critical [19].
Collaboration is a very dynamic process that combines functionality that supports
communication, management and involves content handling. During the execution of
a project team members are not always collaborating and their work alternates with
cooperation, when a greater emphasis is placed on a value-chain model of producing results.
Project management is a tool used to provide a team the capabilities required to produce
the benefits defined by vision [24]. Risk management is a critical element in defining the
relationship between risks, uncertainty and objectives thus contributing to the chances of
success in the execution of a project [9]. In the present context of information society both
project and risk management should reconsider collaboration by thoroughly understanding
its mechanisms and adapting its tools in order to fully harness it. In this study we will
present some of the main aspects regarding collaboration that are relevant in order to build
an efficient project and risk management strategy. This will be followed by some approaches
from software development that we consider relevant for the context and present our risk
management approach for similar projects.
2. Collaboration
The term collaboration is used often when one refers to quite different aspects of working
together, like cooperation or even communication [33]. Focusing on national programs that
©2012 Podean and Benta, licensee InTech. This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
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involve agencies, David Osher [30] identifies collaboration as being the most sophisticated
level of relationship because it requires efforts to unite people and organizations in order to
achieve common goals that could not be achieved by any single individual or organization
acting alone.
On the other hand, in [15] collaboration is regarded from a more project management
oriented point of view focusing on the elements required to achieve this level of relationship.
Collaboration is identified as a process in which entities share information, resources and
responsibilities to jointly plan, implement, and evaluate a program of activities to achieve
a common goal. Following this author, collaboration is a process of shared creation that
involves mutual engagement of participants to solve a problem together and implies sharing
risks, resources, responsibilities, and rewards. Sharing risks, resources, responsibilities, and
rewards can also give the group to an outside observer the image of a joint identity.
This approach implies that collaboration is more than what will later see that is identified
as cooperation by adding joint identity and novelty to the goal. Michael Schrange in his
Shared Minds [37] focuses especially on this novelty of the group’s goal. Schrange considers
collaboration as a process of shared creation: two or more individuals with complementary
skills interacting to create a shared understanding that none had previously possessed or
could have come to on their own.
Collaboration is often confused with cooperation. Because for many people the two terms
are indistinguishable [15], in the following we will take a closer look at what collaboration is
and how can it be attained. One general accepted model that describes what is collaboration
and what are its main components is the 3C Collaboration Model [15]. This model states
that collaboration is attainable by implementing three main processes: communication
(networking), coordination and cooperation.
Communication [22] is the starting process in each collaborative process. It is a general belief
that efficient or so to say “ideal” communication will provide better common understanding
or agreement but when people communicate accurately they realize more precisely the
differences that exist on their perspectives of the concepts in use [18]. Different types of
agreement tend to mask the differences in perception that accurate communication would
uncover.
The second process required by the 3C model is coordination. Coordination refers to [22] the
management of people, their activities and resources. Coordination allows team members
to manage conflicts and activities in order to increase the efficiency of communication and
cooperation efforts. Networking or communication is used as a foundation [45] but involves
also altering activities for mutual benefit and for a common goal. It also increases resource
usage efficiency and the ability to meet the targets.
Cooperation refers to the interaction among group members in order to produce, manipulate,
and organize information, or build and refine cooperation objects like documents,
spreadsheets etc. [22] This process requires a shared workspace that should provide the
required tools in order to manage these artifacts, tools like version and access control and
authorization. The shared workspace is very important because it allows group members to
count on group memory and it provides also some basic awareness mechanisms.
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Cooperation, coordination and collaboration are often used interchangeably, but they should
be describing different stages in the transformation of the relationship between groups and
organizations [30].
The backbone of collaboration is not the process of relationship but the strict following of
a specific result [18]. We consider that an extra element must be added to the 3C model of
collaboration, namely “Creativity”. In order to support creativity in collaborative systems we
consider that a) integrated light-weight project and risk management, and b) flexible content
management tools have to be implemented [33].
Figure 1. The 4C Collaboration model [33].
In order to discuss about collaboration, a key prerequisite must be satisfied, namely having
a joint/ compatible goal or problem to solve (it is not enough that parties have their own
individual goals) [15]. A vision specifies the scope and extent of these benefits but does not
provide the means to attain them. Project management is a tool used to provide a team the
capabilities required to produce the benefits defined by vision [24]. Vision delineates a strategy
and project management sets the tactics by detailing the steps required to put it in practice.
Teams can successfully implement their vision if they can bind it with the tactics.
Hilson [24] identified that a “zero risk” zone not also that it does not exist, but it is not even
desirable because the available benefits are determined by the degree of risk it is confronted.
Risk is defined as [35] “any uncertain event or set of circumstances that, should it occur,
would have an effect on one or more objectives”. Thus an uncertainty that does not effect
the objectives is not a risk, but it can even be an opportunity. Risk management it is an
important component in defining the relationship between risks, uncertainty and objectives
thus contributing to the chances of success in the execution of a project.
Project management is about making complexity manageable and it is important to
collaboration because it provides teams an organized way of keeping in touch with their
goals. As defined by The Project Management Institute (PMI) [35], project management is
“the application of knowledge, skills, tools, and techniques to project activities to meet the
project requirements”.
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Project risk management provides approaches by which uncertainty can be understood,
assessed, and managed within projects. One of the key prerequisites of success in
implementing risk management is to have a proactive approach. This process must
supplement project management and must follow a holistic approach. Risk management will
not provide great benefits to the teams using it if their practices fall under two limitations:
focus on tactics and focus on threats [24].
3. Creativity
The rationality behind collaboration is creativity. Creativity, and especially scientific creativity,
is a process of achieving an outcome that is recognized as innovative by the relevant
community. As defined in [16], this process does not occur in one person’s head, but in the
interaction between that person’s thoughts and a sociocultural context.
Creativity can refer to the work of artists, but can also refer to every-day problem-solving
abilities. This type of creativity is essentially, equally significant because enables people to
become more productive and make better results. Support for divergent and convergent
thinking, development of shared objectives and reflexivity[20] are identified as key
requirements for creativity.
Divergent thinking represents the ability to return in response to a challenge or undertaking an
extensive set of alternatives, responses, ideas or opinions [20]. On the other hand, convergent
thinking represents the ability to narrow down to one set of alternatives and is comparable
with consensus building. If a group manages to build trust, uninhibited exchange of ideas
and mutual support, each member can use the mind of the other as an extension of his own.
At this stage, each person acts as a critic for the other and ideas are reworked into components
of a shared vision. Cognitive conflicts within groups that use brainstorming effectively can
alleviate divergent thinking. This stimulates thoughtful consideration of new and innovative
ideas during brainstorming in a collaborative interaction[20]. Colleagues disagreement can
result in evolutionary thinking, viewed as a series of small alterations that cause substantial
changes in a concept.
Minority dissent [20] stimulates a reappraisal of a situation manifested in the search for
further information and the use of thoughts and strategies about the issue. Some studies
have shown that arguments can stimulate creative solutions even when wrong. Dissent
stimulates both divergent and convergent thinking; the minority’s consistency in advocating
his opposition during convergent thinking may cause questions about the majority position,
resulting therefore in making better decisions.
Clarity of goals is a necessary requirement for creativity flow [16] but team members have to
take in consideration how they express these goals. Having clear objectives helps convergent
thinking filter with greater precision. Developing shared objectives is a necessary condition
for creativity because it requires group members to share their domain-specific knowledge
and generates less resistance to change.
Upgrading from 3C to collaboration starts with the development of shared goals. Shared goals
are more that common or compatible goals because they provide the team a joint identity
by eliminating the value-chain model of building a common understanding or result. A
component that supports the definition of a shared vision and a description of this vision
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in terms of shared goals is essential. This must allow users to (re)adjust their goals according
to the changes in the environment [31].
Obtaining immediate feedback is essential in having complete participation in the task at hand
[17, p. 54]. In the context of a group, this refers to the extent to which members collectively
reflect on the group’s objectives. This process is known as reflexivity and consists of three
elements: reflection, planning and action or adaptation [20].
In order to allow creativity to develop in a group, requirements like support for reflexivity
must be implemented [20]. Reflexivity is built on processes like:
1. reflection: consists in evaluating, filtering and selection of ideas that will be further taken
in consideration.
2. planning: is one the main subprocesses of project management and its main relevance for
creativity is that it guides member’s attention towards action and means of accomplishing
their goals. Good planning reveals hidden aspects of the task at hand and is a good support
in motivating team members.
3. action or adaptation: adaptation is actually a simple process of risk management because it
represents a continuous adaptation of tasks and objectives in concordancewith the changes
in the environment. Integrated risk management tools are a must in order to identify,
mitigate and define action plans that cover decisions at both strategic and tactics level and
include not only threats but opportunities also [24].
In order to make planning more accessible and easy to access process maps are identified
as a solution [40]. The process map should be derived from the project management and
risk mitigation plan. It’s main purpose it to i) provide an clear understanding of the hole
workflow involved in reaching a goal, and ii) to supply a open delineation of the responsibility
distribution. This is particularly useful in avoiding responsibility overlapping or uncovered
responsibility areas. A mechanism that can manage the sequence of tasks and their execution
for a particular process is required in order to enable the coordination process.
Reflection [20] is based on critical thinking, which is a form of thinking that is focused,
disciplined, consistent and constrained. Critical thinking can be associated with convergent
thinking because it implies evaluating what divergent thinking offers, filters it using
acceptability criteria and selects the ideas that will be also taken in consideration.
Planning [20] creates conceptual readiness for relevant opportunities and guides group
member’ attention towards actions and means to achieve goals. Planning generates high
reflexivity if during the process factors like potential problems, hierarchical ordering and
short/ long term planning are taken in consideration.
Action or adaptation [20] refers to the continuous renegotiation of group’s reality during
interaction between groupmembers, andmembers and the environment. Adaptation consists
in goal-directed behaviors that are relevant to achieving the desired changes in group
objectives, strategies and processes identified by the group during the stage of reflection.
Risk management is used to identify, mitigate and define action plans for the full range of
uncertainty, including both risks and opportunities.
Serendipity represents the possibility of making unexpected and fortunate discoveries and
consists in a) discovering new pieces of information that can lead thinking to new ideas,
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and b) the sagacity needed to make the connections between different pieces of information
[1]. Computers can help develop serendipity by i) revealing stimulating connections, and ii)
supporting either the growth or the sharing of an idea.
Creative activities are the result of the relationship between an individual [2] and the realm
of his or her work, and other human beings. The resolution of complex problems is based
on different aspects of knowledge that reside in the minds of individual stakeholders as
tacit knowledge [2]. Full agreement may not always be achievable but what is decisive is
to make informed compromises. This can be achieved by using the so called symmetry
of ignorance [2]. Symmetry of ignorance is also highly valuable in identifying risks that
may affect the team’s goal negatively. Stakeholders bring perspectives to the collaborative
process, perspectives that are of considerable importance in framing the problem. This
concept requires externalizations or boundary objects that capture distinct domains of human
knowledge.
At the core of intelligent human performance, is not the individual human mind in isolation,
but the interaction [2] of the mind with (i) tools and artifacts, and (ii) groups of minds in
interaction with each other. In the first case, the interaction with externalization objects is
straightforward, the knowledge an individual needs is distributed between his head and the
world - an address book, a file system, etc. In the second one, the need for such objects
becomesmore critical because the distribution of knowledge has to be available to all members
implicitly.
Externalization objects are essential to collaboration [2] because they a) create and store mental
effort records, evidence that is outside the memory; and b) represent artifacts that provide
information and form the basis for critique and debate. Very valuable assets for a group or
organization are not only the results but also the way people think, the way they get to god
results. It is a significant challenge to try to capture the thinking process in tools that are
remarkably easy and intuitive to use.[31]
4. Agile team management
Concerns about principles and practices of agile development approaches are well examined
in many works as [28] where authors offer several answers to area. Agile is a people-focused
approach [27] and considered effective in terms of team work and collaboration of small
teams. People factors that can affect the performance of the team from an agile perspective
are analyzed. The ability of adapting to changes efficiently and cost-effectively influenced in
a radical way the path to success and survival in business environments [38]. As business
processes become more complex, interconnected, interdependent, and interrelated than ever
before, traditional approaches [4, 6] are no longer used and are characterized as reflecting
linear and sequential processes. Even seemingly minor changes can produce unanticipated
effects, as systems become more complex and their components more interdependent. Agile
development methodologies were developed in response to this complexity, with a focus on
rapid iterative delivery, flexibility and working code [4, 5]. However, for this migration to be
successful, organizations must channel the bulk of their change efforts to the development
team. The reason is that, the development team serves as a “fulcrum” on which the
organization’s efforts are applied and through which these efforts are turned into software
products for customers [4].
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Although agile development methodologies are viewed as an improvement to the traditional
methodologies several key considerations need to be taken into account when deciding to
migrate to Agile. In order for this migration to be successful wemust take into account several
variables such as the organizational culture, resistance to change, accepting the new roles by
the members, the use of self-organizing teams, the insurance of face to face communication
on behalf of the organization and the motivation of the members composing the team.
Traditional teams are characterized as command and control teams while agile ones are
characterized as self-organizing teams. From this view, agile teams have a number of key
advantages over traditional ones. For this reason, agile teams succeed to deliver products at
better quality in less amount of time. A main problem in adopting agile is represented by
human resources and their resistance to change. For example the manager might be afraid of
losing his power over the members of the group, or becoming “role-less”. Although the roles
might change the manager is still needed not for planning and controlling ability, but for the
important job of interfacing on the team’s behalf with the rest of the organization [4]. Project
managers pass from planning, controlling, directing, andmanaging, to new roles like building
trust, facilitating and supporting team decisions, expanding team capabilities, anticipating
and influencing change. They become facilitators, liaisons and network builders, boundary
managers, “resource allocators”, team champions and advocates, and in most cases, still have
responsibility to watch the project budget. The roles of team members also change, as the
group takes on increasing ownership of work processes and the agile practices. They become
decision makers, conflict managers, innovators and conveners of standup meetings. These
new and unique roles of the project manager and teammembers engender amore co-operative
team with rapid results [4].
The agile methods focus on each team member and offers motivations to achieve a common
goal of the team and the project. Building projects around motivated individuals, giving
them the environment and support they need, and trusting them to get the job done;
is central to the success of an agile team [42]. Different agile methods have different
approaches for encouraging motivated individuals in development teams. For example,
Extreme Programming, XP [7] has the concept of “collective ownership”, while Scrum [41]
has “scrum teams”.
Communication represents a crucial factor on agile methods and treated in a different manner
as traditional methods do. Face-to-face communication is preferred rather than written
documents and this new mentality increases the quality of coordination and communication.
This is in line with one of its core principles that states that, the most efficient and
effective method of conveying information to and within a development team is face-to-face
conversation [42].
It is well known that organizational culture influences the project trajectory and its
implementation environment. Therefore, the only way to succeed in such a change is through
a conscious programme of continual reinforcement of the desired behaviors until they become
a natural and automatic part of the daily business of the organization [4].
To sum up, although agile development might be an improvement on the traditional
development methodologies, an organization looking to migrate to agile needs to take into
consideration several aspects regarding organizational culture and other variables that may
prevent performance during this transition.
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5. Proactive risk management
Project risk management is an essential and determinant step towards successful projects. A
detailed analysis and a precise definition of risk can lead to achievement of objectives. PMI
states [35] that “the objectives of Project Risk Management are to increase the probability and
impact of positive events, and reduce the likelihood and consequences of negative events in
the project”.
One of the key prerequisites of success in implementing risk management is to have a
proactive approach [11]. Risk management must supplement project management and must
follow a holistic approach. Project management can be seen as an attempt to control the
uncertain environment, through the use of structured and disciplined techniques such as
estimating, planning, cost control, task allocation, earned value analysis, monitoring, and
review meetings. Each of these project management elements has a role in defining or
controlling inherent variability in projects. Project risk management provides approaches by
which uncertainty can be understood, assessed, and managed [12, 13].
According to PMI [35], risk management can be implemented using the following
sub-processes: plan risk management, identify risks, perform quality and quantitative risk
analysis, plan risk responses and monitor and control. Based on the description provided by
PMI, we will outline the main aspects involved by these processes.
Planning risk management [35] consists in agreeing on how to conduct risk management
activities. This implies that the process should start at the beginning of the project and
evaluate the extent and type of riskmanagementwith the project’s importance and scope. This
is essential in order to avoid performing extensive risk analysis on small projects that might
not require such a considerable extent. Planning risk management uses as inputs documents
like the project scope statement, cost plan, and schedule and will produce documentation
that describes risk categories (a clear understanding on the types of risks - technical, external,
organizational or project management related) and risk probability and impact (in order to
have a common understanding of the terms used in identifying the risks a glossary of terms
must be defined).
Identifying risks is an initiative that requires the identification and documentation of the
risks that may affect the project. This sub-process should be regarded as an iterative one
because new risks may evolve or emerge as the project progresses. Identifying risk requires
that all the relevant stakeholders should be involved. Identifying risks is the most complex
sub-process, and uses techniques like documentation review, information gathering (tools like
brainstorming, interviewing, root cause analysis andDelphi technique1 can be used), checklist
analysis, assumptions analysis, diagramming techniques or SWOT analysis2. This subprocess
should have as output the list of identified risks and possible responses.
Performing quality risk analysis consists in prioritizing risks by combining their likelihood
and impact [32]. Performing quantitative risk analysis requires a numerical analysis of the
effects of identified risks on the project objectives. Planing risk responses requires that options
1 The Delphi technique consists in reaching consensus of experts by requesting ideas about relevant project risks
anonymously using questionnaires. The results are summarized and recirculated to the experts for further analysis.
This approach reduces bias in the data and restricts a person from having excessive weight on the outcome.
2 Other techniques for risk assessment can be consulted in [29, p. 41-46]
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are developed in order to increase opportunities and reduce threats. In order to determine the
appropriate alternatives, strategies like avoidance (changing the project management plan in
such a way that the identified risk does not affect it anymore), transfer (requires shifting all or
part of the negative effect along with the responsibility to a third party), mitigation (consists in
reducing the chances and/or impact of a risk in order to be in satisfactory threshold limits) and
compliance. Monitoring and controlling is an ongoing process and consists in implementing
risk responses, tracking identified risks and identify new ones.
As we have seen in Section Creativity, identified as an essential requirement for creativity was
reflexivity support. Reflexivity consists in the group’s focus on its objectives and the actions
identified as required in order to reach them. Adaptation, as one subcomponent of reflexivity,
consists in goal-directed behaviors that are relevant to achieving the desired changes in group
objectives, strategies and processes identified by the group during the stage of reflection. Risk
management can be used as a tool by team members in order to respond to changes in the
environment.
The Practice Standard for Project Risk Management [36] identifies the following factors as
critical for a successful risk management:
1. individual commitment and responsibility (risk management is the responsibility of all
team members)
2. open and honest communication. All team members must participate at risk management
and avoid actions or attitudes that can hinder communication because it can lead to
ineffective risk management
3. risk effort scaled to project (the costs of risk management should be appropriate to its
potential value)
4. integration with project management. Risk management can be performed only in strict
correlation with project management.
Risk management will not produce substantial benefits to the teams using it if their practices
fall under two limitations: focus on tactics and focus on threats [24]. Focusing only on project
related issues (like risks related to project processes or performance) or technical functionality
and not considering strategic sources of risk that menace the vision a decoupling between
objectives and project deliverables will appear. On the other hand, focusing only on the
negative side of uncertainty (threats, risks) will lead to ignorance towards opportunities,
situations that should be integrated in the risk management plan in order to maximize
benefits. This shift requires minor changes in the typical process, but the greatest challenge
is to produce the change in people’s approach which is centered on the threat aspect of
uncertainty.
In [35] the following strategies for handling opportunities are identified:
a) exploitation (eliminate the uncertainty factor and ensure that the opportunity definitely
happens);
b) sharing (requires allocation of some or all of the ownership of the opportunity to a third
party so that all parties gain from their actions);
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c) enhancing (identifying the key driving factors and enhancing their probability and/or
positive impact); and
d) accepting (take advantage of an opportunity if it comes, but not actually pursuing it).
An integrated risk management [24] approach is required in order to cover both strategy and
tactics, and opportunities and threats. Such an approach can provide increased benefits not
available to a limited scope risk management. According to the aforementioned author, these
benefits consist in:
• project deliverables become more concordant with the group’s needs and vision by
reducing the strategy - tactics gap,
• taking in consideration that projects as a tool are used to a) produce results that meet
specific needs, and b) provide benefits, a focus on these aspects is necessary in order to
avoid simply producing a series of deliverables,
• avoid having a poor or to late response to opportunities by enabling a proactive
management of opportunities at both strategic and tactical level,
• support the best possible decision approach in an uncertain environment by providing
relevant information to decision-makers,
• reduce waste and stress and increase productivity and effectiveness by managing
uncertainty in advance with planed responses to known risks,
• increase the chances of achieving both strategic and tactical objectives by minimizing
threats and maximizing opportunities,
• safe risk-taking leads increased rewards and that requires an appropriate level of risk
to be taken with full awareness of the degree of uncertainty and its potential effects on
objectives, and
• develop a risk-mature culture that is aware that risks exists at all levels and they can and
should be managed proactively.
As we have seen in this section, risk management is a key factor for all teams, regardless
of size and work domain, to help them make more informed decisions and take a proactive
approach in regard to risks and opportunities.
5.1. Risk mitigation
A project driven organization represents a main approach for most medium and large sized
institutions to successful deliver projects. Projects are more often used to transfer all personnel
focus and involvement in day to day work, tasks and activities. Thus, concerns as respecting
predefined terms become their main objectives. A proper project risk management approach
deals with a set of techniques by which inevitable uncertainty can be understood, assessed,
and managed within projects. Its main objective is to deliver projects in predefined costs, time
and quality respecting customer specifications.
A main problem in project management and project risk management is represented by
optimism bias and by human behavior to underweight outcomes that are merely probable
and to overweight outcomes with a low probability to happen. This problem was clearly
identified and presented by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky [25, 26] in prospect theory
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with origins in decision making under risk. Prospect theory is based on some well-observed
deviations from rationality and helped Kahneman win the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics.
As a first experiment, they used a group to choose between two options. For first problem
(Figure 2), the group had to choose between option A (to win 2500 with a probability of 33%
or 2400 with a probability of 66% or there were a 1% chance to win nothing) and option B (to
win 2400 certainly). For this first problem, 18% of respondents chose option A, while 82% of
respondents chose option B.
Figure 2. Problem 1 from prospect theory
Their choice was influenced by the 1% probability to win nothing even if in option A they
had 66% chance to win more than option B and 33% chance to win equally to option B (a
99% chance for option A to win more or equally to option B). Events with low probability (1%
chance to win nothing) influence their decision.
According to results (18% for option A and 82% for option B), utility function means: 33%
utility to win 2500 plus 66% utility to win 2400 is lower than 100% utility to win 2400.
33%u(2500)+66%u(2400) < 100%u(2400)
33%u(2500) < 100%u(2400)-66%u(2400)
33%u(2500) < 34%u(2400)
For second problem (Figure 3), the group had to choose between option C (to win 2500 with a
probability of 33% or there were a 67% chance to win nothing) and option D (to win 2400 with
a probability of 34% or there were a 66% chance to win nothing). For this first problem, 83%
of respondents chose option C, while 17% of respondents chose option D.
Figure 3. Problem 2 from prospect theory
Their choice was influenced by the +100 win and 1% probability difference. The 1%
probability difference is now ignored and they chose higher win. Probability difference (1%
as difference between 67% and 66%) influence their decision.
According to results (83% for option C and 17% for option D), utility function means: 33%
utility to win 2500 is higher than 34% utility to win 2400.
33%u(2500) > 34%u(2400)
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This is exactly the reverse inequality from first problem. This is a clear example how
human behavior tends to underweight outcomes that are merely probable and to overweight
outcomes with a low probability to happen. As can be observed, second problem is derived
from first problem (Figure 4) by elimination of Win 2400 with a probability of 66% option.
Figure 4. Problem 2 is derived from Problem 1 (from prospect theory)
This theory is main root for Reference Class Forecasting, which for a particular project,
aims to identify a relevant reference class of similar projects from the past, to establishing
a probability distribution for the selected reference class and to compare the specific project
with the reference class distribution for establishing the most likely outcome for the specific
project [21]. Another concern specifies that “to eliminate intentional or unintentional planning
mistakes leading to time and cost overrun, current project management theories prescribe the
eradication of any bias leading to overly optimistic forecasts. In an effort to hamper optimism
bias, normative project management theory and practice introduce further tools and processes
to eradicate the causes of optimism bias” [44].
According to [23], risks are defined as uncertainties which, if they occur, would affect
achievement of the objectives negatively (threats). Similar, opportunities are uncertainties
which, if they occur would affect positively the project. Examples include the possibility that
planned productivity targets might not be met, interest or exchange rates might fluctuate, the
chance that client expectations may be misunderstood, or whether a contractor might deliver
earlier than planned. These uncertainties should be proactively managed through the risk
management process. Changes in the business environment, project evolution and percent
of completion, will continue to affect the risk situation inside projects. As each project is
unique and has its own trajectory, project risk management should be a proactive approach
for efficient and effective decision-making.
Projects continue to fail because of a proper project risk management lack and the
management problem is getting bigger. A large number of organizations and institutes spend
a lot of time and resources to develop and improve standards and methodologies for project
risk management. Among these, the most common are:
• AS/NZS 4360:2004, The Australian and New Zealand Standard on risk management, [14]
developed by Broadleaf Capital International PTY LTD;
• IRM Standard, jointly developed by The Institute of Risk Management (IRM) [43], The
Association of Insurance and Risk Managers (AIRMIC) and by ALARM The National
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Forum for Risk Management in the Public Sector (widespread in the United Kingdom)
– adopted by the Federation of European Risk Management Associates (FERMA);
• PMBOK Guide developed Project Management Institute [35] (widespread in the U.S.A);
• PRAM (Project Risk Analysis and Management) Guide developed by Association for
Project Management3 (widespread in United Kingdom).
Adapted after PMBOK Guide, developed by Project Management Institute in a Practice
Standard for Project Risk Management [35, 36], and by improving planning tools and
techniques, a framework for project risk management can be derived, as presented in Figure
5.
A risk identification step where techniques and special tools are used is needed because a
risk cannot be managed unless it is first identified. After identification, a risk assessment and
evaluation step follows. Each risk is evaluated based on the probability of its occurrence and
its impact on project objectives (in qualitative risk analysis) and a numerical estimate of the
overall project risk is provided (in quantitative risk analysis). The risk analysis should be
performed not only once but in iterative cycles along major. Monitoring is also recommended
in continuous intervals. Monitoring is mandatory to permanently track and control identified
risks and to promptly respond in case of new risks occurrence that were not previously
identified. Risk management does not aim to eliminate risks, but focus to actively manage
risks in a business context [39].
Back to risk mitigation step, to certain risks may apply a set of mitigations. Often, mitigations
address processes of the organizations. For fruitful results, this process may require long time
from implementation. The strategies to manage the risks and the method of mitigation and
the priorities are mostly decided by the project manager. Each risk is identified in previous
steps and each one is characterized by probability of occurrence and impact. The focus should
be on risks that yield a high impact and are identified with high probability of occurrence.
Figure 5 presents risks after and before mitigations. Another approach is to address risk after
mitigation costs ranking. Deriving a root cause of several risks represents another method to
mitigate risks; improvements may be applied there. In this way, the impact of multiple risks
that are related to root cause may be decreased.
There are several strategies that can be applied in risk mitigations step. First of all, a risk
can be avoided, by not performing tasks that imply risks. Despite this method is not always
fruitful from economic perspective, those tasks may be replaced if suitable. A second method
aims to reduce the negative effect and impact of the risk in terms of monetary costs, delay
or low quality. In some cases the risk can be transferred to another party. Not all risk
can be mitigated or make sense to mitigate, in some cases risks should be accepted (in an
inconvenient cost/benefit analysis). After successful mitigation, risks are represented based
on probability vs. impact. After mitigation, in case the probability decrease the risks are
represented on a lower as a parallel shift with y-axis; in the case the impact decrease, risks
shift left as Figure 6 shows.
Mitigation actions should target those risks associatedwith high leverage towardsminimizing
the residual risk afterwards or acceptable mitigation costs. The risk analysis methodology
provides means of visualizing mitigation costs and expected residual risks with and without
mitigation. After mitigation actions and responsibilities for the measures are agreed and
3 http://www.apm.org.uk/
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Figure 5. Risk management framework [12]
decided upon, the implementation of these actions need detailed planning and controlling.
According to the findings in the risk mitigation phase the responsible action owners should be
mandated by the project manager. Hence, the project manager needs to prioritize mitigation
options and corresponding costs and efforts to decide whether measures will be taken or not.
Performing agreedmitigation actions will contribute to reduce the risk status and create a new
risk situation in the project. However, the implementation and controlling of the mitigations
will be driven by the project team.
High risks are represented with red, medium risks with yellow and low risks with green in
both situations: after and before risk mitigations. Our focus is on high and medium risks.
Despite the enormous sums of money being spent on project planning, risks arise. A risk
management oriented culture is preferred to manage risks (cost, time or quality related) in
conditions that most of the big projects fall victim to significant cost overrun.
5.2. Opportunity management
In project environment, risks are considered as uncertain events that if occurs has a
negative effect on a project objective. Contrasting, the positive and desired effect is
considered opportunity. A proactive risk management plan should be applied to successful
manage uncertainties. Threats risks and opportunities should be treated as single unit and
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Figure 6. Risk representation Probability vs. Impact (After and Before Mitigations) [12]
individually defined in a single plan. Traditional project risk management approaches offer
less attention on project opportunities. For example, check lists are considered a great
technique to identify risks and captures previous experiences but most of the time this
technique includes only threats and misses opportunities. Another technique is represented
by Lessons Learned Reports that prevents making the same mistakes or missing the same
opportunities twice. It also offers solutions and ideas where the opportunities can be
unlocked. SWOT analysis addresses both threats and opportunities. As risks, opportunities
are linked to one project objective (time, cost, quality, scope etc.). Some of the authors
consider that companies can overlook opportunities that provide significant possibilities for
organizational innovation and new competitive advantage by focusing on the downside of
risk [8]. Both, risk and opportunities require attentions and should be treated. By managing
risks, threats can be and also an opportunity perspective is available. Such opportunities may
provide significant results in terms of innovation and project delivery at high-quality. In many
situations, the opportunity is easily missed. Some strategies for identifying opportunities are
listed and presented in [8]: learning from the past, customer sensitivity, learning from others,
scanning, scenario planning, identifying the market gaps and change the game, idealized
design and competing in advance and market sensitivity.
6. Conclusion
The rationality behind collaboration is creativity. Collaboration uses communication,
coordination and cooperation as a backbone but it is seen as something more than that. It is
about creating shared understanding that no member could achieve on his own and in order
to generate insight, new ideas or new artifacts it is a necessity to bring together different and
often controversial points of view.
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Collaboration can be achieved if defined in a goal oriented framework and should use
knowledge from project and risk management to increase the chances or obtaining the
envisioned deliverables. These tools can lead to successful achievement of objectives, but
they are not sufficient.
During the execution of a project team members are not always collaborating and their work
alternates with cooperation, when a greater emphasis is placed on a value-chain model of
producing results. Focus permanently switches from the flexible content approach to the
management tools according to task’s specific. In order to fully support the process of
collaboration, the aspects that precede it or come in-between the collaboration sessions must
be fully supported so that they will not represent a problem that can hinder collaboration.
Both collaboration and cooperation require efficient project and risk management and this
can only be achieved if collaboration prerequisites are sufficiently understood and integrated
in the overall strategy.
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1. Introduction 
1.1. The case for risk taking or risky decision making 
In this chapter, we will argue that the very concept of risk management must be called into 
question. The argument will take the form that the use of the phrase ‘risk management’ 
operates to cover over the ethical dimensions of what is at the bottom of the problem, 
namely, risky decision making. Risky decision making takes place whenever and wherever 
decisions are taken by those whose lives are not immediately threatened by the situation in 
which the risk to other people’s lives is created by their decision. The concept of risk 
management implies that risk is already there, not created by the decision, but lies already 
inherent in the situation that the decision sets into motion. The risk that exists in the 
objective situation simply needs to be “managed”. By changing the semantics of ‘risk 
management’ to ‘risk taking’ or ‘risky decision making’, the ethics of responsibility for 
risking other people’s lives will come into focus. The argument of the chapter is that by 
heightening the ethical sensitivity of decision makers, these decision makers will be less 
likely to make decisions that will cause harm and/or death to those who are the principal 
actors in the situation created by the decision.  
2. Definition of terms 
We should first define our terms. The phrase ‘risk management’ will refer primarily to the 
risk of life and limb of human beings, present and future and to the life and health of the 
planet. Secondarily, it will refer to the taking of risk with the possessions, e.g., the wealth of 
human beings. For the most part, the discussion will refer to the primary sense of the term 
and only occasionally in special contexts, to the second. It should be pointed out, at the 
outset, that the phrase ‘risk management’ is already biased in favor of risk. The phrase 
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implies that the taking of risk is either necessary and/or advantageous and if it carries any 
negative consequences, these consequences can be mitigated or eliminated by proper 
management. This bias toward risk is assumed in the acceptance of the use of the phrase 
‘risk management’. A major purpose of this investigation is to call into question this built-in 
bias toward risk. 
In the strictest sense, the proper reference for the inquiry should be ‘risky decision taking’ or 
‘risky decision making’ rather than ‘risk management’. Such a refining of the subject of inquiry 
would make the concept of risk either neutral or questionable since the ‘taking’ of risk implies 
negative consequences whilst ‘risk management’ carries with it the hidden meaning that risk is 
already being protected against or absorbed by effective management policies. The phrase 
‘risk management’ grants risk a protective coating such that the consequences of the risk are 
camouflaged. As a result, the following discussion will focus primarily on the entire question 
of ‘taking risk’ or making ‘risky decisions’ in the first place and only secondarily with the 
‘management of risk’.1 It is important to make this distinction because the entire question of 
the ethics of risk must be considered in the first place.2 Where, to any degree, whatsoever, ‘risk’ is 
already acceptable, the question of the ethics of risk becomes diluted in value. When the taking of risk is 
itself under question, the ethics of risk takes on greater meaning. 
In the specific case from which we will draw most of our information and discussion, the 
launching of the U. S. space shuttle, Challenger, the action to be taken, was considered to be an 
‘acceptable risk’. The question of ‘acceptable risk’ was applied to the action to be taken, not to 
the decision to take the action. Had the notion of ‘acceptable risk’ been applied to the decision 
to launch, some ethical responsibility for the decision would have been present. As it turned 
out, the ethical responsibility for the decision to launch was conspicuous by its very absence. 
The ethical issues involved in the decision to launch were further nullified by the choice of 
terminology utilized to classify the level of risk involved in the malfunction of the part that 
eventually did malfunction (the O-ring). The label utilized was criticality 1, the definition of 
the consequence of its occurrence being, loss of mission and life. When one of the four 
managers who overrode the unanimous decision of 14 engineers and managers not to launch 
was asked at the Presidential Commission hearings, whether the phrase ‘loss of mission and 
life’ had a negative connotation, the answer given by the manager, Larry Mulloy, was that 
such a description had no negative connotation and simply meant that you have a single point 
failure with no back-up and the failure of that single system is catastrophic.3 
                                                                                    
1 For the sake of convenience, in general we will employ the term ‘risk taking’ as a short-hand for ‘risky decision 
making’ which will always stand for ‘risking the consequences to the principal risk takers as a result of decision 
making’. The phrase ‘principal risk takers’ refers to those whose lives will be affected by the occurrence of the risk, the 
primary actors who will be directly involved in taking the risk in the risky situation; e.g., in the case of the Challenger, 
the astronauts and civilians aboard rather than the ‘decision makers’, the four middle managers. 
2 It is gratifying to learn that the U.S. government is currently teaching the terms and definitions for the proper 
understanding of risk management that the author of this chapter originated that are at the basis of the ideas in this 
chapter in its educational training courses for FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Association.  
3 Richard C. Cook, Challenger Revealed, An Insider’s Account of How the Reagan Administration Caused the Greatest Tragedy 
of the Space Age, New York: Avalon, 2006, p. 243. Without Richard Cook’s early articles in the New York Times, it is 
possible that the entire Challenger investigation would not have occurred. It was a source of inspiration to be in 
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The reaction of Richard Cook, the budget analyst at the time, shows how the language of 
choice removes ethical considerations from one’s consciousness: 
How extraordinary: possible “loss of mission and life” doesn’t have a negative connotation.4  
Cook goes on to say that there was no negative connotation because it had been deemed an 
acceptable risk and, moreover, there had never been any criteria for defining an “acceptable 
risk”. This was a result of using a failure modes effects analysis without any quantitative 
risk measures. In other words, the odds of the risk of a catastrophe occurring to the 
Challenger, were conjured out of thin air, not calculated, because it was a subjective 
engineering judgment that was not based upon any previous performance data. 
Three conclusions present themselves. Firstly, there must exist considerable ethical 
blindness when loss of life has no negative connotation. Secondly, there must be 
considerable ethical blindness when loss of life is somehow considered an acceptable risk. 
Thirdly, there must be considerable epistemological blindness when a notion of “acceptable 
risk” can be in use without being based on any objective measurements. Cook, one of the 
few if not the only source on the Challenger who goes into detail on this point, points to one 
study, conducted in 1984, which concluded that the chance of a Solid Rocket Booster 
explosion was one in thirty-five launches.5 Nevertheless, the Marshall managers spoke of 
“acceptable risk”. If you “lost” one astronaut, that was “data” in the risk equation. 
In 1977, NASA commissioned a group called the Wiggins Group to study the possibility of 
flight failures and by examining data for all previous space launches, a likely failure rate of 
one in fifty-seven was derived. According to Cook, NASA complained that many of the 
launch vehicles the Wiggins group included were not similar enough to the Challenger 
shuttle to be part of the data base. So, Wiggins changed the probable failure rate to one in 
100. Another study conducted by the Air Force placed the likely failure rate for the shuttle in 
a similar range to the Wiggins analysis. According to Cook, none of these studies were 
publicized and most of the newspaper reporters who covered NASA most likely had never 
heard of them. When NASA was forced to arrive at an official number, their chief engineer 
came up with the infamous and arbitrary estimate of one in 100,000. As Cook put it, ‘At a 
rate of twenty-four launches per year, this meant that NASA expected the shuttle to fail 
catastrophically only once every 4,167 years.6 In the language of risk utilized in this chapter 
introduced below, the possible incidence was therefore negligible. By presenting, not 
calculating, the incidence of risk as virtually non-existent, it was possible to immunize 
oneself against the realities of the consequences of the risk. One could then make a decision to 
risk other people’s lives, because statistical probability had eliminated the problematic 
dimension of the risk factor, the consequences, from the equation. When a figure is used, 
such a one in 100,000, one might assume that this is a calculated risk since it is put in the 
                                                                                                                                                                   
communication with Richard Cook at the time of my writing the Challenger chapters in my book, Saving Human Lives: 
Lessons in Management Ethics. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., p. 356. 
6 Ibid., pp. 126-7. 
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mathematical language of percentages and statistics. But, this was not a “calculated risk” at 
all, but fantasy parading as mathematics. A figure picked out of thin air had granted the 
decision makers moral immunity.  
3. Incidence and consequence 
An important distinction to keep in mind when considering the whole question of risk 
taking is the distinction between the likelihood of the occurrence of the risk under question 
versus the harmful consequence of the actual occurrence of risk under question. Clearly, 
when the likelihood of occurrence is high and the consequence of occurrence severe in terms 
of harm doing to risk takers, be it the public at large and/or the environment, this is an 
example of the kind of risk that should never be taken except under the most severely 
warranted circumstances. The example of self-defense, when confronted with a murderer 
who is armed and plans to murder you, comes to mind. Here, the likelihood that your 
defense will result in his escalating his response is very high, and the consequence of his 
escalation, in the hypothetical circumstance, could prove to be fatal. Nevertheless, in order 
to protect your own life, you must take the risk of self-defense under these circumstances. 
There is no need to consider the case in which the incidence of occurrence is low and the 
consequence is also low.7 Here, the example of starting to speak while inside a house during 
the winter in Finland with all the windows and doors closed and the sound of a bird 
chirping that interrupts one’s speech may be taken as an example of low possibility of 
occurrence and low severity of consequence. Of course, one may imagine a scenario in 
which one’s speech was to warn another of a fatal and impending danger, and this warning 
would be blocked, but any example can be played with to tamper with the point it is 
designed to illustrate. All we needed to do in this case would be to qualify the original 
example to state that the speech one was about to utter was an exclamation of how blue the 
sky was this morning. But, it is important to consider what point an example is designed to 
make since one can always find some way to find some fault with the example one is 
choosing to illustrate one’s point. 
We also need not consider the kind of risk that involves little consequence even if the 
possibility of its incidence is high. For example, when we carry a glass of milk across the 
floor, we may easily spill some milk. But, the consequence of the spill (excepting the 
scenario that we or the person to whom we are carrying the milk are starving) is of no great 
import. Our discussion need not include examples of high risks of incidence that involve 
harmless consequences. 
The kind of risk with which we most frequently struggle is the risk in which the incidence of 
its occurrence is low, but the consequence of its occurrence is grave. The example of an 
airplane exploding in mid-air is a good example of this type of risk. We assume in the state 
of technology that currently exists commercial air travel is an advantage that we do not wish 
                                                                                    
7 For the sake of convenience, whenever the term ‘consequence’ is used it is understood that what is meant is ‘harmful 
consequence’ to primary risk taker, general public, the environment, future generations or all of the above. 
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to surrender. We also know that in the general, unknown risk category, that a plane may 
explode in mid-air. This risk taking is minimized by careful and regular inspection of the 
mechanical parts of the airplane and a replacement of said parts and said plane on a needful 
basis. Other aspects of this risk are minimized by guarding against a drunken pilot, 
hijacking by suicidal terrorists, etc. In such cases, risk is minimized. It is more accurate to 
consider that the risk in these cases is minimized rather than managed, because its possibility 
of occurrence is reduced rather than the occurrence of its risk being managed. The latter 
understanding is how the term ‘risk management’ might well be construed. In fact, it is 
difficult to understand what the term ‘management’ means in the case of ‘risk management’.  
4. The ethics of Risk 
We assume, as an ethical premise, that there should never be a risk taken to potential life 
and limb unless it is absolutely necessary. A good example of this would be the Hippocratic 
Oath taken by physicians which begins with the axiom: ‘Primum non Nocere’, ‘Do no Harm’. 
One takes risk, as with surgery, only when it is necessary to promote or safeguard health. In 
other words, risk is justifiable only when it is absolutely necessary in the service of life.  
What about cases of advantage rather than absolute necessity? For example, let us again 
consider the case of commercial airplane travel. There is certainly risk involved and it would 
seem to be the case that the concept of risk management would come into play. Upon closer 
examination, however, when one considers the safety precautions that are taken through 
mechanical inspection, etc., one realizes that it is ‘risk taking’ that is modified, that is, one is 
reducing the risk involved, rather than “managing” an existing risk. One minimizes the risk 
involved: one is not managing risk; one is minimizing risk. 
5. General unknown risk versus specific and foreknown risk 
There is a confusion that is frequently made between general and unknown risk that is 
operative in the universe and any specific risk that is known in advance to exist. For 
example, whenever one gets out of one’s bed in the morning, one may trip, fall, crack one’s 
skull and have a concussion. This is the general and unknown risk that is operative in the 
universe. We should not construe risk in these terms as this kind of risk exists, for the most 
part, outside of human control and intervention. 
Risks that are foreknown in advance to the principals involved in the risk-taking are the 
only kind of risks that our discussion should consider. A classic case in point of the contrast 
that exists between general, unknown risk and specifically foreknown risk is the case of the 
faulty and dangerous O-rings that were known in advance to exist (by managers and 
engineers though not by the principal risk takers) prior to the fatal flight of the space shuttle 
Challenger. The classic case of the Challenger disaster can be used to illustrate the fallacies of 
the concept of ‘risk management’ and the need to replace this concept with the more 
accurate, new concepts of ‘risk taking’ or ‘risky decision making’. While other cases could 
also be chosen, the availability of overwhelming, documented evidence in the case of the 
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Challenger disaster makes it an ideal case study for the purposes of examining the concept of 
risk management. 
One can argue, fallaciously, that whenever an astronaut goes into space, that astronaut is 
subject to that general, unknown, universal-style risk of space travel. This, however, is not 
comparable to an astronaut going into space equipped with the full knowledge of the 
existence of a real, specific and pre-existing mechanical fault that could be potentially fatal 
to her or his space craft. It is only with the latter kind of known risk, known fully to those 
taking the risk, that a discussion on risk management should focus. Such was not the case 
with the astronauts and civilian passengers of the U.S. space shuttle, Challenger. 
In the case of the Challenger launch, the overwhelming evidence has revealed that the 
astronauts were completely unaware of the specific dangers that the O-rings posed. 
According the Malcolm McConnell, the science reporter, no one in the astronaut corps had 
been informed of any problem with the SRB field joints.8 According to Charles Harris, 
Michael Pritchard and Michael Rabins, authors of Engineering Risks, Concepts and Cases, ‘… 
no one presented them [the astronauts] with the information about the O-ring behavior at 
low temperatures. Therefore, they did not give their consent to launch despite the O-ring 
risk, since they were unaware of the risk.’ 
Claus Jensen writes in No Downlink, A Dramatic Narrative about the Challenger Accident and 
Our Time, that when the Rogers commission summoned a group of space shuttle astronauts, 
‘During this session, the astronauts reiterated that they had never been told about the 
problems with the solid rocket booster.’ And, in a private correspondence with the present 
author and Roger Boisjoly, the late senior scientist and the engineer who knew the most 
about the O-rings, Boisjoly wrote, ‘I KNOW for a FACT that the astronauts on Challenger 
did NOT KNOW about the problem with the O-rings at temperatures below 50 degrees F.‘ 
(emphasis his)9 According to Richard Lewis’ book, Challenger, The Final Voyage, ‘Along with 
the general public, the astronauts who were flying the shuttle were unaware of the 
escalating danger of joint seal failure. So were the congressional committees charged with 
overseeing the shuttle program. NASA never told them that the shuttle had a problem.’ 
Later, in the same work, Lewis pointedly quotes from the Presidential Commission report:  
Chairman Rogers raised the question of whether any astronaut office representative was aware 
[of the O-ring problem]’ Weitz, [an astronaut’s representative] answered: “We were not aware of 
any concern with the O-rings, let alone the effect of weather on the O-rings.10 
Despite the very clear declarations above, nowhere in the 575 pages of Diane Vaughan’s 
book, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA, is it 
ever mentioned that the astronauts and the civilians were not informed of the O-ring 
dangers.11 By not ever mentioning this crucial point of information, her book leaves one with 
the impression either” (i) that the astronauts knew about the risk they were taking and 
                                                                                    
8 Robert Elliott Allinson, Saving Human Lives, Lessons in Management Ethics, Dordrecht: Springer, 2005, p. 156. 
9 Ibid., p. 184. 
10 Ibid., pp. 184-5, 187. 
11 Ibid., p. 187. 
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thereby had given their informed consent, or, (ii) that their knowledge and thereby consent 
to take such a risk, was completely irrelevant. 
All of the above clearly points to the fact that the objection that one always takes a general, 
unknown existential risk in life and is aware of this fact is irrelevant whenever there is a 
specifically foreknown risk that carries with it great and unfortunate consequence. These 
points make a further argument to support the case that the very notion of risk management 
needs to be replaced with the idea of risk taking when a known risk carries with it a high 
probability of life and death danger and there is nothing crucial to be gained by taking such 
a risk, such a risk is never “managed”, such a risk is never taken. In such a case, any 
possibility of risk is eliminated by not being taken in the first place. Risk management becomes 
risky management. We can now turn to the examination of risky management. 
6. Risky technology versus risky management 
In the classic case of the space shuttle Challenger example, two years after the horrific event, 
when the official, U. S. government committee on Shuttle Criticality, Review and Hazard 
Analysis examined the risk that had been taken in launching the Challenger, the Chairman of 
that committee wrote in the very first paragraph of chapter four of their report, entitled 
‘Risk Assessment and Risk Management’: 
Almost lost in the strong public reaction to the Challenger failure was the inescapable fact that 
major advances in mankind’s capability to explore and operate in space – indeed, even in routine, 
atmospheric flight – will only be accomplished in the face of risk. 
And, later, in the body of that same report, the Committee wrote: ‘The risks of space flight 
must be accepted by those who are asked to participate in each flight …12 
It is rather easy to spot the fallacy that is being made in this case. It is the fallacy of equating 
a general unknown risk (space flight in general) with a specifically foreknown fatal risk (the 
flawed design of the O-rings about which the senior engineer Roger Boisjoly had issued red 
flagged warnings).13 If the committee were pressed on this matter and replied that they were 
aware that there was some risk in the use of the technology employed at the time (the 
hazardous O-rings), in the case of the Challenger disaster, what the Committee on Shuttle 
Criticality, Review and Hazard Analysis would then seem to be saying is that it was 
justifiable to employ the ‘risky technology’ that was employed at the time because of the 
understanding that in order to make progress in space exploration that one was required to 
take chances with very risky technology. Is this actually the case? Was it necessary to take 
cavalier chances with risky technology in order to make progress in the arena of space 
exploration? The implication is that the risk would have to be taken and the “management” 
of the risk would seem to amount to something on the order of crossing one’s fingers, and 
hoping that nothing would happen. 
                                                                                    
12 Preface by Alton Slay, Chairman, Committee on Shuttle Criticality, Review and Hazard Analysis, Post-Challenger 
Evaluation of Space Shuttle Risk Assessment and Management, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1988, p. v; p. 
33. 
13 Robert Elliott Allinson, Saving Human Lives, Lessons in Management Ethics, Dordrecht: Springer, 2005, p. 138. 
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When one examines the Challenger case more closely, one discovers that there was no need 
to choose the technology that was chosen in the first place. The risky technology in this case 
in point was the engineering design of the O-rings. Of four designs submitted, the one 
chosen was the least safe (and the cheapest). This choice was a case of risky judgment on the 
part of the managers who chose this design that was an initiating cause of the Challenger 
disaster, and not the fact that they were obliged to employ a risky design in order to venture 
into space. The design itself was risky. Why? This design was chosen because financial cost 
factors, read profit, were taken as a priority over safety. This decision to place cost ahead of 
safety is an example of ethical misjudgment. Thus, we may consider the decision to choose 
this unsafe design a case of management malpractice. There was no necessity to choose this 
particular design. Alternative designs were available. 
The O-ring design of giant rubber gaskets keeping combustible hot gases from leaking out, 
in actual fact, ranked fourth out of four submitted engineering designs and, according to an 
important article co-written by Trudy Bell, Senior Editor of the engineering journal, IEEE 
Spectrum and Karl Esch: the selection of this design was the chief cause of the Challenger 
disaster.14 For the next space flight, this design was replaced with the safest design, 
demonstrating that the safest design could have been chosen in the first place and it was 
economically feasible to have done so.  
There was also no need to choose a design for the space shuttle that did not include an abort 
system, that is explosive bolt hatches, space pressure suits and a parachute descent system. 
That it did not include such a safety system was a matter of policy, not impossibility since 
earlier spacecraft had been equipped with launch escape systems. Again, nowhere, in any 
place, in the 575 pages of Ms. Vaughan’s, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, 
Culture and Deviance at NASA, is it ever mentioned that there was no necessity to omit an 
escape system for the crew and passengers. Omission of this detail can readily be regarded 
as ethically unpardonable. It implies that there was no way to save the lives of the crew and 
passengers when in fact they were indeed alive when the space craft broke apart (the space shuttle 
did not explode, as was popularly reported – the spectacular image of the smoke was due to 
the chemical reaction of hydrogen colliding with oxygen). The astronauts were conscious as 
they hit the ocean floor at the tremendous impact (some of the crew had actually activated 
and used their emergency air packs) that caused their death. By omitting this incredibly 
important fact in her volume, Vaughan leaves one with the impression that the life and 
death risk that was taken was one that could not possibly have been prevented!15 That it 
could, indeed, have been prevented places an entirely different perspective on the kind of 
unnecessary, and therefore, incredibly unwarranted risk that the astronauts were forced to 
take. The Challenger space shuttle astronauts never needed to take a risk with their lives. The risk did 
not exist: it was created by risky and unethical management decisions. The false impression 
created by interpreting the plume of smoke to mean that the space shuttle Challenger had 
exploded blinds one to the fact that the crew compartment had separated from the orbiter 
                                                                                    
14 Robert Elliott Allinson, ‘Risk Management: demythologizing its belief foundations,’ International Journal of Risk 
Assessment and Management, Volume 7, No. 3, 2007, p. 302. 
15 Op. cit., pp. 188-189. 
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and thus the lives of all passengers could have been saved with a parachute descent system. 
There was no need to take a risk with their lives! The continuing belief that the shuttle 
exploded continues to play its role in veiling the real issue of the ethics of risky decision 
making. 
The above examples make it clear that the problem of risk lies in the choices to be made by 
the risk takers, or, more precisely, the risk decision makers, not in the management of risk 
already taken. By focusing on the term ‘management’, one takes for granted that a risk must 
exist in the first place and needs only to be managed. It is not even clear in this case how the 
risk is managed unless crossing one’s fingers counts as management. In the case of the O-
rings, there was no need for this risk to exist in the first place. 
One can look into the matter in more detail. Suffice it to say for the present discussion and 
analysis that there were two levels of risk taking that were matters of choice, not 
management. The first level was the choice of design. The choice of design could have been 
altered to have prevented the breaking apart of the space shuttle. The choice of the design 
could have been altered to prevent the death of the crew and passengers. It was design 
choices that determined the cause of the disaster and the fatal consequences of the disaster. The 
second was the choice to fly under weather conditions that heightened the risk involved. 
These were both management choices or decisions. The focus should be on risky 
management in the sense that there was risky choice and risky decision-making, not on the 
technology involved, because the risky technology only came into being in the first place 
because of these two very risky management choices: the choice of technology and the 
choice of launch timing. 
There has been much erroneous discussion of the technical issues of the temperature and the 
O-rings and as a result, massive misconceptions have created complicated layers of 
confusion around the issue.16 Diane Vaughan’s book, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky 
Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA, has been responsible for generating much of this 
confusion. Note the first phrase in her sub-title: ‘Risky Technology’. The clear implication is 
that the fault lay not in the decision to employ such technology but in the problem of having 
to rely upon risky technology.  
According to Roger Boisjoly, the senior scientist at NASA and the one who knew the most 
about the O-rings, she routinely mixed up data relating to field joints and nozzle joints and 
did not have a clue about the difference between the two joints.17 Diane Vaughan is 
dismissive of Professor Feynman’s famous gesture of dipping a piece of an O-ring into a 
                                                                                    
16 The mass of confusion surrounding the technical issues is, to the best of this author’s knowledge, discussed in proper 
factual detail in the two chapters on the Challenger disaster in the author’s Saving Human Lives, Lessons in Management 
Ethics (now in Kindle and Google Books). The author is indebted to extensive private correspondence with Roger 
Boisjoly for clearing up the confusion about the technical issues that made understanding the Challenger issues murky 
and seemingly resistant to plain understanding. To the best of the author’s knowledge, such clear explanations that 
Boisjoly gives, sorting out the mistakes in previous analyses of the Challenger disaster such as in Diane Vaughan’s 
confused studies on the issue only exist in print in the author’s Saving Human Lives. Cf., especially Chapter Seven, ‘The 
Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster,’ and Chapter Eight, ‘Post-Challenger Investigations’, pp. 107-197. 
17 Saving Human Lives, pp.192-3 et passim. 
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glass of ice water during the televised Commission hearings and of his astonishment over 
the concept of ‘acceptable risk’. In contrast, Boisjoly argued that Feynman’s scientific 
experiment proved exactly what Feynman was trying to prove: rubber gets stiff at freezing 
temperatures. In Boisjoly’s words, ‘As the temperature decreases the sealing performance of 
the O-ring gets worse. At freezing temperature or below, it will get much worse. IT’S REALLY 
THAT SIMPLE.’18 Whose opinion should we accept, the opinion of a Nobel laureate physicist 
and the senior scientist who knew the most about the O-rings, or a sociologist with a Master’s 
Degree who is evaluating the validity of a scientific experiment carried out by a Nobel laureate 
physicist the validity of which is confirmed by a rocket scientist?19  
We can point to three elementary characteristics of warning signals to illustrate that the risk 
was foreknown and knowledge of it was transmitted: The three characteristics of warning 
signals. To focus on risky technology is to put the cart before the horse. Risky choice is the 
horse: it pulls the technology along behind it. Without the horse, the cart would not move. 
Technology has no power on its own. It is the servant of decision making 10 14-15. 
7. That the risk was foreknown and knowledge of it was transmitted 
In the case of the Challenger disaster, nothing should blind us to the point that the most senior 
engineer involved was keenly aware of the fatal risk involved and sent red-flagged warnings 
to this effect. That these warnings were not heeded is sometimes obscured with the 
“argument” that one cannot hold up actions to be taken on the basis of warnings since every 
possible action will always have risks and it is next to impossible to take note of every single 
warning that comes across one’s desk. The existence of warnings that cannot supposedly be 
noticed is referred to under the hypothesis of “weak signals”.20 The hypothesis of “weak 
signals” is offered up as a rationale why warnings cannot always be well noted.  
This “weak signals” hypothesis is easily refuted when one considers the source, the content 
and the form of the signals. The source of the signal in this case is the most senior scientist 
and the one who knows the most about the O-rings. It is not a crank call made by a tourist to 
the space center at the information desk. The source in this case was the project’s senior 
engineer himself. It was a warning from the inside, by an insider, who knew the most about 
the technology about which he was issuing the warning.  
The content of the signal warns of the danger being fatal to all aboard. There is no weakness 
in terms of the content of the message. In Boisjoly’s famous memorandum of July 31, 1985, 
he warned before the fact that if there were a launch, ‘The result would be a catastrophe of 
                                                                                    
18 Ibid., p. 192. (emphasis his) 
19 Ibid., pp. 172-3. The author of this chapter was gratified when he personally received a hand-written letter written to 
him by the famous sociologist David Riesman from Harvard, author of The Lonely Crowd, who wrote to commend the 
merits of this author’s first review of Diane Vaughan’s book, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture 
and Deviance at NASA, which was to come out in Society . Later, he was prompted by this author’s second review, 
which took a very different tack, and which appeared in Business Ethics Quarterly to read her book after which he wrote 
to this author to say that Diane Vaughan’s book was simply, in his words, ‘a bad book’. 
20 The hypothesis of “weak signals” to describe the warnings of the failure of the O-rings was put forward by Diane 
Vaughan in her book, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA. 
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the highest order – loss of human life.’ In his earlier warning of July 22, 1985, he warned of a 
horrifying flight failure unless a solution were implemented to prevent O-ring erosion.21 
One can readily see that there is no mincing of words to minimize the possibility that the 
danger might be understood to be less than absolutely extraordinary. The consequences in 
terms of life and death danger are spelled out in detail. The specific risk factor is named. 
One could not possibly ask for a stronger signal. 
Finally, the form of the message is red-flagged to indicate the most serious of attention must 
be given to this message. There is no rational way that this warning can be construed as a 
“weak” signal. It is the strongest possible signal in three terms: its source, its content, and its 
form. Since the warning is multiple and not single, the form of multiple warnings should 
further make the case that this is not a single and therefore “weak” signal that might not be 
noticed. In the case of Boisjoly’s warnings, there were two such red-flagged warnings.  
It should be noted that this signal was not a one-time occurrence. This signal was continuously 
sounded for eight years. It was not a one-time message that could conceivably have been 
missed. There is a memorandum written in 1978 by John Q. Miller, Chief of the Solid Rocket 
Motor Branch to the Project Manager, George Hardy, when referring to the Thiokol field 
joint design that was chosen, in which he writes that this design was so hazardous that it 
could produce ‘ … hot leaks and resulting catastrophic failure.’22 It was known eight years 
prior to the Challenger launch that this design choice was a dangerously, faulty one which could end 
in a catastrophe! 
In terms of, in terms of the form of the “weak signals” hypothesis, it should be noted that 
when it came to the timing of the launch, 14 managers and engineers alike unanimously 
voted against it.23 One could not conceive of a stronger signal than this. That this decision 
was overturned in a meeting of 4 managers (with no engineers present who were not 
managers) does not take away from the fact that these 4 managers were fully aware of the 
previous signal of 14 unanimous votes against the launch.24 There is no possibility that the 
signals that were made were not the strongest possible signals to be made. To refer to the 
warnings as “weak signals” is to turn a red light into a green light. 
8. Two straw men 
It should be emphasized that the Committee on Shuttle Criticality, Review and Hazard 
Analysis did not focus on the life and death consequences to the principals involved in 
taking the risk of launching the Challenger, but rather focused on the general, abstract case 
of space flight as an opportunity for learning about the universe. In short, they examined a 
“straw man” and not the real case in front of them to examine. 
                                                                                    
21 Op. cit., p. 170.  
22 Ibid., p. 151. 
23 Ibid., pp. 174, 195. 
24 Ibid., for an extended analysis of the unsound and unethical decision making process engaged in by the four middle 
managers. 
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In the case of the red-flagged warnings, regarding the launching of the Challenger, the 
consequences were not the consequences marked out by the Committee on Shuttle 
Criticality, Review and Hazard Analysis. The consequences marked by that Committee 
were outlined in terms of the risk that was to be accepted in terms of general space 
exploration. The implication is that those who accepted such a risk were space explorers and 
that they were fully aware of the risk that they were taking. Neither of these implications is 
accurate. 
The first straw man was to examine the case as if all aboard were astronauts. This assertion 
was contrary to fact. Not every person aboard the shuttle was an astronaut. In addition to 
the five astronauts, one of whom was a female, Judith Resnik, there were two passengers: 
one, a junior and high school teacher, a 37 year old mother of two, Christa McAuliffe and 
the other, Greg Jarvis, an engineer from Hughes Aircraft (not a member of the Astronaut 
Corp) who had been given a ride in a space flight as a prize for winning a company 
competition. Mrs. McAuliffe was scheduled to deliver a nationwide “lesson from space” 
called the “Ultimate Field Trip” to the nation’s school children. She was also supposed to 
receive a telephone call from President Reagan in mid-flight. 
Part of the consequences, then, was the risk of the death of two civilians, who were there, 
not to operate the space craft, but one to act as a Teacher in Space and the other to claim his 
contest prize. Both civilians were given the deceptive, camouflage designation of “payload 
specialists” that implied some kind of crew responsibilities that did not exist. For a cover, 
Mr. Jarvis was given the task of conducting a fluid dynamics experiment and Mrs. 
McAuliffe was to videotape six science demonstrations of the effects of weightlessness on 
gravity, etc.25 The Teacher-in-Space mission portion was to be featured in President 
Reagan’s State of the Union address the evening of Tuesday, January 28, though the White 
House later denied it. 
The second straw man argument is to assume that knowing the risk of space flight in 
general was equivalent to knowing the risk of a launch under weather conditions that were 
known to be unsafe with the O-ring technology in use. Again, neither the astronauts nor the 
two civilians aboard were made aware of the risk that they were taking. They may have 
been aware of the existential, general unknown risk of space exploration, but they were not 
aware of the specific, needless risk they were actually committing to take by being launched 
into space with a known, faulty technology.26 Indeed, would not the inclusion of the 
schoolteacher Christa McAuliffe, who had been given the understanding that the launch 
was safe, create the vivid impression to all aboard, and to the public at large around the 
world that this was a very safe flight? The genuine risk being taken was perceived to be 
minimal around the world by the inclusion of non-necessary personnel on the shuttle.  
Was Mrs. Christa McAuliffe made aware of the risk that she was taking? Grace Corrigan 
wrote: 
                                                                                    
25 Richard C. Cook, Challenger Revealed, An Insider’s Account of How the Reagan Administration Caused the Greatest Tragedy 
of the Space Age, New York: Avalon, 2006, pp. 177-8.  
26 Op. cit.., p. 156. 
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With respect to the Challenger launch, ‘ … Christa felt no anxiety about the flight. ‘I don’t 
see it as a dangerous thing to do.’ She said, pausing for a moment. ‘Well, I suppose it is, with 
all those rockets and fuel tanks. But if I saw it as a big risk, I’d feel differently.’27 
It was not only the case that Christa felt no pre-flight fears. She was never even informed 
that there was any real problem about which she should have been informed. Corrigan 
relates Christa McAuliffe’s account of what the President and the pilot from a previous 
launch told her in the White House: 
‘They were told about the dangers of the space program. She said that one could be intimidated 
thinking of all that he had said until you realize that NASA employed the most sophisticated 
safety features, and they would never take any chances with their equipment, much less an 
astronaut’s life.’  
When interviewed by Space News Roundup, she said that, ‘When the Challenger had the 
problem back in the summer with the heat sensors on the engine … and … one of Boston’s 
papers called me and asked me what I thought was wrong, … I said, ‘I have no idea. What 
has NASA said?’28 
It is obvious that Christa McAuliffe was not informed of any O-ring faults and the 
consequent life and death risk she was engaged and committed to taking by her 
participation. Is this a case where the statement from the Committee on Shuttle Criticality, 
Review and Analysis, that ‘The risks of space flight must be accepted by those who are 
asked to participate in each flight’ is even relevant when no one has been informed about 
the specific risks to which this particular flight will be prone? The fallacy of conflating the 
general, unknown risks of space flight with the specifically known risks of this flight makes 
“risk management” here into an unethical practice. There is, strictly speaking, no risk 
management that is being practiced. There is simply a wanton risk taking with human life. 
9. Subjective judgment versus performance data 
The Nobel laureate physicist, Richard Feynman was shocked to learn that NASA 
management had claimed that the risk factor of a launch crash was 1 in 100,000 which they 
had arrived at through a subjective engineering judgment without relying upon any actual 
past performance data. If one calculated risk based upon actual past performance data, the 
risk was, according to Professor Feynman, 1 in 100.29 While management, in defending its 
decision to launch, pointed to the risk involved as being 1 in 100,000, there was no 
examination of how these figures were generated. If one took the actual performance data of 
rocket engines in the past, as the Nobel laureate physicist Roger Feynman did, the risk was 
far greater. When one does this, one can more clearly consider the case of the possibility of 
incidence versus the actuality of consequence. Does one wish to risk the lives of the 
astronauts and the civilians when the chance of their death is 1 in 100?  
                                                                                    
27 Grace George Corrigan, A Journal for Christa, Christa McAuliffe, Teacher in Space, Lincoln and London: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1993, pp. 115, 118. 
28 Op. cit., p. 185. 
29 Ibid., p. 183. 
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From the above example, one can generate the conclusion that whenever possible, when 
calculating risk, one should not calculate risk in any other way than from the conclusions 
generated from actual, real-life, past performance data. The lesson to be learned is that in 
risk assessment, past performance data, when available, must always be consulted. One 
should avoid guess work. Unless the risk estimates are based on past performance data as a 
data base, according to Professor Feynman, ‘it’s all tomfoolery’.30 There is no reason why we 
should not learn from the lessons of the Challenger disaster to generalize sound conclusions 
concerning the method we should employ when engaging in risk assessment. 
10. Safety margins 
Major General Kutnya, Director of Space Systems and Command Control, USAF, and 
Presidential Commission member, argued that the O-ring evidence was analogous to 
evidence that an airliner wing was about to fall off. Professor Feynman pointed out with 
respect to Diane Vaughan’s contention that there was a ‘safety factor of three’, that because 
in previous cases, the O-ring had burned only one third of the way through, that did not 
prove that there was a safety factor of three. If we merge the O-ring and the airplane wing 
examples, the argument that General Kutnya, an Air Force General and Professor Feynman, 
a Professor of Physics, give is that if the wings of an aircraft have burned one-third of the 
way through, that did not mean that they had a two-thirds safety margin as Diane Vaughan, 
a sociologist with a Masters Degree in Sociology, thinks. If a part that is designed to hold 
back inflammatory gases is weakened by one-third, then its capacity to hold those gases 
back is diminished by one-third. In such a weakened state, the margin between its holding 
up and its caving in to the pressure of the gases is seriously undermined. It is not that it 
possesses a two-thirds safety margin; it is that one-third of its capacity is diminished. It may 
not be capable of standing up to a heavy load. Its safety margin at that point may be zero. 
In Professor Feynman’s words: 
If a bridge is designed to withstand a certain load … it may be designed for the materials used to 
actually stand up under three times the load … But if the expected load comes on to the new 
bridge and a crack appears in a beam, this is a failure of the design. The O-rings of the solid 
rocket boosters were not designed to erode. Erosion was a clue that something was wrong. 
Erosion was not something from which safety could be inferred.’31 
If we are to generalize from these arguments to future scenarios of risk assessment, we must 
be careful never to consider problems that develop as evidence that the design is still 
basically sound. Problems are danger signals, not signals that everything is fine. When 
safety is compromised, it does not signify that there is still a viable margin of safety. When 
safety is weakened, what we have left is not a state of safety conditions which are a little less 
than perfect; we have conditions which are not safe. 
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11. Safety back-ups 
One must also be very careful when one considers safety back-ups. In engineering language, 
safety back-ups are referred to as redundancies. (It is important to take note of the difference 
in English language usage in the case of technical engineering terms and ordinary English 
language usage since, in the latter case, a redundancy is that which is unnecessary!) In the 
case of the Challenger, the back-up system was a secondary O-ring seal. The secondary seal 
was known also to be prone to failure. In effect, there was no secondary seal. Of course, if 
we are to consider the argument made above carefully, if the primary seal is unsafe, and the 
secondary seal is made from the same materials with the same design, how is it any safer? 
When examining any safety back-ups, one must be certain that the back-ups are not of the 
same faulty design as the technology that they are supposedly “backing-up”. Since the O-
ring was considered to be at Criticality 1 (no back-up), it is thus not suprising that the 
secondary seal was not considered to be a back-up by this designation. 
In addition, it must not be forgotten that initially all 14 engineers and managers 
unanimously voted against launching the Challenger. Such a vote of no confidence would be 
proof enough that all 14 engineers and managers had no confidence in the secondary seal. If, 
when Professor Feynman in his famous, improvised experiment during the televised 
hearings dropped a piece of the rubber O-ring into a glass of ice water obtained from a 
waiter, and demonstrated that it had no resiliency left to it at a freezing temperature and 
therefore could not expand to contain superhot inflammable gases, how would a second 
piece of the same rubber material be of any use? If one piece of rubber would not seal, why 
would another piece of the same rubber not also be stiff?32 There is no safety back-up if the 
materials of the back-up suffer from the same defect as the materials of the primary material 
they are supposedly backing-up. 
12. The right to make decisions over others’ life and death 
As a final point in the question of risk taking, we must consider what gives any person or 
group of people the right to make decisions which will have life and death consequences for 
those who partake in the actions that will take place as a result of that decision-making. It 
has been argued that astronauts already knew the risks of space travel when they undertake 
such an adventurous role. Again, this is to confuse the general unknown risk of space travel 
with the specifically foreknown risk of launching with an unsafe part. It is also to ignore the 
fact that two civilians were aboard in addition to the five astronauts. 
What if we consider the question of decision making over life and death when the one 
involved is oneself? Suppose, for example, the astronauts and the civilians had been told of 
the dangers. It is entirely possible that the astronauts would still have chosen to launch. 
Even if the decision were placed in the hands of the Captain of the astronauts on that launch 
and he was fully informed of the dangers, should he have the right to decide if the launch 
should proceed? In a war, a general does decide if troops should engage in battle. There, of 
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course, there may be a set of circumstances when something very valuable (the lives of one’s 
countrymen for example) must be protected. But, here, we are still considering the scenario 
where there is nothing great to be gained – such as protecting one’s countrymen from 
destruction - by proceeding with the timing of this launch.. 
What if we leave the decision to launch to the astronauts themselves and make sure that 
they are fully informed of the dangers? (For the sake of this discussion, we except the case 
that there are two civilian passengers aboard). The crew, who perceive themselves as heroes, 
are likely to decide to vote to launch. When the author had the privilege to personally 
interview Kathyrn Cordell Thornton, the celebrated astronaut who was part of the 100 
strong astronaut corps at the time of the Challenger, and then Director of the Center for 
Science, Mathematics and Engineering Education at the University of Virginia, and the 
author of this chapter was privileged to be accompanied in this interview by the 
distinguished business ethicist, Patricia Werhane, we discussed this very issue. The author 
of this chapter vividly recalls Thornton saying that, ‘if these astronauts had refused to go up, 
there would be 100 others behind them waiting to take their place.’ This is not surprising 
when one considers the peer expectations of that kind of group. There is a psychological 
expectation that they should be fearless. This is no different from football players going into 
the field with a head injury. The question now has become, does one have a right to take a 
risk with one’s own life? One could say that this is a matter of individual choice. But, is it?  
One can consider the choice of a circus performer who decides to risk her or his life by 
performing on a high wire with no safety net. Should this be a matter of individual choice? 
Suppose the circus performer has overestimated her or his abilities? Again, the possibility of 
the incidence may be low, but the consequences are fatal. The performer is placing a greater 
value on the spectacle value of a performance without safety than on the value of her or his 
life. Should such a decision be left in the hands of an individual performer? Or, should such 
a decision be overridden, if necessary, by the director of the circus? 
Do we ever have a right to make life and death decisions that affect our own life and death? 
Or, is the value of life so precious that it should never be risked unless there is an absolute 
necessity? If we take the latter position, no one has the right to take such a risk with one’s 
own life except under the conditions of absolute necessity; e.g., as in the case of self-defense. 
The point here is that the ethics of the preciousness of life is valued over the concept of absolute choice. 
The case becomes more clear when we consider the circumstance of intended suicide. 
Assuming a situation in which the intended is not the victim of an incurable disease and is not 
making a forced choice (such as when a Nazi may say to a Jew, ‘Kill yourself now or I will kill 
your child’), does anyone have a right to gratuitously take her or his own life? While it may be 
thought that this is still a matter of individual choice and one can point to the custom of 
ancient Romans and Japanese in this regard, one must remember that in the case of ancient 
Rome and Japanese tradition, it was a case of personal honor and not merely gratuitous. In the 
case of the ancient Romans and the Japanese, these honorable suicides were not sanctioned 
because the individuals involved were desperately unhappy with their lives. 
In the case of the astronauts – leaving aside the civilians, the secondary school teacher and 
the journalist who have no such honor code – they do not lose their honor if they refuse to board 
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an unsafe vehicle. However, being young, adventurous and headstrong, they may not be able 
to understand that the risk that they are taking is an unnecessary one. It should not be their 
decision. It should be the decision of the engineers. The managers, in this situation, have the 
responsibility to follow the opinions of their experts. That some scholar/commentators have 
argued some of these experts concurred that it was safe to launch or they questioned the 
senior engineer’s warnings about the safety to launch is based upon uninformed, 
unsupported or prejudicial evidence. This issue is discussed in detail in the author’s Saving 
Human Lives: Lessons in Management Ethics. The prejudicial evidence is examined in Robert 
Elliott Allinson, Saving Human Lives: Lessons in Management Ethics. 
Ultimately, the deciders, those who are taking the risk of other people’s lives in their own 
hands, have the responsibility of not risking other people’s lives. It is as simple as this. There is 
no such thing as an ethical choice to risk another person’s life, including one’s own, when it is not 
necessary. If managers do so on account of cost-saving, they are making unethical choices if 
we define the basic principle of ethics to value human life as the highest priority. 
We should not leave the discussion of this one classical example without reiterating that the 
astronauts and the civilians aboard could have easily been provided with proper space suits, 
parachutes and ejection chairs. No one died as a result of the explosion. Horrifically, all died 
because of too fast a collision with the ocean. All were breathing until ocean contact. It is 
important to emphasize that the crew and the passengers were alive, were conscious after the spectacular 
explosion. As pointed out above, during their three minute descent, some crew members had 
actually activated and used their emergency air packs.33 That such a provision of space suits, 
parachutes and ejection chairs were considered and then rejected by management is another 
risky decision that resulted not in the safe abortion of the mission, but in the deaths of every 
person aboard. Earlier spacecraft had been equipped with launch escape systems, thus 
proving that escape systems were not only possible, but were actual. The decision not to equip 
the Challenger with an abort system was not a decision based on possibility, but a decision 
based on policy.34 This death, or should it be said, manslaughter of the astronauts and 
passengers, was not the result of high-risk technology, but the result of a cost-benefit analysis 
that took into account the benefit of profit, not the benefit of life. This horrific outcome was the 
result of risky and unethical decision making, not the result of improper risk management. 
This risk did not have to exist in the first place. It was a management decision that decided not 
to include these safety precautions: it was risky decision making, not a lack of risk management. 
(All later missions were equipped with such life-saving devices). 
13. Risking funds 
Classic examples of risk management would appear to be the actions of fund managers. 
Under the arguments advanced above, if one likens one’s funds as the means to one’s 
livelihood, one should never take risk with other people’s money. While this would appear 
to be impossible without doing away with capitalism altogether, there is one interesting 
counter example that should give pause to one’s thought. There is one hedge fund company 
                                                                                    
33 Ibid., p. 188. 
34 Ibid. 
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on Wall Street that guarantees any loss of any client’s investment up to four million US 
dollars.35 How does this company do this? While the author of this chapter cannot answer this 
question, it would be assumed that this company is sufficiently profitable such that it can 
make this guarantee. What is notable is not that it is capable of making this guarantee; what is 
notable is that it makes the guarantee. By making such a guarantee this company is making the 
statement that it regards the potential loss of its client’s funds as completely unacceptable. This 
standard of ethics is apparently commercially viable. This is an example, not of practicing risk 
management in the context in which it is most commonly accepted (that of a fund manager), 
but rather of practicing not taking risk in the first place (with other people’s money).  
14. On the hindsight objection and the problems with risk management 
Before departing from this topic, we must address an objection commonly brought forth, 
which in the designation of the author may be labeled, the ‘Hindsight Objection’. The 
following is the ‘Hindsight Objection’. There are always warnings of disasters and they are 
commonly ignored. When no disaster occurs, these warnings are forgotten. If one went back 
to every successful venture; e.g. a space flight, one would find the ignored warnings. 
Therefore, if one infers from warnings that an unsuccessful flight occurred, one is inferring 
from unwarranted premises. Whenever one goes back and traces the causes of disasters to 
unheeded warnings, one is justifying warnings through hindsight which is always 20-20. 
Hence, the label, the Hindsight Objection. 
There are two major replies to this objection. The first reply is that it is entirely hypothetical. 
In order to make good on the Hindsight Objection, one must bring forth evidence to support 
it. In other words, one must take a successful venture; e.g., a space flight, and show first of 
all that there were red-flagged warnings that the flight should not have taken place. If the 
‘red-flagged’ designator is not in use, the warnings must be shown to be of high-priority 
status, i.e., it should be demonstrated that such warnings were equivalent in status to the 
warnings not to launch disastrous flights, such as the dire warnings that were lodged in the 
attempt to stop the launch of the Challenger. Warnings must be vetted in terms of the criteria 
spelled out above, in terms of source, form and content. What is commonly brought forth as 
“hindsight evidence” in the case of the Challenger are operational parts which are 
designated as Criticality 1, of which there were many such on the Challenger which did not 
fail. A Criticality 1 designation indicates that the failure of such a part would result in the 
loss of the vehicle and human life. But a Criticality 1 designation is not equivalent to a red-
flagged warning that the part designated as Criticality 1 was likely to malfunction. One 
cannot point to parts with a Criticality 1 designation that did not fail as evidence that there 
were warnings that failure was imminent. A part with a Criticality 1 designation could, 
theoretically, be extremely safe. To count as a legitimate warning, there must be a specific, 
high priority (red-flagged) warning concerning the faulty design or operational capacity 
under certain weather conditions, etc., of a part which possesses a Criticality 1 designation. 
                                                                                    
35 Cf., Peter Lattman and Jenny Anderson, ‘For 92nd St. Y, a Break from Wall Street Worry,’ NY Times, November 29. 
2011. In this article, this guarantee is offered by the hedge fund manager, John A. Paulson. 
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This first condition, the prior presence of red-flagged warnings that meet the above criteria 
in terms of source (knowledgeable expert witness), form (red-flagged), and content (spelling 
out the specific flaw in the part), to the best of my research and knowledge, have never been 
met. The Hindsight Objection is always made as a purely hypothetical objection without any 
evidence for its truth value ever put forth. In the case of space flights (this example is used 
because it is best known to the author), one must show that there were other launches in 
which the senior scientist issued repeated red-flagged alerts and all of the engineers and 
managers voting on the planned launch voted unanimously against the launch. Has anyone 
ever brought forth any evidence in support of the Hindsight Objection claim?  
The second major objection is that even if one could offer an example of a flight which met 
the equivalent set of warnings that were issued in the case of the Challenger, one might miss 
the point that such warnings are not intended to be construed to be 100% reliable 
predictions concerning the particular flight in question. Such warnings are not meant to be 
on the level not of, if this flight will take place, but of when this flight, or a similar flight, 
takes place, such a likelihood of such a flight ending in disaster is a horrific eventuality. If 
the warnings are not justified on the basis of one flight, they might well be on the basis of 
the third or the seventh flight. When one leaves the auto mechanic’s shop with faulty brakes, 
the service manager might warn the customer that the brakes may fail. If the brakes do not 
fail on the first hill, that does not mean that her or his warning was without value. They may 
fail on the ninth hill. Thus, even if one could find a case in which dire warnings that fit the 
above criteria were present and the flight or sail went without incident, that would not 
prove that all such flights were to be considered safe. 
It is informative to reflect on the fact that Boisjoly’s warnings cover both the likelihood of the 
possibility of the incidence of the occurrence of the horrific failure of the mission and the 
consequence of the death of the crew and passengers. Thus, both aspects of risk are covered: the 
possibility of the likelihood of the incidence and the gravity of the consequence. This example 
of risk taking fits both the criteria of the likelihood of the possibility of the incidence and the 
enormity of the consequences. Such risk taking is entirely incompetent and unconscionable. 
That it need not be restricted in its eventual occurrence in this flight is evidenced by the fact that it was 
warned against eight years previous. The resistance to launch on this flight was based on the fact 
that the weather conditions compounded the already existent risk. The problem was that the case 
of the decision to launch the Challenger was an iconic case where it was thought that risk could be 
managed. In other words, to some extent, the very concept of risk management was at fault. A better 
example of a safeguard would have been never to have installed this unsafe part in the first 
place. That would have been an example not of risk management, but rather of not taking risk 
in the first place. (After that fatal flight, one of the original designs that was originally rejected 
was chosen to be used). More obviously, not launching in adverse weather conditions would be an 
example of not taking risk. Launching in dangerous weather conditions is an example of attempting to 
manage risk. It comes under the thinking of, ‘the weather is not good, but we can manage it’. It 
is not clear what this means. It seems to suggest the belief that ‘the weather is not good, but we 
can chance it.’ ‘Risk management’, when properly analyzed, seems to be equivalent to ‘risk 
chancing’ or gambling’. The eminent Nobel laureate physicist, Richard Feynman likened the 
decision to launch the Challenger space shuttle to playing Russian roulette. The proper way of 
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thinking would have been, ‘the weather is not good; we are not going to take the risk’. When we 
frame the decision to be taken in term of risk taking rather than risk managing, it is far more likely that 
we will act not to take the risk rather than to act to take the risk and then attempt, somehow, to 
“manage” it. 
It is therefore worthwhile to consider abandoning the concept of risk management and 
replacing it with the concept of risk taking. When one removes the euphemism of risk 
management and replaces it with risk taking, it becomes abundantly evident that it is actual 
human life with which one is taking risk. One is playing G-d with human life. The very 
concept of risk management is itself too risky. The seemingly objective social science language of 
‘risk management’ is in reality a license to treat human life lightly. 
15. In conclusion 
Whenever, under whatever circumstances, risk management is being considered, one must 
first consider whether any risk must be in existence in the first place. In a condition of great 
advantage, such as commercial air travel, the existence of risk is minimized in the first place. 
After its minimization, it is not a case of risk management that is practiced as much as it is a 
case of safety protection. It is not a case of a mere shift in wording, because if we employ the 
language of safety we will be reminded of the ethical priority of the preciousness of human life 
(together with its corollaries of future generations and the health of the planet). The risk of 
airplane travel is minimized with proper attention to mechanical safety, pilot training, etc. The 
airplane pilot has the right to make the decision not to fly when she or he decides weather conditions are 
not safe. Such an important decision is placed in the commercial pilot’s hands. The judgment as to 
whether it is safe to fly and therefore to risk lives of the crew and passengers is given to the most 
experienced and most expert person among the primary actors who will be actually taking the risk. 
To make a brief shift to another example to ensure that the problems with the concept of risk 
management are not confined to the case of the Challenger, many years ago, the author of 
this chapter personally recommended to cruise ship management, that all commercial cruise 
ships be outfitted with cockpit voice recorders (black boxes) as are airplanes. Originally, 
when the author made this recommendation, this author was told it was against strong, 
naval customs. It is refreshing to learn that strong customs can be changed. This provision of 
a black box is, of course, strictly speaking, a device that serves as a prevention of future 
disasters rather than a safeguard for the sail in question.  
Whatever we do in life, we cannot close our eyes and pretend that we can remove all 
dangers from any human endeavor. But a step forward can be made if we consider safety 
protection as our highest priority. In doing so, we must pay attention to the taking of risk in 
the first place and not be content with managing risk that need not exist in the first place. 
When we do take steps that minimize risk, we should not consider these steps to be 
“managing” risk, but rather as steps that reduce the consequences of risk. While cruise ships are 
now required to have enough life boats to accommodate 100% of their passengers, the diesel 
engines with which they are equipped can only power them up to 6 knots and cannot carry 
passengers to a faraway shore if harsh wind and sea conditions exist.  
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The idea of “risk management” implies that risk must be present. We must ever guard against 
complacency. If we keep uppermost in mind that the preciousness of life is our highest 
priority, we will ensure that the presence of the possible incidence and the consequence of risk 
is kept at the lowest possible point. If we change our language from the language of “risk 
management” which implies that somehow there must always be a risk present, and it is our task to 
manage it, to risk taking, we will be more alive to the ethical responsibility which is involved in taking 
risks with our own or other people’s lives. We will be more inclined to work sincerely to minimize 
the possibility of risk and to reduce the effect of the consequences of risk. 
The notion of providing enough safety boats for half of the passengers (the model of the 
Titanic) fits perfectly into the concept of “managing risk”. When we do this, we have 
performed some kind of cost-benefit analysis, or, to speak more strictly, some kind of 
probability-benefit analysis, and have reached a decision that by providing life boats for 
only half of the passengers we are fulfilling the responsibility of “managing risk”. It is not 
clear how this decision was reached. Perhaps, it was reached by assuming that only half of 
the passengers would make it to the life boats, hence, by providing half of the needed boats, 
we have “managed” the risk. 
In conclusion, if we use the language of risk taking, the provision of life boats for half of the 
passengers on board is still a case of taking risk with half of our passengers’ lives. On the other 
hand, if we take the language of risk taking seriously and consider that human life is precious, 
we would not sail, that is, we would not take risk, unless there were enough life boats 
provided for 100% of the passengers. (If we rely upon life preservers, for example, those in 
ocean waters would only live for a few minutes because of the icy temperature of the sea). 
Everything in the area of risk management is a matter of ethics. Do we value human life? What do 
we mean by the phrase ‘acceptable risk’? Such a concept can only be tolerated if there are 
safety provisions that will fully protect and preserve life if the consequences of the risk 
taking threaten human life. Otherwise, there is no such concept as an ‘acceptable risk’. Was 
the decision to provide life boats for only half of the passengers aboard commercial vessels 
based on past performance data? In the case of the Titanic, lifeboats for only half of the 
passengers were provided and, as a result, the lives of 1,523 men, women and children were 
lost.36 1,523 men, women and children were killed based on risk management. The Titanic 
disaster was in 1912. Now, 100 years later while the custom is to provide enough lifeboats 
for all passengers, the lifeboats are prepared with engines that will leave their occupants at 
the risks of the high seas.  
It is hoped that this introduction to the new idea of risk taking as opposed to risk 
management will create reflection and commitment to a greater ethical sensitivity when we 
consider how our decision making may affect other people’s lives. Do we ever have a right 
to take decisions that risk other people’s lives? If the message of this chapter is heard, then 
we do not ever have the right to risk other people’s lives unless we provide full and 
adequate protection for the consequences of the risk that we are taking with other people’s 
lives. If we change our language habits from commonly using the phrase ‘risk management’ 
                                                                                    
36 Ibid., p. 87. 
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to never using this term, but rather replacing it with the phrase, ‘risk taking’, we may have a 
more ethically responsible world. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the cargo transport process has improved mainly in the areas of logistics 
efficiency and documentation handling. The World Trade Centre terror attack in 2001 
changed the world and with it the conditions for logistics world-wide. The logistics 
consequences were according to[1]: It is instructive to note that these disruptions were not caused 
by the attack itself, but rather by the government’s response to the attack: closing borders, shutting 
down air traffic and evacuating buildings throughout the country. The aftermath to the attack 
brought needed attention to the vulnerability of modern supply chains. Supply chain 
vulnerability reflects sensitivity of the supply chain to disruption [2]. This vulnerability can 
in many cases be described as “unwanted effects” in the supply chain caused either by 
internal or external forces that create disturbances larger than the supply chain is designed 
to handle. The objective of Supply chain security is to prevent antagonistic threats from 
affecting the supply chain performance. Antagonistic threats and other risks and 
uncertainties are demarcated by three key words: deliberate (caused), illegal (defined by 
law), and hostile (negative impact for transport network activities) [3].  
This chapter presents first the major antagonistic threats to the supply chain and secondly 
how these threats should be prevented. This leads to the current development of different 
supply chain security programs.  
2. Supply chain and the transport network 
[4] defines the supply chain as, “The network of organisations that are involved through upstream 
and downstream relationships in the different processes and activities that produce value in the form 
of products and services in the hands of the ultimate customer”. These processes can be in 
different companies or in the same company. The different building blocks in a supply chain 
can, literally, be located throughout the world and connected through the use of a transport 
network. The transport network is designed to use economy of scale when moving products 
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from consignor to consignee in a supply chain, through nodes and links. This means the 
transport network only physically integrates the supply chain with the fulfilment of its 
transport demands [5]. Therefore, several different supply chains can be present at the same 
time and the same place in the transport network. This indicates that the relationship 
between supply chains and transport activities would be better described with complexity 
theory, especially if the interactions between components are the object of the research [3].  
Looking at transport from a system perspective, we find that logistics is made up of 
different levels, infrastructure, resources and material known as the three levels of logistics 
[6]. A logistics system consists of links and nodes, where nodes are geographically fixed 
points such as factories and terminals, while the links are the elements connecting the nodes, 
i.e., the modes of conveyance. The flow of materials is the first level of the system, because it 
is the reason for the system’s existence. Moving material from one place to another requires 
a flow of movable resources such as Lorries, trains, airplanes, and ships. These movable 
resources need infrastructure like roads, harbours, airports, and terminals [7, 8].  
The complexity in logistics can be explained by displaying the four flows always involved in 
logistics activities. The flows of material and resources are mentioned already. These two 
flows represent the “physical” part of logistics, but the other two flows, monetary stream 
and flow of information, are just as necessary to make the system work [6]. The four flows of 
logistics need geographical fixed constructions and infrastructure to fulfil the scope of 
logistics. Some of the infrastructure is owned and used exclusively by one company while 
some is co-owned or owned by governments. The four flows of logistics and the necessary 
infrastructure are the five needs for logistics fulfilment [9].  
The cargo thief aims to remove goods from the goods flow by attacking the movement of 
resources and/or the infrastructure it uses. A potential perpetrator can also utilize the 
information flow in order to better plan the theft of goods or commit a fraud which targets 
the flow of capital. This paper uses primary the three elements, flow of goods, movement of 
resources and infrastructure of the five needs for logistics fulfilments. The frame of reference 
uses the routine activity theory from criminology to explain the interaction between the 
transport network and potential perpetrators, where the theft opportunity is determent by 
each unique configuration of the five needs for logistics fulfilments and then exploited by a 
potential perpetrator. 
3. Threats to supply chains 
3.1. Usage of official macro statistics 
The usage of general statistics (mainly different types of criminal statistics) can provide a 
hint about the general criminal threat in a country or local area [9]. This fact is well known. 
Sometime is the relationship between reported crimes and public fear of crime direct whiles 
other times more indirect. Thus, it is possible that inverts that relationship and use macro 
level statistics in order to hint criminal hotspots in general. Important to remember is that 
this only provides a general hint about criminal threats and this clearly limited the 
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possibility to draw far-fetched conclusions unless more detailed data is added. A good 
indicator for criminal threats and common distrust in the society is level of corruption in a 
country [10]. The higher level of corruption, the higher is the distrust in the society and this 
may lead to a lower will to report crimes to the police. This is only a weak indicator. 
A good indicator of the violence present in a society is the number of homicides per 100 000 
citizens (lower number means safer). The average homicides rate 2007 in EU which is 1.4 in 
general but increases to 1.9 in capital cities [11]. This indicates that the country sides are 
safer than bigger cities, and the long term trend is a lower average homicides rate, which 
means a safer society (relatively). Other good indicators of criminal threats are the reported 
total number of crimes as well as the reported number of thefts and robberies. Risk rating 
(both relative and absolute) are good indicators on more transport related crimes. It is 
important to remember that each country may (are likely to) have different definition of 
crimes and guidelines for data collection [9].  
The general criminal trend in EU is that crime is declining from the pike around 1995. 
According to [11] have their being an increase in reported crimes types violent crime (up 
3%), drug trafficking and robbery (both up 1%) in the period 1998-2007. During the same 
period has seen a decrease in motor vehicle crimes (down 7%) and domestic burglary (down 
3%). There seems to be a time difference between countries in the trend but nevertheless the 
declining in reported crimes and even criminal patterns are surprisingly similar between 
member states [12]. The reason for this decline is according [12] the “changing demographics, 
among other factors, have played a causal role in the decreases in crime across the Western world. 
Since the bulk of common crimes are committed by young males”. There is also a suggestion that 
the better policing and/or more severe sentencing contributes to the declining criminal trend 
[12]. The different official statistics supports these conclusions.  
3.2. Shrinkage and theft 
The term inventory shrinkage is the loss of products between the point of manufacturing or 
purchase from supplier and the point of sale. According to [13], the average shrinkage rate is 
1,8 percent of total annual sales. This means a total loss of $33,21 billion annually in the U.S. 
The report points out four major sources of shrinkage: employee theft, shoplifting, 
administrative error, and vendor fraud. Therefore, three of four sources for shrinkage are 
criminal actions. The losses in the European fast moving consumer goods are for 26 percent 
in manufacturing, 8 percent in distribution, and 66 percent in retail [14]. Shrinkage during 
distribution/transport is approximately 0,14 percent of annual sales for all types of products. 
According [15] is the worldwide loss ratio as 0,025 percent of the total revenue ($307 billion 
revenue and $77 million in losses). Benchmark participant loss rates varied from 0,0038 
percent to 0,25 percent of total revenue. The three different reports [13, 14, 15] indicate that 
the annual shrinkage during distribution/transport would be 0,025 percent to 0,14 percent of 
annual sales. This loss ratio is compared with the loss ratio for retailers (1,75 percent) and 
manufacturers (0,56 percent) [14]. 
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There is a significant problem with the theft of cargo worldwide. It is estimated that theft 
represents a loss of at least US$10 billion per year in the United States and US$30 billion 
worldwide [16]. The value of cargo theft for the European Union is estimated to be €8.2 
billion annually, an average value of € 6.72 per trip [17]. Gathering accurate numbers for 
cargo theft losses is difficult or impossible in many cases, due to limited reporting by the 
transport industry and the lack of a national law enforcement system requiring reporting 
and tracking uniformity [18]. Despite these figures, cargo theft generally has a low priority 
status in most countries and is often perceived largely as the cost of doing business. 
A problem related to cargo theft is the theft of vehicles and the lorry-driver’s private 
property. There are many reasons behind a truck theft, but they can be described basically 
with three main characteristics - value, cargo carrying ability, and valuable documents [3]. 
The first characteristic, value, represents the truck’s value as all objects and can be sold and 
exchanged for money. The second characteristic, carrying ability, refers to the general propose 
of a truck. The vehicle and its load were targeted in 63 percent of the attacks [19]. The truck 
can be stolen with the current load where the goods are the desirable object and the truck is 
only the simplest method to move the goods to a warehouse or to another truck for further 
movement. A truck also can be stolen for other criminal activities. 
The third characteristic of theft problems toward freight is the attack for the lorry-driver’s 
private property or other types of valuable documents such as credit cards, mobile phones, 
and digital cameras stored in the truck during transport. According [19], 17 percent of all 
drivers suffered an attack during the past five years, 30 percent were attacked more than 
once. Of all drivers attacked, 21 percent reported they were physically assaulted during the 
attack [19]. This type of attack represents a considerable amount of the total, but nothing 
was stolen in 38 percent of attacks against trucks [20]. However, even if nothing was stolen 
it was still a crime against a part of the transport network and therefore shall be seen as an 
antagonistic threat. 70 percent of attacks against road transports occur between 22:00 in the 
evening and 06:00 in the morning [19]. Therefore, it is possible to state that time of day plays 
an important role in antagonistic threats. According [19], the direct cost for an attack is 
approximately €25000 per attack, including theft of vehicles, load and the driver’s personal 
belongings. 
Regardless of which of the three characteristics of theft problems the motivated perpetrator 
uses, there is a number of commonly defined modus operandi or methods to attack trucks. 
These different modus operandi are used differently depending on where the attack is 
executed. The different locations are described in terms of different steps in a road transport 
from consignor to consignee, which starts with loading the goods and ends when unloading 
them. Eurowatch has developed a threat/risk matrix based on the data on cargo theft in road 
transports over a seven-year period [23]. The matrix presented in Table 1 maps modus 
operandi and location of attacks against each other.  
A quick analysis of the matrix points out some obvious relationships. The method fake 
accident is best suited to deceive a truck driver to stop during driving and then conversion to 
a hijack. The same course of events can be created with the use of fake police tactics. The 
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threat/risk matrix points out the most dangerous location to be near end location or at insecure 
parking depending on which modus operandi is considered most threatening.  
 Hijack Robbery 
Theft 
from 
vehicle 
Theft of 
vehicle 
Fake 
police 
Fake 
accident 
Deception 
Load point 2 3 2 3 1 1 4 
Driving 4 1 1 1 4 4 2 
Insecure 
parking 
2 4 4 4 3 1 2 
Secure 
parking 
2 2 3 3 1 1 2 
Near end 
Location 
4 3 3 4 3 1 3 
Unload 
point 
2 3 2 3 1 1 4 
Table 1. Threat/risk matrix, road transport using Eurowatch data 2002-2009, 4 represents the highest 
risk [23] 
The greatest source of risk for businesses is trusted insiders [21]. Some authors consider 
insiders to be involved in approximately 60 percent of all losses [22]. According to [23] is 65 
percent of all “whole load losses” related to the use of inside information. Others claim there 
are no reliable figures [24]. This is interesting when considering the fact that most 
countermeasures are implemented to reduce external theft [25]. An internal perpetrator acts 
not randomly or in an unstructured way, but more as a response to social and 
environmental factors present in the work environment [22]. According [26] is the 
complexity around insiders and drivers expressed: “Some estimates indicate a high level of 
driver involvement, but drivers are possibly the weakest link in the security of the supply chain. They 
are also the first line of defence and there is a need to train and educate them on cargo crime and 
personal safety issues whilst on the road.” This leads to that the potential perpetrator both can 
be external to and internally involved in the supply and/or the transport chain. 
3.3. Terrorism 
The word “terror” is a Latin word meaning “to frighten.” Consequently, a terrorist is a 
person that intends to frighten others through fear. The term terrorist/terrorism is itself 
controversial because its key signature is political and it has been used by states to 
illegitimatize political opponents. This leads to a vindication of the state's own use of terror 
against its opponents [27]. The lack of a universal definition of consequence of this is best 
explained with the cynical comment “that one state's terrorist is another state's freedom fighter”. 
Regardless, terrorism is definition by [28] as, “Terrorism is not an ideology or movement, but a 
tactic or a method for attaining political goals. Terrorism is one of the major obstacles for 
meaningful international countermeasures.  
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The World Trade Centre terror attack in 2001 changed the world and the conditions for 
logistics worldwide. The aftermath of the terrorist attacks clearly indicated that logistics 
operations will suffer consequences of an attack. [29] state that, “over the longer term, there 
is a question of whether the attacks can have a negative impact on productivity by raising the costs 
of transactions through increased security measures, higher insurance premiums, and the 
increased costs of financial and other counterterrorism regulations”. The motivation for the 
majority of terrorist attacks is because the perpetrator intends to influence and alter the 
current balance of power in a certain direction [30]. Both the current balance of power and 
the potential effects on it may only be understood within the perpetrator’s own mind. 
Therefore, the non-economically driven antagonistic threat is more nuanced, uncertain, 
and harder to predict that other types of antagonistic threats. According to [31] the fear 
for terrorist attacks is an extreme form of perceived risk. The definition of terrorism 
influences the difficulty to present valid statistics for the category, because one source 
may classify an incident as a terrorist act while another considers it to be a “regular” 
crime. According [28] is the official reported number of terrorism attack in EU declining 
(581 attacks in 2007 and 294 attacks in 2009) and the major threat (in numbers) comes for 
separatist movements (Basque and Corsican) whiles Islamist terrorism is still perceived as 
the biggest threat.  
The modern or new thing with terrorism is not the use of violence to influence and alter the 
current balance of power in a certain direction. According to [32] is: “Terrorism in all its 
forms, by its very nature, an asymmetrical response to superior force, and terrorist have always used 
their capabilities as force multipliers – usually through the exploitation of terror. The generation of 
fear, in effect the use of purposeful violence as a form of psychological warfare can now be carried 
much further, enhanced by the modern media and the proliferation of mass media as much as by the 
proliferation of weapons”. The new thing with terrorism is therefore more related to 
development in media technologies than to vulnerabilities in supply chains. Nevertheless, 
terrorism is a special form of antagonistic threat that needs to be managed, in one way or 
another. 
Reviewing official terrorist statistics from one global source (MIPT Terrorism Knowledge 
Base) leads to the following transport related conclusions: 
 Transport activities represent 4% of the targets in 2006 and 5% in 2007. 
 The main modus operandi for attacks is armed attack (38% 2006 and 31% 2007) and 
bombing (51% 2006 and 54% 2007). 
 The main area for terrorist attacks are Middle East/Persian Gulf (68% 2006), and Asia 
(24% 2006). 
The terrorists prefer to use bombs and armed attacks because 80-90 percent of all attacks 
used these tactics. The targets are rarely transports but more in form of police and other 
governmental or religious institutions (~53% of the attack 2006). The interesting feature is 
related to the geographic side of terrorism, because the terrorist threat is mainly linked to 
local/country/regional contexts. 
 
Supply Chain Security – Threats and Solutions 163 
The official statistics for terrorist attacks indicates that, in order to understand terrorists, it is 
better to focus on possible attacks instead of probability for attacks. In accordance with this, 
there is no objective [33] way to determine who is a terrorist and who is not. It has all to do 
with the context to the terrorist threat. This follows the same logic when terrorism is 
presented as black swan problem [34]. Nevertheless direct and indirect effects from a 
terrorist attack or threat will affect the global flow of goods and thereby, to different extent, 
the global economy.  
3.4. Smuggling of goods 
The primary target of illegal goods is the black market. The black market consists of places 
and situations where products with doubtful or no legality are traded for money. This 
market is subject to the same forces of supply and demand as legal ones. Buyers of these 
illegal products are everywhere. Statistical reports show that counterfeited and pirated 
items amounted to $176 billion in Europe in 2007 [35]. According to [36], in 2006, nearly 3 
million pharmaceutical products were found to be counterfeit. Product smuggling does not 
necessarily mean that the product is illegal everywhere. What is legal in one country can be 
illegal in another, which creates the possibility that the actors in smuggling can be legal 
companies that are trying to access a market that is prohibited for them. An example of this 
is Western companies that smuggled products into former communist countries during the 
Cold War era. 
The supply of a typical black market (both authorities and customers knows that the 
product is illegal) can be illustrated with the illegal smuggling of cocaine to USA. The 
illegal drug supply chains come mainly from South America. This depends on that the 
raw material, coca leaf, is grown there. The smugglers use land, sea, and air routes to get 
past US authorities. The whole distribution of cocaine is controlled by Colombian-based 
organized crime, but in recent years it has started to cooperate with Mexican criminals to 
streamline the logistics and share the risks. The Colombians have organized their 
operations in a business-like manner, creating cells for special purposes like 
warehousing or transport [37]. According [38], the illegal drug markets are best 
understood as having high adaptation and great resilience to always supply their 
products to the end user. This resilience and adaptive ability is clearly found in the 
logistics system setup and can be understood and explained with the concept of risk for 
detection presented in this paper. 
The supply of a typical gray market (only authorities know that the product is illegal) can 
be illustrated with the illegal smuggling of counterfeited products. The gray market 
involves the diversion of goods from legitimate supply chains [39]. The only distinction is 
the risk for discovery from the authorities or the company whose products are copied. 
This diversity leads to a different design of the supply chain. The location of the 
production facilities is subject to the risk of discovery. Normally, counterfeited production 
units are placed where the risk for detection is low combined with the normal business 
problem as different types of costs and quality aspects. A counterfeited supply chain uses 
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the freight routes and port activities in the same way as legal supply chain does. Among 
the receiver countries, Europe and the US are favorites, just as Africa is the favorite for 
transit activities. Confiscated products that have not been produced in Africa, like jewelry 
and CDs, show this, because the African market does not have the ability, in general, to 
buy that type of product. Countries in Central and South America act like magnets for 
counterfeited products. Purchases of counterfeited goods to launder money occur in 
larger numbers there than anywhere else in the world [40]. Large stocks of illegitimate 
products are easily shipped from parts of South America to Central America, where they 
are big consumers of that type of product. Organized crime also uses Central America as 
the base for shipments of illegitimate goods to North America. The situation in Europe 
makes it the most lucrative market for counterfeited products. The types of confiscated 
goods at the external borders of the EU are different from other places in the world. This 
indicates that the dealers of counterfeited products adjust products to each market’s 
special condition. They look at the fashion, culture, and buying habits of individual 
countries [40].  
Both types of Illegal supply chains use the international flow of containers to transport their 
products all over the world, regardless if the product is counterfeited or an illegal drug. 
Criminals try to delude customs’ watchfulness by "breaking" their way through from the 
area of production to the area of supply, and avoiding direct paths that are well known to 
the authorities. 
A problem linked to smuggling is the manufacturing of products without intellectual rights, 
or the production of counterfeited goods. Everything that has been produced can be 
reproduced by someone else. In order to bring counterfeited products from the production 
site to the end user, they may have to cross several national boundaries as well as 
intellectual property legislation. The counterfeiting business evolves constantly within 
current trends and technologies. The production and distribution of illegal products is 
performed under the risk for detection and this diversity leads to a different design of the 
supply chain [41]. The location of the production facilities is subject to the risk of discovery. 
Normally, illegal production units are placed where the risk for detection is low, in line with 
the normal legal business problem of where to produce according to different types of costs 
and quality aspects. Then, the illegal products are distributed by trade routes and port 
activities in the same way as legal products [42]. The pollution of illegal products in the legal 
transport network is a serious problem. The most common countermeasure against 
smuggling is the inspection of cargo carriers when they cross a national border. The mere 
existence of these inspections creates disturbances in the transport network, even if no 
illegal product is discovered. 
The counterfeiting business evolves constantly within current trends and technologies. The 
illegal products are then distributed by trade routes and port activities in the same way as 
legal products [42]. According [43], the discourse on the gray market is filled with the idea 
of a criminal underworld in order to separate it from the legal/normal upper-world. In 
reality is it very difficult to establish the underworld/upper-world image. The legal 
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companies naturally are not pleased with the competition from black market actors. They 
may not be pleased with legal competition either, but that is another question. Striving for 
better business deals and the globalization trend that started centuries ago led to an 
embedment of illegal actions within legal markets [42]. This implies that the old black 
markets have been integrated with legal transactions, and today’s markets contain every 
shade of gray when referring to the legality of the markets as a whole [42]. Legal businesses 
are concerned especially with the problems of counterfeit branded products and the theft of 
their own products. To increase the efficiency of detecting counterfeited products, legal 
businesses use cutting-edge technology and security actions [97]. 
3.5. Piracy 
The modern types of pirates do not act officially of any specific courtiers’ order but research 
has indicated relationship between piracy and weakness of central governances [44]. In 
essence is piracy an international crime against all states and the perpetrators can be 
brought to justice in all everywhere [45]. In recent years has the threat from piracy against 
sea shipment (direct threat) and also against the different supply chains utilizing sea 
shipment (indirect threat) received increasing attention [44, 46, 47, 48]. The real increasing 
threat from pirates, primary at the horn of Africa [45, 47], has resulted into both a changes in 
shipping routes (Sullivan, 2010) and also a naval response from several countries [46] that 
are depended on a smooth passage of cargo carrying ships. According [49], was there 489 
attacks last year (2010) and over a twelve year period was there about 347 attacks/year 
globally [43]. Piracy is an increasing problem, especially near Somalia [48]. The pirates are 
changing their tactics and targets to use more sophisticated weaponry and apply more 
advanced techniques, all in order to improve their own success ratio. Table 2 presents the 
current trends and patterns in piracy. 
 
Year Number
of acts 
Lives
lost 
Wounded
crew 
Missing
crew 
Crew
hostage/ 
Kidnapped
Crew
assaulted
Ships
hijacked 
Ships 
missing 
2006 254 17 23 0 224 225 10 0 
2007 310 22 75 57 223 39 18 0 
2008 330 6 22 38 773 21 47 1 
2009 406 8 57 9 746 2 56 2 
2010 489 1 27 0 1027 30 57 12 
Table 2. Trends and numbers in piracy 2006-2010 [48] 
As stated in table 2, piracy is an increasing threat and especially alarming is the increasing 
use of violent and kidnapping of crew members. According to [48], piracy cost the maritime 
industry between 7 - 12 billion dollars a year. In addition to this shall also the cost for 
rerouting to avoid pirate infested waters, ransom payments and support from various 
organizations be added. 
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4. Preventing the threats - solutions 
4.1. Interdisciplinary research mixing criminology into logistics 
According to several authors [50, 51, 52], criminology is interdisciplinary research of the 
history and future of crimes, and this paper follows this tradition by using theories from 
criminology to strengthen the field of logistics. This mix of theories also challenges the 
predominant research approach in logistics related to tangible artefacts [53], and human 
intervention or influence to a smaller extent [54]. The reason for this approach is that 
violation of law is considered a human attribute. Criminology distinguishes three elements 
of a crime that are present in all sorts of crime ranging from occasional violence to advance 
and complex economic crimes [55, 56, 57]. The elements are: 
1. Motivated perpetrator 
2. Suitable object 
3. Lack of capable guardian  
These three different elements can be described as: 
Motivated perpetrator: The perpetrator is an individual that, based on the outcome of the own 
decision process, commits a certain action or prepares for a certain action that is prohibited by 
locality or country of international law. The perpetrator can be modelled with two different 
categories depending on how decisions are made by each individual, namely rational choice 
theory (also known as the economical man theory) or determinism [54, 58]. It is commonly 
agreed that different crimes demand various mixtures of rational choice and determinism 
from the perpetrator’s side, where crimes of passion (sexual crime, etc.) are considered more 
deterministic than property crimes (economic crime, etc.), which are more rational [59]. Thus, 
therefore can the general description of human behaviour be described as acting rational on 
the margin or limited (by circumstance, choice or mixture of both) rational choice [60, 61]. 
Object: The desirable outcomes or objects for the motivated perpetrator differ greatly 
depending on the motivated perpetrator’s decision process. Normally is it suitable to 
describe the object as the primary or direct reason for the action, but also as secondary or 
indirect reasons [56]. The primary objects can be shipped products, resources used, 
infrastructure, or even the media attention an attack will receive (terrorist attacks, action 
junkies etc.). It is in the relationship between object and motivated perpetrator that the 
categorisation of the antagonistic threat is found [3]. 
Lack of capable guardian: The preventive measures that can be induced to alter the motivated 
perpetrator’s decision process are called security [62]. If the security measures are 
considered insufficient by the motivated perpetrator, then there is nothing to prevent the 
crime [56].  
Most important to remember about the elements of crime is that it is first when all three 
elements comes together at the same time that a crime is possible. This means that if one of 
the three elements is missing than is crime impossible. Any combination of lack of security 
and target are normally referred to as a crime opportunity.  
 
Supply Chain Security – Threats and Solutions 167 
4.2. Opportunity to crime 
Crime opportunity is a cornerstone of criminal behaviour. There are ten crime opportunity 
principles as follows [63]: 
1. Opportunity plays a role in causing all crimes, 
2. Crime opportunities are highly specific, 
3. Crime opportunities are concentrated in time and place, 
4. Crime opportunities depend on everyday movements, 
5. One crime produces opportunities for another, 
6. Some products offer more tempting crime opportunities, 
7. Social and technological changes produce new crime opportunities, 
8. Opportunities for crime can be reduced, 
9. Reducing opportunities does not usually displace crime, 
10. Focused opportunity reduction can produce wider declines in crime. 
Some of these principles are self-explanatory and easy to understand. All of them are valid 
for every type of crime and therefore they are also valid for crimes committed against the 
transport network. The more interesting examples of these opportunities will be explained 
and described later in this thesis. The most important thing to remember about crime 
opportunity is that an opportunity alone does not explain why a crime occurs because a 
crime needs a motivated perpetrator and opportunity to occur [64]. The theory of crime 
opportunity also refers to the fourth principle of microeconomics [57] - people respond to 
incentives - and there the degree of necessary opportunity or incentive depends on the 
individual. The incentives could range from vindication to morality, ethics, altruism, or 
determinism [3, 64]. Altogether, this leads to that the relationship between threats 
(motivated perpetrator) and countermeasures (security) linked around a desirable outcome 
or object, are complex and contextual depended. 
4.3. The two different outlooks on mankind in criminology 
It is possible to separate mankind into two different categories, depending on how decisions 
are made. This separation is a theoretical construction and its validity varies for every 
person in every situation. 
Modern criminology uses rational choice theory as the basis for research. Rational choice 
theory, also known as rational action theory, is a framework for describing and modeling 
social and economic behavior. This theory originates in the idea of the economic man in 
economic research, primarily microeconomics. This theoretical model is also central in 
modern political science and scientific fields such as sociology and philosophy. Rational 
choice theory assumes that individuals choose the best action according to the constraints, 
opportunities, functions, and abilities they face. Today, rational choice theory in 
microeconomics is defined best with the first four principles of microeconomics [58]. In 
short, the theory states that every presumed criminal is should be considered a rational 
person who makes decisions about potential crime from relationships between the benefits 
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of the crime and the troubles and risk it brings. By increasing the perceived trouble and/or 
risk, it is possible to reduce criminal activity with this perspective [55]. 
The opposite of rational choice is determinism. The idea is that the course of events depends 
completely on existing conditions. This approach refuses the idea of free will - everything is 
predetermined. In reality, every individual is a mixture of their ability to be influenced and 
the lawful. Among social scientists today, the idea of restricted free will is a common and 
useful insight. The cause of these restrictions can be found in the individual biological or 
psychological vulnerability, way of life, upbringing, social group, ethnic background, or 
society in which the individual lives, and how this affects his or her life with regard to their 
ethnic background, gender, and social position [55].  
These opposing perspectives of the human being as either the master of his own life or as a 
victim of circumstance can be found in every aspect of criminology. This contrast affects not 
only how we see the causes of criminal behaviour, but is also important with respect to the 
social response to criminal behaviour [55]. According to [65], the current approach toward 
crime, punishment, and pardon is a good way to understand the surrounding society. It is 
commonly agreed that different crimes demand various mixtures of rational choice and 
determinism from the perpetrator’s side, where crimes of passion (sexual crime, etc.) are 
considered more deterministic than property crimes (economic crime, etc.), which are more 
rational. That being said, the big difference appears when discussing the possible 
punishment for a certain crime. If an individual is responsible for his or her actions (rational 
choice), then the possible punishment will deter the crime; however, if the individual is a 
victim of circumstance (determinism), then it is useless to punish the individual. Therefore 
all crime prevention methods assume that an individual is responsible for his own actions 
and that he can perceive the consequences of those actions. The big question for the rational 
choice perspective is how each individual estimates the risk in a rational way. An individual 
that has received a formal or perceived punishment for an action previously should be less 
likely to commit that action again. The outcome of a formal punishment on the perception of 
risk is mixed [66] and each individual should be considered not rational, but to act rationally 
on the margin [3].  
4.4. Criminal prosecution and punishment  
This discussion of the two outlooks on mankind in criminology clearly demonstrates the 
need to add theories from criminology into logistics. Several logistics authors claim that the 
weak prosecution of criminals is one reason behind the increasing need for security [16, 67, 
68]. In the context of the two outlooks on mankind in criminology, [16, 67, 68], state the 
threats against logistics activities is simply based on the rational choice theory, while 
authors in criminology [55, 63, 66, 72, 74] refer to an individual acting rationally on the 
margin which eliminates the deterring effect of potential punishment that [16, 67, 68] 
suggest. The deterrent effect that a punishment can have on a perpetrator not to commit a 
certain crime is very low, due to that the perpetrators do not plan to get captured. Therefore 
has the risk for detection a bigger deterrent effect that the potential punishment [41]. The 
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authors’ [16, 67, 68] request for stronger prosecution of criminals can be seen as a way to 
understand the surrounding society in general [65]. Compare that to [69] who state that risk 
management and TQM systems are normally linked to a punishment and reward system for 
the users. The difference between legal prosecution achieved by a state and a punishment 
and reward system controlled by a company or similar organization is that legal prosecution 
involves a weaker relationship between action and consequence for the perpetrator.  
4.5. Perpetrator, opportunity and security  
The relationship between security and opportunity is the predominant understanding of 
security in different contexts. This depends on the premise that security only can deter or 
repel a motivated perpetrator from committing a crime by limiting the opportunities for a 
certain crime. The most important thing to remember with crime opportunities is that an 
opportunity alone does not explain why a crime occurs because a crime needs a motivated 
perpetrator and opportunity to occur [62]. Opportunity plays a role in causing crime, and 
these opportunities are highly specific, concentrated in time and place, and depend on 
everyday movements. These opportunities can be reduced and focused opportunity 
reduction can produce wider declines in crime. It is the theory behind security. The real 
problem occurs when an organisation’s security capability is lower than the capability of the 
potential perpetrator. The driving force within each potential perpetrator can be vindication 
from morality, ethics, altruism, or determinism. Therefore, the relationship between security 
and opportunity must be understood from the viewpoint that the parties involved 
(stakeholders, actors, and humans) have different individual incentives to exploit 
opportunity that security needs to address. Consequently, security cannot be seen as only 
opportunity limiting but also as incentive limiting, making security a preventive factor on 
both sides of the opportunity (pre- and post-event).  
Crime opportunities depend on routines or predictability within certain boundaries. This is 
the routine activity perspective in criminology and it argues that normal movement and 
other routine activities play a significant role in potential crime. The routine activity theory 
states that potential perpetrators may seek locations where their victims or targets are 
numerous, available, convenient, and/or vulnerable. [70] uses the illustration of “how lions 
look for deer near their watering hole” to explain the practical relevance of the routine activity 
perspective. Social disorganization in combination with the routine activity theory can 
provide a wider and better explanation of property crime.  
4.6. Incident preventing 
The security of freight transport was long under-developed, but since terminal security has 
improved, theft incidents have increased in the links between terminals [71]. This 
development is also valid from a supply chain perspective; while security in manufacturing 
facilities normally is focused and well-managed, the rest of the chain is without security 
[72]. Security during transport is necessary to prevent unwanted negative disruption in the 
flow of goods. Transport security means the interaction between physical obstructing 
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artifacts (locks, fences, Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) etc.) and the intervention of 
humans, with the aim of reducing theft, sabotage and other types of illegal activity. The 
technological development of the range and sophistication of anti-theft devices and after-
theft systems is increasing rapidly [73]. There are different preventive methods that can be 
used to reduce the risk of a cargo theft incident, but the primary method is to use physical 
security countermeasures correctly (fences, locks, seals, guards etc). The objectives for these 
types of countermeasures are to make the theft both harder and riskier to commit. The next 
important countermeasure is the control and trust of employees in the company. This 
method targets the internal theft problem and can be subdivided in two parts: present 
employees’ supervision and new employee reference checks [74]. 
The configuration of transport networks leads to the need for security measures in different 
forms, depending on the exact function and appearance of each nod and link. All different 
theft preventive methods used can be explained with the basic theory of situational crime 
prevention. The aim is to reduce factors specific to different types of crimes, locations and 
situations. The key issue in situational crime prevention is the recognition that a crime often 
reflects the risk, effort and the payoff as assessed by the perpetrator [75]. The theory does not 
state that a perpetrator will commit a crime every time an opportunity occurs. Rather, the 
potential perpetrator makes a calculated decision about the opportunity to commit a crime 
[76]. In short, a perpetrator acts according to the rational choice theory, seeking to maximize 
its utility with regards to a particular time and available resources. Since cargo theft is a 
property crime, situational crime prevention is a useful method to address this problem. 
Basically this is achieved by applying the following three prevention principles [77]: 
Increased perceived effort [78] – Motivation to commit a theft is reduced if the perpetrator 
believes the crime is too hard to commit. Preventive actions based on this idea can be 
categorized as physical separation of the potential perpetrator and the object of the theft. 
This can be accomplished through the use of access control and physical barriers (fences, 
locks, etc.).  
Increased perceived risks [70] – If perpetrators think they will get away with a theft, it is more 
likely they will commit it. By increasing the risk for perpetrators they are less likely to 
commit a theft. This can be accomplished with surveillance systems, security personnel, and 
by increasing employee’s security awareness. 
Reducing anticipated rewards [70] – People are more likely to commit a theft if they can benefit 
from it. By making the target for the theft worthless or reducing its resale value it becomes 
less attractive for potential perpetrators. This can be accomplished by marking the goods 
with unique numbers or a product destruction device. Good examples of this principle are 
the safety cases used in transports of valuables and money and the ink tags used in fashion 
stores. 
[71] added a fourth preventive principle based on rational choice theory: 
Inducing guilt or shame – A theft is more likely to occur if it can be excused by appeal to 
reasons such as “the company can afford it” or “I’ve worked hard for the company but they 
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have not thanked me for it” [79]. This is a form of ethic relativity. Companies and 
organizations can affect this ethic relativity by using company rules, signs, and regulations 
that demonstrate the right moral values. When theft is seen as an additional wage benefit for 
employees, this preventive action has failed [24]. By appealing to people’s morals and 
making it easy for them to do the right thing, it will be more difficult to make excuses [71]. 
Some of the criticism against situational crime prevention states that this method leads to 
property crime receiving more attention than is appropriate. Furthermore, situational crime 
prevention addresses the symptom and not the cause of the crime. This can lead to an 
excessive trust in technology [80]. Both of these criticisms are valid for the usage of 
situational crime prevention to hinder cargo theft. This may explain the over confidence in 
technology in order to prevent terrorism due to that terrorism is not a property crime and 
therefore has the use of technology an even lower impact on reducing the threat than for a 
cargo theft incident. The prevention of incidents are traditionally closely linked to the 
definition of security as a show of force which leads to that security work becomes symbolised 
with uniformed guards and normal police duties [81]. In order to include impact reduction 
in the term security is the second definition, freedom from danger, better to use. This definition 
embraces all things that allow the organization to act and carryout the business “free from 
danger”. This is from this view point the supply chain security shall be understood.  
4.7. Crime displacement 
The theory of crime displacement says that crime prevention in one area may have 
unintentional consequences in other areas or situations. Therefore, crime prevention may 
not lead to an absolute reduction in crime. The theory of crime displacement is based on 
rational choice theory, with the following three assumptions about the potential perpetrator 
and target [69]:  
Crime displacement assumes that crime is inelastic [82] - This assumption indicates that the 
demand for crime is unaffected by preventive efforts. This is not true because all crimes are 
more or less elastic [83]. Professional criminals are more inelastic while opportunistic 
criminals are more elastic [75]. 
The perpetrator has mobility [75] - Perpetrators have flexibility relative to time, place, method, 
and type of crime. In reality, perpetrators are limited in their mobility, adaptability, and 
flexibility relative to a particular crime, place, time, and method [76]. 
There exist unlimited numbers of alternative targets [84] - The perpetrators have unlimited 
numbers and types of potential targets to choose from. In reality, the number of targets is 
limited in one way or another [76]. 
The theory of crime displacement states that rational thinking perpetrators with crime 
mobility will alter their behaviour in response to crime prevention efforts [69]. Crime 
displacement will only occur when the alternative crime has a similar cost-benefit structure 
rationalised within the perpetrator’s decision process [85]. Based on the ten principles of 
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theft opportunities presented earlier in this thesis and the configuration of the transport 
network, it is obvious that all opportunities cannot be eliminated, but they can be reduced 
by applying substantive preventive countermeasures. The object is to reduce crime 
opportunities which will lead to a change in potential theft situations. Therefore crime 
displacement is a valid theory [75].  
Crime displacement can occur in several ways. [75] uses five types of displacement - crime, 
target, method, place, and time. [86] add another type of displacement, the perpetrator. The 
six types of displacement are explained below [65]:  
Crime:  Transfer to other types of crime 
  Ex: offenders stop doing robberies and instead commit burglaries. 
Target:  Transfer to other types of goods  
  Ex: offenders stop taking goods and instead target money transports. 
Method: Better locking devices force the offender to be more innovative 
  Ex: better doors force the offender to break-in through the windows.  
Place:  Transfer to a less protected target in the same or other areas 
  Ex: if one area improves security then the offender attacks another area.  
Time:  Transfer to different times of the day 
  Ex: better night security forces the offenders to strike during daytime. 
Perpetrator: Transfer to another perpetrator 
  Ex: Preventing one offender can create an opportunity for another offender.  
The theory of crime displacement does not explain why perpetrators commit a certain crime 
or why some crimes are more attractive than others. Furthermore, it does not explain the 
perpetrator’s perceptions and reactions to changes in opportunities [76]. Crime 
displacement is one probable explanation of why criminal patterns change in a certain 
system. A practical statement about crime displacement is that if perpetrators have the ability, 
mobility, and flexibility to exploit the weakest link in the chain, they will do so. It is the 
perpetrator’s ability to organize a successful crime and their relationship relative to the 
actors within the transport network that are the fundamental variables for categorizing 
perpetrators.  
4.8. Logistics, risk management and criminology 
The three terms security, risk management, and crime prevention often are considered 
similar and always work together [61, 74]. This idea suggests that security and risk 
management are good from an ethics point of view because they reduce crime; therefore, 
more or better security or risk management will reduce crime. The problem here is that 
crime is defined by a law according to the principle “no crime without a law” [54], while 
security or risk management has no philosophical attachment to law. Therefore, people on 
both sides of the law can have better security or risk management and that security and risk 
management are not necessary against crime.  
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Security for an individual or a group of individuals can, if unrestricted, jeopardise the 
security of others by threatening them or transferring threats to them. This type of 
discussion can be found with philosophers such as Hobbes and Mills. Unbounded or 
unrestricted individual security could threaten the authority of a state. This problem is 
demonstrated in the current debate about individual and private secure communication 
encryption, which some states want to make illegal unless they can break them. Taking this 
into account, a security problem may or may not be a legal problem. As a concept, security 
involves a protector or guardian and a threat against an asset or object [74]. This threat can 
be from either side of the law. To obtain the right security, it is vital to answer who is 
protecting what, from whom, in which situation, to what extent, and to what consequence 
[61]. Security can be seen as contextual risk management [3].  
Contextual and statistical risk management approaches as crime prevention methods work 
in different ways and address different types of potential perpetrators. This demonstrates 
the difference in the philosophical views of contextual and statistical risk management. 
Statistical risk management needs a fairly predictable world, or at least a larger amount of 
trustworthy statistics. Since previous events or incidents are the basis of statistical risk 
management, it cannot deal effectively with a self-inflicted alteration of the threat pattern. 
Therefore, statistical risk management is effective in crime prevention if the potential 
perpetrators are limited to unsophisticated and indifferent methods based on opportunistic 
behaviour [87]. However, as potential perpetrators become more sophisticated and gain 
more capability, the accuracy of statistical prediction will reduce dramatically. Antagonistic 
perpetrators study the victim to discover routines and regularities and improve their skills 
with this knowledge (planning, technologies, and tactics) to maximize their likelihood for 
success [88]. The prevention of antagonistic threats by following current business trends 
makes the system even more predictable. Military special forces and similar organizations 
have proven this time after time [75]. 
4.9. Transfer of the effect from antagonistic threats 
The mitigation of antagonistic threats refers to strategies to transfer the economic impact to 
another organisation/company. The basic idea is that by transferring the risk to someone 
else through different types of contracts, it reduces personal risk substantially [89, 90]. The 
contractual agreements are divided into two different categories - insurance policies and 
non-insurance contractual agreements between two organisations. Good risk transfer 
strategy is composed normally of both types of risk transfer. 
Transfer of risk by usage of insurance: The insurance principle prescribes that the insurance 
company takes over the economic impact if something happens that is covered by the 
insurance contract. Therefore, the risk of this event needs to be rather easy to identify, 
classify, and determine for the insurance company to estimate the cost related to the risk 
and determine the insurance premium. This premium is also accompanied by an 
insurance excess, giving the potential insurance buyer three components to consider: the 
terms, premium, and excess of specific insurance. The incentive for each individual 
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insurance buyer is the central issue, and in extension, also the potential reduction of a 
potential loss [3, 91].  
Today special insurance policies exist for everything from cargo damage and machinery 
breakdown to terrorism, war, and general consequence liability. Typically, all insist on 
special events to be considered valid for a certain incident. Sometimes the terms are so 
specific that different types of insurance are valid depending on the cause of the incident. 
One of the best examples is the often-conflicting terms in terrorism contra war insurance. If 
there is a recognized government behind the incident, then war insurance is valid, but if the 
incident is caused by someone else, it is the terrorism insurance policy that covers the 
economic impact. This also depends on the different terms that each insurance company has 
in their product [3]. 
Transfer of risk by usage of business power: This risk transfer strategy is commonly used 
between contractual partners, but is rarely mentioned because it opposes the belief that 
everybody wants to collaborate fairly and for the greater good [92, 93, 94, 95]. The general 
idea of this risk transfer strategy is to use the business power of size, information advantage, 
or control over a critical asset [96, 97] so the business partner can obtain a share of the 
business risk as a part of the contractual agreement.  
4.10. Supply chain security 
The terrorist attacks at the World Trade Centre and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, 
brought attention to security in trade, for more reasons than just the attacks. Three factors 
can be outlined: first, the globalization of world trade depends on and is generated by the 
free flow of people, goods, and information; second, the increasing demands from 
businesses for efficient supply chain operations; and third, the increasing threats of terrorist 
attacks [98]. The last reason can be seen as an increase in perceived risk for terrorist attacks. 
This factor can define illegal and antagonistic threats, of which terrorists are one type. 
Therefore, supply chain security management can be defined as, “the application of policies, 
procedures, and technology to protect supply chain assets from theft, damage, or terrorism, and to 
prevent the introduction of unauthorized contraband, people, or weapons of mass destruction into the 
supply chain” [83]. The only problem with this definition is that it does not address the origin 
of the threat or risk. The five sources of supply chain risks provide that. Supply chain 
security needs to adjust its policies, procedures, and technology to protect the supply chain 
from all five risk sources. The flip side of supply chain security is supply chain resilience, or 
a supply chain’s ability to withstand and recover from an incident [83]. Supply chain risk 
should incorporate security and resilience, where resilience also must handle a near miss 
incident that affects the performance of the supply chain and from which it needs to recover. 
Present supply chain security research outlines several changes for how security in a supply 
chain should be approached. First, supply chain security should incorporate not only theft 
prevention but also anti-terrorism measures. Second, the focus is now on global issues and 
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not just local or national issues [99]. Third, when conducting contingency planning, the 
concept of crisis management is to be included to obtain better resilience. Last, security is no 
longer an internal corporate question but rather an issue for all actors within the supply 
chain [83]. 
[100] suggest that methods and ideas from total quality management can be used 
successfully to increase supply chain security. The main idea is the lesson from quality 
management that sample inspection is expensive and useless at the end of the production 
line. Just like in quality management, supply chain security becomes more effective and less 
expensive by implementing the right management approach, technology, and re-
engineering operational processes. [85] state that security should be integrated throughout 
the entire supply chain to be successful at a reasonable price. This opinion is supported by 
several other authors [74, 83, 101, 102, 103]. 
4.11. Supply chain security programs 
Several new security programmes were launched in the aftermath of the World Trade 
Centre terrorist attack to protect international cargo flow from being abused for criminal 
(primarily terrorist) intentions without compromising supply chain efficiency. The U.S. 
Customs Office launched several programmes such as the Customs-Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), Container Security Initiative (CSI), the 24-hour rule, etc. These 
security programmes address different aspects of supply chain security and target different 
parts of a transport chain. The link between these security programmes is that they involve 
all parties or stakeholders in supply chain security [104]. The effects from these programs 
both in order to handle security threats and their impact on different logistics processes 
have been addressed in a few papers [105, 106, 107, 108, 109]. [110] states that the C-TPAT 
certification will probably have a negative impact, mostly on small enterprises whiles large 
firms instead may have the possibility to trade-off the security costs with benefits related to 
supply chain transparency. [111] demonstrates the economical and competitive advantages 
for large and small shippers becoming FAST-approved (Free And Secure Trade). The 
acquisition of the FAST status may provide shippers with faster trans-border operations and 
consequently a substantial advantage on the export market [96]. [112] emphasize that 
efficiency and security in supply chains are closely related to each others, since higher 
security may reduce Customs delays. The relationship between security, efficiency and 
custom activities is clearly found in the AEO-program.  
Other types of security programmes existed before the attacks on the World Trade Centre. 
These programmes were designed primarily to address theft problems within the transport 
business (TAPA FSR and TSR, etc.) [113]. The big difference between security programmes 
before and after the terrorist attacks is that afterwards, authorities (mainly U.S.) took the lead 
in developing and implementing these programmes. Before September 11, 2001, security was 
something the business itself handled. The implementation of these programmes has so far 
mainly occurred in the old western countries in North America and in Europe. 
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Other types of security programmes existed before the attacks on the World Trade Centre. 
These programmes were designed primarily to address theft problems within the transport 
business. The big difference between security programmes before and after the terrorist 
attacks is that afterwards, authorities (mainly U.S.) took the lead in developing and 
implementing these programmes. Before September 11, 2001, security was something the 
business itself handled. The implementation of these programmes has so far mainly 
occurred in the old western countries in North America and in Europe. 
The cost for implementing these programs alters the current collaboration models with 
regards to risk and profit sharing within the supply chain. The risks for antagonist threats 
are depended on the local environment. This shall be compared with that the security 
programs advocates one to three different security levels which shall solve the problem. 
This leads to that the security level is adjusted towards the security programs instead of the 
local threat. This may lead to that the security cost is higher than needed but a 
standardisation within the supply/transport chain in security may result in better 
collaboration. The political reasons behind the different supply chain security programs is 
most likely the fear for terrorist attacks which according to [32] depends more on the 
proliferation of mass media than development of new weapons. This is the context to 
understand the content and effects from fear of terrorist against international trade. 
Nevertheless the supply chain security programs provides collateral benefits like better 
product control, lesser shrinkage and better incident prevention by reducing threat 
opportunities. 
The compliance with these different logistics security programs are based on different 
reasons. The compliance with business logistics security programs (like TAPA:s) are based 
on customer requirements. This depends on the simple fact that these programs are focusing 
on theft prevention. The governmental logistics security programs like AEO, C-TPAT, CSI 
etc. are on other hand more focusing on preventing terrorist activities. These programs 
normally also contains some kind of disadvantage for the own organisation if not 
compliance. Therefore are the governmental logistics security programs entail with a higher 
likelihood of compliance due to that need for compliance are not based on a risk assessment 
about the potential causes and impacts for antagonistic threats but on a general business 
assessment. For legal businesses, the AEO, C-TPAT, etc., are both a global supply chain 
headache and a business opportunity, depending on the risk for theft and counterfeiting for 
that company [114]. Irrespective of the difference in compliance reasons, the governmental 
logistics security programs may result in collateral benefits like lower cost for theft and 
better working conditions for the employees but there are still to be demonstrated that the 
terrorism preventing logistics security programs actually reduces the risk for non-
economical-driven antagonistic threats because it’s their primer reason for existing. 
5. Conclusions 
First, [1] clearly points out the effects of the WTC terrorist attacks on the global flow of 
goods. The effect may be indirect, but it was devastating. This event along with non-
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antagonistic events such as Hurricane Katrina and other natural disasters demonstrated 
their power to disrupt or cause uncertainty in supply chains. Second, terrorism conducts 
fund raising through criminal activities, which leads to that terrorism represents all 
antagonistic threats. Third, the tools and strategies for handling antagonistic threats are 
partly governmental (police and justice system) and partly consequence handling (insurance 
businesses, conventions and business contingency).  
For terrorist threats, it is useful to refer to transferred and perceived threatening pictures 
[31]. The perceived or actual marketing strategies which link a company or organisation 
with certain values/states/advocates will affect the risks for terrorist threats to the 
organisation/business/market position. The key issue in this conclusion is that the perceived 
relationship between a company/organisation and values/states/advocates is made by the 
potential terrorist. Therefore is it important for a holistic threats assessment to include and 
consider these different relationships between an organisation and different 
values/states/advocates with regard to direct and more important indirect connections.  
Historically, terrorist groups and organisations have been closely related to a certain 
geographical area and executed in that area. This is a valid statement for terrorist 
organisations such as IRA and the Basque separatist movement, even if both have 
conducted attacks outside their fighting area but within their targets (e.g., in UK but outside 
Northern Ireland, and in Spain but outside the Basque province). Those types of 
organisations only constitute a threat if the operations are carried out in that area and if the 
logistics operation possesses any real or symbolic value for the terrorist organisations. The 
strong relationship between different terrorist groups and geographical area may be 
reduced when referring to international terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda, but the 
targets should still possess a symbolic value for the terrorist organisations, even if the value 
is public fear. 
The vulnerability of the supply chain is transmitted to the transport network. This depends 
on the simple fact that transports and freight activities physically bring the facilities of a 
supply chain together. Therefore, risks, uncertainties, and vulnerabilities in the supply chain 
and the transport network affect, contribute, and neutralize each other. Supply chain 
security is indented to safeguard the supply chain (in this meaning the transport and freight 
activities) from different antagonistic threats and thereby reduce the vulnerability of 
modern global trade.  
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1. Introduction
Supply chain is a set of activities involving a group of commercial actors to create a product
or a service to satisfy a customer demand. The actors are the ones who form the supply chain,
they are suppliers, transporters, manufacturers, distributors, retailers and customers.
In this chapter, our objective is to describe dangers for people, environment and goods from
dangerous goods exploitation. We want to show how dangerous goods can be source of
accidents during storage activities. To understand the potential of chaining event we elaborate
accident scenario to describe the consequences of such accidents.
This risk study in warehouse provides insights to elaborate a risks management strategy
relying on communicating objects such as RFID tags and wireless sensors. Then, by exploiting
the technical features that provides these smart items, it becomes possible to detect in real time
any accident risks and to react in consequence.
This chapter is organized as follows. Part 2 introduces briefly what supply chain management
is and gives some definitions. Part 3 describes dangerous goods in logistics and notably the
risks inherent to their storages. Current regulations such as CLP is presented, it provides a
standard in the European Union to classify and identify dangerous goods. Risks relative to
dangerous goods manipulation are presented, segregation strategies and storage constraints
must be respected to maintain the security within awarehouse. In part 4, a risk study is lead to
extract three scenarios that describe the domino effect consecutive to accidents. These scenario
are treated further in part 5 when communicating objects are integrated at pallet level. Then,
these smart items allow elaborating real-time risk assessment that contribute to detect early
accident risks and to deploy emergency procedures to mitigate that risks.
This work is funded by German BMBF and French ANR as part of ReSCUeIT project.
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Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0),which permits
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2. Supply chain management in logistics
Depending on actors involved in Supply Chain (SC) (suppliers, transporters, customers), SC
definitions can differ regarding the described interactions and dependences between actors.
A definition is given by [1]: "A network of organizations that are involved, through upstream to
downstream links, in the different processes and activities that produce value in the form of products
and services in the hands of the ultimate customer".
With this definition, it appears that each company owns an internal SC and participates to
another SC. A SC is a succession of activities related to a specific function performed by one
or several actors in order to satisfy customer demands. Then, each actor belongs to a global
flow, he evolves according to three interactions: his internal tasks, his provider status and his
customer status.
2.1. Supply chain management
A SC exists if at least two companies work together to the production of a particular product
or service. If this association is explicitly guided to improve the performance then we describe
this as supply chain management, also called SCM.
From a general point of view, the SCM can be defined as the coordination between companies
internal and external activities. The goal of thismanagement is to improve the SC performance
on long term basis so that each actor of the SC can take benefit of this global management.
The SCM consists of managing the whole organizations involved in the delivery of a final
product or service. Its aim is, on one hand, to produce products relying on information
received from the customer needs and, on the other hand, to minimize the different supply,
production, warehousing and delivery costs. The SCM gathers two parts: the integration
of the company along the SC and the coordination between the physical, information and
financial flows.
The main objective of the SCM is to improve the competitiveness of companies by minimizing
the costs while the quality of service required by the customer is guaranteed.
3. Dangerous goods management in logistics
A good is considered as dangerous when it may present a danger on population, environment
or on infrastructure according to its physicochemical properties or because of the reactions it
can imply.
Activities involving dangerous goods concern all parts of the world. A global regulation
is needed and should be coordinated with local authorities to make laws more reliable and
respected. Since the logistics tend to be global, the control should be also global for a better
efficiency.
Laws related to the use, the loading, the unloading, the storage, the transportation and the
handling of dangerous material differ according to activities, status or modality of transports.
Countries rely on international recommendations proposed by the Organization of United
Nations to regulate the operation on dangerous goods.
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The UN proposes recommendations for the dangerous goods since 1957 and updates
periodically its texts. It is a referencewhich provides the main recommendations related to the
dangerous goods notably about the different methods of transport: air, road, railway, canals
and sea. A specialized authority is dedicated for each means of transportation, they are the
followings:
• International Air Transport Association, IATA, is for transport by airplane;
• European Agreement concerning the international carriage of Dangerous goods by Road,
ADR, manages the European transport of dangerous goods by road;
• Regulation concerning the International transport by railway of Dangerous goods, RID, is
for the international transport of dangerous goods by railway;
• EuropeanAgreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland
Waterways, ADN, manages the international transport on internal canals;
• International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code, IMDG Code, is for international
transportation by water.
Due to the existence of international regulations, countries or groups of countries (the
European Union for example) have adapted their laws to harmonize them with the UN
model. Thus, country legislations tend to follow the international regulations to make the
management of dangerous goods more standard and more visible by a third.
3.1. Dangerous goods identification
Considering the important number of substances, there is a clear need for dangerous goods
classification. Existing classifications of dangerous goods are based on chemical families
(acid, alcohol, amide, etc.), chemical reactions (oxidation, reduction, combustion) or also on
chemical compositions.
The CLP (Classification, Labelling, Packaging) regulation is relative to the chemical substances
imported or commercialized in the European Union. This regulation entered into force in
January 2009 and will be totally applied in 2015.
3.1.1. Obligations under CLP
CLP provides a global obligation for all suppliers in the supply chain to cooperate.
This cooperation is necessary to make the different suppliers meet the requirements for
classification, labelling and packaging.
3.1.2. Terminology
A new terminology is used, terms of existing regulation are kept whereas news are adopted.
The term substance is used to designed hazardous material and the transformation of these
substances into a new one is called mixture.
As well, the properties of substances are described according to three properties:
physicocochemical, toxicological and ecotoxicological. According to these three criterion, the
definition of hazard classes helps to classify a substance. Then, a hazard class defines the
nature of a hazard, it can be physical, on health or on the environment.
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3.1.3. Classification of substances
CLP possesses specific criteria of classifications that are rules that allow associating a
substance to a class of hazard or a category in this class. In particular, the classification process
is based on the substance concentrations to establish the effects of those substances on the
health and the environment.
CLP defines three hazard classes and 28 categories, such as:
• 16 categories for physical hazards;
• 10 categories for health hazards;
• 2 categories for environmental hazards.
For example, the physical hazards regroup explosives, flammable gases, solids, aerosols,
liquids. The health hazards are relative to acute toxicity, skin corrosion, irritation and
sensitization. The environmental hazards address hazardous to the aquatic environment and
hazardous to the ozone layer.
3.1.4. Labelling
A substance contained in packaging should be labelled according to the CLP rules with the
following information (called labelling elements):
• the name, address and telephone number of the supplier of the substance;
• the quantity of the substance in the packages;
• hazard pictograms;
• signal word;
• hazard statements;
• appropriate precautionary statements;
• supplemental information.
A substance contained in packaging is labelled according to the CLP rules and contains a set
of information such as name of the supplier of the substance, quantity of the substance in the
packages or hazard pictograms, see Fig. 1.
The CLP regulation helps then the identification of chemical substances through the supply
chain since it provides a standard framework for the classification, the labelling and the
packaging of substances.
3.2. Risks in dangerous goods storage
In the context of logistics the main considered risks are relative to the physical or information
flows disruption. The case of a supply chain whose physical flow manages dangerous goods,
the risk becomes different and takes another dimension.
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Figure 1. Pictograms used in CLP regulation.
3.2.1. Risk definition
The Process Safety Management (PSM) defines risk as follows:
"Risk is defined as a measure of frequency and severity of harm due to a hazard. (...) In the context of
public safety, risk is commonly characterized by fatalities (and injury) to members of the public".
According to this definition, several factors make difficult to assess the risk for dangerous
goods manipulation. Among these factors, there are the followings:
• Because of the diversity of hazards, the chemicals physicochemical properties are different
and consequently risks evolve also;
• The localization of potential accidents stays uncertain, it is not possible to determine where
an accident can occur (warehouse, highways, county roads, local roads, etc.);
• The large diversity of causes implies that it is impossible to enumerate all cases and to treat
these risks.
3.2.2. Risks in warehousing
Among dangerous goods, products can react when they are in contact. For these reasons, they
must be stored in separate places. Strategy of storage consists in avoiding that incompatible
products are neighbors. To this end, a first step is needed to identify substances as a function
of their potential chemical reactions.
In order to prevent any storage of incompatible chemicals and risk of chemical reaction
in case of wrong handling, seggregation strategies are used. As shown in Fig. 2, it exists
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Figure 2. Identification of storage compatibilities between dangerous goods. The letter F means
inflammable, F+ means very inflammable, T means toxic, Xi means very irritant, means O oxidizing, Xn
means noxious, N means polluting and C means corrosive.
incompatibilities for storage that is why the maintain of segregation between products
constitute a risk assessment strategy to mitigate the risk of chemical reactions.
Once dangerous goods are stored in separate places of a warehouse, other sources of risks
remain:
• Container falls;
• Container damages;
• Storage conditions (humidity, heat, cold, light);
4. Risk study in warehouse by scenarios
Within the framework of scenarios modeling, three different scenarios are built, including
causes and effects of accident risks that define a basis for further risk assessment by
communicating objects.
The methodology used is the one usually practised in audit or studies of risks and dangers
and also in the impact procedures.
4.1. Methodology
The methodology used for scenarios definition aims at characterizing, analyzing, and
assessing the risks in warehouse. Those risks can have two different causes: due to logistic
exploitation (e.g., shipping, handling, storage), or due to external causes such as flooding,
lightning.
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This first analysis, find all the regulatory constraints aims to identifying and at recording,
through various tools, the potential hazards that may occur in the retailer warehouse and its
operating system. The natural and human environment hazards are also analyzed. These
steps are intended to identify external attackers at the retailer warehouse.
4.1.1. Risk evaluation
An analysis of the warehouse neighborhood is conducted in order to identify targets and their
vulnerabilities and to characterize the severity of the dangerous phenomena. Equipments that
may be impacted (eg. racks, clarks, trucks) due to internal or external logistics processes are
also identified.
4.1.2. Preliminary risk analysis
A rating of hazardous phenomena identified enable to identify major accidents and through
a combination of different criteria:
• Probability of occurrence of a dangerous phenomenon;
• Intensity of these effects;
• Vulnerability of the target impacted by these effects.
Following this preliminary risk evaluation, we can discard non significant risk, which are
evaluated as low gravity, and probability. Therefore, we perform a detail analysis over the
major identified risks.
This rating corresponds to a hierarchy through a matrix (gravity/probability) allow
identifying two categories of risk:
• risk level is considered generally sufficient;
• risk has to be subject to a closer examination.
4.2. Scenario 1: Aerosol explosion
The warehouse is likely to receive products classified under the heading 1412 UN code, bottles
generating aerosols. The propellant gases contained in these bottles is most of the time of
butane or propane under pressure.
In this scenario, we describe the explosion of aerosol (air freshener). It is considered as an
inflammable.
4.2.1. Risk evaluation
The principle of a generating bottle of aerosols is to allow the propulsion of the product
(lacquer, deodorant, adhesive, maintenance product, ...) out of the bottle thanks to a gas under
pressure contained in the bottle. Common bottles have a varying volume from 50 to 500 ml
and contain between 30 and 150 G of product plus propellant gas.
The behavior in fire of aerosols generators of depends on one hand nature on propellant gas
and on the other hand on the nature of the conditioned liquid. Therefore, if the propellant gas
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is a flammable gas standard butane or propane, there is a risk of explosion. The bottles are
then dispersed by missile effect and can be in their turn a propagator of fire.
In the same way, if the liquids contained are flammable liquids, they will support the fire. The
generators of aerosols are thus the subject to specific storage, depending on the nature of the
containing products (gas and/or liquid).
4.2.2. Preliminary risk analysis
Based on the calculating probability scale and the calculation of gravity scale, this scenario
occurred and may occur throughout the life of the installations and no person will be
impacted.
The method used to assess the effects of an explosion of aerosols in a warehouse is
multi-energy model. Explosion cloud formed by the gas contained in a bottle would not
reach the thresholds of overpressure. Regardless of the distance to the cloud, a target suffers
less than 20 mbar pressure which causes no human and material damage. We consider the
explosion of the cloud formed by the simultaneous outbreak of 100 bottles of aerosols, which
is extremely unlikely even when taking into account that the bottles are for most made on
aluminium.
4.3. Scenario 2: Fire truck incident
This scenario develops the consequences of the fire on a truck loaded with pallets, we assume
that the truck is loaded exclusively with generic aerosol or fertilizer.
Nitrate-based fertilizers (that do not contain high nitrate content) are not capable of
detonation. The ammo-nitrates high or medium dosage, French standards or European are
difficult to detonate in the absence of contamination. Furthermore, dust fertilizer containing
ammonium nitrate in the air are not combustible and do not present an explosion risk, unlike
the dust of grain or organic fuels.
4.3.1. Risk evaluation
The detonation is possible in some cases:
• Contamination of the nitrate high or medium dosage of substances fuel (fuel, oil, plant
protection products) or incompatible;
• heating of the nitrate high or medium dosage especially if it is contaminated, and
maintenance of a containment of the gases emitted by the combustion;
• Severe impact of projectile on the product or shock very violent in contact the nitrate.
4.3.2. Preliminary risk analysis
Based on the calculation probability scale and the calculation of gravity scale, this scenario
event thought: occurred and may occur throughout the life of the installations or may
unlikely event: something similar already encountered in the sector of activity or this type
of organization at the global level, without any possible corrections made since bring a
significant reduction in its probability is guarantee and no person will be impacted.
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The following scenario develops the consequences of a fire truck loaded with pallets at a
unloading dock site. The fire or explosion of aerosols and fertilizer is due to inflammation
of a palette (mechanical heating, inflammation, engine, non-compliance with the prohibition
of smoking). We left the assumption that a cigarette would be has the origin of the starting
point of fire. We leave the principles which another vehicle charged with manure would be
been parked on the quay dimensioned. The starting point of fire and the propagation with
the truck containing of manure cause effects missile, explosions, and dangerous heat fluxes
for the man as well as the toxic dispersion of smoke, of projection has missile effect as well as
discharge of water and product polluting for environment.
4.4. Scenario 3: Hazardous liquid spill
Accidental discharge is related to the presence of liquid products on site. The spill may trigger
the leakage of an important quantity of hazardous liquid. A leakage of hazardous substances
can occur due to the fall of one or more pallets of a rack but also due to a weakness in on (or
a series) of container (bottle, can). A spill of hazardous substances can have an impact on the
environment and on people.
4.4.1. Risk evaluation
Because of the loss of integrity of a container, a liquid will flow and form a pool of dangerous
liquid which mainly function of the topography, the viscosity of the product and quantity.
The multitude of references and stored products do not enable to study exhaustively all
dangerous chemical reactions. However, all possible precautions are taken to avoid storing
incompatible products in a single cell.
4.4.2. Preliminary risk analysis
This scenario occurred and may occur throughout the life of the installations and no person
will be impacted. Wewill find a fall of pallet that will provoke liquid spill which is the starting
point of fire, projectionmissiles effect, various explosions and propagation of smoked and gas
dangerous for the man and the environment.
According to the nature of fire, it must there have a respect of the means of extinction, in this
case of figure it will be impossible to respect this standard, and the means of extinction set up,
will cause a pollution of the natural environment.
4.5. Scenarios modelling
In this section, we model the scenarios presented previously by UML diagrams to describe the
sequential chain of events following an accident. In particular, we are interested in identifying
the main damages and consequences of accidents involving dangerous goods.
As we said, the accidents are evaluated by several measures, by the place and by the number
of persons within this place. The type of accidents we consider and which can occur during
the manipulation of dangerous goods is correlated to the chemical features of those goods.
Further, the main effects we consider in our scenarios are the followings:
• Release of substances which are toxic to health and to the environment;
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Figure 3. Scenario 1: a bomb attack triggered from a stored pallet.
• Release of thermal energy;
• Release of pressure.
The consequences that derive from an accident depend obviously on the type of dangerous
goods, the area population, the accident time, the accident place, etc. Here, we are interested
in describing the impacts of accidents by scenarios. In particular, we study the consequences
of energy release according to the two phenomenons of Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion
(UVCE) with the first scenario and the Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE)
with the second scenario.
4.5.1. Scenario 1: Aerosol explosion
Based on the scenario introduced as Scenario 1, we describe how a bomb attack can occur in a
warehouse. We propose a first sequence diagram; see Fig. 3, to model this scenario.
We remark that the bomb is transported from a first place to the final storage place where
the bomb attack is triggered. Nevertheless, by considering that terrorism attacks have a
probability to miss their targets, we can assume that a remote bomb attack can potentially
become a road accident when the bomb explodes at an untimely moment.
We describe by an activity diagram, see Fig. 4, the events following a bomb explosion once
it has been stored. The first events are relative to the way that the bomb is susceptible to
explode when the trigger is activated; it can burn first before exploding. Once the explosion
happens, the shock wave provokes damages on near products and a domino effect starts from
the pallet to the rack beams. With time the whole pallets are susceptible to burn and then
to explode. The fire and explosions provoke pressure effects and thermal effects which have
consequences on persons present in the stock. The damages caused by this bomb attack are
measurable by three dimensions: the human, the structure and the merchandises damages.
Here the humans damages are relative to the persons working in the warehouse and who
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Figure 4. Scenario 1: activity diagram for a bomb attack.
have: inhaled gases, been victims of missile effects or building collapses, been burnt. The
structure damages regroup the building destructions notably the racks, the traverses and the
building structure. The merchandise destructions are easily evaluable and correspond to the
pallets implied during the fires and the explosions.
This first scenario describes actually the consequences of a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor
Explosion, BLEVE. This scenario describes the chain reaction explosion generated from
the expansion of inflammable vapors produced by gas substances (previously kept under
pressure in a liquid state). The effects that derive from this type of explosion are effects of
excess pressure and fire balls projections and provoke damages on people, structures and
goods. This type of event entails three main dangers: the shockwave from the explosion, the
thermal flow from the fire and the projectiles from the damaged goods.
4.5.2. Scenario 2: Fire truck incident
This scenario involve a set of actors during the loading or the unloading of a truck. Then, the
transporter is present and follows the operations while the driver handles pallets between the
dock and the stock. This scenario is modeled by a sequence diagram in Fig. 5. The accident
occurs in the dock after the driver knocks its cargo against another one on the dock.
We describe by an activity diagram, see Fig. 6, the chain of events from this accident. As
we see, the collision is the trigger of this scenario and occurs on the dock. The presence of a
cigarette increases strongly the accident consequences. The shock provokes the release of gas
which concentrates to form a cloud around the dock and the truck. The cigarette provides
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Figure 5. Scenario 2: a pallet collapse and a chain reaction on dock.
the spark so that uncontrollable events start. In presence of the cigarette, the released gas
provoke thermal and pressure effects. The damages caused by this accident spread on four
dimensions: the human, the structure, the merchandises and the environment damages. The
human damages are relative to the person evolving around the accident place. Among them,
we can cite the transporter, the driver, the person who works near the dock and near the stock.
The structure damages implies the dock itself which can be deformed by the explosion, the
truck which can burn and also the warehouse building which can suffer from the explosion.
The merchandises destroyed are the ones present on the dock or the ones which burnt during
the fire. This type of accident provokes the formation of toxic gas clouds which are polluting
the environment. Before and after the cloud explodes the mixed gases stay in suspension and
moves with the ambient air. It constitutes then environment pollution.
4.5.3. Scenario 3: Hazardous liquid spilt
The third scenario describes how a rack failure is susceptible to involve a collapse of pallets
and then provoke an accident. The pallets fall over each others contributing to gas emanations
and liquid spreads, see Fig. 7.
We propose an activity diagram to describe the actions, see Fig. 8, leading to an accident.
Here, we don’t use any aggravating facts and we consider that the gas emanation and
liquid spreads stay stable and don’t provoke yet any explosions. Nevertheless, this unstable
situation represents a danger for different reasons. Thus, the gas emanations are toxic for
the persons working in the warehouse and the different pallet collapses and rack damages
constitute structure and goods damages.
5. Integration of communicating objects for a dynamic risk management
Over the past few years, communicating objects have become a new emergent solution to
secure the international trade by providing tracking tools [2–4] and environmental monitoring
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Figure 6. Scenario 2: activity diagram for a pallet collision on dock.
Figure 7. Scenario 3: rack failure and chain reaction.
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Figure 8. Scenario 3: activity diagram for a rack failure.
[5, 6]. Then, tracking tools provide geolocation solutions that can be used to detect any risks
inherent to goods location. environmental geolocation gives the possibility of detecting any
"unusual" or "dangerous" environmental conditions such as high temperature or incorrect
constraints.
In this chapter, a SCM approach that exploits RFID tags and wireless sensors is presented.
The studied supply chain manipulates chemical substances that represent potentially hazard
for persons and environment. The developed approach integrates constraints from existing
regulations and complies with them to finally propose a dynamic risk assessment.
5.1. Supply chain actors and activities
The studied supply chain involve different actors that manipulate chemical substances:
• Chemicals providers are located in Asia. They prepare pallets by loading chemicals on
communicating pallets and organize the container loadings in the Shanghai harbour;
• Transporter by road or by ship, transport containers and deliver them in Le Havre port or
to the retailer warehouse;
• Retailer in France for big-box stores. This actor organizes the pallet storages. Operators
unload containers to store pallets in racks, load pallets in containers and finally send them
to the downstream supply chain actor.
• Customers, they are big-box stores around Paris. They receive containers, unload them and
transfer chemicals from communicating pallets into common ones and send back them to
the pallet-provider.
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Figure 9. Risk assessment description. The risk assessment is based on classification and activities that
define constraints to be respected along the supply chain.
The communicating objects are integrated at the pallet level. The cost is shared by the different
actors and the programming of communicating objects is realized by an upstream actor: the
pallet-provider. This last is responsible of writing information in RFID tags and initializing
wireless sensors.
5.2. RFID technologies
A basic RFID system contains three elements; a tag, a reader and a middleware. A tag is
mainly formed by a microchip attached to an antenna. An RFID tag is read when it receives
radio signals from the reader and sends data back to the reader. The reading and writing
process between the tag reader and the RFID tag can be realized from centimeters up tometers
depending on the system characteristics.
5.3. WSNs: Wireless Sensor Networks
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSANs) refer to a group of sensors linked by a wireless medium
to carry out phenomenon sensing and acting in consequence. The devices deployed in the
environment are considered as nodes. Nodes are sensors whose main features are: low-space,
low-cost and low-power, they are able to collect environmental data.
5.4. Risk assessment with communicating objects
The proposed risk assessment is based on the chemicals physicochemical properties.
Depending on these properties, the substances are classified to a specific class of hazard
according to the CLP regulation. From this classification, constraints are deduced and must
be respected all along the supply chain. Then, chemicals evolve in an environment that
defines their "context". The combination of the identified constraints and the environment
of chemicals are the source of risks, see Fig. 9. The deployment of communicating objects for
a dynamic risk assessment allows monitoring in real-time pallet environments.
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Different sensors are associated to form a cluster of sensors able to monitor a set of constraints.
Sensors send data to a centralized software that translates them into accident risks in case of
unusual values. By this way, the software is able to send alert messages to supply actors that
are currently responsible of goods so that they can intervene on goods.
The accident risks treated by the software are associated to sensors, they are the following:
• Overheating (temperature sensor);
• Pallet squashing (pressure sensor);
• Pallet overturn (stability sensor);
• Pallet lost (gps sensor);
• Gas release (gas sensor);
• Fluid leak (fluid sensor);
• Solid product dumping;
• Humidity constraint (humidity sensor);
• Incompatible product (RFID tag).
5.5. Scenarios: Explosion and chemical reactions on stow
In the first scenario, the events occur at dock where the truck is stowed and a forklift driver is
unloading pallet and put them on the dock before storing them further on rack. The dangerous
goods considered are aerosols and are commercialized as air fresheners.
Sensors present on pallets send periodically their data to the software. A terrorist triggers
a bomb explosion (remote activation by mobile phone for example) from a pallet that is
still on the truck cargo. Different events occur from this explosion: thermal and smoke
emanation, release of toxic gases and missile effects. Pallets in the container and on the dock
will be damaged by the blast wave, the main consequence on goods is the loss of aerosols
containment. Consequences are expected on environment, on warehouse workers and on
warehouse building structure.
As soon as the explosion occurred, sensors present on pallets that suffer from the bomb
consequences will immediately be damaged and will not emit anymore whereas sensors
present on dock will emit only few seconds before being destroyed by fire. The software
that collects data will receive unusual values such as increasing heat and gas pressure and in
consequence will sends an alert message to the warehouse manager. This last is responsible
of the security maintain and will understand that an accident occurred on a dock. He will
then deploy emergency procedures and will be helped by the software that provide strategic
information with the alert messages. The software will send information about the pallet
whose sensors are broken, the CLP designation of goods present on these pallets will be sent.
By this way, the retailer manager will know exactly what the involved goods are, he will adapt
emergency procedures as a function of physicochemical properties of goods.
In the second scenario, the context and the assumptions are the same than the first one: the
action takes place on the stow where the truck is being unloaded by an operator. Goods
considered are housekeeping products, they are flammable liquids. An handling error such
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as a pallet is poorly loaded and taken by the forklift driver with a slight offset provokes a
collision between the handled pallet and others already unloaded on the dock. This collision
provokes a liquid leakage on the dock and a trigger event like a spark or an electrical arc
created by a cell phone provokes a fire.
This accident is treated by the same way than the scenario 1. The pallet collision and collapse
on dock correspond to unusual stability values. The software sends an alert message to the
warehouse manager who will be able to locate the place where the accident occurred and will
coordinate the emergency services relying on qualitative and quantitative information about
chemicals involved in the accident.
5.6. Scenarios: Pallet collapse and domino effect in stock
The scenario 3 takes place in the warehouse storage area and involves operator, pallets and
racks. During operator movements, we assume that the rack structure can be damaged by
forklift collisions and the accumulations of such shocks can potentially provoke rack damage
that can lead to the rack destruction due to the supported pallet weights.
The detection of a collision between a forklift and a rack can be detected relying on the stability
sensor values transmitted by sensors. If more than four pallet have their stability values
modified between 20% and 40%, the software translates this situation into "rack stability"
alert and sends it to the retailer manager. From this alert, the retailer manager will trigger
emergency procedures to check the involved rack. Then, the software provides different
information relative to pallets whose stabilities have evolved, these information are exploited
by the retailer manager to locate them using his internal WMS (Warehouse Management
Software). Then, if the pallets whose stabilities have evolved are neighbours and located near
the rack structure, an internal alert of "rack collision" is emitted and the forklift drivers that
operate in the cell are convoked for a further debriefing.
In the scenario 4, we assume that forklift drivers move in the stock area when a forklift loses
its cargo that fails. Stability values transmitted by sensors of this pallet will trigger a "pallet
fail" by the software. The software provide also gps location of the involved pallet but this
information cannot be exploited by the warehouse manager because none mapping exists
between the geolocation and the location in the storage area. For that reason, an internal
alarm is triggered in the corresponding cell to inform forklift drivers about a pallet fallen but
none other accurate information are available.
6. Conclusion
In the global context of supply chain management, the three common flows of goods,
information and physical are subject to modelling regarding optimization concerns.
Risk studies allow identifying logistics missions that may represent danger on persons,
environment and goods. Scenarios are then extracted to describe risk management strategies
and then improving emergency procedures.
In this chapter, three scenarios are developed to answer specific events, located in quite precise
places and representing real risks. The chosen scenarios presented three types of accidents:
• the creation of an explosive area resulting from a leak of aerosol;
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• a departure of fire from a truck stowed;
• a breakdown of racks causing a toxic mix dangerous goods;
In the presented scenarios, only the product concept and application of procedures and risk
prevention differ. It is the analysis of risks, its causes and its impacts which will enable to set
up one of the mechanisms of detection and prevention.
The integration of communicating objects such as RFID tags and wireless sensors offer new
features for a dynamic risk assessment. Sensors are then used for accident risk detections,
collected data are transmitted to a centralized software that is able to compare them with
confidence intervals and in case of mismatches alerts are sent. Then, communicating objects
are used to risk detection and also to risk mitigation. Risk mitigation consists in providing
strategic information (involved goods, their quality and quantities, accident place, etc.) to
emergency services that can then plan and adapt their intervention.
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1. Introduction 
Ting and Comings [1] described how to use the Information Assurance (IA) Object 
Measurement (OM®) metric as a tool to measure the monitoring step (Step 6) described in 
the United States (U.S.) National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Risk 
Management Framework (RMF)1 [2]. This chapter expands the applicability of the IA OM® 
metric and shows how it may be used as an enterprise-wide information security risk 
management metric.  
Risk management is concerned with the identification of risks, the avoidance, mitigation, 
transference, or sharing of unacceptable risks, and the acceptance of risks that are within an 
organization’s risk tolerance. However, just as with information system controls within 
NIST’s RMF, it is necessary to monitor the risk posture of systems, maintaining an ongoing 
assessment of the level of risk they represent within and to an organization. This risk 
posture changes with changes to the hardware and software employed by the organization, 
as well as when patches and updates are released that are intended to be applied to 
deployed software. Changes can also occur from vulnerabilities identified with no patch 
available, or when new types of information are allowed on a previously authorized or 
accredited information system. Different types of information are of varying interest to an 
organization or adversary. More valuable information generally has a higher impact on the 
organization when it is compromised2, and can increase the threat level of an information 
system. From an information system perspective, many of the monitoring activities, 
conducted to ensure the systems remain operational and maintain an acceptable security 
posture, are also activities involved in the management of information system risks.  
                                                                 
1 The RMF is described in detail in NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-37, available from: http://csrc.nist.gov/ 
publications/nistpubs/800-37-rev1/sp800-37-rev1-final.pdf 
2 Compromise is used in this chapter to indicate a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the information. 
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The IA OM® metric is a good choice for use as an enterprise risk management metric, as 
described in this chapter, due to its versatility as a management metric. This metric:  
 Measures information security risk management activities within an organization;  
 Shows organizational senior management where their organization currently stands 
with respect to its risk management strategy, and its monitoring plan; and  
 Demonstrates to senior management how such metrics can be used over time to track 
and improve their organization’s ability to meet its overall risk management strategy 
and risk monitoring plan. 
2. Risk management 
Risk management focuses on understanding and managing risks to an organization. This 
chapter focuses on information security (also referred to as information assurance (IA)) 
risks. Wheeler [3] in his book on risk management stated that “The goal of risk management 
is to maximize the output of the organization (in terms of services, products, revenue, 
[mission accomplishment], and so on), while minimizing the chance for unexpected 
outcomes”. This goal is best accomplished through the use of an established, proven 
framework for managing information security risks to organizations. This chapter proposes 
an approach based on the structure provided by the NIST. 
The approach described by the NIST is used in this chapter due to several factors. First, the 
NIST approach has been developed to be consistent with and harmonize with international 
standards to the extent appropriate. These international standards include those of the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) 3. This approach is also being adopted and used by the U.S. government 
for virtually all government organizations, as well as other private organizations regulated 
by the U.S. government.  
The approach described by the NIST is based on a 4-step process, used within a 3-tiered 
structure. The 3-tiered structure is used to depict the principal functional areas within an 
organization as they relate to risk management decision-making – the organization, 
mission/business process, and information systems Tiers – described in Section 2.2. The risk 
management process and the 4-steps in the process – frame, assess, respond, and monitor – 
are described in Section 2.3. 
2.1. Risk management overview 
Information security practitioners are transitioning from a compliance-based, checklist type 
of approach to a more risk managed approach to security [3]. This is being done largely due 
to practicality and resource constraints [3]. It is not possible to eliminate risk in an 
                                                                 
3 The NIST risk management structure is aligned with ISO/IEC 3100, Risk Management – Principles and Guidelines; 31010, 
Risk Management – Risk Assessment Techniques; 27001, Information technology – Security techniques – Information Security 
Management Systems – Requirements; and 27005, Information Technology – Security Techniques – Information Security Risk 
Management Systems. 
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information system, and is resource intensive to try [3, 4]. In order to effectively manage 
resources and maintain usability of the system, it is necessary to implement a risk managed 
approach to securing Information Technology (IT) systems.  
To understand this change, it is important to start with a good definition of risk. A good 
definition in this case is one that can be understood operationally and can be easily used to 
clarify the process. Not surprisingly, there are many different definitions of risk. Wheeler [3] 
defines risk as: “the probable frequency and probable magnitude of future loss of 
confidentiality, integrity, availability or accountability”. Accountability is not commonly 
accepted as being a part of the definition of risk, is not included in the definition of risk used 
by the NIST4, and thus will not be included in the definition of risk used in this chapter. The 
definition of risk used for this chapter is therefore: 
Risk: The probable frequency and probable magnitude of future loss of an organization’s 
operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, 
individuals, other organizations, and the Nation resulting from a loss of confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability. 
There are two fundamentally different approaches to Information security risk management 
activities used by organizations:  
1. Compliance-based; and  
2. Risk management-based.   
Each of these approaches, while working toward the overall objective of ensuring the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the organization’s information and information 
systems, attempts to meet that objective in a fundamentally different way. Compliance-
based approaches default to including controls from the best practice or other framework 
they are implementing – not including a prescribed control is the exception [5]. On the other 
hand, risk management-based approaches default to not including a control unless its need 
and utility can be justified by a risk analysis [5]. 
2.1.1. Compliance and best practice frameworks 
Failure to comply with the legal and regulatory structures confronting an organization can 
result in penalties, loss of contracts, loss of confidence, loss of business, and stock price 
declines [6]. Some of the requirements that organizations may need to maintain compliance 
with include: 
 U.S. Legal requirements (e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA); 
                                                                 
4 The definition of risk provided by the NIST is: “A measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a 
potential circumstance or event, and typically a function of: (i) the adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance 
or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence. [Note: Information system-related security risks are those risks 
that arise from the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or information systems and reflect the 
potential adverse impacts to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), 
organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation]” [17]. 
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 Non-U.S. Legal requirements for organizations operating outside the United States; 
 International frameworks (e.g., Basel, Basel II); and 
 Industry standards (e.g., the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI or 
PCI-DSS)). 
Compliance with these requirements is often a part of an organization’s due diligence [7]. 
The focus on best practice frameworks frequently focuses on satisfying the 
auditor/examiner, helping to meet compliance requirements rather than the organizations 
genuine information security needs [8, 9]. Unfortunately, these checklist or compliance-
based approaches to information security risk management provide static, “one-size-fits-all” 
information security “solutions” [3]. One result of this approach is the common perception 
among information security practitioners that “if you are secure you may be compliant, but 
if you are only compliant you are certainly not secure” [6]. 
There are a number of best practice frameworks for information security, including the 
Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) [10], COBIT [11], and the ISO/IEC 
27001 [12], 27002 [13], and 27005 [14]. Unfortunately, these approaches are dated almost as 
soon as they are published due to the speed of change on the Internet and within the IT 
security arena [15]. Attackers are very adaptable, and change their tactics quickly. In 
addition, a checklist or compliance-based approach assumes that every system requires the 
same protection as every other system, without regard for cost, information sensitivity, and 
mission or business impact [3]. However, there are often considerable differences in the 
types of systems deployed in an enterprise, and the information they contain. Since the 
information contained in the IT system is normally the critical asset requiring protection, the 
protective mechanisms that should be implemented will depend largely on the sensitivity of 
the information processed, stored, or transmitted by the system [8].  
However, best practice frameworks do provide a useful method for ensuring that all aspects 
of an IT information security program are considered when using a risk managed approach 
to IT information security requirements development. Due to the need of organizations to 
remain compliant with respect to specific legal requirements and industry frameworks some 
form of compliance-based approach is likely to remain necessary. 
2.1.2. Risk managed approaches 
Risk-based approaches to securing information systems allow organizations to customize 
their information security protections, based in the needs of their organization. Using a risk-
based approach requires consideration of the information processed, stored, or transmitted 
by the information system, as well as consideration of the IT system’s environment, 
connectivity, and threat environment [7, 16]. Other considerations include the cost of 
implementing security controls weighted against the impact on the mission and business 
operations of the organization should a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the 
information occur [7].  
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A risk-based approach to information security is what the U.S. government is transitioning 
to with the release of the NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-37 [2] and SP 800-39 [3, 17]. The 
NIST has developed a series of SPs to focus on information security risk management, 
starting with an enterprise view in SP 800-39 [17], an information system view in SP 800-37 
[2], and by providing an approach for performing risk assessments in SP 800-30 [18]. NIST 
SP 800-53 [19] provides a catalog of security controls, and recommends “baselines” of 
security controls based on the sensitivity of the information on the system. These baselines 
are intended to be customized, or “tailored” to meet the needs of the information and the 
information system when consideration of the system’s environment, connectivity, and 
threats are considered [19]. 
2.2. 3-Tiered risk management structure 
When addressing information security risk management activities, the NIST and other 
authors divide organizations into three levels [17, 20]. The NIST [17] identifies these tiers as 
the: 
1. Organization; 
2. Mission/Business Process; and 
3. Information Systems. 
Each tier has different organizational risk management responsibilities. However, despite 
their different perspectives and roles, they all use the same 4-step risk management process 
described in Section 2.3 for risk management actives within their Tier. This 3-tiered structure 
is depicted in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Risk Management Tiers5 
                                                                 
5 This figure is adapted from Figure 2 on page 9 of NIST SP 800-39 [17]. 
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2.2.1. Organization tier  
At the organization tier, risk to the entire organization is considered and managed. Part of 
the responsibility for managing risk throughout the organization is the process of “risk 
framing”, establishing the context within which all organizational risk management 
activities will be conducted [17]. Risk framing establishes the governance framework from 
which are derived the risk management activities and the risk tolerance of the organization. 
Other activities occurring at Tier 1 include: 
 Establishment and prioritization of activities and programs at the Mission/Business 
Tier;  
 Determination of organization-wide common controls6; and 
 The Risk Executive (Function)7 recommended by the NIST is established in and is 
located within the organization at this level [17]. 
The Risk Executive (Function) (REF) is an individual or group within the organization that 
serves in an advisory role to organizational decision makers at all 3-tiers. The REF does not 
make decisions for the organization; rather it informs decision makers about the risks to the 
system, network, and the organization that may result from a particular risk decision. The 
REF considers risk from a holistic perspective, considering mission and business risks, in 
addition to security risks. This risk consideration is done with an organization-wide 
perspective, allowing the REF’s recommendations to evaluate the potential impact of 
accepting risks in one area or system on other systems or the organization.  
2.2.2. Mission/business process tier 
Tier 2 is where the mission/business processes necessary to implement the strategic goals 
and objectives established at Tier 1 are defined and prioritized [17]. This is also where the 
types of information required, the information sensitivity, and information flows necessary 
to support the Tier 1 goals and objectives is determined [17]. The IT enterprise architecture 
is defined and established at this tier, to include the implementation of the common controls 
identified in Tier 1. The decisions and activities at this tier have a direct effect on the 
activities undertaken at Tier 3.  
2.2.3. Information systems tier 
Tier 3 is where the information systems that support the organization reside. The decisions 
and prioritizations established in Tiers 1 and 2 are implemented in information systems at 
this tier. The activities required for each of the steps in the Risk Management Framework 
                                                                 
6 Common controls are security controls implemented in a way that they are available to information systems across 
the organization. Common controls can be “inherited” by a system, meaning that the system itself does not need to 
implement the control the system can leverage/use the control as implemented by the organization.  
7 The Risk Executive (Function) is an individual or office responsible for considering risk across the organization, to 
include mission, business, and security risks, balancing them appropriately for the organization, and making 
recommendations to decision-makers within the organization based on their risk determinations. 
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(RMF)8 and the system development life cycle 9 are performed here, to ensure each 
information system meets its technical, mission, and security requirements. In this tier, 
“information system owners, common control providers, system and security engineers, 
and information system security officers make risk-based decisions regarding the 
implementation, operation, and monitoring of organizational information systems” [17].  
2.3. Risk management process 
The risk management process is comprised of a number of discrete steps. These steps take 
place at different times within the process, and possibly at multiple times in the process due 
the iterative nature of risk management activities. It is important that all of the steps are 
completed for a risk management program to be fully effective. These steps apply to risk 
management activities taking place at each tier within the organization, so this process is 
equally applicable to risk management activities taking place at Tier 1 as it is at Tier 2 or 3. 
NIST describes four distinct steps in the risk management process. These steps are: 
1. Risk Framing 
2. Risk Assessment 
3. Risk Response 
4. Risk Monitoring 
2.3.1. Risk framing 
Risk framing is a governance activity that is performed at Tier 1. Its principal output is a risk 
management strategy “that addresses how organizations intend to assess risk, respond to 
risk, and monitor risk” [17]. The risk management strategy is created as a joint effort 
between an organization’s senior management and/or executives in conjunction with the 
risk executive (function) [17]. The risk management strategy explicitly states the 
assumptions, constraints, risk tolerances, and priorities or trade-offs used in making 
investment and operational decisions for the organization [17].  It also details what types of 
risk responses are supported, how risk is assessed, and how risk is monitored for the 
organization [17]. 
2.3.2. Risk assessment 
Risk assessment is the process of: 
1. Identifying risks (threats and associated vulnerabilities) to an organizational asset, 
activity, or operation; 
2. Estimating the potential impact and likelihood of the risk materializing, and  
                                                                 
8 The RMF is described in detail in NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-37, available from:  
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-37-rev1/sp800-37-rev1-final.pdf 
9 The system development life cycle established by the NIST is described in NIST SP 800-64, Security Considerations in 
the System Development Life Cycle, Oct. 2008 [23].  
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3. Prioritizing the identified risks according to their severity to the organization [3, 17].  
Risk assessments can and should be conducted at every Tier of the organization. However, 
the objectives of risk assessments conducted at different Tiers will reflect the differences in 
responsibility and objectives for the Tier being assessed [17]. For example, a risk assessment 
at Tier 3, the Information Systems Tier, will go into considerable technical detail on a 
specific information system and the risks involved in its operation. Whereas a risk 
assessment at Tier 1, the Organization Tier, may address information systems from the 
perspective of the organization’s enterprise architecture or common control framework, but 
will not go into significant technical detail, nor will it address a specific information system. 
However, a Tier 1 risk assessment will address business risks, and the risks involved in 
investing in particular missions or business areas. 
2.3.3. Risk response 
Responding to risk involves deciding on and implementing a course of action to address the 
risk within the organization. The options available to the organization for risk response are 
defined in the organization’s risk management strategy. The courses of action available to 
address risk as identified in NIST SP 800-39 [17] are: 
1. Accept – take no action when the risk is within the organization’s risk tolerance; 
2. Avoid – eliminate the activities or technologies resulting in risk that exceeds the 
organization’s risk tolerance, or reposition the activities or technologies into areas or 
positions where the risk is avoided; 
3. Mitigate – apply security controls, safeguards, or process re-engineering to reduce the 
risk to a level acceptable to the organization; 
4. Transfer or Share – shifting all or part of the liability for risk, respectively, to another 
organization. 
2.3.4. Risk monitoring 
Risk monitoring is conducted on an ongoing basis to ensure that the organization’s risk 
posture remains within the organization’s risk tolerance. The risk monitoring process allows 
an organization to: 
 Ensure compliance with national laws, regulations, organizational policies, and 
mission/business functions; 
 Determine how effective its risk response measures are; 
 Identify changes to organizational assets or their operating environments that result in 
changes their risk postures [17]. 
Risk monitoring activities are normally conducted on a periodic basis, with the period 
determined in accordance with the organization’s risk management strategy and the 
sensitivity of the information or business process being protected [16, 17]. Monitoring risk 
and changes to operating environments includes identifying changes to the threat 
environment, and determining whether a change in the threat environment requires a 
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reassessment of the risk posture of an organizational asset, activity, or operation earlier than 
normally scheduled [3]. 
These risk monitoring activities can be implemented at any tier in the organization [17]. The 
objectives and process for each tier will differ according to their respective needs, and, 
particularly at Tiers 1 and 2, are likely to involve cross-tier monitoring – as the upper tiers 
are directly affected by operational or process-level changes to the organization’s risk 
posture at the lower levels [17]. An example of cross-tier monitoring would involve the 
monitoring of the risk posture of an information system authorized to operate within an 
organization. The organizational official responsible for the authorization decision will want 
to monitor the risk posture of the information system to ensure it continues to operate 
within an acceptable level of risk, and that any changes to the risk posture of the system or 
its environment are properly evaluated and addressed. 
3. IA OM®  
The metrics or results derived from the IA OM® methodology are meaningful to the 
organization because the measurements themselves are “tied directly to questions that are 
important to the organization”[21] . The results are also useful to organizational 
management since they indicate the degree to which specific information security risk 
management goals are being met as action is taken to improve an organization’s overall 
information security posture in terms of its information security objectives [1]. In this 
instance IA OM® can be conceptually expressed as providing a measure of the degree to 
which the organization’s information security risk management objectives are being met [1]. 
The creators of the OM® methodology, Donaldson and Siegel [21, 22], have 20+ years of 
professional software engineering experience at Science Applications International 
Corporation (SAIC) and in the Department of Defense (DoD). The OM® methodology 
enables one “to measure software products and software systems development processes in 
everyday terms familiar and – therefore meaningful – to your organization” [21]. The OM® 
methodology measures software products and software systems development processes as 
part of a continual process improvement exercise. The OM® framework derives its 
effectiveness as a “management process” tool in that the OM® Index, akin to the Consumer 
Price Index, folds in a number of individual measurements into a single overall value [1, 22]. 
The OM® Index can also be deconstructed to gain insight into the elements comprising the 
index value. By looking at trends in the index values, it is possible to determine the effect or 
outcome of changes within the organization.  
The OM® quantifies software product “goodness” and software process “goodness”, where an 
object (i.e., an attribute, component, or activity) is measured through its characteristics. “For 
products, these characteristics are called attributes; for processes, these characteristics are 
called components and activities” [22].  Software product “goodness” is the degree to which 
the product satisfies the customer and meets the customer’s requirements. Software process 
“goodness” is a measure of the product creation process’ ability to consistently and reliably 
create good quality products within budget [1].  
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The IA OM® metric can be used with existing organizational objectives or industry best 
practices. However, industry best practices are not appropriate for many organizations, and 
as described in Section 2.1.1, are often not sufficient in and of themselves to meet the an 
organization’s requirements. Each organization must determine what is most appropriate 
for its needs. This is best accomplished when requirements are evaluated in the context of 
their budget and a thorough risk analysis [7]. Evaluating an organization’s information 
security risk management posture, based on how well its systems comply with the 
organization’s information security risk management objectives, provides a metric with 
greater versatility and applicability across a wider range of organizations [1]. 
Implementing IA OM® at an organizational level provides Senior Management with a high-level 
or strategic-level view of where its organization’s risk management program stands and how 
well it is meeting its stated information security risk management objectives. IA OM® is the 
OM®10 metric created by Donaldson and Siegel [21] adapted to information security and 
information security risk management activities as IA OM®11. The IA OM® metric can be used to:  
 Quantitatively determine the degree of risk identified within an organization’s 
information security risk management program;  
 Characterize the organization’s risk management policy elements as they are applied to 
its information security risk management program for IA OM® evaluation;  
 Determine the weighting factors, based on a determination of the relative importance of 
each component, for the identified characteristics of the organization’s risk 
management strategy and policy;  
 Periodically present the results of the evaluation, the current risk management posture 
of the enterprise, in a balanced scorecard-like format that is familiar and easy to 
understand and interpret by Senior Management;  
 Analyze the metrics data, identify the strengths and weaknesses of proposed metrics 
approaches; and  
 Suggest areas for future assessment and evaluation.  
IA OM® will help answer Senior Management’s questions regarding the state of their 
organization’s information security risk management program enabling them to determine 
their organization’s current risk posture, identify areas needing improvement, and prioritize 
the allocation of organizational resources in addressing identified risks. 
Any effective risk management program requires periodic monitoring and re-assessment, 
including risk monitoring at the organization, mission/business process, and, information 
systems Tiers. The components of risk management at these multiple-tier levels are 
specifically identified12 and encompass the following: 
                                                                 
10 OM® was developed by Donaldson and Siegel, SAIC, [21] to evaluate system development life cycle (SDLC) 
processes.  
11 See Ting and Comings [1] for a complete description of IA OM®. 
12 NIST SP 800-39 [17], Managing Information Security Risk, describes the fundamentals of risk management in Chapter 2 
and the process for framing, assessing, responding and monitoring risk in Chapter 3. 
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 Tier 1 – Addresses risk from an organizational perspective by establishing and 
implementing governance structures including: 1) Establishment and implementation 
of a risk executive (function); 2) Establishment of a risk management strategy including 
a determination of organizational risk tolerance; and 3) Development of organization-
wide investment strategies for information resources and information security. 
 Tier 2 – Addresses risk from mission/business process perspective by designing, 
developing, and implementing the processes supporting the mission/business functions 
defined at Tier 1 including: 1) Risk aware processes designed to manage risk according 
to the risk management strategy defined at Tier 1 and explicitly accounting for risk in 
evaluating the mission/business activities and decisions at Tier 2; 2) Implementing an 
enterprise architecture, and, 3) Establishing an information security architecture as an 
integral part of the organization’s enterprise architecture. 
 Tier 3 – Addresses risk from an information system perspective, guided by risk context, 
risk decisions and risk activities at Tiers 1 and 2, risk management activities (i.e. 
activities at each step of the Risk Management Framework (NIST SP 800-37 [2]) and in 
the systems development life cycle (NIST SP 800-64 [23]) 
These three Tiers, properly integrated, provide the capability to establish a strong, risk-
based security infrastructure for an organization. 
Risk management monitoring must be conducted at all three Tiers, making sure that all key 
activities are performed properly within each Tier and across Tiers [17]. Monitoring at the 
information systems level must take into account those controls that are “common” to an 
organization or enterprise [2]. Common controls are those controls that are established by an 
organization itself, or an element within an organization, and are made available for use by 
other elements and information systems within the organization. It is often not possible for 
an individual system owner to monitor common controls – such monitoring must be 
provided by the Common Control Provider.  
With monitoring taking place at many levels within the organization, the need for an 
enterprise-wide risk management solution is even greater. Without a big-picture view of the 
information security risk posture of the systems within an organization, there may be 
systems operating that are creating significant risks to the organization without anyone in a 
position to address the problems realizing a problem exists. 
At the Tier 1 and 2 levels, the concept of common controls is not the same as at Tier 3, 
however, there is still the need to ensure that organizational guidance and organizational 
functions remain aligned. When strategies, policies, and other organization-level guidance 
changes, the changes need to ripple through the organization – updating policies, programs, 
investments, etc. to ensure they remain in alignment with the top-level guidance. 
IA OM® addresses these needs by aggregating the results of risk monitoring programs 
occurring throughout the organization, rolling them up, and presenting them as a set of 
summary statistics indicating where an organization stands with respect to remaining 
within its: 
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 Overall risk tolerance 
 Risk tolerance within organizational elements 
 Risk tolerance for individual systems 
Applied this way, IA OM® allows Senior Management to readily assess their current 
information security risk management posture and determine whether it fits within their 
risk tolerance. It also identifies those areas, programs, and systems of greatest risk to the 
organization – allowing Senior Management to quickly and easily prioritize their 
remediation efforts. 
4. Using IA OM® as an enterprise risk  
management metric 
The process for using IA OM® as an enterprise risk management metric involves a number 
of steps. The overall steps in the process, as adapted from the OM® process, are: 
1. Decide what questions you need or want answers to regarding your organization’s risk 
management program; 
2. Identify the organizational assets, processes, or operations that need to be measured to 
answer the questions from step 1; 
3. Identify any characteristics and sub-activities of the organizational assets, processes, or 
operations to be measured from step 2; 
4. Define an activity value scale for each activity or sub-activity in terms that make sense 
within the organization; 
5. Determine the current value (or location along the value scale) for each activity or sub-
activity being measured; 
6. Calculate the value for each asset, process, or operation identified in Step 2 using the 
formulas provided in Section 4.4 and the activity (or sub-activity) values from step 5. 
Weighting factors are selected based on the organization’s determination of the relative 
importance of the activities; 
7. Combine the values for each activity (asset, process, or operation) into an overall IA 
OM® index value to be reported and analyzed. 
These steps and activities are applied to organizational risk management using IA OM®, 
resulting in a metric that provides: 
 The ability to evaluate the risk posture of a specific organizational asset, process, or 
operation;  
 A set of organizational assets; 
 All activities within a risk management tier; or  
 Risk management activities across tiers.  
This process is shown in Figure 2 [24] using an activity from an organization’s personnel 
security process as an example. The individual process steps are examined in more detail in 
Sections 4.1 – 4.7. 
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IA OM® Process13
Steps Examples
1. Decide what questions you 
want answered
Am I complying with my organization’s personnel 
security policy?
2. Identify the organizational 
assets, processes, or operations 
that need to be measured to 
answer the questions from step 
1 
1) Employee job description 
2) Employee information security training 
3. Identify any characteristics or 
sub-activities of the 
organizational assets, processes, 
or operations to be measured 
from step 2
1) Extent to which security in job definition and 
resourcing are met 
2) Actual fraction of employees trained with 
respect to entire organization 
4. Define an activity value scale 
for each activity or sub-activity 
5. Determine the current value (or 
location along the value scale) 
for each activity or sub-activity 
 
          Associate observable events 
with value scale numbers 
 
1) Number of requirements fulfilled in employees’ 
job description 
 
2) Date that employee trained records in training 
log that employee received  
        Measure each characteristic 
 
1) Filled positions addressed 7 of the 10 employee’s 
security requirements called out (Value = 0.7) 
2) The employees’ training log showed that 1 
employee did not receive training
6. Calculate an index by 
substituting measured values 
into the appropriate IA OM® 
equation  
2 20.7 0.6 0.65
2
PersonnelSecurityComplianceIndex 
 
7. Combine the values for each 
activity (asset, process, or 
operation) into an overall 
IAIndex value14 to be reported 
and analyzed 
2 2
1
2 2
1
(max[ ])
n
i i
i
n
i i
i
w da
IARMIndex
w da





 
Figure 2. IA OM Process with Personnel Security Process Example 
                                                                 
13 Adapted from interview with Stanley G. Siegel on Jan. 7, 2004 [24]. 
14 This equation and its components are described in Section 4.5. 
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4.1. Step 1 – Ask questions 
IA OM® is like other investigative ventures – the first step in the process is determining what 
you want or need to know. This chapter focuses on evaluating and understanding the 
ongoing risk management activities within an organization. As a result, the questions 
framed for use with IA OM® in this chapter focus on what the organization’s executives, 
program managers, or system-level managers want or need to know about the risk posture 
of the portion of the organization they are responsible for. As such, the questions to be 
addressed by IA OM® need not to be restricted to Tier 1 – they can, and ultimately should, 
be spread across all three tiers so that the managers at each tier have the answers they need 
to be successful in the organization’s risk management program. 
Examples of questions that might be asked at each Tier are presented in Table 1: 
 
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 
Is our risk management 
strategy aligned with our 
organizational goals and 
objectives? 
How well do our 
mission/business processes 
align with our 
organization’s risk 
management strategy? 
Are our information 
systems properly operating 
within the risk tolerance of 
our organization’s 
mission/business processes? 
How well aligned is our 
risk management strategy 
with our mission and 
business programs? 
How well does my mission 
program align with our 
organization’s risk 
management strategy? 
Is the risk posture of this 
system within established 
boundaries to support this 
mission? 
Is our common control 
strategy effective? 
Which common controls are 
cost effective? 
How fully am I using the 
common controls available 
to me? 
Table 1. Example questions by Tier 
4.2. Steps 2 and 3 – Identify assets, processes, or operations to measure 
Now that the questions to be answered have been identified, the next step is to identify the 
assets, processes, or operations that can be measured to obtain answers to those questions. 
For example, to determine the effectiveness of an organization’s common control strategy, 
you could examine: 
 The common controls called for in the common controls strategy/policy; 
 Their alignment with current organizational goals and objectives; and  
 Their utilization. 
An example analysis of Tier 1 risk monitoring activities, their components, and their 
subcomponents is provided in Figure 3. The common controls assets are presented as 
Characteristicn in the right hand branch of the figure. These characteristics and 
subcharacteristics will also be referred to as diagnostic areas, where diagnostic area 1 (da1) is 
equivalent to characteristic1; da2 is equivalent to characteristic2; and so forth. The 
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subcharacteristics for each area follow a similar numbering scheme where, for example, 
subcharacteristic11 is equivalent to da11 and so forth. This is done to simplify the 
abbreviations used in the equations in Steps 6 and 7. 
It is important to remember that the identification of organizational assets, processes, and 
operations are organization-specific. This is one of the strengths of the IA OM® process, 
since it enables the abstraction of these key activities – specifically identified by the 
organization as being of interest – into a metric that shows Senior Management where their 
organization stands with respect to its risk management strategy and policies. If low level 
technical metrics exist, they can be combined and abstracted into the IA OM® process. 
Metrics produced through the use of the IA OM® process can be deconstructed into their 
component areas, allowing Senior Management to identify the areas needing attention. If 
further improvement in their risk management program is required, the IA OM® and its 
component measures can be used to track and improve the organization’s risk posture over 
time.  
 
Figure 3.  Example analysis of risk monitoring activities and their subcomponents 
4.3. Steps 4 and 5 – Define activity value scales and determine activity values 
Activity value scales used for IA OM® activities are normally scoped to range between 0 and 
1. This makes comparison easy and allows them to be aggregated and rolled-up into 
measures that are easy to use and understand. Also, these values can be readily seen as 
percentages to further enhance their understanding. However it is perfectly acceptable to 
have more important characteristics have values greater than 1 if desired to indicate their 
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relative importance to the organization. Alternatively, the relative importance of different 
characteristics/subcharacteristics can be accounted for using the weighting factors discussed 
in Steps 6 and 7.  
For activities that can only assume a specific set of values (e.g., Yes/No, or high, moderate, 
and low), the value scales can be adapted to accommodate them. For example, with a binary 
set, like Yes and No, it is common to use Yes = 1, and No = 0. Sets like high, moderate, and 
low could be represented with high = 1, moderate = 0.5, and low = 0. It would also be 
possible to decide that high = 0.9 (since even high is not definite like “yes”), moderate = 0.5, 
and low = 0.1 (since low is also not definite like “no”). The decision on value scales is made 
by the organization and is made to maximize the utility and understandability of the 
measurements in the context of their organization. 
Continuing with the example of the effectiveness of an organization’s common controls 
strategy, value scales for each of the three subcomponents can be defined, and values 
determined for each of the subcharacteristics assigned as shown in Figure 4. Each 
subcharacteristic/diagnostic area (daij) will be evaluated separately and then combined in 
Step 6 to provide an overall value for each characteristic or top-level diagnostic area (dai). 
These values are then combined in Step 7 to provide an overall IA OM Index Value. 
 
Figure 4. Common Control Value Scales Example 
4.4. Step 6 – Calculate an asset, process, or operation index 
Steps 3 through 5 have shown how to derive values for each of the assets, processes, and 
operations identified in Step 2. Each of these values represents a characteristic or 
subcharacteristic for an asset, process or operation. In this step, any values for 
subcharacteristics (daij) will be combined with weighting factors and aggregated to provide 
values for each characteristic (dai).  
The weighting factor value (wij) for each subcharacteristic (daij) is assigned by organizational 
management to represent the organization’s determination of the relative importance of 
each subcharacteristic to the characteristic being evaluated.  
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Equation 1 – Calculating diagnostic area (characteristic) values: 
2 2
1
2 2
1
(max[ ])
ni
ij ij
j
i ni
ij ij
j
w da
da
w da





 
Where: 
ni= number of diagnostic criteria for diagnostic area dai 
wij = weighting factor for diagnostic daij of diagnostic area dai 
daij = the jth diagnostic criterion of the of the ith diagnostic area dai 
max [daij] = maximum value of daij 
For the common control example, using organizationally determined weightings and 
subcharacteristics/diagnostic areas values provided in Table 2: 
 
Weightings 
Subcharacteristics/
diagnostic areas 
w31 = 1 da31 = 0.42 
w32 = 1 da32 = 0.94 
w33 = 2 da33 = 0.61 
Table 2. Weightings and Subcharacteristics Values 
The equation works out to: 
2 2 2 2 2 2
3 2 2 2 2 2 2
(1 0.42 ) (1 0.94 ) (2 0.61 )
(1 1.0 ) (1 1.0 ) (2 1.0 )
Characteristic
    
    
 
Thus:  
Characteristic3 = √����√�  = .65 
Inserting values for the other characteristics, and arranging all of the values into a fishbone 
diagram for clarity of presentation provides breakdown of the process as shown in Figure 5. 
4.5. Step 7 – Calculate the IA OM® index 
Calculating an IA OM® index provides a concise, high-level assessment of the enterprise 
risk management posture of the organization. The IA OM index, in this case referred to as 
the IA risk management index, or IARMIndex, is defined in terms of: 
1. Diagnostic areas 
2. Diagnostic criteria for each diagnostic area 
3. Diagnostic criterion value scales 
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Figure 5. Fishbone Diagram with All Risk Monitoring Characteristics and Subcharacteristics Values 
All of these items are provided in the fishbone diagram provided as Figure 5. A weighting 
factor can be applied to each characteristic/diagnostic area. As noted above, the weighting 
factor is an organizationally defined value indicating the relative importance to the 
organization of the particular characteristic. In this example the IARMIndex is normalized to 
one (i.e., ranges between zero and one). In all cases, value scales are defined in terms 
familiar to corporate management. 
The process for calculating the IARMIndex is shown in Equation 2. For activity element 
characteristics, the IARMIndex15 is normalized to one: 
Equation 1 – Calculating the IARMIndex value: 
2 2
1
2 2
1
(max[ ])
n
i i
i
n
i i
i
w da
IARMIndex
w da





 
Where: 
dai = diagnostic area (characteristic) 
n = number of attributes 
wi = weighting factor for attribute dai 
max [dai] = maximum value of dai 
Using the values from above and the organizationally defined weightings as shown in  
Table 3: 
                                                                 
15 Taken and adapted from Donaldson & Siegel [22] (p. 420). 
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Weightings 
Characteristics/ 
diagnostic areas 
w1 = 2 da1 = 0.25 
w2 = 1 da2 = 0.25 
w3 = 1 da3 = 0.65 
Table 3. Weightings and Characteristics Values 
Results in a value for IARMIndex = 0.35 
4.6. Evaluating the IA OM® index 
The following steps describe the analysis process allowing organizational management to 
quickly uncover areas needing attention and prioritize which area(s) to address first to 
obtain the greatest benefit: 
1. The IARMIndex value is examined to determine whether it is within the range 
determined by the organization to correspond to its risk tolerance; 
2. If the IARMIndex value is within the risk tolerance of the organization, the current 
values are included in the trending information and no further action is required until 
the next review cycle is initiated. 
3. If the IARMIndex value is not within the risk tolerance of the organization: 
a. The individual component index values that were aggregated to derive the IARMIndex 
value are examined and the value(s) furthest from the normalized value of 1.0 (the 
values closest to 0) is singled out for further analysis;  
b. The selected component index value(s) is then unfolded (if applicable) to find the 
subcomponent(s) with the lowest value(s);  
c. The component(s)/subcomponent(s) with the lowest value(s) is analyzed and a method 
for improving it is identified and implemented; 
d. At management’s discretion, reassess and recalculate the characteristic(s) (and any 
applicable subcharacteristic(s)) value(s) for the component(s) that was addressed and 
update the IARMIndex value to assess the impact of the changes made.  
4. By looking at trends in the IARMIndex values, and the component index values 
compiled over time, the organization may determine the overall improvement resulting 
from addressing these components. 
5. By looking at the IA OM® mapping and measurement trends in the component values, 
leadership or management can see which areas have had the greatest improvement, and 
which areas are most in need of attention. 
Continuing with the example from above, the IARMIndex value = 0.35. Assuming the 
organization has determined that any value under 0.70 is outside of its risk tolerance, the 
next step is to determine which component(s) to single out for further analysis. Using the 
values in Table 4, we find that characteristics da1 and da2 have the lowest values. However, 
if we also consider the weightings we see that w1 = 1.0 indicates that it is a higher priority 
item to the organization than w2, suggesting that if we cannot address both areas, priority 
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should be given to characteristic1, reviewing and updating the organization’s risk 
management strategy. 
 
Table 4. Component Values and Their Weightings 
5. Conclusion 
The need to initially assess, and then conduct ongoing monitoring of an organization’s 
overall risk posture, the risk posture of its assets, processes, and systems has been clearly 
established. The more valuable the information, asset, activity, or operation, the greater the 
need to increase the frequency of monitoring activities to ensure these resources are not 
compromised, or to identify and respond to any compromises as quickly as possible. This 
chapter shows how the IA OM® metric herein described provides an enterprise-wide risk 
management metric that can integrate synergistically with other risk management tools and 
efforts within an organization to provide monitoring personnel and decision-makers with 
the timely, accurate, and useful information they need to perform their functions and ensure 
their organization’s mission and business functions are protected. IA OM® not only provides 
a metric targeted to organizational senior management, but one that can be used by 
decision-makers at all levels in the organization to ensure the processes and assets they are 
responsible for are protected in a way that aligns with the risk management strategy of the 
organization.  
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1. Introduction 
A world marked by rapid changes of the economic, financial, political and social 
environment, a world ruled by uncertainty is subject to the emergence of increasingly higher 
risks, affecting the process of economic development of world economy. The increasingly 
frequent manifestation of unforeseen events caused high interest for research in the risk 
identification, quantification and prevention at the microeconomic level. In this context, risk 
management can be considered the art of taking decisions in an uncertain environment, on 
the background of the identification, quantification, analysis and management of the risks 
which affect an organization. 
Why is it necessary an active management of risk? The globalization process, the 
interdependence between economies in a regional and global plan, the problems arising 
from the need to ensure compatibility between legislative previsions, the effects of free labor 
movement, the macroeconomic context located in an accentuated dynamic, the fierce 
competition at the level of participants from the economic circuits, the limited degree of the 
resources and unlimited of the needs, the need to adapt to technological changes, the 
challenges generated of climate change, the high degree of complexity of the factors which 
influence economic and financial results of the business, the diversity of international 
economic flows are just some aspects which sustain the organized risk management, 
training the personnel for managing the activity, the identification of the losses caused by 
the action of the risk and the insurance of resources necessary to cover them, but also in the 
identification and communication of the risk, fact which requires the existence of a strong 
organizational culture oriented to this sense. 
Defining risk has been done in different ways over several decades, the polemics continuing 
today. But regardless of the angle of approach, defining the border between risk and 
uncertainty, the identification of the management methods, a thing is certain: the existence 
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of risk. The importance of the risk management is even more striking in the current 
economic climate, amid a crisis which seems to be having just begun. In these conditions, 
the timeliness and necessity of the topic is obvious. The existence of an arid land in 
Romanian economy seeing application of some specific techniques and strategies to the risk 
impose the immediate development of risk management, especially at the level of small and 
medium size entities (at the level of large companies it is noticed a considerable orientation 
towards the risk management, being created even different departments to exercise an 
active management at the level of risks). 
 The analysis of the economic-financial performances requires taking into consideration the 
risk factor as well, and hence of its possible implications on profitability and financial 
stability. At the level of any economy it cannot be discussed about the existence of some 
investments. Estimated return does not coincide with the actual one. Therefore, in addition 
to an analysis of profitability, the manager should also focus his attention on potential risk 
factors of the investment. In addition to estimating the expected future return it is imposed 
also a quantification of the risk associated with its achievement. Profit variability may 
involve achieving a lower return than expected; the higher the profit variation range is, the 
more risky the investment. Thus, the profitability - risk trend analysis provides a better 
classification of the investment opportunities. Rational investors, generally characterized by 
an aversion to risks, will exclude from the list those investments that offer the same return, 
but with a higher risk, and the option for one of the remaining opportunities will ultimately 
depend on their degree of risk aversion. Also, some authors consider that the risk is 
measured as variability in comparison with the profitability average of the last exercises and 
in foresight as variability of the profit in relation to the hope of profitability or as variability 
of the profit in relation to the volume of activity (turnover) of the company [1]. 
Avoiding risks due to significant changes in the activities concerned can be considered a 
beneficial strategy for the trader, in the context of the possibility of occurrence of problems 
with serious consequences. Against the background of strong economic and financial 
instability or when carrying out complex activities involving the development of 
partnerships, strategies may be adopted to follow fundamental indicators and to develop 
action plans for risk occurrence (for example, we can predict the resources used in case of 
higher costs or stocks of spare parts can be constituted to repair equipment and avoid large 
interruptions in production, are identified the opportunities for rescheduling of exchanges 
in case of defects which do not allow obtaining the quantity of finished products necessary 
to comply with the contractual obligations and so on). A commonly used option is that of 
transferring potential risks to specialized companies or individuals (insurance companies, 
experts in the field) or to some businesses which provide service for the technological 
equipment used, even if this generates additional costs.  
The emphasized development of the international economic relations, the existence of a 
complex ensemble of agents that influence the economic-financial performances of the 
economic organizations, the economic - financial instability, the competitive environment's 
volatility, the extension of information and communication technologies are just some 
aspects that support unconditionally the necessity of risk management. 
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The research conducted aims to clarify an issue considered previously, but also to identify 
new issues, allowing further future approaches. Thus, the paper will be structured in several 
important parts, concerning the:  
- Presentation of the concepts and theories regarding risk and highlighting the need to 
manage it; 
- Elements of risk identification, with customization at the level of economic entities; 
- Risk probability theory in risk study; 
- Opportunities for risk assessment; 
- The system of indicators that allow the determination of the economic - financial 
performance of economic entities, and the foundation of risk management decisions; 
- The possibility of using discriminating statistical models in determining an entity's 
financial and economic status and the realization of forecasts on the outcome of future 
events, in order to provide answers to the managers’ concerns to identify and use the 
most viable means of action in order to develop business and ensure sustainability of 
the entities they manage. 
So, we consider that the problem that managers are facing is reflected by the need to 
manage risk at the level of any company, which implies: tracking to identify the factors that 
impact negatively on the work performed; the estimates quantifying the consequences of the 
event risk; basis for a complex of measures to prevent event risk; mitigate damage caused 
when it realized; using the services provided by the specialized units in risk management if 
it is not possible by the entity. Each manager must determine a minimum and maximum 
risk on the scale that is willing to accept, as a result of the company’s results are dependent 
on them (assuming a higher risk lead to better results but and corresponding losses and vice 
versa). 
2. The risks identification at the level of economic entities 
Any firm bases their activity on two major coordinates: satisfying consumer requests and 
maximizing the obtained profitability. In order to achieve these goals, it is imposed 
primarily, a sizing of the capital necessary and identifying the funding opportunities. The 
object of the financing decision is realized by the selection of the sources of capital at the 
lowest cost for obtaining them in terms of risk reduction. So, developing a financial policy 
aimed at determining the financing needs for a period of time, selecting a financing 
structure, meaning a way of funding through its own resources or loans, and establishing 
the ratio between short-term use of resources or long term. But, all these issues require the 
identification of potential risks and establishing a strategy which allows reducing or even 
avoiding their effects. 
Before performing a risk analysis, a differentiation between the concepts of risk and 
incertitude is necessary [2]. The unanimous opinion is that both regard essential categories 
that affect the general policy of a firm, but, often it has been made confusion between them, 
putting the sign of equality. In reality, the two concepts are different and proper 
understanding. The theoretical and practical approach of the two concepts has suffered 
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many changes due to the more accentuated degree of complexity of the worldwide 
economy, relations in social area, technological area, economic crisis event, diversification of 
financial instruments, etc.  
The inability of companies to adapt to changes recorded in the external environment with 
minimal cost can develop into a risk for this. If we refer to this sense, it is clear that any 
company (even the most profitable ones) is subject to constant risk, being imposed the 
development of risk management mechanisms to enable a fast referral of the changes 
recorded but also developing a mechanism of intervention. 
A definition of the notion of risk is based on the changes recorded at the profit level 
compared to the average achieved in the previous years (this can be implemented also to the 
level of change in future profitability, of revenues to be obtained, of the results recorded). 
Another manner of approach, illustrates risk as the possibility of producing a fact which has 
unintended consequences. It is noted that the risk is regarded as the probability of 
manifestation of an event (possible to predict or not) with negative implications on the 
economic activity of a company. 
Whatever the way of approaching the concept of risk we observe that it transforms the 
potential losses according to the probabilities of their manifestation, which are known or 
determined.  
Instead, uncertainty implies inability to estimate those probabilities. It can be considered 
that the uncertainty is similar to a variable that cannot be defined fully as you cannot 
identify or predict possible events and neither the probability of their occurrence. In other 
words, uncertainty is present in the fact that it is not known which of the situations will 
intervene."[3] 
In presenting these concepts it can be observed that the risk results from uncertainty. Thus, 
the inability to estimate an event to occur, of the time of registration and the size of the 
effects recorded materializes the state of uncertainty. Following, the adoption of decisions 
today determines the registration of results in the future, these being subject to a state of 
uncertainty.  
At the level of an economic organization, uncertainty is similar with the risks that cannot be 
identified and estimated. So, any increase of their weight in the total of risks which affect the 
activity that takes place determine an increase of the uncertainty state and reverse (knowing 
and anticipating almost fully the risks involved in the activity that takes place is not similar 
with the elimination of uncertainty). Uncertainty is seen by the manager as the total amount 
of the consequences of the existence of some potential undesired situations. As a result, the 
objective or subjective character of uncertainty is reported to the necessity of correlating the 
opinions and perceptions of the decision maker with logical argument, based on real dates 
recorded in the previous period.  
Obviously, no one can say that he proposed to avoid the uncertainty state, because, as it has 
been specified, the profound transformations that affect the entire world have such an 
accentuated dynamic as it would be utopian such an attitude. The bigger and bigger 
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possibilities of choice make future being uncertain also for who realizes the strictest 
planning [4]. As a result, it is much closer to reality an acceptance of the uncertainty and 
maintenance of it in reasonable limits. A study made on a sample of 50 countries has 
highlighted important differences in the attitude regarding the avoidance of uncertainty, 
explained by differences of economic conjuncture, but also cultural, educational or 
behavioral [5]. Clearly, scientific investigation pointed the reduction of uncertainty at 
different components and behaviors of human mind. But, the activity of people has caused 
the action of some new uncertainties so that economic and financial crisis, poverty or 
globalization accompanies us permanently on the evolution scale of the whole society.  
The more and more frequent occurrence of unpredicted events has caused a high interest for 
researches in the field of risk identification, quantification and prevention at microeconomic 
level. Therefore, ever since 1955, the professor Wayne Snider had defined the concept of risk 
manager, and in 1956 the concept of risk management appeared. On this background, risk 
management has known a fast development, being defined also the concept of global cost of 
risk. The definitions given to risk management have either empirical character(”the art of 
making the right choice, an art based rather on anticipating future events than on the 
reaction to past ones” ,- or “risk management is just common sense”) or pragmatic character 
(“the management of global cost of insurable or non-insurable risks, in a company” – [6]). 
Although the concept of risk itself expresses a state of uncertainty and indeterminacy, 
however, it must be made a distinction of it, starting from the reasoning that we can act for 
the purposes of identifying opportunities for expressing some options, not only favorable 
but also unfavorable, and also of the degree of likelihood. In the market economy frame, the 
concept of risk has been widely debated, without existing uniform opinions, but rather 
diverse and even contradictory.  
If we consider the definition of the explanatory dictionary of Romanian language, 
respectively:” The possibility of reaching a danger, of having to face trouble or harm 
suffered; Danger possibly more or less predictable”, we can depict the side of probability to 
express a danger which determines the human factors to identify opportunities in order to 
prevent and mitigate its effects. Into the specialized dictionaries are meet also other 
definitions of risk such as, “the possibility that a loan or investment to generate a loss ", and 
“likely future event, whose production may cause some losses”. It can be predictable when 
factors that cause losses can be predicted in advance and unpredictable when determined by 
fortuitous circumstances”. In the classical theory of decision, the risk is considered „an 
uncertain element but possible that always appears in the social and human activities 
whose effects are damaging and irreversible”. 
From the definitions presented we can depict the conclusion that the risk is an uncertain 
phenomenon but with a certain degree of probability of event that can cause both losses and 
the effects which can be removed with difficulty or even at all. The area of risk event is 
broad, covering both the human side and also the social, political or other nature side. As a 
result, conscious or unconscious actions exerted on the components of a system can cause 
expected direct effects, appropriate to the objectives followed, but also the evidence of 
unwanted direct or indirect adverse effects that the specialty literature defines as risks. 
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Among the economic agents, there is a wide range of risks arising both from their actions 
and from the external environment. The development of the society has created new forms 
of risk and imposed the identification of new strategies and methods for forecasting and 
analysis of risk and uncertainty. Thus, to the risks caused by natural disasters, the ones 
related to economic processes and phenomena, armed conflicts, etc., were added also other 
categories that are often difficult to define or to estimate quantitatively. Thus, there is 
growing evidence of risks caused by increasing complexity of the business environment, 
changes in legal systems (especially for harmonization with other legal systems), conducting 
business in different countries which experience different rates of economic development, 
the action of political, demographic, cultural, juridical factors. 
The group of risks can be realized from more points of view, in the specialty literature being 
meet many approaches. Without planning to repeat them, we shall try to report especially at 
those typologies that put in light categories which execute a big influence on the economic-
financial performance of the economic organizations (table 1). 
 
Table 1. Classification criteria of risks that affect the activity of economic entities 
The risks specified can be deducted at their turn on subcomponents and they allow an 
analysis of generator causes. No matter the classification criterion and the possibility of 
dividing, one thing is for sure: the risk in business is a certain state, a feature of market 
economy. Its inexistence could lead to methods of performing the activity by the economic 
entities not according to the economy realities (practically, this thing would equalize with 
the existence of some administrative intervention leverages at the level of state that could 
eliminate freedom of action of the economic operators). 
The conclusion of the aspects presented converges in only one way, more exactly that one 
where there is no probability of performing an activity in a certain environment, of course, 
no matter the field, branch or sector where an economic agent places his activity. As a result, 
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exercising an active risk management can only have favorable effects at the level of 
economic operators. The structure of such a process can be highlighted schematically like 
this (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Structure of risk management process 
The activity performed by a company is subject to different possibilities of manifestation of 
the internal risks and of the external ones, generated by the interaction with the 
environment. As a consequence, the first stage imposes the identification of different risks 
their notation in a “register of risks”. Their analysis implies an evaluation and ranking 
process according to the effects they can generate. The elaboration of an action plan, with 
clear action measures, for avoiding risks and reducing the losses caused by their 
manifestation is the next mandatory step. But, there not enough these actions without a 
permanent verification of the risk management process and performing a rigorous control 
over the way the corresponding measures are applies so that they record an improvement of 
the company’s performance. 
3. Theory of probabilities in risk review 
Can it be estimated and avoided the risk only by using the manager's intuition? The answer 
is clear, demonstrated by daily realities. An inherent aspect of any activity is the possibility 
of existence of a not desired event, for which it would be ideal at least determining the 
probability of manifestation. To the possibility of manifestation of a situation, process, 
phenomenon, etc. it can be associated an interval or one or more concrete answers. In the 
probabilities theory, these elements are defined as discrete random variables (the ones for 
which there can be enumerated the results) and continuous ones (those for which there can 
be placed the results in certain intervals).In practice, there can be also used mixed variables, 
which report to the possibility of using a combination of the two types mentioned 
previously for reflecting the possible results (these are specific to the insurance sector).  
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These probabilities can be identified, but, the recorded results do not appear at the same 
time also at the level of all variants. For instance, at a bowling competition, you can strike 
down between 0 and 6 skittles (there are 7 possible results), but only after the throw you will 
clearly know their number, without being possible recording in the same time two variants. 
The question is however to assess the probability of the results to action. In the case of 
discrete variables, things seem simple; the evaluation is possible by reporting favorable 
variations at the number of possible cases. For example, consider an economic agent who 
has an order for making furniture for at least one piece of each, but with a higher production 
capacity. In this context, he would like to know what is the probability to charge a minimum 
amount of 3000 euro from the sale of the goods mentioned, knowing that the unit price of 
sale is 500 euro for product X and 300 euro for product Y, and the quantity that can be 
offered for sale is of 5 pieces of each product. To identify favorable situations, are followed 
the dates from table 2. 
Table 2. The Matrix of possible situations 
Given the minimum amount targeted and unit sales prices, the favorable situations are 
represented by the following cases: (3X, 5Y) (4x, 4y) (4X, 5Y), (5X, 2Y) (5X, 3Y); (5X, 4y), (5X, 
5Y). As a result, there are 7 favorable cases from 25 possible. The probability of obtaining the 
amount targeted is 7/25 = 0.28. Certainly, the example considered is simple, but we took into 
consideration highlighting a case that allows a quick estimate of the probability of recording 
a desired situation. And in the case of continuous random variables, the probability theory 
gives the theoretical foundation for identifying the possibility of manifestation of a situation. 
It cannot be questioned the result of applying these mathematical methods for assessing the 
probability of outcomes to appear. And still, we must consider the following aspect: how 
many managers know the probability theory, are willing to apply it and are convinced that 
they can use it in any case, according to the level of complexity of the factors that can 
influence the work done? If it would be made a survey in Romania, especially at the level of 
small and medium organizations, the percentage would be extremely low. 
Moreover, the risk management issue in our country has acquired a well-defined contour in 
a recent period, the researches performed being divided and the simple and the legislation is 
insufficient and permissive. In addition, although the manifestation of a result can be 
anticipated through these rational methods, even the term used, “probability” "shows that 
the activity of the economic agents cannot be translated into logical terms to quantify some 
uncertain aspects. Also, the use of some statistical data for sizing the probability of the 
appearance of a phenomenon allows obtaining relevant results when reporting to a large 
number of different cases that are not interrelated. 
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In this context, our approach supports the need for linking conceptual issues from the 
economic theory with the creation of a information database as complete as possible 
(reported not only to statistical data but also to forecasted information), so that economic 
entities to identify the trend of the evolution of phenomena and processes that influence 
the market and over the economic – financial situation. Such behavior would allow them 
to achieve the obtained objectives established with the available resources and 
opportunities for action. Obviously, the process of obtaining information is costly. But, 
what is more important - recording some additional costs generated by obtaining essential 
information and avoiding unintended consequences through the manifestation of some 
risks that have not been identified and evaluated? The answer can be supported by 
arguing that the firm size is conditioned by the need and the information possibilities, 
also by the information costs [7]. We must not believe that the fact of having a large 
volume of information on possible alternatives, allows adopting decisions in the absence 
of risk conditions and uncertainty. But, ignoring the information pushed to the extreme by 
the rationing “anyway it will happen, with or without strategy "can only be 
counterproductive attitude, with negative repercussions that can result even in 
bankruptcy. 
4. Possibilities for risk assessment 
Is risk identification sufficient to determine a course of action so as to avoid or minimize 
losses? Obviously, the answer is no. An important aspect of risk management is represented 
by dimensioning its size so that there can be evaluated the effects generated by its 
manifestation. In general, risk quantification starts from certain assumptions: 
 The existence of multiple risks does not determine the reduction or increase of losses 
specific to a certain category (e.g., the loss caused by the manifestation of interest rate 
risk does not action over the one arising from environmental risk); 
 The manifestation of a risk does not automatically act on the probability of the 
appearance of another risk (the increase of price of used raw materials does not directly 
or indirectly influence the risk of the firm's reputation); 
 The losses caused by the manifestation of a risk must be under the level of available 
assets owned by the company. 
On any business, the activity is reported on the components, differentiated in relation to the 
business established at its set up. Considering an economic agent engaged in the activities of 
production and marketing, we can identify and assess major risks that may occur in the 
economic, financial, investment and trade area. For this, it is imposed stating the 
possibilities of capital (Figure 2). 
This structure allows capital allocation process targeting specific risk assessment activities of 
the two components. As a consequence, we shall report to the main risk categories that 
action at the level of each component. 
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Running operating cycle determines both revenue and expenditure, activity level all 
affect profitability. Obviously, these are uncertain and do not remain unchanged from 
one period to another. The revenue is subject to combined influence of several factors: 
the volume of production conducted, quantity sold, market demand, sales price. The 
level of expenses acts on profitability both through the volume and the structure. Thus, a 
high level of fixed costs will pose a risk for a major operating company. It will be even 
greater as the sales volume will be lower, the fixed costs will be higher and the output 
will be made near the critical point (that level, on account of production or profit made 
are not recorded, no loss). The economic theory offers solutions for the determination of 
the point where the developed activity does not generate any profit or loss and the 
economic realities have shown a tendency of bringing forward the growth rate of 
expenses of the corresponding increase in production due to higher labor productivity, 
improving the organization of work or assimilation of technical progress. In addition, the 
increase in the level of production leads to a lower cost per production unit, the 
allocation base for fixed costs being higher. In this context, companies which registered a 
high level of fixed costs are much more exposed to risk than those who have a high share 
of variable expenses. For the operational risk assessment the operators can monitor the 
level of turnover compared to breakeven. From the surveys conducted it emerges the 
idea that a difference between them up to 10% reflects an unstable situation, between 10 
and 20% - a relatively stable situation and over 20% a comfortable situation. Also, 
another indicator that allows sizing the operating risk is the operating leverage which 
reflects the percentage increase of the operating result due to the increase by one 
percentage of sales. 
 
Figure 2. Use of capital at the level of economic agents 
The risk manager must analyze all possible risks that can influence the profitability of the 
operating activity at the level of each phase. In this way, there can be identified and 
structured a series of risks as presented in table 3. 
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Table 3. Potential risks associated to the operating activity 
One of the most important decisions at the micro-economical level is the allocation of capital 
for the course of the investment processes because they reflect the performance of current 
costs in order to achieve future revenue. So, the quantity of resources allocated for the 
investment achievement can determine their success and the business development. Real 
investments, embodied by essential assets for the development of the production and sale 
processes, are the subject of differentiated risks, the ability of managers in the selection of 
projects that ensure the maximization of the economic agent value being essential. To 
substantiate the investment decision, the practice imposed certain elements that allow the 
sizing of the efficiency of the analyzed project, namely: the amount of invested capital, life of 
purpose, net cash flows, residual value and the discount rate [8] 
The criteria that can be applied to analyze the investment project must relate to an uncertain 
environment because a certain environment does not exist in reality. Building some models 
on the assumption that future cash flows are certain, it has an explanatory nature. In a 
deterministic economic and social environment is assumed the previous and certain 
knowledge of the interest rate and future monetary flows of the investment projects. 
Possible variations in interest rates and the risk of an improper activity, that of achieving 
breakeven (the dead point) and/or to become insolvent and to go bankrupt are not included 
in the calculation base for the investments efficiency. As a result, the foundation of the 
investments decision in a certain environment has more a theoretical nature, of 
understanding the essential tools of the analysis of investment projects. It is about using the 
actuarial computations in selecting investment projects or project portfolios that maximize 
the wealth of equity investors (shareholders and creditors) and thus maximize the enterprise 
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value. Concepts of interest rate as rate of productivity without risk (Rf) and net present 
value (NPV) are in the center of the analysis in the certain environment. 
The determination of cash flows generated by the investment project and of the moment of 
their action, the balance of the capital market and the practice of an unchanged interest rate 
for a long time that allows the exact identification of the borrowing costs are items that 
cannot be recorded on different market segments. In this context, the estimation of future 
positive and negative flows is a difficult operation which can be completed with an unreal 
perception and therefore a failure in the investment process. Estimation can be achieved by 
identifying some probability elements in the registration of certain levels of the used 
indicators even in an uncertain environment. The states of uncertainty can be generated by 
the investment project or the market. So, the manner in which is done the investment 
projection, project implementation and its use, and also the capital market fluctuations, the 
competitors’ actions, the manifestation of possible financial and economic crisis can generate 
risks and differences between predictions and reality. For the embracement of an investment 
decision in the probabilistic environment are required the following steps: the sizing of the 
positive and negative flows in different probability assumptions, the measuring of the 
investment risk, the adoption of investment decision for a specific project [9]. 
To achieve the first stage it is necessary the sizing of the mathematical hope, respectively the 
expected annual average value of the cash flows and their comparison. The comparison can 
be done with the update of the cash flows or without this operation. The mathematical 
expectance of the cash flows of the investment projects is determined by the weighting of 
the annual flows (estimated in three ways: one positive or optimistic, one pessimistic and 
one medium) with their probability of implementation (this is determined either statistically 
or by consulting specialists with experience in the field or on the investor's intuition and the 
sum of the probabilities must be equal to the unity). When there are analyzed several 
projects, it is obvious that it will be chosen the one that generates the greatest mathematic 
hope of realizing the future returns. Comparing the projects allows better results if it is used 
the technique of flows update. The drawback of this criterion is that it does not take into 
account the variation of the results around the average. As a result, in financial practice, it 
can be used the criterion of dispersion of the total net discounted absolute cash flow. In this 
sense, it is considered the best project the one which determines a total discounted net cash 
flow that has the smallest dispersion.  
The risk reflects the possibility of undesirable results. In the investment process, the risk is 
much higher than in other economic activities because the effects are recorded for long 
periods (resulting the difficulty of accurate predictions of the obtainable effects) and the 
negative flows have comfortable values that can materialize in losses (in case of failure ). For 
the avoidance of the risk, the investor may choose: the increase in the discount rate with a 
differential percentage according to the degree of risk associated with the type of investment 
(for example, the replacement investments are associated with a very little risk, the 
upgrading of the existing equipment in use involves a low risk, new investments have a 
higher risk while the strategic investments involve a substantial risk), but manifesting a 
degree of subjectivity in determining its size; the execution of an investment plan which can 
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be varied according to specific conditions both from the point of view of costs that have to 
be made and also from the point of view of performing gradually the investments during 
their execution; projects with a lower lifetime (to avoid negative effects of the obsolescence, 
and also for projects that allow faster recovery of the invested capital). 
At the same time, however, it can be measured the risk by using some mathematical methods. 
The risk can be measured by using the dispersion or the intermediate square deviation of 
individual flows to the mathematical expectation. The smaller the dispersion is, the lower the 
investment risk is. This process involves a comparison between the sizes of the dimension of 
variation period of the rate of return for different investment projects. Practice also stated 
another procedure that allows accurate identification of optimal investment solution, referred 
to as the standard deviation [10], which reflects the small deviation of the distribution of 
probability of the return. For example, we consider two projects, X and Y, for which there are 
estimated the following rates of return and probability distributions (Table 4). 
 
Table 4. The rates of return and the probability of occurrence for investment options 
For the risk assessment of the two projects we proceed as follows: 
- It is determined the weighted average of the return for the two projects: 
 RmX= 0,25x0,3 + 0,15x0,5 + 0,05x0,2 = 0,16 
RmY= 0,30x0,3 + 0,20x0,5 - 0,10x0,2 = 0,17 
- It is determined the amplitude of the variation of the rate of return with standard 
deviation (table 5). 
 
 
Table 5. Determination of risk based on the spread - type (standard approach) 
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It is found that the lowest standard deviation is recorded in the project Y, the decision 
maker choosing for the realization of this project. 
In the process of adopting an investment decision, the decision makers can use the breakeven 
analysis, the sensitivity analysis, the decision trees method, the simulation method. 
Getting a higher rate of return is an objective aimed of any economic entity. Achieving this 
is often conditioned by the level of available resources. The insufficiency of own resources 
determines the use of borrowed resources, which increase indebtedness. If the economic 
profitability is higher than the financing costs for borrowed resources, the leverage effect is 
positive (otherwise the effect is negative). The manager must not omit, however, that a 
change in the financial structure may cause the increase of financial risk, without being 
possible an exact identification of the period in which insolvency may occur, especially 
because obtaining a rate of return greater than the cost of borrowed capital is not dependent 
only on the work done by the economic agent but also on the joint action of some external 
factors: competition, the evolution of energy prices, fuel, raw materials, the emergence of 
substitutes; the manifestation of some crisis with large amplitudes, the demand. Therefore, 
establishing a break-even point as a range rather than a fixed size seems a much more useful 
solution in avoiding financial risk [11]. 
The indebtedness and the insolvency (the insufficiency of available resources for the 
discharge of outstanding debt) are at the basis of the determination of insolvency and 
bankruptcy. These should be analyzed not only at the level of a financial exercise, because 
insolvency occurs when liabilities of previous period, to which we add the present and 
future ones, are higher than the existing availabilities and those that will be cashed in the 
future. To predict and avoid the bankruptcy risk it can be used a system of indicators 
represented by solvency ratios (these allow the sizing of the liquidity of a company), 
leverage, financial debt repayment capacity and the rate of financial autonomy. But, the 
expectation of a state of financial difficulty should not be synonymous with the liquidation 
of the firm. The manager can present to the creditors a plan for the recovery of the activity, 
and if they accept taking risks by granting new loans or rescheduling debts, the bankruptcy 
situation can be rectified. 
In Romania, the insolvency law was adopted in the year 2006, when bankruptcy law was 
repealed. According to the legal provisions, an economic agent that is unable to pay his 
debts at maturity is obliged within 30 days from the date of recording this situation, to 
address the court showing that he wants to enter in the simplified procedure or 
reorganization one in accordance with a plan, with the to pay its debts. Not respecting the 
plan or the record of new losses determines the judicial administrator, the creditors 
committee or the special administrator to enter into bankruptcy. 
From the data analysis presented in table number 6 there is a significant growth in 2006 and 
2007, explained by the change of legal provisions in the field. The situation was set in 2008, 
but as a result of the global economic-financial crisis and fiscal measures taken by the legal 
authorities, the number of bankrupt companies increased considerably in 2009. For a 
complete vision of the situation recorded in the business environment from Romania as a 
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result of the measures stated, we must provide other information. Thus, in 2009, 133.362 
companies have temporarily suspended their activity, marking an increase of 1009,59% 
compared with 2008, 18766 have requested dissolution (increase of 398,83% compared with 
2008) and 43616 were canceled from the Register of Commerce. Also, over 50% of Romanian 
companies with a total of more than 50 employees have opted for layoffs of staff, and from 
all these entities only 4.23% have recorded an economic growth. 
 
Source: www. coface.ro 
Table 6. Evolution of bankruptcies recorded in Romania between 2006 – 2010 
An analysis of the existing data for highlighting the number of bankruptcies for the first 10 
fields of activity reveals the most exposed sectors to this risk (table 7). 
 
Source: www. coface.ro 
Table 7. Distribution of bankruptcies recorded by sectors of activity (first 10 positions) 
It is noted that the most exposed sectors are: wholesale, retail and construction, these 
retaining the “leadership” in almost all years of the period analyzed. In 2011 the shares held 
by them are of 21%, 22% and 17% (Figure 3). 
The main factors that have caused major financial difficulties were: reduced possibilities of 
financing and aggravation of credit conditions, a significant reduction in consumption, with a 
direct impact on the demand of goods and services, the establish of new tax liabilities, 
products prices increases, particularly in the energy, fuel and raw materials level, the excessive 
bureaucracy, lack of an incentive package for the development of the business area, difficulties 
in the mechanism of absorption of community funds, the examples could continue. 
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Figure 3. Structure of bankruptcies on sectors of activity in 2011 
5. The system of indicators that allow the highlight of the economic-
financial performances of the economic entities and the substantiation 
risk management decisions 
Maximizing the efficiency of the activities performed at the firm level requires a constant 
monitoring of the financial performances. In other words, to optimize economic 
performances is necessary to implement a financial diagnostic system of the performed 
activity, resulting in a series of' documents that include a set of indicators requested by the 
management team. It is obvious the fact that the efficiency of the system is determined by 
the type of documents requested, by the way in which cooperation takes place between 
different components of the company but also by the technology used in the development of 
the reports. 
To estimate the financial status of a firm there can be used use a series of indicators that 
allow highlighting the profitability, solvency, liquidity, turnover of debts and the degree of 
financial independence. The activity of financial diagnosis of a firm can be made to 
determine the situations of financial disequilibrium and of the generating causes, so that 
there can be adopted in time the necessary measures for effective management. In this case, 
are involved the managers, shareholders and the employees. However, the diagnosis may 
cover the company's ability to make profit, to record surplus flows in comparison to the 
negative ones due to the activity performed, to honor payment obligations, cases in which it 
is performed by persons outside the firm (banks, potential investors, customers, 
competitors, state). But, even if it concerns an internal or external analysis of the activity 
undertaken, the objectives followed are the assessment of economic and financial 
performance and identification of the potential risks that may occur.  
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But a real analysis involves not only determining the state of the financial balance and 
liquidity of a firm but it should aim to identify the margins of cash accumulation. To this 
purpose, there can be used the information provided by the profit and loss account statement 
which summarizes the outcome of economic and financial flows of entry, the combination of 
production and output factors over the period considered. Basically, this document creates a 
group of incomes and expenditures which have determined the overall result for the ended 
financial year and allows assessment of the overall economic and financial performances 
achieved by the firm by using some performance indicators. Known as intermediate 
management account balances these indicators are underlying preparation of financial 
statements analysis and forecasting, providing managers the possibility to identify deviations 
from the predictions made by categories of activity. Thus it can follow the degree of turnover 
achievement and the anticipated gross margin, carrying out the operating expenses in limits 
set, the impact on the indebtedness degree on current outcome, obtaining the estimated profit. 
Sizing the economic and financial performances is based on the diagnostic analysis, which 
aims to identity responses to a series of questions related to the results obtained, how they 
were obtained, the levels recorded compared with those projected, of the measures that can 
be adopted to achieve the objectives, both short and medium term and long term. The 
diagnosis-analysis is based on synthesis accounting documents (the situation of assets, 
liabilities and equity - balance sheet, financial results - income statement and attachments) 
and other information on the evolution of prices and exchange rates [13]. 
The sizing activity of the financial and economic performances should be carried out 
continuously and not only in difficult situations, as Jean- Pierre Thibaut stated “Performing 
some analysis is motivated not only whether the company has difficulties, but also when it 
wants to improve the results obtained”. Practically, realizing continuously some analysis of 
the financial statements concerns the achievement of information necessary for taking 
decisions by managers in a rational manner. 
The analysis made must be supplemented by a series of liquidity indicators such as the 
overall liquidity, immediate liquidity, ability to pay rates, coverage degree of daily 
expenditure, the rotation period of assets, debt indicators, namely: indebtedness, the degree 
interest coverage, total debt ratio, leverage, general solvency ratio, management indicators 
(duration of stock rotation, customer flow, credit suppliers, non fixed, fixed and total assets) 
and other indicators of profitability. 
Whatever the type of indicators used, the decision maker must consider a number of issues 
related to the need to supplement the fixed analysis with dynamic analysis (permanently 
there occur changes which can affect the results recorded at a moment in time) but also the 
use of a complex system of indicators (making analysis based on a single indicator may lead 
to misinterpretation) which are able to show clearly and accurately the financial and 
economic performance level of the company. 
The activity done by any economic entity can be structured at the level of three fundamental 
components: operating, financial and extraordinary (Figure 4). The manager must identify 
the potential risks for each component so that it can base an effective strategy. 
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Figure 4. Structure of developed activities and risks afferent 
Obviously, is not enough an overview of these risks, without a detailed analysis of the 
causes. For example, the risk, “cutoffs in the supply "can occur from multiple causes. Thus, 
the supplier fails to comply with the contract clauses regarding the delivery terms or 
quantities established , may occur accidents during transport, the quality of goods supplied 
is not according to the requirements established, which leads to their refusal by the buyer, 
there take place extraordinary events ( fires, floods, earthquakes), etc. Also, these cutoffs 
may have a short, high or very high length, with direct implications on the production 
process, or, as appropriate, in marketing (minor, significant or major). The analysis of these 
issues should be completed with the assessment of the losses caused by the manifestation of 
the mentioned risk. Another example can be the one of the risk of increasing taxes and fees. 
The causes in this case are external, but applying the principles of fiscal management can 
only have a favorable impact on the financial performances of the company. 
Risk management should be based on an analysis of indicators highlighting economic 
financial performance at the level of the activities shown in figure number 5. But it requires 
a detailed breakdown of the indicators presented in order to identify the contribution of 
each component in recording a result or another, being not enough to follow-up the 
synthetic level. In addition, if not takes into account also their dynamics and not is not 
corroborated with factors of influence and circumstantial situations, it is not possible to 
determine the causes that generate negative effects and no anticipation of any difficult 
times. 
The main components that are at the base of the formation of the gross result, are presented 
in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. The formation of the result of activity performed broken down by components 
The operating result is decisively influenced by the level of income and expenditure 
obtained. As a result, the manager must seek firstly the dynamics and the structure of sales. 
The risk of reducing them may be caused by: 
- emergence of new competitors; 
- reduced consumption due to the manifestation of strong economic and financial crisis; 
- insufficient promotion of products; 
- emergence of similar products at lower prices, on the basis of labor productivity growth 
at the level of competitors; 
- punishment by consumers low quality level of products supplied; 
- existence of a structure based mainly on marketed products which determine lower 
revenues. 
 At the same time, it is necessary to identify the impact of the costs upon the operating 
result. Thus, an increase in costs can be determined by: 
- rising prices of raw materials supply, fuel and energy; 
- record of high specific consumption per product unit; 
- technological losses; 
- low labor productivity; 
- use of technologies worn out, etc.. 
But, a great importance is had not only by the determination of the indicator stated and by 
the analysis of its components, but also by the investigation process from the dynamic point 
of view because it can provide additional information on level of performance correlated 
with potential generating causes. In this respect, it is necessary to calculate the indexes that 
diminish the evolution of operating incomes and operating expenses and their comparison 
(Table 8). 
We consider that the income index is calculated as ratio between the income from current 
period and the income obtained in the previous period. We use for comparison the index 
from total incomes and the index from operating activity. 
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Table 8. Effects and causes of the evolution of revenues and operating expenses 
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Analysis can be extended to the other components. Thus, if the index exceeds the financial 
cost of financial income, there is an inefficiency of the funding policy (table 9). 
 
 
Table 9. Effects and causes of the evolution of financial and extraordinary revenues and expenses 
Causes may include the prevalence compared with their borrowed resources; increase the 
interest rate on loans, recording a difference of an adverse exchange rate, yielding 
investment securities at a lower value than the book, etc. 
If the operating result and the financial one are positive, there is a state of, “financial health” 
in the company, which, combined with a shorter duration of the credit customer compared 
with the credit provider (the collection of receivables is achieved at a shorter interval than 
the payment of liabilities), determines a state performance. Situations that can occur in 
practice are presented in table 10. 
In this connection, we draw from the research conducted a series of ideas to be considered 
of being in risk management: 
- Determination of indicators is based on the information recorded at a time (the end of a 
financial year), without taking into account the dynamic changes recorded; 
- Analyzing the performance indicators that do not allow forecasting famous risks of 
integrated business, respectively the dependence on suppliers and customers; 
- Distortions in the functionality of the production, supply or sale may adversely affect 
the overall activity performed, although a past performance can mark a positive 
situation; 
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- Ensure the ability to pay and the cash required is determined by the system 
performance indicators, a high level of profit recorded in the profit and loss does not 
always correspond to the actual cash flow - so, large companies faced with situations 
such as the current way of calculating the profit is based on elements whose 
achievement is not always certain (for example, claims that cannot be collected due to 
customer bankruptcy or financial bottlenecks) or equivalent of non-specific economic 
flows of the financial year. 
 
Table 10. Situations determined by the evolution of the components of the current result of  
the year  
6. Using the discriminating statistical models in determining of financial 
and the financial condition and the risk analysis  
The financial condition of an economic agent can be considered a qualitative indicator 
that characterizes the overall activity of the economic agent, is subjected continuously to 
the influence of quantitative variables. This allows the use of statistical discriminant 
analysis to determine the financial status of an economic agent (in-depth presentation of 
this method and of the models developed on its basis was performed by Anghel [14]. The 
best known method from the specified category is the scores method. For variables taken 
into account are determined certain weights so that their sum reflects a global indicator 
called” The Z score ". This method involves the building of a database with information 
on a group of bankrupted companies and a group of healthy companies that allow 
calculation of financial ratios for each entity subject to the analysis and the determination 
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of the best combination of rates that allow the differentiation of the companies analyzed. 
Basically, the indicator resulting (statistical discriminant model) reflect the overall 
situation of the company with manifest and predictability. One of the first score functions 
used in the analysis of default risk was developed by Altman in 1968, which allows the 
registration of a degree of predictability of 75% of bankruptcies two years prior to their 
production [15] . The model was further developed to be applied in all branches. Altman 
model is frequently used in financial practice and enable a correct the result in the 
classification of 70% [16]. 
It should be mentioned also other important models: the Conan – Holder model [17], the 
model of the Central Balances of the France Bank or the method of the French 
Commercial Credit. In the Romanian school, the possibility to determine this pattern was 
limited because the transition from the centralized economy to the market economy was 
quite large and the information required was not available or relevant. However, the 
significant concerns embodied in the formulation of the scoring models have many 
authors [18 -20, 14]. The application of scoring functions in the Romanian economy 
cannot yet be considered as a safe situation of risk management. We believe that the 
models that have demonstrated the applicability of the developed economies do not 
correspond to an economy characterized by high instability. In addition, the proper 
identification of the bankrupt companies, the long absence of the legislative provisions 
governing the bankruptcy, the lack of analysis of a wider range of firms before 
bankruptcy, focusing on financial variables without including non-financial indicators 
and trying to develop the models available in all branches reflect some of the aspects that 
require the completion of the risk management techniques based on a discriminant 
analysis with other possibilities. 
7. Conclusions 
The manifestation of risks in a higher or lower degree cannot be eliminated, regardless of 
the strategy used. However, in practice it has been shown that a potential risk with higher 
negative impact but which has been identified and controlled can cause fewer losses than a 
lower but uncontrolled risk. Therefore, a good manager should use a risk management 
strategy in order to enable the reduction or even avoidance of losses caused by their 
manifestation. A proactive risk management can generate durable benefits for the company, 
materialized wither in costs reduction or in improving or making internal processes 
efficient, or in canceling insurances expenses, which are not justified from economic point of 
view. 
The problems presented in this work are due to identify the issues that highlight the 
importance of active risk management, to optimize the ratio of the risk level –the level of the 
profitability achieved, the need to monitor and update the information on risk and the 
possibility of realization, the role of risk management in identifying the opportunities of the 
business determines the highest level of profitability in accordance with the accepted risk 
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level and the amount of available resources, the proactive risk management capacity 
generates sustainable benefits for the company, resulting either in reducing the costs or to 
improve and streamline of the internal processes or the elimination of the insurance costs, 
economically unjustified, the need of training the decider as a person capable to take the 
increased costs due to the running of a business, whether to obtain a corresponding 
reduction in risk and thus of the losses that would be determined by their expression ; the 
attraction of the approach risk management to empiricism in the application of techniques 
with clear and measurable objectives. 
The application of techniques and methods of risk management must be a starting point for 
substantiating and applying the company's financial strategy. The course of action must be 
related to identifying the elements that may cause the manifestation of risks, sizing the 
probability of their manifestation, forecasting channels of influence and establishing means 
of protection. 
It is not advisable to use only statistical models to determine the financial status (statistics 
entails the use of previously recorded data, and the maintaining of a constant level of 
indicators calculated on their basis is unlikely in an environment subjected continuously to 
profound transformations at short time intervals) but is required their completion with 
analysis reported to financial equilibrium, level of profitability, the ability to pay, the 
changes in the financial flows so as to enable an evaluation of the global risk and to apply an 
optimal management of it. 
Taking into consideration the issues presented in the paper it resulted: the importance of 
active risk management, to optimize the degree of risk assumed - the level of profitability 
achieved; the need to monitor and update the information on risk and the possibility of 
realization; the role of risk management in identifying business opportunities that lead to 
the highest level of return, consistent with accepted risk level and the amount of available 
resources; the capacity of proactive risk management to generate sustainable business 
benefits, materialized either by cost reduction or improvement and streamline of internal 
processes or the elimination of expenses with insurances, economically unjustified; the 
necessity to train the decision maker as a person able to undertake increasing the costs of 
running a business, whether obtaining a corresponding reduction in risk and thus of the 
losses that would be determined by their expression; attracting risk management from the 
area of the empiricism into that of a clear approach and the application of techniques with 
clear measurable objectives. 
Author details 
Gabriela Dobrotă  
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration,  
Constantin Brâncuşi University of Târgu Jiu, Târgu Jiu,  
Romania 
 
Risk Management in Business – The Foundation of Performance in Economic Organizations 251 
8. References 
[1] Stancu I (2002) Finance. Bucharest: Economic. 867-868 p. 
[2] Dobrotă G, Paliu Popa L, Babucea A.G, (2010) Risk management at the  
level of Economic Agents, whitin the context of Sustainable Development,  
Recent advances in risk Management, Assessment and mitigation, In Proceedings  
of the International Conference, RIMA’10. Bucharest: WSEAS Press. pp 380- 
386. 
[3] Andronic C.B (2000) Firm performance. Iași: Polirom. 157 p 
[4] Giarini O, Stahel W.R (1966) Certainty limits. Bucharest: Edimpresss- Caruso.  
255 p. 
[5] Hofstede G (1996) The management of the multicultural structures. Bucharest: 
Economic.136 p 
[6] Sonigo P (1994 ) Risk management. Risques: 17: 131-136 
[7] Williamson E.O, Winter G.S (1997) The nature's company Timișoara: Sedona.  
191 p. 
[8] Cocriș V, Ișfan V (1997) The economics of business. Iași: Graphix.118 p. 
[9] Dobrotă G (2009) Financial management of the company. Theory and applications. 
Craiova: Scrisul Românesc. 111 p. 
[10] Baicu M (2010) Risk Management in Business Bucharest: Foundation România de 
Mâine. 178 p. 
[11] Prunea P (2003) The risk in economic activity. Hypostasis. Factors. Modalities to reduce 
Bucharest. Economic. 110 p. 
[12] Dobrotă G, Chirculescu F (2008) The economic and financial performance of the 
enterprises. Annals of the Constantin Brâncuși University of Târgu Jiu, Economiy 
series.2: 93-102. 
[13] Avare Ph, Legros G, Ravary L, Lemonnier P (2006) Management and Financial Analysis 
Bucharest: Economic. 24 p. 
[14] Anghel I (2002) The bankruptcy. Radiography and prediction. Bucharest: Economic. 61 
p. 
[15] Altman E.I. (1968) Financial ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the predictin of corporate 
Bankrupcy. Journal of Finance. 23(4): 589-609. 
[16] Stancu I (2007) Finance. Bucharest: Economic. 787 p. 
[17] Conan, Holder, (1979) Variables explicatives de performances et controle de gestion 
dans les P.M.I., Universite Paris Dauphine. 
[18] Mânecuţă C, Nicolae M, (1996) Building and Using score function for the  
diagnosing the efficiency of economic agents. Finance, Credit and Accounting. 5,  
47-54. 
[19] Băileşteanu Gh, (1998) Diagnosis, risk and efficiency in business Timișoara: Mirton. 294 
p. 
 
Risk Management – Current Issues and Challenges 252 
[20] Ivoniciu P (1998) The analysis of bankruptcy risk by the method scores. Finance, Credit 
and Accounting. 4: 17-19.  
Chapter 12 
 
 
 
 
© 2012 Vasile and Croitoru, licensee InTech. This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of 
the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits 
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. 
Integrated Risk Management System –  
Key Factor of the Management System of  
the Organization 
Emilia Vasile and Ion Croitoru 
Additional information is available at the end of the chapter 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/47883 
„Life itself is a risk” 
1. Introduction 
The management of any organization, whether working in the public sector, whether 
working in the private sector, aims in order to achieve its objectives to monitor and reduce 
risks. Risk control is achieved by managing them effectively, namely by implementing an 
adequate risk management system. 
Risk management is an important concept related to safety and financial integrity of an 
organization, and risk assessment is an important part of its strategic development. 
The strategy of an organization on risk management should be that all the risks it faces must 
be identified, assessed, monitored and managed so that they are maintained in a certain 
limit, accepted by the entity’s management. 
2. Risk management – Defining function within the organization  
Risk management is the process of identifying, analyzing and responding to the risks the 
organization faces and is exposed to. The costs of implementing this system depend on the 
methods used to manage unexpected events. 
Risk management process is an ongoing one and the results are embodied in the decisions 
taken on accepting, reducing or eliminating risks that affect the achievement of objectives. 
The aim is to optimize the organization’s exposure to risk in order to prevent losses, avoid 
threats and exploit opportunities. 
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2.1. Conceptual approaches for risk 
In general terms, risk is part of any human effort. Once we leave to go back home, we are 
exposed to risks of different levels and degrees. It is significant that some new risks are 
completely voluntary, and some are created by us through the nature of activities. 
The word “risk” derives from the Italian word „risicare”, which means “to dare”. In this 
sense, the risk is a choice, not fate1. From this definition it follows that the risk is not an option, 
but we are permanently exposed to risk in everyday life, what is really important is that 
each time, to gain control over it. 
Nowadays there is no unanimously accepted definition of the concept of risk by all 
specialists in the field. Among the most commonly used definitions, we present the 
following: 
“Risk is the possibility of obtaining favorable or unfavorable results in a future action expressed
in terms of probabilities.” 
or 
“Risk is a possible future event whose production could cause some losses.” 
or 
"Risk is the threat that an event or action to affect in a negatve manner the capacity of an
organization to achieve its planned goals.2 " 
The analysis of these definitions of risk gives rise to the following conclusions: 
a. Probability versus consequences. While some definitions given to risk focus only on the 
probability of the occurrence of an event, other definitions are more comprehensive, 
including both the probability of risk manifestation and the consequences of the event. 
b. Risk and threat. In defining the concept, some experts have put an equal sign between 
risk and threat. We specify that a threat is an event with a low probability of 
manifestation, but with high negative consequences, since the probability of 
manifestation is difficult to assess in these cases. A risk is an event with a higher 
probability of occurrence, for which there is sufficient information to rate the 
probability and consequences. 
c. Comparing only negative results. Some concepts about risk are focused only on 
negative events, while others take into account all variables, both threats and 
opportunities. 
d. Risk is related to profitability and loss. Achieving the expected result of an activity is 
under the influence of random factors that accompany it in all stages of its 
development, regardless of the domain of activity. 
 
Integrated Risk Management System – Key Factor of the Management System of the Organization 255 
In conclusion, the risk can be defined as a problem (situation, event etc.) which has not yet 
occurred, but can occur in the future, threatening the achievement of agreed outcomes. 
Viewed in this context, risk is the uncertainty in obtaining expected results and should be 
treated as a combination of probability and impact. 
The probability of risk occurrence is the possibility that the risk materializes and it can be 
appreciated or determined by measurement, when the nature of risk and available 
information permit such evaluation. 
The risk impact is a consequence of the results (objectives) when risk materializes. If the risk 
represents a threat, the consequence upon the results is negative and if the risk represents an 
opportunity, the consequence is positive. 
The probability of risk occurrence and its impact on the results contribute to establish the 
risk value. 
Based on concepts presented above, in our opinion, the risk is a permanent reality, an 
inherent phenomenon that accompanies all activities and actions of an organization and that 
occurs or not, depending on the conditions created for it. This could cause negative effects 
by deteriorating the quality of management decisions, reducing profit volume and affecting 
the organization’s functionality, with consequences even in blocking the implementation of 
activities. 
In the literature, but also in practice, besides the concept of risk other concepts are used, 
respectively: 
Inherent risk is the risk that exists naturally in any activity and is defined as “the risk existing 
before the implementation of internal control measures to reduce it” or “all risks that threat the 
entity/organization and may be internal or external risks, measurable or immeasurable”. 
Residual risk is the risk remaining after implementation of internal control measures. 
Applying these measures should have as effect the limitation of inherent risk to a level 
accepted by the organization. The residual risk should be monitored in order to maintain it 
at accepted levels. 
Risk appetite is the level of exposure that the organization is prepared to accept, namely the 
risk tolerated by the organization. 
Practitioners recommend to organizations’ management to bear in mind that risks can not be 
avoided and under these conditions to be concerned by their evaluation to keep them “under 
control” at levels considered acceptable, tolerated by the organization, and not to seek the total 
elimination of them, as this can lead to other unexpected and uncontrolled risks. 
2.2. Risk – Threat and opportunity  
Internal and external environment in which the organization operates generate risks. In these 
circumstances the organization should identify its weaknesses and threats it faces, in order to 
manage and minimize them. Also, strengths must capitalize and exploit opportunities. 
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In this respect, designing and implementing a risk management process at corporate level, is 
appropriate and necessary due to uncertainties of threats in achieving organizational goals. 
The implementation of this concept leads to certain changes within the organization, whose 
effects should be materialized through a better use of available funds and obtaining levels of 
profitability planned, namely: 
- risk management requires modifications in leadership style, the organization’s management 
would be forced besides the consequences treatment measures of events that occurred, 
to devise and implement adequate internal control devices to limit or eliminate the 
possibility of risks manifestation. Implementing these control devices should enable the 
organization to master, within acceptable limits, risks and to achieve the objectives. 
- risk management ensures the efficient and effective achievement of objectives, mastering threats 
the organization deals with, allows to hierarchy risks based on materialization 
probability, of impact magnitude and costs posed by mitigating or limiting unwanted 
effects. 
- risk management requires a healthy internal control system, designing and implementing 
adequate internal controls and ensuring their operation require a reasonable assurance 
that objectives will be achieved. Enhancing and strengthening the internal/management 
control system is indispensable without designing and implementing appropriate risk 
management. 
Risk management is characterized by the establishment and implementation of concrete 
activities and actions of identification and risk assessment leading to determine the risk level 
and by this act to implement adequate internal control devices to limit the probability of the 
risk occurring or the consequences if the risk materializes. The process must be coherent, 
integrated to the objectives, activities and operations carried out within the organization. 
The staff within the organization, regardless of the current hierarchical level, should be 
aware of the importance of risk management to achieve planned results and to form 
necessary skills in order to perform monitoring and control based on principles of efficiency 
and effectiveness. 
The functional structures responsibles within the organization have the task to identify and 
analyze regularly the risks related to their activities, to propose and substantiate appropriate 
measures in order to limit the possible consequences of risks and ensure approval by 
decision makers within the organization. 
Practice3 recommends that any organization needs to manage its risks, because in many 
cases the occurrence of risks can have serious consequences upon the activities, sometimes 
these consequences jeopardizing the very existence of the organization4. 
The complexity of risks and their increase has led organizations’ management to understand 
that it is better to manage a risk than to cover a loss. Based on this requirement, many 
organizations have proceeded to implement risk management, developing specific strategies 
that have defined the organization’s behavior towards risk and risk management 
arrangements. 
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2.3. The importance of risk management organization  
Risk management is a preventive attitude on the elimination or limitation of damages, if any 
possibility of a risk materializing, namely a process of identifying, analyzing and 
responding to potential risks of an organization. 
In these conditions, the role of risk management is to help understand the risks the 
organization is exposed to, so that they can be managed. This role varies depending on 
when the analysis is done, as follows: 
- if the risk assessment is conducted before the risk materialization, the goal is to avoid 
the occurrence of this event; 
- if the risk assessment is carried out after the risk has materialized, the goal is to ensure 
the development of the activities and the organization’s activities continuity. 
The advantage of implementing the risk management system within the organization is to 
ensure economic efficiency. To achieve this requirement, the organization’s management 
has the responsibility to make known the risks they face and manage them properly, in 
order to avoid consequences for their materialization. 
2.4. Responsibility for risc management 
Risk management is the responsibility of the organization’s management, and the central 
objective of this process aims the risks management so that resources to be used efficiently 
and effectively in order to maximize profit and minimize threats, while safeguarding the 
interests of employees and customers. 
In this respect, the entity’s management must act in the following directions: 
- establishing the definition of risk that is widely accepted and understood across the 
organization and also the types of risk; 
- assessing current risks and monitoring potential sources of internal and external risks; 
- establishing clear responsibilities on each hierarchical level and per employee 
concerning the implementation of risk management process; 
- developing an adequate information system for the management on risks and risk 
assessment system; 
- setting tolerance in taking risks and limits of exposure in accordance with it; 
- permanent analysis of achievements and poor results in risk management and 
continuous improvement of risk management process; 
- ensuring an adequate level of knowledge and skills of employees in accordance with 
the requirements followed by the implementation of the risk management process. 
To ensure an efficient risk management is necessary to create certain organizational 
structures appropriate for the policies and strategies of the organization. In this respect, the 
organization should adopt appropriate policies regarding the organization plan, in order to 
effectively monitor each risk or category of risk and in an integrated manner, the whole risks 
system accompanying activities. 
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Policies and strategies that may be adopted regarding the organization plan are related to: 
- establishing and developing its own system of rules and procedures that, implemented, 
to ensure avoiding or minimizing risks; 
- establishing appropriate functional structure based on a clear concept, which should 
ensure appropriate departments in order to contribute at identifying and monitoring 
risks. 
Given that risk can be identified, evaluated and limited, but never completely eliminated, 
the organization must develop both general policies and specific policies to limit exposure. 
2.5. Effectiveness of risk management 
The activity of an organization is characterized by all processes, procedures, inputs, outputs, 
resources (financial, material, human and informational) and technical means for recording, 
processing, transmitting and storing data and information on activities and environment 
where the system is operating. 
By internal/management control programs prepared each functional structure should 
identify the risks they face, and by using procedures and risk management policies to 
ensure their maintenance at acceptable levels. 
Risk management is an ongoing, structured process, that allows identifying and assessing 
risks and reporting on opportunities and threats affecting the achievement of its objectives. 
The benefits of implementing the risk management process include: 
- higher probability of achieving the entity’s goals; 
- improving the understanding of risks and their implications; 
- increased attention to major issues; 
- limitation to the consequences by implementing adequate internal controls; 
- assuming a certain tolerance to risk is acceptable; 
- broader information for adequate decision making in terms of risks. 
The organization’s management and staff perform risk management activities in order to 
identify, assess, manage and control all types of events or situations that may affect its 
activities. 
In the world today has become increasingly more imperative for corporate managers to 
monitor and manage risk5 in all aspects. A good risk management means avoiding or 
minimizing loss, and also treating opportunities in a favorable manner. 
Risk management is necessary because organizations face uncertainty and the biggest 
challenge of the leadership is to determine what level of risk it is prepared to accept to 
achieve its mission, in order to add value to activities and to achieve planned goals. 
Risk management is an essential component of the organization’s success and must become 
an intrinsic part of its functioning. It must be closely related to corporate governance and 
internal control, but also connected with performance management6. 
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3. Integrated approach to risk 
Integrated risk management process is designed and set by the management and 
implemented by the whole staff within the organization. This process is not linear, a risk 
management may have impact also on other risks, and control devices identified as being 
effective in limiting a risk and keeping it within acceptable limits, may prove beneficial in 
controlling other risks. 
Risk management currently knows an appreciation and recognition increasingly large, both 
in theory and practice, which means, on the one hand the increase of number of specialists 
in the field, and on the other hand the interest of managers within organizations to design 
and implement effective risk management systems to meet the objectives. 
Mastering risk determines organizational development, performance growth, both 
generally, of the whole organization and also of individual activities. 
3.1. COSO and integrated risk management  
Referring to risk management, COSO presented an initial framework methodology for 
implementing internal controls, built-in policies, rules, procedures and regulations that have 
been used by various organizations to secure control over how to run the plan and meet 
objectives. 
Later, after the appearance of great scandals of fraud and the need to improve corporate 
governance processes, large corporations talked about and set up risk management 
departments to help implement procedures regarding the identification, assessment and risk 
control. 
Following the emergence of these needs, Treadway Commission, COSO model promoter, 
initiated a program in order to develop a general methodology that can be used by 
organizations’ management to improve risk management. 
Risk management within the organizations was created on the concept of internal controls, 
but the focus was particularly on risk management. This was not intended to replace 
internal controls, but incorporating basic concepts of internal control in this process. 
Thus, between risk management and internal control was preserved a strong connection 
interrelated with common concepts and elements. 
3.1.1. Risk management and internal control 
The main objectives of internal control/management system are to ensure the efficiency and 
effectiveness of activities, the reality of reporting and regulations compliance in the field. The 
internal control/management system is developed and monitored in order to implement by 
the organization’s management, which is responsible for designing adequate internal 
control devices in order to ensure limitation of significant risks and keeping them within 
acceptable limits, aiming to give the security that the organization’s objectives will be met. 
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Risk management system was structured on components of internal control/management, 
structured according to COSO model, namely on five elements, whose implementation 
ensures that the tools/internal control devices exist and function as intended. 
These components were defined as: 
- the control environment specific to the organization is the one that sets the foundations of 
internal controls system, influencing the control awareness of employees and represents 
the basis for other components; 
- risk assessment is carried out by management, is performed at both corporate and activity 
level and includes identifying and analyzing risks that affect the achievement of 
objectives. In general, risk assessment involves determining the level of importance of the 
risk, assessing the probability that the risk to occur and determining the way to manage it; 
- control activities are policies and procedures to ensure that management’s provisions are 
respected. By this, it is ensured that all necessary measures are taken in order to manage 
risks and achieve the objectives set by management; 
- information and communication helps other components through proper communication 
to employees of their responsibilities with regard to internal control and provision of 
relevant, reliable, comparable and understandable information so that they could 
perform their duties and tasks; 
- monitoring implies the verification made by the management of the implementation 
means of internal controls it demanded, or by responsibles pursuing if internal controls 
imposed by it work and if they are sufficient so that activities or actions to take place as 
planned. 
3.1.2. Objective of risk management system 
COSO defines integrated risk management as “the process conducted by the Board, management 
and others, applied in setting strategy and across the organization, designed to identify potential 
events that may affect the entity and to manage risk within the risk appetite to provide a reasonable 
assurance regarding the achievement of organizational objectives”7. 
From the content of this definition it follows some essential elements, characteristic to the 
integrated risk management, as follows: 
- the process is conducted permanently throughout the organization, being 
circumscribed to other activities;  
- the purpose is to manage risks associated with objectives and to secure expected results 
through their implementation; 
- within the process is involved the whole staff, regardless of the hierarchical level; 
- the approach starts from the strategic goals rather than from operational objectives; 
- the process is applied to the entire organization and not functional structures. 
The general objective of integrated risk management is to effectively manage uncertainties, risks and 
opportunities. The need for risk management stems from the fact that uncertainty is a reality 
and the reaction to uncertainty is a constant concern. 
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Risk management involves establishing actions to respond to risk and to implement 
adequate internal control devices, with which to limit the possibility of occurrence or 
consequences of risk, if it would materialize. In order to ensure efficiency in achieving 
objectives, the process must be coherent and convergent, integrated to objectives, activities 
and operations carried out within the organization. 
Also, regardless of the staff’s hierarchical level, it should be aware of the importance of risk 
management has in achieving its own objectives and thus to form the necessary skills to 
perform monitoring and control based on principles of efficiency and effectiveness. 
In order to ensure the success of this approach and to achieve an effective risk management, 
within the organization it needs to create a culture of risk, namely developing a risk 
management philosophy specific to the organization and management, and awareness of 
risk’s negative effects at all levels of the organization. 
From the above it is found that the need for internal control/management is determined by 
the existence of threats or opportunities in carrying out planned activities or actions with 
negative consequences in the organization. This requires the establishment and 
implementation of certain internal control devices in order to prevent or limit the risks. 
Also, the need for risk management stems from the fact that risk is everywhere, in 
everything we want to achieve. It can not be removed; any action to eliminate risk can lead 
to the emergence of new risks, uncontrolled, which may affect to much greater extent the 
organization. In these conditions, the risk needs to be minimized, process that can be 
achieved by establishing and implementing adequate internal controls. 
3.2. The role of integrated risk management system 
Risk management process is considered to be a set of activities and actions carried out in a 
certain manner and order to prevent or reduce exposure to risk, resulting from an operation 
or several operations. 
In practice, most commonly applied concept of risk management is that managing risks 
should be carried out separately within departments independently organized in the 
organization’s functional structure. This method provides simplicity and efficiency form in 
making decisions on risk management, but leads to actions and multiple records of the same 
exposure to risk and does not address correlations between different exposures. 
There are other practices too, which considers that each employee must be responsible for 
the risk management, having the competence to identify risks and implement appropriate 
internal controls to mitigate the probability of their manifestations. This mean of managing 
risks does not lead to results and does not ensure the guarantee of conducting activities 
given that they were planned, because it does not ensure the requirements for exposure on 
the same activities, and the process is influenced by knowledge and understanding by 
employees of the risk management system implemented within the organization. 
These traditional risk management processes are usually fragmented, meaning they are 
found implemented at the operation or transaction level and are aimed at preventing losses. 
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Managing risks in these cases “does not consider the fact that risks are a source of competitive 
advantage”. 
Recent research on models and risk management strategies focus on competitive advantages 
of risks if they are approached as a whole or at system level. In this case the system is 
considered to be composed of all processes and activities necessary to achieve the objectives. 
This approach requires that all relevant functions within the organization (personnel, finance 
and accounting, manufacturing, commercial, procurement, IT, legal, internal control, internal 
audit, strategic development, marketing etc.) to participate in risk management process. 
For implementing the integrated risk management is necessary that the organization to be 
viewed from the standpoint of system, both as the link of the industry in which it operates 
and as part of it, acting in accordance with certain principles, features being: the complexity, 
limitation of resources, factors that influence its activity, the nature of events, the 
possibilities for development. 
In this view, it is considered that the risks should be managed in an integrated way, to 
eliminate multiple records on the same risk exposure and to analyze correlations between 
different exposures. This risk management approach is complex; it requires a large volume 
of information necessary for decision making and higher costs of administration. At the 
same time, making wrong decision can have a high impact on the business, or even on the 
organization. 
The integrated risk management system, based on this concept, must be interdependent 
with the organization’s development needs and to include the processes of development 
and establishment of elements concerning assessment, monitoring and risk management. At 
the same time, integrated risk management must be also approached in correlation with all 
types of risk management for each functional structure of the organization. 
Integrated risk management system operates with broad categories of risk (personnel risk, 
financial risk, legal risk etc.), with different risks attached to various activities, risks 
associated with different operations or transactions, and also with external risks that may 
affect the development of the overall organization (risks related to legislative changes) or 
making one or more activities carried out within the organization. 
In these conditions, implementing the concept of integrated risk management within the 
organization is more than necessary because the risk management process should be 
approached by all types of risk that are found and affect all functional structures of the 
organization. 
The approach in this unitary manner, of the exposures, respectively as a righteous and 
coherent system of exposure to various risks, of connections and mutual conditioning between 
them, will enable effective management of risks that may affect achieving the objectives and 
will contribute to improve activities and performance growth within the organization. 
The integrated risk management system can identify all risks that affect the implementation 
of processes and activities attached to an organizational goal; it can assess the overall 
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consequences and adopt measures depending on the level of uncertainty and the existing 
inherent risk that affects achieving objectives set. 
Also, integrated risk management allows the foundation and decision making to lower 
hierarchical levels of the organization and also at the top level and ensures co-ordination of 
activities in order to solve current problems between certain functional structures. It helps to 
increase efficiency within the organization also by others administrative or managerial 
ways, such as better allocation of resources. 
The implementation of integrated risk management within the organization will provide to 
shareholders and potential investors, more concrete and reliable information on the risks to 
which it is exposed, which will allow them to base their decisions in more optimal conditions. 
Once with the development of organization’s activities, the old risk management systems 
become inadequate and risk exposures, especially the risk of fraud and error increases 
significantly. Implementing the integrated risk management system involves the design of 
evaluation criteria capable of measuring all activities related risks, by considering the 
relationships and connections between them and thus, to determine the exposure to any 
organization’s risk factor or its functional structures at any time. 
This risk management process, characterized by the development of integrated risk 
management methodology, shall include as steps: establishing the organizational context 
and risk management, identifying, analyzing and assessing risk, risk treatment, risk control, 
communication and monitoring the risk management plan. 
The process should not be a linear, the risk management may impact on other risks, and 
measures identified as being effective in limiting a risk and keeping it within acceptable 
limits may prove beneficial in controlling other risks. 
3.3. Integrated risk management system functions 
The effectiveness of implementing an integrated risk management system, compared with 
traditional risk management, is determined by the fact that it reflects the integration of all 
activities related to risk and risk management in a single system. This system is operated 
and controlled from a single management level, thus eliminating duplication and disruption 
of communication and action that can occur within a classical system. 
The functions that the integrated risk management system meet within the organization’s 
management system can be classified as follows: 
a. defining goals and setting objectives of the organization on risk. Setting goals represents a 
defining requirement for the identification, assessment and risk response planning. The 
organization must define properly its objectives, so to be understood and carried out by 
people who were assigned to. 
The basic role of integrated risk management is to provide to the management and 
organization’s board a reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives. In this 
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respect, COSO8 states that in order to identify associated risks it should be established in 
advance the organization’s objectives, which shall be grouped into four categories as follows: 
- strategic objectives, that define the mission and long term development directions; 
- operational objectives, that refers to the effective and efficient use of available resources; 
- reporting objectives, that refers to reporting reality; 
- objectives of compliance, that refers to comply with the regulations, standards, rules or 
regulations applicable to the organization. 
In order to define the objectives, the key is that, first, to define strategic objectives, and then, 
of these, to derive other types of goals: operational, reporting and compliance. 
Also, for each goal it is necessary to establish risk tolerance, accepted materiality concerning 
the degree of achievement of identified indicators attached to the objectives in order to be 
considered achieved. 
b. determining courses of action to manage risk. To achieve risk management within the 
organization, the lines of action of the integrated risk management are: 
- defining the organization’s strategy on risk; 
- setting activities to be achieved if the risk occurs; 
- evaluating results and measuring performances; 
- risk monitoring at corporate level; 
- reviewing corporate strategy on risk. 
The strategy on risk must be coherent, contain how to recover losses caused by an adverse 
event and to integrate risk response measures. 
Activities to be carried out if the risk materializes deal with the settlement of measures to 
address the consequences of risk, recover losses and identifying and implementing 
appropriate control devices to eliminate the causes that led to the risk occurrence. 
To apply vigorously decisions taken in order to ensure effective functioning of integrated 
risk management will ensure continued operations and obtaining the expected results. 
Monitoring risk at corporate level refers to observing the functioning of integrated risk 
management system, identifying and reporting existant weaknesses to adopt necessary 
remedial measures. 
Updating the strategy on risk is necessary to be made whenever the organization changes its 
development strategy or strategic objectives, and also when management’s risk policy 
changes. 
Also, periodic review of risks involves the redistribution and concentration of resources in 
areas of interest. 
c. determining relations between integrated risk management system and other subsystems of the 
organization. The organization’s management must permanently ensure the 
interdependence between the objectives of the organization, its functional departments 
and risk management. 
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Risk management process aims to identify and assess risks that can affect the objectives’ 
achievement and to establish risk response measures. It should “become part of the 
organization’s functioning as the base of management approaches9”. 
Considering that the objectives concern all levels of the organization, strategic, general and 
operational, being defined at strategy level, functional departments and even individual 
level, in a post, it is required that risk management to be aware of all the relationships that 
occur or develops between them or within them. 
The incomplete determination of the relationship between risk management system and 
other subsystems of the organization, will lead to an inadequate identification and 
management of risks associated to the objectives with major negative consequences on the 
organization. 
d. setting activities, responsibilities on risk. Seeks to identify all activities in progress within 
integrated risk management process and establish responsibilities for implementing 
each activity. Since the process involves all functions and functional departments of the 
organization, it is required that the activities and responsibilities on risks, defined and 
agreed at their level, to be communicated to employees involved in carrying out the 
activities. 
e. defining performance indicators. For each strategic objective, operational, reporting or of 
compliance defined at corporate level, must establish performance indicators by which 
to ensure measurement of the degree of achieving goals. Also, setting goals to achieve 
within each indicator, will allow establishing performance resulting from the risk 
measures imposed within each goal. 
f. allocating resources necessary to carry out activities and training the staff involved. For each 
activity planned to be conducted, it must be identified the necessary resources for their 
achievement, respectively financial, human, material and information resources. 
Resources necessary in order to accomplish the activities must be available and 
approved in budgets. 
g. communication and consultation on the results, performance evaluation related to risk 
compared to objectives planned. Communication involves on time and clear transmission 
of necessary information about risk, as follows: 
- the responsibles for risk management communicate information about the process 
content and also on management decisions relating to any measure on risk; 
- the responsibles for risk of functional structures communicate information on risks 
associated to objectives established, and on how risks are managed. 
- the entire staff reports information on identified risks and whose management needs to 
be achieved. 
The consultation on the results aims to provide information on risk exposure, after their 
evaluation and the implementation of control measures. The role is to establish the 
effectiveness of control measures applied. 
Performance evaluation of risk aims to determine performance obtained due to the risk 
response compared to the costs involved for implementing control measures taken to reduce 
risk and maintain its level within the risk appetite. 
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h. monitoring effects and reviewing formulated strategy. It involves evaluating the efficiency 
and effectiveness of risk management process within the organization and conducted 
according to the results obtained to carry out the appropriate review of the risk 
strategy, in order to ensure the minimization of adverse events and appropriate 
integration of measures to respond to risk.  
In our opinion, we believe that the implementation and operation of an integrated risk 
management is neccesary, it can be done through ongoing monitoring of risk and 
integration risk response measures, based on risk strategies, which ensure the objectives 
achievement and deliver the expected results, in case of an event causing loss. 
The firm implementation of decision taken, as the effect of the effective operation of 
integrated risk management system, gives premises for further activities and obtaining 
performance across the organization. 
Knowing threats that affect the achievement of the goals will allow their classification 
according to the level of materialization, the extent of impact on the objectives and costs 
involved for the measures necessary in order to minimize risk effects. Establishing a 
hierarchy of threats will lead to establish an order of priorities in resource allocation. 
4. Integrating risk management into the management sistem 
The conception, implementation and operation of an integrated risk management system 
must ensure ongoing monitoring of risk and the integration of the risk response measures in 
a coherent risk strategy. 
Risk strategy should contain clear objectives on risk policy promoted and applied within the 
organization, to define exposure levels and response to risk in all circumstances where it is 
analyzed and evaluated. Also it should be set the terms and conditions for recovery of losses 
whenever the risk is manifested and had or will have financial consequences. 
4.1. Integrated risk management system - Part of the organization’s management 
system 
Implementing an integrated risk management within the organization will allow the 
organization’s management to focus its resources on those risks that affect the objectives 
achievement, in order to protect assets, ensure continuity of organization’s activities and 
adopting the effective decisions. 
Risk management function must be a defining function within the organization and provide 
a complete and coherent set of activities and actions that define decision-making of the 
organization if the risk materializes and to guide staff in risk management. 
An effectively integrated risk management system must ensure the recovery of the 
organization in case of interruption in activity, by maintaining its essential functions, at least 
of minimal levels from event appearance until its remediation. 
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The decisive part in the functioning of an integrated risk management system is the 
plannification in order to ensure business continuity, because it contains measures of 
recovery for activities under risk event. 
The approach, implementation and functioning of an integrated risk management system in 
the organization is achieved depending on the processes undertaken, the organization 
situation and leadership style. However, to ensure process efficiency it needs to be taken 
into account primarily the following: 
- COSO10 principles on the integrated risk management, whose compliance involves 
designing and implementing an efficient risk management, which contributes to further 
objectives and efficient use of resources; 
- risk approach within the integrated risk management, starting from strategic risks and 
then the operational, reporting and of compliance; 
- analysis and risk assessment must be done in terms of relevant factors, materiality, 
impact, probability; 
- preparing reports on risk management, having practical value that can be used by 
management in making decisions. 
The role of integrated risk management system is to ensure the implementation of risk 
management function within the organization’s management system. Its functions are 
activated while the organization’s management system signals the existence of threat in 
achieving its objectives and deliver the expected results because of their activities. 
 
Figure 1. The management system of an organization 
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From the scheme presented above it can be seen that developing and implementing an 
integrated risk management enables entity’s management to focus efforts on the risks 
affecting the achievement of the objectives. 
Also, the integrated risk management system reflects the integration of all activities and 
actions related to risk and risk management in a single system so that it can act upon them 
at one level. By it, the parallelism and dysfunction of action and communication are 
eliminated, occuring within organized systems operating independently of each other. 
Implementing an integrated risk management system within the organization leads to the 
following: 
- strategic risk analysis, operational, reporting and of compliance that may affect the 
achievement of organizational objectives; 
- definition and prioritization, according to risk level and costs required, of control 
devices required to eliminate the consequences if the risk has manifested or to limit the 
risk, if it constitutes a threat to the organization; 
- identification and evaluation of internal controls related to activities and actions 
attached to the objectives, both in terms of their existence and of those expected to exist 
and the establishment of areas or zones that require implementing control measures, so 
that targets set to objectives to be achieved within conditions planned; 
- designing and implementing certain internal control measures to improve activities; 
- providing conditions for the organization to comply in different situations; 
- establishing data and critical information concerning the environment of the 
organization, that may be used in the analysis and decision-making strategy. 
Exercising risk management function, as defining function within an organization, involves 
making through integrated risk management system a coherent set of processes, activities 
and operations, by which it is ensured an effective risk management and defined the 
decision-making process if risk occurs. 
However, depending on the types of risks identified, on the response to risk determined 
according to risk appetite, on the costs involved and the levels at which risks may be 
maintained after their treatment, integrated risk management system can guide 
organization to improve work according to the benefits of good risk management. 
4.2. Assessing and measuring risks – Component of integrated risk management 
system 
In the integrated risk management process, the component on risk assessment is a major 
step aiming to: 
- identify significant risks within the organization, associated to objectives; 
- assess the capacity of the internal control/management system to prevent/manage risk 
effectively; 
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- determinate significant risks and uncontrolled adequately by the organization and that 
are going to be treated to reduce exposure levels; 
Risk assessment depends on the probability of occurrence and severity of the consequences 
if the risk materializes, meaning the impact of risk and uses as tools the risk assessment 
criteria. These criteria should cover the purpose, in which risk was identified, in terms of 
compliance and performance. 
By prioritizing are selected medium and large risks on which will conclude responses to the 
risk. 
The risk assessment process includes the assessment of inherent risks existing before the 
implementation of control measures and residual risks, resulted after implementing control 
measures and have two phases, namely: 
a. Assessing probability is a qualitative element and is carried out by evaluating the 
potential for risk occurrence, by considering qualitative factors specific to the context in 
which goals are defined and achieved. This can be expressed on a scale of values on 
three levels as follows: low probability, medium probability and high probability. Illustration: 
 
PROBABILITY If
LOW 
 
Rare modifications in the regulatory framework, over 3 years 
Less complexity of activities and actions 
Experienced staff 
Objectives and targets are not changed 
Reliable, adequate and updated information 
Processes well designed, formal and conducted 
MEDIUM
 
Legal framework is relatively new or experienced significant 
changes 
Average complexity of activities and actions 
Average level of employment and experience of staff 
Rare changes of objectives and targets 
Existing information from many sources, but insufficient 
Processes related to practice
HIGH 
 
Very frequent modifications in the regulatory framework 
High complexity of activities and actions 
Inexperienced staff and newly employed 
Frequent changes of objectives and targets 
Poorly designed processes and lead 
Insufficient and outdated information
 
b. Assessing impact is a quantitative element and is carried out by evaluating the effects of 
risk if it would materialize, by considering quantitative factors specific to the financial 
nature of the context of achieving objectives. This can be expressed on a scale of values 
on three levels as follows: low impact, moderate impact and high impact. Illustration: 
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IMPACT If
LOW 
 
Low cost of implementation of activities/actions, under planning 
No losses of financial assets, employees nor materials 
Good image of the organization 
Competencies and responsibilities provided in decision making 
Good quality services 
Continuity of activities is ensured
MODERATE 
 
Costs of implementing the activities/actions equal to planning 
Reduced losses of financial assets, employees and materials 
Moderate image of the organization 
Decisions made without assuming responsibilities 
Moderate quality of services provided 
Very rare interruptions in activity
HIGH 
 
High costs in relation to implementation planning of activities/actions 
Poor image of the organization 
Decision making without ensuring the competence and responsibilities 
Poor quality services provided 
Significant break in activity
 
Risk analysis criteria are represented by the probability assessment of risk occurrence and 
the impact level assessment if the risk would materialize, as follows: 
- the probability assessment is made based on the analysis and evaluation of quality 
factors specific to the context in which objectives are defined and met; 
- assessing the level of impact is made based on the analysis and evaluation of quantity 
factors specific to financial nature of the context of achieving objectives. 
 
Figure 2. The level of risk depending on the probability and impact 
Establishing the response to risk and pursuing if it falls into the risk appetite, agreed by the 
organization’s management, is carried out by multiplying probability and risk impact, 
obtained from the formula: 
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PT= P x I , 
where:  PT = total risk score 
 P = probability  
 I = impact 
Depending on the outcome of the risk measurement process, applied to all risks the 
organization faces and that affects achieving objectives employment shall be: high risk, 
medium risk and low risk as follows: 
- for PT = 1 or 2, low risk 
- for PT = 3 or 4, medium risk 
- for PT = 6 or 9, high risk 
c. Assessing internal control 
To assess the internal control are considered the risks associated with the objectives the 
organization faces and that were measured. 
Internal control assessment process involves the identification and analysis of internal 
controls expected and existing, implemented by the entity to manage risks and aims to 
establish areas where it does not work or work improperly. This can be expressed on a scale 
of three levels as follows: compliant internal control, internal control partially compliant and 
non-compliant internal control. Illustration: 
 
INTERNAL 
CONTROL 
If
COMPLIANT Implemented internal control system, prevent risk materializing. 
Regulatory framework of risk management and internal control known. 
Positive attitude towards internal control/management and risks. 
Internal control/management integrated into organization’s activities and 
actions. 
Risk management ensures identification of significant risks, their 
assessment, establishing risk management measures and monitoring their 
effectiveness. 
Systematic reporting on activities development. 
Objectives met and appropriate remedies for violations. 
PARTIALLY 
COMPLIANT 
Internal control system is implemented, but does not prevent risk 
materializing. 
Neutral attitude towards internal control/management and risks. 
Internal control/management is partially integrated into the organization’s 
activities and actions. 
Risk management process ensures the identification of risks, their 
assessment, but risk management measures are not always adequate and 
effective. 
Systematic reporting on activities development, but states objectives met. 
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NON-
COMPLIANT 
Internal control system not implemented. 
Regulatory framework of internal control/management is not known. 
Uncooperative or indifferent attitude towards internal 
control/management. 
Internal control/management perceived as a separate activity, conducted in 
parallel with the activities of the entity. 
Risk management does not provide identification of significant risks. 
Systematic reporting on activities development, but information is not 
reliable.  
Risk response involves establishing and implementing possible actions, selecting those 
appropriate to the risk appetite and the costs required to implement risk management 
measures, by considering the following: 
- for objectives whose risks were classified as low risk and for which internal controls 
have been assessed as compliant, the risk is residual, so the organization’s exposure is 
below the accepted level. In these cases, the organization accepts the risk as such, 
without interfering for its treatment, but will provide ongoing permanent monitoring to 
ensure that the exposure level does not change. 
- for objectives whose risks were classified as medium risk or high risk and for which 
internal controls have been assessed as partially compliant or non-compliant, the risk is 
inherent, so organization’s exposure is above the accepted level. In these cases, the 
organization will proceed to treat, avoid or transfer risks. 
5. The structure of integrated risk management 
Achievement of the objectives of integrated risk management within an organization 
presupposes the meeting, in a logical sequence, of specific and required activities, as 
follows: setting the context, setting the objectives, risk identification, risk assessment, setting 
a risk response, implementation of control measures, information and communication and 
monitoring. 
5.1. Integrated risk management process 
Integrated risk management is structured on component elements of the COSO model, 
indicating that the control environment is defined by the internal environment and risk 
assessment consists of setting goals, identifying events, risk assessment and risk response. 
5.1.1. The internal environment 
It represents the theoretical and conceptual stage of risk management process, which 
presupposes an organizational culture on risks and knowledge of risk management 
operating concepts, and whether they are implemented and known at all levels within the 
organization. 
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This stage involves carrying out specific activities to implement risk management within the 
organization, as follows: 
- establishing an organizational context, that analysis of objectives, operating structure, 
delineation of duties and responsibilities and the main conditions in which the 
organization operates. They also set requirements for future development of the 
organization and key risk exposures, including the characteristics and consequences; 
- setting the context of risk management, the concept of the organization against the risks 
they face and the level of acceptance in relation to exposure to risk. 
In relation to the means of establishing the context of implementation of risk management it 
is established and designed risk management policy, objectives and tasks of the 
implementation of risk management methods and methodologies for the identification, 
evaluation, treatment and control risk. At the same time, it is determined the structure 
responsible for risk management, the powers and responsibilities of it, taking into account 
the fact that “management activity it means to commonly achieve the necessary objectives for the 
final of the organization11”. 
The characteristic of this work is the tone given by the organization on risk management 
and methodology they use in risk management and how are communicated the concepts of 
risk and the response of staff on risk management philosophy. 
5.1.2. Objectives establishment 
Implementing an integrated risk management system involves identifying and assessing the 
risks that are threatening to accomplishment of objectives. 
This includes risks related to activities and actions of input and risks of actual processes 
undertaken within the organization, risks that prevent achieving the intended results and 
the risks about the impact of realized activities on organizational development. 
Identification of the events that may affect achieving the expected results is only possible if 
objectives are set in advance and under each one were defined activities necessary to ensure 
their implementation which, therefore ensures, the delivery of the expected results. 
If we consider the approach according to which performance is characterized as "achieving 
organizational objectives regardless of their nature and variety” 12, we believe that goals 
should be established to represent a challenge for management and employees. 
Management by objectives has a beneficial effect for the organization, it facilitates the 
exercise of effective control over all activities, motivates employees to participate in the 
objectives and it creates a coherent organizational framework which stimulates the 
collaboration between all structures within the institution. 
The control of meeting the objectives is considered necessary for the management of the 
organization and requires each manager to have established controls for each activity and 
objective for which he has responsibility. At the same time, it must be taken into account the 
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impact of likely risks that may jeopardize the attainment of these objectives, so it is 
necessary to design and implement appropriate risk management systems. 
5.1.3. Identification of events 
To ensure achievement of activities as planned, it is necessary for the management to 
identify all events, internal and external, positively or negatively affect the objectives, and 
depending on the probability of event and type of consequences that can be produced in the 
organization they are divided into risks and opportunities. 
Risk identification, depending on the time in which the process takes place, involves the 
following stages: 
- the initial risk identification specific to newly established organizations and those who 
have not previously identified risks. 
- the permanent identification of risk is specific for those organizations that have 
implemented a risk management and necessary for assessment of risks that have not 
previously shown to change their circumstances, and the limitation of the probability to 
manifest13. 
An effective risk management involves identifying risks at any level, where there is a threat 
on the goals and taking specific measures to limit the problems caused by these risks. Risks 
can be identified and defined only in relation to those objectives that are affected by their 
materialization. 
Risk identification can be achieved in two ways: 
- self-evaluation of risks carried by each employee involved in the objectives and 
activities, regardless of where they performed tasks hierarchically, by monitoring the 
risks they face daily, 
or 
- establishing a special department within the entity, that has responsibilities regarding 
the evaluation of operations and activities within the organization and on this basis the 
identification of risks that characterize the organization's objectives and individual 
goals set for thr employees. 
Application of either of two ways to identify risks can have negative consequences for the 
entity because, first, each employee has a certain culture and training which leads to a 
different understanding of risk management, making monitoring, to identify risk differ from 
employee to employee. Also, some employees can be more involved in current tasks and 
pay less attention to their risk management. 
Second, establishing a specialized department, with responsibilities in risk identification 
ensures not always effective risk management. However, as much the staff of this 
department is prepared, it is very difficult to know in detail how to achieve the activities 
and therefore to identify all threats that may affect achievement of objectives. 
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The practical and effective risk identification is the combination of the two forms presented. 
Thus, employees from all levels of the organization have responsibility for identifying and 
reporting threats to their achievement by the specialized compartment, and it has the 
responsibility to assess each reported event and if it finds that the event reported is a risk to 
do registration, evaluation and its treatment. 
In identifying and defining risks should be considered the following rules14: 
- risk must be an uncertainty, so it must be considered whether it is a possibility or about 
an existing situation which is an existing problem and not a risk; 
- difficult issues identified should be assessed, as they can become repeat risk situations; 
- problems not occurring are not risks, this means that the organization has control over 
them, and their analysis may lead to consumption of resources; 
- problems that are guaranteed to arise are certainties and measures are to be taken as such, 
with certainty as a starting point; 
- risk should not be defined by its impact on the objectives, as the impact is the result of the risk 
materialization; 
- risks are identified by correlation with the objectives; the aim is to identify those threats that 
could lead to failure of objectives; 
- risks have a cause and effect, the effect is the consequence of the materialization, and the 
cause is a circumstance which favors the appearance of risk; 
- making the distinction between inherent and residual risk. Inherent risk is related to the 
objectives and the risk is there before intervening with internal control measures. The 
residual risk is the risk result after implementation of internal controls. Residual risk 
that results from the inherent risks cannot be controlled completely, whatever measures 
were taken, uncertainty remains. 
On identifying opportunities, they are performed by employees within the organization 
regardless of where they are, and their recovery is the responsibility of management, to be 
used to increase efficiency and effectiveness of activities. 
5.1.4. Risk assessment 
Achieving this step involves assessing the likelihood of risks materializing and the impact of 
risk when it would occur, and classification of risk on 3 levels (high, medium or low) based 
on a risk analysis matrix. 
After the risk assessment process is done, priorities are established so that high risks are 
considered by management to treatment. 
The purpose of risk assessment is to establish a hierarchy of risks within the organization 
and to establish the most appropriate ways of dealing with risk. 
Risk assessment process involves consideration of the following: 
 the probability of materialization of the risk stems from the fact that, at some point in the 
progress of activities, there may be conditions that favor the emergence of risk. In these 
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conditions, analysis of the causes which favored the emergence of risk can lead to an 
appreciation of its opportunities to materialize; 
 the impact of risk on the objectives represents the consequence of risk materialization, and 
how risk affected the achievement of the objective; 
 risk exposure represents the extent to which risk can be accepted by the organization, if it 
would materialize; 
 determination of the specific outcome, involves risk assessment after deployment of control. 
The result may be a risk exposure exceeding the limits of acceptance, which means that 
risk is inherent, which involves the review of existing internal control mechanisms, or 
exposure below the limits of acceptance, which means that the risk is residual. 
The risk assessment is performed to identify the likelihood and impact of risk and thus to 
determine how it can be managed. 
Risk assessment must be the essential component and a constant concern of management 
organization, as the people change, regulations change, the objectives are reviewed or new 
ones established. All these contribute to the continuous changing of the map risks, namely 
the emergence of new risks, modification of existing risks and the level that the organization 
accepted the risks. 
5.1.5. Reaction to risk 
Information collected following the risk assessment is processed and measures to diminish 
risk exposure identified. To limit exposure the organization should identify opportunities to 
reduce risk, the probability of the event, or if this it is not possible, to establish measures to 
eliminate risk. 
Also, the organization should develop appropriate criteria for risk management to reduce 
the likelihood of risk and risk consequences. If risks are not well managed or costs are high 
relative to benefits of the activities, the criteria should be directed to transfer the risk or 
eliminate the risk. 
The management of the organization, based on the risk assessment, will determine the 
response to risk, as follows: 
 accept the risks as they are, without mitigation measures, and without devices to establish 
and implement internal control. Acceptance or tolerance of risk as the risk response 
strategy is recommended for the risks inherent with low exposure, less than the risk 
tolerance. 
After acceptance, the risk becomes residual and will be monitored regularly, aiming as it 
does not change the level of acceptance. 
Setting the limit for the tolerance of risk is the responsibility of management and involves 
the establishment of the exposure that can be assumed, in conjunction with costs and control 
measures to be taken. If the risk exposure is a probabilistic measure on a sized scale 
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(combination of probability and impact) then the risk tolerance must respect the same 
features. 
 treat risks, and that will identify and implement appropriate control devices, to limit the 
probability of risk manifestation and keep it within acceptable limits. 
In practice, for risk treatment the following categories of controls instruments are used: 
- preventive control tools are used when it is intended for an undesirable outcome not to 
materialize or for limiting the risks that may materialize; 
- corrective control tools are used when it seeks to correct undesirable results of risk 
materialized and is a way to recoup losses; 
- direct control tools are used when seeking to ensure any particular outcome, that is when 
we intend to effect a particular risk that may materialize to be oriented towards a 
tolerable direction of the organization; 
- detective control tools are used when aimed at identifying new situations arising from the 
risk materialized. 
If the risks materialize, the cause is represented by the internal control that either has not 
been implemented or was implemented but they not functioned properly. 
 avoid risks, risks that cannot be treated, and treatment costs are higher than assumed 
results, will be eliminated or kept within reasonable limits by reducing or abolishing 
their activities. 
 transfer risks, risks that cannot be controlled will be transferred to other units or 
organizations. This option is especially beneficial for financial or economic risks. 
Transfer risk is a measure to help reduce exposure to a functional structure of the 
organization, but another functional structure or organization, which are capable or 
specialized in managing such risks, will take the risk exposure. 
Diversity of internal control is considerable for all aspects of activities and can be classified 
as: objectives, resources, information systems, organization, procedures and supervision15. 
Objectives - grouping tools/internal control devices implemented through measures aimed 
at: their clear defining, their decomposition into a pyramid up to the job, convergence, 
measurability, association of measurable outcome indicators and monitoring information 
system. 
Means - is the group of devices/tools of internal control implemented through measures of 
adequacy of resources against objectives. 
Information system – it groups devices/an internal control instrument operationalized and 
aims to achieve a complete information system and steering, reliable, comprehensive and 
appropriate. 
Organization - grouping devices/internal controls instruments resulting from application of 
measures aimed at correcting anomalies detected in the procedural and structural 
organization and that are circumstances favored for the manifestation of risk. 
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Procedures - are tools / internal control mechanisms which control the risks arising from lack 
of processes and rules to be observed while activities are taking place. 
Supervision - grouping instruments/devices of internal controls designed to control risks 
arising from abnormal exercise hierarchical control. Such internal control tools are aimed at 
the management style of the makers of different levels. 
5.1.6. Risk control 
Represents policies, procedures, controls and other management practices established by the 
organization to make a prudent management of risks, and ensure the implementation of 
activities as intended. Also, to control risks is to ensure that objectives are met and 
significant risks are properly managed. 
To prevent conflicts it is recommended to ensure independence of risk control to functional 
structures of the organization that runs the identified risk. Any measure taken to control 
risks should be placed in the famous “internal control system”, which is responsible for 
directing the implementation. 
Risk control requires that the functional structure where there is a risk, carry out continuous 
monitoring of risks and appropriate mitigation of the manifestation probability or risk 
impact. Otherwise, the risks are uncontrollable and there are no means of intervention to 
limit the probability and risk impact. 
5.1.7. Information and communication in the supervision of risk 
Activities are initiated by the management entity for transmission to employees of their 
responsibilities regarding the identification and monitoring of risks. 
At the same time for employees to ensure proper risk monitoring in accordance with the 
requirements of established risk management process within the organization, it is 
necessary for the management to provide appropriate and timely information for them to 
accomplish the tasks set. 
5.1.8. Risk monitoring and supervision 
Risk monitoring involves reviewing and monitoring whether their risk profile changes 
following the implementation of internal controls. Review processes are implemented to 
assess whether: risks persist, new risks have emerged, the impact and likelihood of risks 
have changed, internal controls are effectively put into practice or risks should be redefined. 
Risk monitoring involves tracking the knowledge of strategies applied to risk management, 
of their implementation and the evaluation of performance after implementation. Risk-
sensitive areas are monitored continuously, and the results are sent in the initial stage for 
reconsideration, identification and implementation of adequate internal control tools or 
application of other ways to reduce exposure to risk. 
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The management of risk register, which contains summary information and decisions in risk 
analysis, attests that the organization has introduced a risk management system and that it 
works. 
The process of identification, assessment and risk treatment must ensure that risk analysis is 
carried out periodically and are established mechanisms for information management on 
new or emerging risks of changes in already identified risks so that these changes to be 
addressed properly. 
Risk monitoring is necessary to monitor progress of risk profiles and to ensure that risk 
management is appropriate and is obtained by revision of the risks. 
Risk monitoring is done through internal control, which must be flexible, and develop 
appropriate control tools in areas where the risk is not sufficiently controlled or reduce those 
instruments where excessive risks are controlled. 
Risk management must consider internal control system implemented in the organization, 
and the expected internal controls and internal controls existing, and considering their 
sufficiency identifies the risks, makes them subject to the evaluation and based on results 
establishes the internal control necessary to be implemented in order to limit exposure. 
5.2. Internal and external environment and its influence over the integrated risk 
management 
The implementation of a risk management system within the organization should impose 
establishing relationships both within the organization and beyond. Also, the ones 
responsible for implementing integrated risk management have relationships with the 
entity's management and staff of the entity's functional structures. 
The management of the entity shall decide on the risk management strategy adopted in the 
organization and approve any measure relating to the risks. In this regard, is regularly 
informed of the results of risk management and carry out in order to establish ways in 
which the risk management is done. 
The ones responsible for risk management in the organization are communicating and 
realizing the risk strategy and policy promoted to all the employees, and any decision taken 
by management on risks. Receive from the structures any information on the risks, analyst, 
process, and make proposals for the management on appropriate measures to be taken 
depending on the nature of managerial implement these measures. 
Risk communication and how they are required to be managed is based starting on the 
management level to the level of execution and shall ensure that: 
- risks related strategy and all associated risks to the objectives are known by all the staff 
involved in achieving the objectives; 
- staff in the organization is aware of the risks they assume and their monitoring system. 
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The nature of relationships established in risk management process is a functional one, 
respectively; the ones responsible with the risks have the authority to charge risk of 
transmitting to the functional structures of the entity information on risk strategy and 
information related to risk management process implemented. At the same time, they 
require the information about the identification and management of risks. 
The increase of confidence in the risk management system promoted and implemented at 
the organizational level is achieved by: 
- developing a clear risk management strategy; 
- sufficient support at all levels to ensure risk management; 
- development of simple risk management systems; 
- communication with all parties involved in risk management; 
- communication and equal relations and cooperation between different functional 
structures of the organization; 
- improving the risk assessment. 
Entity’s activities are influenced by several external factors, the nature of threats that affect 
achievement. Integrated risk management system must identify the nature of the risks these 
threats, to analyze, evaluate and determine the response to risk. In some cases, establishing a 
risk response does not ensure acceptable risk appetite as risk reduction measures are 
dependent on the activities and objectives of the organization. 
To ensure acceptable levels of risk there should be a system of relationships established with 
various external factors, which, put in place, to ensure reduction of exposure. 
Building and implementing an integrated risk management system helps to direct resources 
to risk which particularly affect the activities and support the organization in achieving its 
objectives. 
6. Impact of integrated risk management on the organization  
To ensure good risk management it is important to provide assurance that each employee 
understands properly the risk management process within the organization and knows his 
role and responsibilities in this process. 
Risk management process does not require identification and elimination of negative events 
that may affect the carrying out, if the risk occurs, but also aims to analyze and evaluate risk 
and risk appetite according to design and implement control devices to limit the probability 
of risk. It provides the management with a “framework approach to effective risk management 
and its possibilities”. 
Risk management objective is to identify risks, causes that generated them and establish 
appropriate control device to reduce its level, but using the lowest cost. 
By implementing an integrated risk management system shall ensure: 
- strategy development, objective setting and risk management mechanisms considering 
the risk appetite. The organization will define its development strategy to the risks they 
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face and how to manage, taking into account the limit of the appetite to which it may be 
exposed. The objectives are dependent on the planned development requirements and 
performance levels established, but should be considered the risks to the objectives and 
the costs necessary to manage these risks. 
- development of a framework for the level of response to risk. This involves performing 
analysis and diagnostics, in order to determine the level of risk to which the 
organization can be exposed and considering the results obtained, to proceed with the 
acceptance, treatment, and avoiding or risk transfer. 
- improving the expertise to identify events that threaten the organization and 
establishing decisions with efficiency and effectiveness. Applying an integrated risk 
management process will allow evaluation of the risks, by providing a link between the 
objectives, functional departments of the organization and components of risk 
assessment. Making this process will help increase the expertise in knowing events 
facing the organization, the nature of the risks threatening the objectives and nature of 
opportunities. 
- identifying and managing risks that affect the achievement of objectives and the set 
planned results and not risks of every operation or activity achieved. Integrated risk 
management system, is not fragmented, to ensure identification and risk assessment, in 
isolation, only at the operation or action, but is a system for identifying and addressing 
risks to the target integrated. This ensures that by implementing a single control 
measures to be managed more risks. It also allows knowledge of risks affecting 
achievement, which ensures that decisions are based and to consider the risk exposures. 
- identifying opportunities following monitoring events and their capitalization with 
benefits in increasing efficiency and effectiveness of the activities. Integrated risk 
management system takes into account the analysis and evaluation, events that may 
affect achievement of objectives. These can be negative events that are risks and positive 
events that are opportunities. 
- appropriate use of capital. Knowledge of risks the organization is facing in achieving 
objectives, allowing management to guide decisions to those activities where the risks 
are well managed, thus ensuring better use of available resources. 
Integrated risk management model has some limitations due to errors, avoiding checks, and 
human judgment in making decisions that can sometimes be wrong. These limitations make 
it impossible to issue an insurance of the need to achieve objectives. 
At the same time, responsibility for designing and implementing appropriate risk 
management is the organization's management and other staff to support risk management 
philosophy and apply established rules on risk management, each in their area of 
responsibility. 
The classic risk management process, which was joined and implemented by most of 
organizations, is a fragmented on, in the sense that functional structures within an 
organization manages its own risks independently. Thus, each compartment, according to 
the procedures and methodologies developed, shall identify and manage risks associated to 
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objectives independently, without a coordinated approach and without taking into account 
the interdependencies of risk within the entity. 
7. The advantages of implementing integrated risk management 
Integrated risk management has mechanisms to help the recovery of the organization in the 
situation of work stoppage, major incident or disaster, by maintaining minimum levels of 
business critical functions. 
The main feature of integrated risk management system is that it integrates risk monitoring 
mechanisms of the functional departments of the organization and its culture, with a focus 
on the risks associated with strategic objectives. Also, the emphasis is on monitoring and 
controlling risk, and minimizing it. 
Advantages of an integrated risk management can result as follows: 
- insurance of correlation with the risk appetite of the organization strategy. Risk appetite 
is a limit to which risk can be accepted and to which the organization may be exposed. 
The management has the opportunities available to them to achieve goals and select the 
most advantageous option in conjunction with the profile of risk; 
- helping to improve decisions about risk treatment. The management options to limit 
risk, assess their correlation with risk appetite and costs and determine appropriate 
measures for risk management. 
- integrated approach of risk allows that, by establishing a single internal control 
measure to be able to handle more risk, or one risk, but which is found in several 
functional structures of the organization; 
- the capitalization of opportunities. Integrated risk management takes into consideration 
events outside the negative and positive nature of the risks, the nature of opportunities. 
- improvement of management decision. Knowledge of risks the organization is facing 
and the level of risk exposure contribute to a more realistic analysis and substantiation 
of managerial decisions. Substantiate decisions can be made by considering the 
following requirements: the existence of one or more objectives to be achieved; 
existence of several alternatives, including economic factors in decision-making plan, 
making the decision, decision and action unit, clear and optimal fit between 
Between components of integrated risk management and objectives of the organization 
must be a direct relationship. The analysis and risk assessment by following the eight 
components of integrated risk management, namely internal environment, identification, 
analysis and risk assessment, risk treatment, risk control, information and communication 
and monitoring of risks is done for each structure and functional organization for each 
objective. 
By applying this method it is showed that risks are assessed and treated for all purposes of 
the organization, regardless of their definition (strategic, operational, reporting and 
compliance) and regardless of the compartment or structure that are defined. 
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Meanwhile, the integrated risk management process represents an instrument that allows a 
coordinated approach across the organization to identify and analyze the mechanisms of 
risk whose initial starting point is the strategic dimension. 
Integrated risk management is a powerful tool that enables the management of the 
organization to have a picture of the risks affecting the achievement of strategic and 
operational objectives, and provides at the same time, leverage for the foundation and 
management decision making. 
The process of identification, analysis and assessment takes into account the events of the 
organization, which can take negative shape and are associated with risks or positive shape 
and are associated with opportunities. 
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1. Introduction 
Due to its impact on economy, resources, environment and society, manufacturing is of 
strategic value to Europe. European manufacturing has to embrace a new logic of global socio-
economic sustainability, in which it addresses not only the welfare of its population, but also of 
emerging economies, contributing at the same time to the preservation of the environment and 
the resources. Megatrends that have a considerable impact on European manufacturing are:  
 Ageing,  
 Individualism, 
 Advanced and emerging technologies / knowledge,  
 Globalization,  
 Urbanization,  
 Sustainability,  
 Finance and Public debt. 
Under the influence of these megatrends, manufacturing sectors are undergoing structural 
changes in view of increasing their competitiveness through intelligent and sustainable 
solutions. The move from eco efficiency to resource efficiency is related to the need for 
building “citizen centred systems”. This will require further improving the socio economic 
dimension of future metropolitan areas and factories by addressing the quality of life of the 
citizens living and working there. 
This new perception of the worker in the manufacturing environments requires that a new 
approach is made available to manage risks and hazards in the manufacturing environment. 
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Worker’s safety and health is observed jointly by legislation, knowledge generation and 
technology development to enable a full risk management focused on the employee 
(paradigm “factory worker first”). When the personalized risk management will be 
achieved, the European Strategy for Safety and Health at Work 2007 – 2012 will be able to 
reach the objective of 25% reduction in workplace accidents and then a yearly reduction of 
5% to finally achieve the ambitious objective of zero-accidents. 
So far, most efforts in work safety have been focused on improving work equipment 
features and definition of more secure tasks. Machine manufacturers have worked hard to 
provide security devices to eliminate or mitigate the risk, but success lies in considering 
security by design. Big gaps are detected in the process of establishment of security systems 
in industrial environments focused on the worker. The worker needs to be introduced as an 
active element in the risk management equation and proactive measures need to be 
facilitated to increase the effectiveness of the solutions in place. 
All working environment variables and conditions in risk management require the 
challenge of finding technologies to monitor and manage the human factor in 
manufacturing processes. The reason is that the human factor is the main responsible for 
incidents and accidents in factories nowadays. The expected risk management system must 
incorporate proactive capabilities understood as the ability to detect the confluence of 
several risk factors with potential likelihood to cause an accident.  
 
Figure 1. FASyS proactive risk management reference framework. 
The best starting point is the general framework of proactive risk management provided by 
the ISO 31000:2009: Risk management – Principles and guidelines, see Figure 1. This 
standard has been suggested by the European Technology Platform on Industrial Safety 
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(ETPIS) as the framework for managing future manufacturing environments. To meet these 
challenges, technical, organizational and human resources are considered, in order to 
identify, detect, monitor and manage, on a continuous and effective manner, risks related to 
health and safety throughout the complete life cycle of the factory. For such solution to 
become fully effective, risk management system should be developed holistically taking into 
account an integrated view from sensing devices to reasoning mechanisms and intelligence, 
capable of reacting to extremely dynamic conditions. 
The chapter is organized as follows. First a brief overview on the concept of Sensing 
Enterprise and Future Internet technologies, where the FASyS system will operate is 
provided. Then, Section 3 presents the FASyS model for proactive health and safety risk 
management. Subsequently, a more in depth discussion on key technological foundations of 
the FASyS model is presented in Section 4 to Section 6. Finally, the main conclusions and 
observations are summarized in Section 7. 
2. The sensing enterprise concept 
The Sensing Enterprise is a concept created by the FInES community in the context of the 
advent of the Augmented Internet. It refers to an enterprise anticipating future decisions by 
using multi-dimensional information captured through physical and virtual objects and 
providing added value information to enhance its global context awareness [1]. The 
enterprise will no longer be composed of and defined solely by atoms, but also by bits and 
kilobits. 
The Sensing Enterprise concept is shifting boundaries – towards a borderless enterprise, where 
collaboration and continuous interactions among smart objects are central to the new scenario. 
Beyond the push and pull model, the sensing enterprise concept goes further to a direct 
presence, « sensing » data and transforming it into knowledge for business operation. The 
concept of sensing enterprise shifts the focus on the interaction among objects and systems. 
The Sensing enterprise concept supports the notion of smart dust in the clouds as a new 
form and evolution of current state of the art computing systems. Thus, decentralised and 
delocalised computing and data storage resources provide dynamically scalable capacities 
to exploit linked open data that facilitate the exploitation of internal and external data 
systems. This highly flexible computing and sensing environment is the basis for a new 
generation of cross-cutting horizontal enterprise application areas. The Sensing enterprise 
concept leverages the power of sensor networks and decentralised intelligence to perform 
analysis and decision making both in synchronised real and virtual worlds. 
3. The absolutely health and safety factory (fasys) model 
The development of any excellence model should be based on a thorough analysis of the 
risks that can be faced in a particular working environment. However, the development of a 
proactive model demands that the very same approach can be used to completely manage in 
an integrated, proactive and continuous manner well-known as well as emerging hazards. 
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Figure 2. FASyS 13 prevalent hazards 
This is the reason why the FASyS model has consolidated the vast diversity of incidents and 
accidents that can potentially take place in handling, machining and assembly factories into 
13 prevalent hazards; such as trapping, falls on a level, awkward postures or repetitive and 
forceful movements, as illustrated byFig. 2. These 13 hazards have been used as reference in 
the development of the FASyS excellence model. 
In the current regulatory framework, both legal and technical and having health damage 
prevention as the ultimate goal, the employer must "ensure" the maintenance and 
improvement of health, supported prevention services, which, through performances in R & 
D have to improve and evolve the performance  and services provided. FASyS provides an 
integrated model for Continuous Risk Assessment, Monitoring and  Management, that has 
to exhibit the following unique features:  
 Integrated medical and technical risk management disciplines. 
 Act as a single health model (mixed and integral) 
 It is based and actions scientific knowledge for active risk prevention – technical 
 Provides a "uniform" and universal framework for  data and information management  
 It can be "embedded" within the company’s control and management system 
3.1. FASyS excellence model 
FASyS is the first integrated solution providing a coherent view to the 4 main dimensions 
that drive risk management i.e. methodology, technology, functionality and normative.  
 Methodological dimension suggests that the risk model should be taken into account 
in the factory of the future; this model must establish the worker as the central point of 
health and safety management, thereby providing the missing link between 
occupational health, hygiene, ergonomics and psychosocial risks that current practices 
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exhibit. This dimension of the model advocates for 4 different approaches to risk 
management so that proactive measures can be supported. FASyS methodological 
dimension combines safety performance based, risk based, incident and resilience based 
combined approaches as the means to address effective risk management. Moreover, 
this dimension increases traditional risk modelling functions on the assumption that 
risk should and will be monitored and therefore a suitable description should be made 
available. 
 Technological dimension establishes the technological fabric needed to support the 
functional requirements of the risk management model. The technological dimension 
provides the technology blocks leveraging the concept of sensing enterprise. The FASyS 
approach to technology lies increasing interest and a prevailing role of ICT in the 
context of factory environment. In parallel with increased sensing and actuating 
capabilities, the improvement in backhaul communications present a new factory 
scenario where more autonomous intelligent reasoning mechanisms could be 
envisaged. The Internet of Things (IoT) scenario that needs to be handled is 
characterized by highly variable spatial and temporal contexts that should be effectively 
managed. FASyS combines the concept of autonomous systems with sensing and 
actuating capabilities with semantic-based distributed reasoning approaches to complex 
system operation. The technological dimension defines the reference architecture, 
where the risk management system will be integrated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Three-level FASyS risk management reference architecture for sensing enterprises. 
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 Functional dimension includes all accesses to functional requirements needed to assure 
that the risk management cycle is complete and effective. The FASyS model defines 10 
different modules that encapsulate the required functionalities to leverage ISO 
3100:2009. The modules mainly deal with risk modelling and risk management strategy 
configuration, business impact analysis and system configuration, health and safety 
monitoring, autonomous actuation, decision support, personalised information and 
augmented training functions. Such scheme deals with a holistic and adaptive, evolving 
view on risk management. 
 Normative dimension is based on the ISO 31000:2009 and establishes the five stages in 
risk management life cycle, which should include the previously described features to 
meet the requirements of each stage: Context, Organization, Monitoring, Intervention 
and Communication. 
3.2. FASyS technological dimension 
The implementation and demonstration of the FASyS model demands that coordinated 
progress is made in particular technology fields. FASyS has identified and prototyped 
technology at communication, complex event processing, human behaviour analysis, 
activity monitoring and reasoning level.  
As depicted by the Figure below, FASyS technological fabric relies in 5 major components : 
 IoT Networking. (a) Wireless sensor networks and activity monitoring (b) 
Communication security and privacy systems (c) Wireless communications in industrial 
environments. 
 Mixed Virtual and Physical World Detection and Evaluation: (a) Industrial safety 
ontologies and reasoning engines. (b) Smart ergonomic characterisation solutions (c) 
Functional workplace adaptation models (d) Human error identification systems (e) 
Models for detecting psycho-social indicators and profiles (f) Adapted learning 
solutions (g) Chemical sensors for pollutant detection 
 Personal Health Systems: (a) Applications for intelligent video analysis (b) Real-time 
risk detection tools (c) Automatic medical alert notification system (d) Occupational 
pathology assessment/diagnosis protocols 
 Machine Tool Active Security Systems: (a) Part manipulation and part feeding systems 
(b) Volumetric protection systems (c) Auto-calibration and auto-compensation systems 
for large units (d) Intelligent part movement guiding systems (e) Visualisation systems 
for part/tool referencing 
 Comprehensive Real-Time Risk Management Systems: (a) Personalized risk 
prevention strategies (b) Personalized decision support systems (c) Semantic solutions 
for services coordination (d) Emotional interfaces for effective risk communication. 
All 5 technologic enablers are supported by a specific information distribution (acquisition 
and delivery) platform depicted by the Figure below. The FASyS services, provided by the 
functional dimension of the model, are leveraged in the FASyS plane based on the smart 
object system plane information and external information sources linked through the FASyS 
information gateway. 
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Figure 4. FASyS technological components 
3.3. FASyS functional dimension 
Ten modules are included in the functional dimension that are directly related to the health 
and safety services leveraged by FASyS: 
1. Risk assessment. This module provides to safety managers many tools to access and 
manage the identified risks, their factors, values and relations. The management of 
these risks demands worker information, machine and device data and environment 
values related to each risk that could be monitored. In addition, this module 
interoperates with factory data stores.  
2. Preventive measures design. In this module, the prevention responsible is able to 
design and establish the prevention measures catalogue to be used for each 
personalized risk identified. The preventive measure design use technical measures, 
medical protocols, data collection, affected users, execution managers and assessment 
agents. 
3. Economic impact evaluation. In this module infrastructure and equipment 
implementation costs related to preventive measures are quantified. In addition, it is 
able to estimate the costs of non-prevention, in order to provide quantitative 
information about the integral risk management. 
4. Preventive measures configuration and management. This module is used by safety 
and health managers. They use the complete prevention plan designed in the second 
module and associates devices (smart objects) to each action. In addition, this module 
monitors the correct operation of the devices and it alerts from any malfunction.   
5. Environment description module. This module is used by safety managers and it 
monitors the real-time factory situation and its related actors, using visual tools to 
adapt the risk visualization through many filters.  
6. Personal health module. This module is able to show to the health responsible a real-
time monitoring of conducts, indicators and benchmarks to determine the evolution of 
the worker’s health status and to provide early alarms related to health. 
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7. Intelligent and automatic remote operation module. This module provides tools to 
automate critical functions in manufacturing equipments. So, the equipment is able to 
adapt its operating parameters to the factory conditions, task values and worker 
status. 
8. Decision making automatic assistant module. In this module, the safety responsible 
interacts with the decision support model, performing informed decision in multiple 
choice situations or in contradictory situations. In addition, it could be preventive 
strategies that need some personal interaction to validate a non-automatic event or 
decision. 
9. Emotional communication module. This module empowers the prevention responsible 
to coordinate communication strategies on health and safety messages and to deliver 
them effectively, individually or massively. The messages could be sent on automatic or 
supervised manner. The module will also modulate the content of messages adapted to 
the emotional and psychosocial profile of the receiver. 
10. Continuous training module. This module allows workers to be trained on prevention 
through “training pills”, that are sent at the right time through the best channel. The 
safety responsible designs the protocols to assign the most suitable pills to a particular 
prevention strategy. The pills are training actions or mass reminders to one or many 
employees and with a predifined periodicity that respects emotional and congnitive 
constrains. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. FASyS information data distribution architecture for the sensing enterprise. 
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4. Industrial wireless communications and Internet of Things (IoT) 
networking 
The concept of sensing enterprise capabilities provided by FASYS are built at the smart 
object level leveraging on one hand enhanced industrial wireless sensing & communications 
and on the other hand, facilitating a semantic plane representation of the sensor information 
provided by smart objects. From a health & safety perspective, the major challenges faced by 
the wireless communication and IoT networking modules in the implementation of the 
sensing enterprise concept relate to (a) provision of a common architecture for secure 
heterogeneous communications (b) reliable wireless sensor network connectivity (c) 
universal object & sensor semantic representation. This section is devoted to describe how 
FASyS has addressed each of those fundamental challenges. 
FASyS activities with respect to sensor and communication technologies are aimed at 
guaranteeing the desired levels of safety and health at work with the use of non-intrusive 
sensor systems (both personalized bio-medical and image sensors) to monitor the worker’s 
physical conditions and the working environment, including environmental conditions and 
the state of the machinery interacting with the worker. The introduction of wireless 
communications in the factory of the future will also facilitate the deployment of distributed 
and mobile sensing applications to improve the factory’s productivity and worker’s health 
and safety. 
4.1. Industrial wireless sensing and communications architecture 
The deployment of heterogeneous wireless communications in industrial environments 
presents significant challenges [2]. On one hand, industrial environments are usually 
characterized by challenging propagation conditions (obstructions, interferences, etc.) that 
difficult the establishment of robust wireless links [3]. On the other hand, hybrid network 
architectures pose significant challenges to design a system platform efficiently managing 
data, in particular when real-time connectivity needs to be ensured across multiple wireless 
technologies [4]  to support the reliable risk management. However, ubiquitously 
monitoring the worker’s conditions requires a reliable mobile sensing and communications 
platform that ensures the wireless connectivity among the Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) 
nodes. FASyS has designed an end-to-end heterogeneous wireless solution that enables the 
continuous sensing of the working environment and the worker’s health and physiological 
conditions in order to detect in advance any potential risks. Fig. 6. depicts FASyS’s 
heterogeneous communications architecture for industrial environments.  
To transmit the sensed data to a control centre, a wireless backhaul including medium range 
technologies for communications within the factory and long range technologies for the 
transfer of the aggregated data to the control centre has been proposed. The medium range 
technologies (IEEE 802.11/WiFi and IEEE 802.16/WiMAX) transmit locally sensed data 
(including video) from different areas of the factory towards a factory’s gateway. The 
gateway can then transmit the received data using WiMAX and/or cellular HSDPA to a 
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remote control centre. This architecture efficiently and reliably satisfies the requirements 
imposed by the industrial environment in general, and by the identified FASyS hazards in 
particular. The proposed architecture takes into account, not only radio propagation and 
communication aspects, but also semantics and security planes. 
 
Figure 6. FASyS heterogeneous communications architecture 
4.2. Industrial wireless communications and sensing connectivity  
To evaluate the performance and connectivity levels of mobile IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee [3] 
sensing communications, as well as the quality of service that IEEE 802.11/WiFi, IEEE 
802.16/WiMAX and HSDPA technologies [4] can provide in industrial environments, a large 
field testing campaign has been conducted. This field testing campaign was conducted in 
GORATU covering a surface area of more than 10.000m2 – see Figure 7a. As illustrated in 
Figure 7b, the plant is characterized by the presence of a large number of potential metallic 
obstacles that influence the radio propagation and thereby the wireless connectivity. 
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Figure 7. GORATU’s main factory of machine tools. 
An example, the results of one of the experiments conducted to analyse the connectivity 
between a TX mobile sensing mote (e.g. a mote attached to a worker or industrial vehicle) and 
a stationary RX base station using the MEMSIC Iris WSN motes are presented in Figure 7. In 
this experiment, the base station was strategically deployed with relatively good propagation 
conditions with the different areas of the factory (the RX base station was located at position 
RX in Figure 7.with an antenna height of hRX=5m). During the experiments, the TX mobile 
node (antenna height of hTX=1.2m) moved across different areas of the factory at pedestrian 
speed. This node was configured to periodically transmit a data packet every T seconds with a 
payload of 50bytes excluding headers, emulating the data transmissions of a body sensor 
device. Along its path, the TX mobile node experienced different propagation conditions with 
the RX fixed node: LOS (Line of Sight) with reduced obstructions (Z1); partial NLOS (Non 
LOS) due to cranes, pillars, and machinery (Z2 and Z3); NLOS due to multiple obstructing 
elements and high distance (Z4); and NLOS and heavy obstruction (Z5, the warehouse). The 
Figure below depicts the PER (Packet Error Rate) levels measured as the mobile TX mote 
moves around the factory. The figure shows the average PER levels experienced during time 
intervals of Tp=5s and the distance between the TX and RX nodes along the path; this figure 
differentiates the different zones of the factory (Z1, Z2,…, Z5). Additional experiments were 
conducted with different transceivers, antenna heights and transmission powers. The obtained 
results show that IEEE 802.15.4/Zigbee can provide the connectivity requirements of industrial 
applications, even for mobile applications. However, the transceiver, deployment conditions 
and locations must be carefully selected. 
(a) Plan of GORATU’s main factory (axis in meters) (b) View of one of the factory’s corridors (Z1) 
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Figure 8. PER performance as a Memsic IRIS WSN mote with Pt=3dBm moves around the factory 
(hTX=1.2m, hRX=5m, T=200ms, payload=50Bytes). 
4.3. Smart object semantic representation 
Regarding semantics, a traversal control plane has been included in the architecture. 
Semantics are based in the Semantic Sensor Web paradigm, [5] and on a specific abstraction 
for virtual objects. Semantics, interoperability and exchange of relevant sensor configuration 
and information are based on Service Oriented Architecture. The key components of the 
FASYS semantic sensor environment are the Sensor Observation Server (SOS), a standard 
from OGC [6], and the HMI located in the command and control location of the risk 
management architecture. 
The concept of semantic sensor network is used to organize, manage, interrogate, 
understand and control the different components of the data gathering process (i.e. network, 
sensors and the resulting data using high-level specifications). If semantics are introduced in 
the reasoning process of a FASyS subsystem, it is important to design properly the various 
steps of communication and interfaces if sensors and sensor networks are involved, as they 
impose various kinds of restrictions and limitations, such as power constraints, finite and 
limited memory, unreliable communication network and the quality and variability of data 
received.   
The Semantic Sensor Web (SSW) or the Semantic Sensor Networks (SSN) base their 
operation on the existence of a sensor network that implements a physical layer (PHY), a 
sub-level medium access (MAC) and network layer (NET), usually implemented by 
standard protocols (e.g. Zigbee and 6LowPAN), but considering mechanisms and 
proprietary systems. The contribution of this type of mechanism is the addition to the data 
measured / generated by sensors in the form of metadata annotations of semantic 
information of a temporal, spatial and thematic, accessible through a Service Oriented 
Architecture.  
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The technology used in FASYS has been standardized by the OGC [6] and has been extended 
and specially applied to factory automation by the research team [10][7]. The concept of SSW, 
is based on the use of a special type of information infrastructure for web-centric collection, 
modelling, storage, subsequent withdrawal, sharing, manipulation, analysis and visualization 
of information on sensors and observation of phenomena from them. The definition of SSW by 
OGC is: "Networks of sensors and sensor data storage accessible via the web, which can be discovered 
and accessed using protocols and application interfaces standards"[6]. The standard and components 
of the SWE SOA are: Observations & Measurements (O&M); Sensor Model Language 
(SensorML); Transducer Model Language (TransducerML or TML); Sensor Observation 
Service (SOS); Sensor Planning Service (SPS); Sensor Alert Service (SAS) and Web Notification 
Services (WNS) [8].  FASYS considers the use of different SOS located in strategic points in the 
Communication Architecture in order to provide homogeneous access in the heterogeneous 
network to the different control applications. 
FASYS semantic sensor system is based in the use of SOS and Sensor ML, it provides access to 
the data generated by the sensors so as the metadata to configure and customize each 
individual component (sensor) of the network. The main benefits of using semantic sensor 
networks in FASYS  are: (i) Platform independence  as practically any sensor or modelling 
system can be supported (even simulated sensors); (ii) easy development of services allowing 
dynamic connectivity between resources; (iii) Liaison with semantic environments, adding 
semantic information to the basic SWE paradigm; (iv) Traceability and support to the 
implementation and management of real-time measurements; (v) Flexibility in implementation: 
container capacity and existing sensors, implementing and processing services; and (vi) 
Scalability from a single sensor to a collection, individual, group or cluster of sensors. [9] 
Regarding the design architecture, it is important to consider the location of the SOS within 
the network. Basically, there are two main approaches. The first approach considers locating 
the SOS in the coordinator node, as near as possible to the physical sensor. The second 
approach considers locating the SOS in the gateway node, as near as possible to the control 
center. In order to determine the most appropriate place for the SOS, it is important to 
consider the data flows that are envisioned between sensors and the SOS and between 
applications and the SOS in order to minimize data traffic. As the FASyS system uses a 
Complex Event Processing (CEP) system as key component of the Control Center that 
continuously issues requests to the SOS, the data flow is considered to be significantly 
higher than the data between sensors and the SOS. Therefore, the second approach has been 
selected in FASyS. Once the SOS has been set up in the gateway node, all sensors have to 
register with the SOS from each gateway to have controlled all data sources [10][11]. 
Regarding interoperability of systems and applications, the use of SOS provides syntactic and 
semantic interoperability. Interoperability is a property referring to the ability of diverse 
systems and organizations to work together (inter-operate). The term is often used in a 
technical systems engineering sense, or alternatively in a broad sense, taking into account 
social, political, and organizational factors that impact system to system performance. 
Interoperability may also be understood as the ability of two or more systems or components 
to exchange information and to use the information that has been exchanged. [12]. 
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Regarding Interoperability we can distinguish two different possibilities syntactical and 
semantics interoperability [13]. FASYS provides both kinds of interoperability starting from 
the correct use of a SOS as support for merging and concentrating the information generated 
by sensors and distributed devices. Though strictly speaking the SOS provides syntactical 
interoperability, it is relatively easy to incorporate simple semantic support as temporal, 
spatial and thematic filtering are natively supported by SensorML and O&M, the two 
standard interfaces used by the SOS. Additionally, SensorML supports extensibility through 
annotations. If such annotations are part of a semantic vocabulary, then more complex 
semantic operations can be supported. SOS has been extended with a database based on a 
specific FASYS data model that includes some specific features not included in the OGC 
standard and are required to integrate the SSN in the FASYS HMI. 
4.4. Mobile sensing applications 
FASyS advanced IoT networking paves the ground for advanced monitoring functions that 
can be exploited by other parts of the FASyS risk management system to perform advanced 
health and safety prevention. Mobile sensing applications facilitated by FASyS include 
among other collision avoidance and continuous physiological monitoring.  
4.4.1. Collision avoidance  
Collisions between workers and fork-lift trucks, or between any type of vehicles, have been 
identified as one of the most common accidents in factories. Such collisions could be 
prevented if workers and vehicles would be equipped with WSN (Wireless Sensor Network) 
motes so that they can dynamically exchange information about their position and speed in 
real time. With this information, they could be able to detect in advance, and avoid, 
potential dangerous situations, such as the intersection shown in the Figure below. Robust 
and reliable wireless communication links should be established between any two nodes 
with a risk of collision, despite the potentially challenging propagation conditions, 
represented in the intersection by a wall, and large metallic machinery and obstructing 
elements placed within a large wood container at the intersection.  
 
Figure 9. Collision avoidance use case: testing intersection 
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4.4.2. Continuous physiological monitoring module 
A second example of mobile sensing application leveraged by FASyS is an innovative 
monitoring platform built up by up to six sensors following the HealthAlliance interface 
that arranges the worker physiological follow up in two strategies: (a) intensive 
monitoring, for those workers on health risk approaching minimum invasiveness as well as 
maximum ergonomics. (b) preventive monitoring, to check periodically main health 
indicators. FASyS is capable of integrating data coming from different sensors, working 
with different communication protocols and interfaces. This is done implementing Health 
Alliance 11073 standard logic communication and manufacturer protocol for the sensing 
devices. After the acknowledgment, the values are packed into HL7 standard messages and 
transmitted through secure pathways to the factory DPC (data processing centre), where the 
personalized health management module can access to it – see next Section on Occupational 
Personal Health Systems. 
5. Occupational Personal Health Systems (O-PHS) 
Most developed countries include within their basic welfare policies the right of citiziens, as 
workers, to be protected from sickness, disease and injury arising from their employment. 
Despite this intention, the International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that 160 
million workers are victims of occupational accidents and diseases every year [14] and over 
two million of people lose their lives from work-related accidents and diseases. The 
standards on occupational safety and health provide necessary tools for governments, 
employers, and workers to establish such practices and to provide for full safety at work. In 
2003, ILO assumed a global strategy to improve occupational safety and health, which 
included the introduction of a preventive safety and health culture, the promotion and 
development of relevant instruments, and technical assistance [14]. 
One of the European objectives set for 2020 is the 25% reduction in the number of industrial 
accidents [15][16]. In order to reduce accidents it is essential to pay attention to the workers, 
their single workplaces and to their working conditions. In addition, favourable 
environments make workers feel more comfortable while they are in the factories, and thus 
the efficiency is increased. As a consequence, it is possible to obtain the maximum efficiency 
in the factory as a whole, which also produces economic benefit for the company. From a 
healthcare point of view, factories lack normally in an amount of enough information to 
allow a holistic care of the worker. Health data stored by companies are only a small 
amount of data, usually stored once a year, and referred to the physical condition of a 
person just in a particular moment [17].  
5.1. Proactive paradigm for Occupational Health Systems 
For these reason, future factories and enterprises need to do an effort in focusing resources 
and strategic planning towards making  the workplace safer, healthier and to significantly 
reduce the number of accidents and the work related diseases in their population. In order 
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for this to happen, it’s necessary to anticipate and predict the occurrence of risk scenarios 
that can lead to a damaging situation, either by accident or health threat. This need 
generates a change of paradigm, moving from a reactive system providing management 
solutions to problems that have already happened and basic preventive measures, to a much 
more proactive model, where risk management is understood as a mostly preventive tool.  
To achieve this, it’s important to collect, measure and analyze data during a continuous 
period of time, in order to evaluate the risks and their evolution.  
In this line, future enterprise risk management solution should turn punctual monitoring 
into a more frequent and personalized vigilance, including individual and collective data. 
However, collecting information of many people during a long period of time requires 
collecting a big amount of data. People are not able to process so much information, so 
intelligent systems for massive data processing are needed. These intelligent systems 
classify data and generate alarms associated to the worker. Thanks to these alerts and all the 
other environmental and personal data stored, it is possible to predict health threats. Thus, it 
is possible to act in the most appropriate way for each worker in particular.  
Nowadays, the number of sensors for monitoring personal health data is increasing. In 
addition, sensors that collect environmental parameters in industrial factories are being 
introduced more and more. The problem encountered so far, besides a reduced frequency of 
monitoring, is that these data are usually not thoroughly connected. The information is only 
collected in order to produce isolated diagnosis or identify single risks, but not common 
results, and the collected data become less relevant if they are not treated together. The final 
decision, in a dynamic environment like a factory, could be more precise if results came 
from a comprehensive study of a diverse set of parameters. However, once the data is 
collected and stored, a significant effort must be done in processing it in order to identify 
and highlight those elements that are directly related to present or future risks. This 
identification becomes more and more difficult as the amount of data analyzed increases 
and rage of risks augments. Therefore, it seems logical to state that, in parallel to the data 
collection efforts, new solutions for clustering, prioritizing and filtering information need to 
be put in place, to generate the most appropriate alarms in the right moment and in the right 
place. Risks nature can vary from emergency situations to predictive probabilities and Risk 
Management systems have to be able to discriminate between the two (and the whole range 
in between) and provide adequate communication of the contextual information so that the 
reaction to the risk matches the risk characteristics.  Finally, once the information has been 
monitored and classified, the next point is focused on the intervention. With the aim of 
representing prevention protocols for this intervention, workflows are developed. Given the 
workers singularity, the adaptation of the prevention protocols is needed for each one of 
them. In this way, the elimination of the occupational hazard is much more effective 
The Health model established in FASyS, is based on the "Ecological Concept of Disease", in 
which, the environment (Physical, Social, Economic and Biology, among others) is a set of 
external conditions and influences affecting the life and development of an organism, 
human behaviour or society, acting on the balance between the so-called "disease agents" 
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and "human host", even capable of altering it and causing a potential disease situation 
where such agents exceed the capabilities of the host response and adaptation. This allows 
to establish, in accordance with the main risk factors (physical, chemical, biological, social 
and psychological), a pre pathogenic state or period, which we have called susceptibility 
stage, on which a primary prevention action is required, and other state or pathogenic 
period, which we called the disease, which holds the secondary and tertiary preventive 
actions and care actions where necessary. 
From here, setting up standard profiles (comparable to health profiles), and pathogenic and 
pre-pathogenic profiles with abnormality parameters, becomes  much more simple and 
affordable and allows to introduce these profiles in the system. The development and 
implementation of a comprehensive and interrelated system of identification and control of 
the elements participating in the working environment through sensory and monitoring 
systems, can establish and develop what we have called the SATSE or System to Aid 
Decision Making in Occupational Medicine. This system consists of multiple modules that 
collect data and information about the company, the job (Identification of potential risks, 
protocols to be applied, pathobiological profiles to be determined, potential limitations, 
referrals ...), the worker (background, demographics and psychosocial factors, medical 
history at work,...), extra-clinical data (organizational profile, demographic profile, 
psychological profile...) and additional data (diagnostic algorithms, performance algorithms, 
medical knowledge data bases...) The use of physiological sensors that help us to determine 
both in the workplace and outside it, the physiological status or health of a worker at a 
given time at work or outside work (whenever necessary), complements the sensor system 
module, that is one of the basic elements of the project. 
5.2. Personal Health Records (PHR) 
Health data has been traditionally produced and owned by the Healthcare Systems and 
stored in Electronic Healthcare Records (EHR), focusing mainly in describing clinical 
procedures, tests and values. However, with the purpose of improving the characterization 
of the person and his environment, EHR data needs to be extended. This new information is 
stored, together with the EHR information, in other repositories. These repositories are 
known as PHR (Personal Health Record) [19] and collect data such as habits, preferences, 
information about the family, work, moods or nutritional profile. These repositories are, in 
opposition to the EHR, owned by the person, who has the option to share it with whoever 
he chooses.  
The usage of PHRs in occupational health could enable that when an employee goes to work 
in a company for the first time, the enterprise’s health professionals can ask him to share his 
relevant PHR data, in order to have his personal file more complete and enable a more 
complete and accurate health risk management. Of course, this situation would require 
enhanced methods for privacy and data protection, ensuring no unauthorized and adequate 
usage of the health information is made. In general, current PHRs contain a summarized 
version of the EHR adapted to the patient’s knowledge and needs and, in some cases, home 
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monitoring data. Future PHRs covering the area of occupational health should be based in 
the following aspects: 
 Includes relevant health hearths and risks linked to the work conditions. 
 It allows patient to introduce data (automatically or manually). 
 It allows an exchange of information with the healthcare system (HER). 
 It includes an option to generate summaries to share information with other PHRs. 
One of the advantages, for example, would be when a worker goes to work in other factory. 
If the new factory is enabled, his PHR could be downloaded in the system of the new factory 
in order to have a more complete file and ensure continuity in the management of the risks 
for that particular worker. Stored Data can also be extracted for consultations and referrals 
in case health professionals need to, of course under the corresponding access control that 
prevents unauthorized sharing of the data. Data can be easily anonymized to be used for 
statistical and epidemiological studies in order to detect population based health problems. 
5.3. Care plans, workflows and medical guidance 
The normalization of processes is more and more present in current society. The formal 
definitions of procedures that are usually deployed in enterprises and factories are 
considered the best practices in order to support the management. This normalization 
allows not only predefine which is expected in the organization procedures but also allows a 
continuous monitoring of the processes that is crucial for their correct management and 
continuous improving. Moving these ideas to Health Care, Care Plans or Clinical Pathways 
[20] there are protocols for standardization of health processes. Nevertheless, the 
standardization of those processes is more complicated than usual enterprise processes. First 
of all, the Health processes are very complex. The high number of variables that are taken 
into account in a care process, the pluripatological patients and the wide quantity of 
different treatments that can be applied to them requires a special expressivity in the process 
definition. In addition, the processes standardized should be designed by health 
professionals.  This requires that the specification language should be legible by those 
experts in order to ensure that the process can be understood and repeated. Moreover, the 
specification of the process should be non-ambiguous. This is a key problem in the 
specification of protocols.  It is said that a protocol is ambiguous when more than one 
interpretation possible for the same specification exists. The presence of ambiguity in Care 
plans is a great problem that prevents that the process will be deterministic. 
Usually, care plans are described as great manuals, free text written, that explain the care 
processes in a whole. Those manuals are available through big medical libraries like the 
Cochrane [21] or PubMed [22]. Although those manuals have the expressivity of natural 
language, they are often ambiguous and the high quantity of data is tedious to read. Other 
approaches are based on specific formal languages like GLIF [23] that provide tools to avoid 
ambiguity and to ensure the completeness of the protocols defined. Nevertheless, the use of 
rule based systems can difficult the creation of legible and controllable frameworks because 
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the high number of rules to be taken into account. In enterprise environments, processes are 
usually defined as workflows. Workflows [24][12] are formal specifications of processes 
designed to be automatized. The main advantage of using workflows is that they usually 
have a graphical interface that makes easier their design and understandability to non-
programming experts like doctors.  In Care Plans environment there are works, available in 
the literature, which faces this problem using workflows technology [25][26]. The main 
problem of workflows against other approach like GLIF or traditional techniques is that 
workflows have less expressivity than them. Nevertheless, there are available workflows 
approaches in literature [26] that ensures a high expressivity for defining very complex 
workflows and even for the design of clinical pathways [27].  
In addition to graphical design, Workflow has more advantages that can be useful for the 
design and deployment of care plans. Current workflow systems usually have associated an 
engine able to automatically execute the processes defined in the graphical way. That means 
that the formally defined processes can be automatically used for deploying the process by 
using automatic deploying systems. In addition, Process mining [27] technologies allows the 
application of pattern recognition technologies to support the iterative design of Care Plans. 
Furthermore, thanks to the low grammatical complexity of some workflow approaches [27] 
is possible to apply a great quantity of algorithms and tools for ensuring the completeness, 
the non- ambiguity and the simulation of processes in order to detect problems in their 
design before their deployment. In the Figure below is presented a basic specification of a 
Care Plan using a workflow based approach. 
 
Figure 10. Example of Workflow Based Clinical Pathway 
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The continuous assessment of processes is critical for ensuring an efficient execution of 
the enterprise procedures. In this way, there are more and more business intelligence 
systems available to empower and support the management providing important 
information about the processes filtered by using Data Mining technologies. Usually those 
systems, present information about static or evolution of numeric data according to 
parameters that can, indirectly, help managers to detect inefficiencies or bottlenecks in the 
processes.  In this scenario, an emerging technology is growing in order to enrich those 
business intelligence systems providing a more directly view about the process execution. 
This technology is called Process Mining (A.K.A Workflow Mining) [28]. Process Mining 
technology is research field, based on pattern recognition paradigm, that uses the events 
or activities of the process logs in order to automatically infer a graphical workflow that 
explains the actual execution of the process. There are many process mining algorithms in 
the literature, based on Events like Alpha [16] or Genetic Process Miner [29], or based on 
activities like PALIA algorithm [27]. Those algorithms are able to create workflows from 
samples and present graphically in order to know exactly how processes behave in real 
implementations. Comparing the results of those algorithms with the designed processes, 
it is possible to directly know what are the most usual paths followed by the processes 
within the designed workflows, what are the differences and exceptions to the designed 
processes that are occurring in the implantation of them, etc.  In this way, there are 
available algorithms that allows the comparison between the designed workflows and 
their real implantation [27]. 
6. Real-time risk management solutions 
The implementation of proactive risk management in a sensing enterprise demands that 
distributed reasoning capabilities are provided as a means for intelligence and analytics. 
FASyS should therefore not stop simply at the data collection and distribution level, but on 
the contrary, it should be able to analyse the vast amount of available information in the 
presence of data unavailability, ambiguity, imprecision and error. Therefore, for being able 
to detect, decide and act in real-time to dynamic risk levels various challenges need to ba 
addressed in the areas of (a) iindustrial safety reasoning engines (b) Real-time risk detection 
tools (c) Personalized decision support tools and  (d) Semantic solutions for services 
coordination 
6.1. Industrial safety ontologies and reasoning engines 
To deal with safety in a quite heterogeneous environment in terms of information 
sources, it is required to create a formal data specification that will be used within 
ontologies structures that support risk management and context. The ontologies are used 
as a knowledge base for reasoning engines that are responsible for the detection of risk 
and responsible of the implementation of relevant actions committed in any situation 
[30].  
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Figure 11. Ontology-based reasoning 
As depicted by the Figure above, the selected architecture is based on a distributed multi-
ontology structure. This way, there is an ontology for each risk and a set of context 
ontologies related to different existing and influent entities in each cycle of risk management 
in the factory. The context ontology properties might be source of different risk ontologies 
properties. Thus, risk can be defined through different entities or actors of the company.  
 
Figure 12. Mapping process results 
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The use of ontologies is related to the introduction of intelligence and reasoning on the 
information processing and the relation established between concepts that increase the 
relevance of such intelligence. Furthermore, this structures will be used for mapping data 
with information systems of the own company or potential external information systems 
[31]. The ontologies are considered therefore as the bridge between the heterogeneous 
information ecosystem and the actual services implementing the FASyS system logic. 
6.2. Real-time risk detection tools 
Inherent to the concept of proactive prevention is the aim of the system to predict a 
particular risk by evaluating all the variables of the worker, the working place and the 
environment. For being able to perform such evaluation the first requirement is to have 
tools that are able to process all the information in a complete, efficient and, at the same 
time, very light way. Currently, risk management is focused on monitoring the proposed 
actions after an evaluation process is periodically; e.g. yearly, performed in the 
companies. With nowadays facilities, there is no way to propose a 'real time' evaluation of 
the situation, due to the fact that the safety manager cannot control all the time what is 
happening in the shop-floor, the data of all the machines involved in the process and the 
information referred to the state of workers that are moving around the factory. This is 
inconceivable. 
 
Figure 13. Continuous real-time risk management based on Complex Event Processing Technology 
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However, in the context of the sensing enterprise, ubiqutous smart object deployment and 
the availability of suitable universal virtual object abstractions make such control possible. 
Thus, a new risk management cycle can be designed based on the capability to master big 
data stream technologies in a scalable manner. FASyS has designed a consolidated 
framework for risk detection. FASyS does not only leverages effective data management but 
also consolidates an integrated approach to health (medical) and safety (security) risk 
management. The consolidated approach is shown below. 
FASyS has proposed a complex event processing (CEP) [32] unit network that through a 
number of pre-set patterns, in the form of a complex formula compound by an 
undetermined number of factors, will feed and evaluate the patterns in a continuous way, 
creating alerts based on particular thresholds that have been previously defined and 
particular set of actions taken concurrently or sequentially place. These tools allow for big 
data volumes processing with really low computing infrastructure requirements.  
However, FASyS data processing solutions go beyond big data volume. FASyS looks for 
flexible solutions that can create complex feedback and feedforward loops across CEP units 
to ensure that the time variable, the event frequency or event correlations-workflow can be 
processed at high speed. 
6.3. Personalised decision support tools 
As it has become apparent from the previous sections FASyS provides the tools and models 
for being able to process as much as information in less time as possible. Thus, the enterprise 
safety and healthy manager can work with relevant information to make informed 
decisions. The aim of FASyS personalised decision support tools is not just to warn and 
make apparent a particular risk level but also to ease the decision process based on strong 
knowledge support. FASyS Monitoring and Control Human Macine Interface (HMI) has 
therefore being designed to provide highly visual interfaces about risk levels. Moreover, the 
system also makes suggestions of the most suitable procedures to be aplied when a risk 
situation is detected, so that the reaction time can be hugely reduced and the user can send a 
highly effective execution action plan immediately.  
The decision support system works with risk patterns that require a human interaction, 
either to provide additional information or to select preferred option in front of a multiple 
selection. 
6.4. Semantic solutions for services coordination 
In the context of the sensing enterprise, FASyS has to deal not only with the detection of 
risks but also has to support the actuation and deployment of the preventive actions 
selected by the safety and healthy manager through the personalised decision suppport 
tools. This implies that FASyS has envisaged a service oriented scenario, where the 
factory is populated by a large amount of services that exchange messages and perform 
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are coregraphed or orchestrated to perform the designed actions by means of smart 
objects.  
Therefore, in the FASyS platform, there is a huge amount of available services involved in 
risk management life cycle. In addition, those services have heterogeneous sources; they can 
become available, temporarely unavailable or even disappear suddenly; the availability of 
them can change anytime. In order to solve these situations, FASyS has proposed a highly 
effective service messaging and service management and coordination semantic solution 
that would use choreography techniques focused on browsing FASyS service topology [33], 
which is made using an ontology definition; e.g. through WSDL or USDL descriptions. With 
this solution, FASyS is able to adapt its reactions to available services at any time and ensure 
the best possible service performance based on the precedence of the risk to be addressed 
and the service load in the enterprise bus. Clustering techniques allow for optimum 
selection of services to be orchestrated otr coreographed to servce a particular aplication in 
the prevention workflow. Those services could be previously known or even configured at 
run-time.  
All of FASyS technological developments and systems have a semantic service library that 
would ensure the availability of its own functionalities to the rest of systems. The access to 
those functionalities will be assured continuously [34]. 
 
Figure 14. FASyS Monitoring and Control Human-Machine Interface (HMI) 
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Figure 15. FASyS processes choreographer 
7. Conclusions 
This paper has presented the rationale behind the development of a risk management 
framework for personalised risk management in the context of the sensing enterprise. The 
paper has presented the main dimensions proposed for the model and it has presented the 
main technical components.  
The paper has introduced the reference architecture and it has argued how this reference 
architecture is in complete alignment with European IoT movement currently under 
development. Moreover, the paper has provided evidence in terms of how the FASyS 
system is capable of providing a personalized and intelligent management of all the factors 
related, directly or indirectly, to the worker and its environment, in order to identify and 
detect warning situations, alerts and propose immediate actions required upon a worker, a 
machine or an area. 
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1. Introduction 
Increasing interest towards Risk Management improvement and timely identification of 
firms' failure are driving demand for the set-up of risk management principles, particularly 
within the financial and banking industries. Although there is no-one accepted definition for 
appropriate and infallible risk management principles, research in this field has led to 
identify best practices that have proven successful results at a variety of industries. Zooming 
into the Financial Sector, this case study is aimed to present six tips which have 
strengthened resilience to bankruptcy and economic losses at a leading European Bank 
which has depicted positive growth in the midst of the Downturn and world-wide economic 
recession. 
2. The Banking Business and the Importance of Risk Management 
Policies 
Financial Institutions’ turnover is influenced by their risk management policies and the 
target risk profile they want to achieve in the market. For instance aiming towards a low-
medium predictable risk profile, jointly with geographical diversification can be key 
elements of differentiation for a firm to achieve a leading position ahead of other industry 
players. [1] 
The effectiveness of Risk management policies enacts as a firm’s identity card, specifically in 
downturn times. This largely explains why seeking continuous improvement of risk 
management policies has stayed as a top priority for key industry players which have 
shown positive growth in the last years of financial turmoil. 
“Risk Management means looking into the future” [2] 
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Fuelled by increasing competition, more stringent regulations and higher levels of 
interconnection amongst different players, the marketplace is becoming more and more 
complex. Concerned with such trend, financial institutions have realized that if they want to 
survive, they need to rely on a robust risk management framework, given by corporate 
organizational policies and supported by sophisticated IT systems and technology. 
Since 2008, financial markets have experienced sharp declines. [3-5]. Analyzing several 
consumer surveys allows us to conclude that consumers, particularly those who have been 
severely affected by the crisis, would rather have opted for higher levels of prevention and 
anticipation, supported by management schemes with enough level of risk management 
considerations. The aforementioned risk management considerations are playing a greater 
role in companies’ overall strategy and strategic choices. Indeed, companies are increasingly 
realizing the need of relying on strong risk governance and a sophisticated hedging 
program. This trend is largely explained due to the fact that these are seen as essential 
elements of a robust financial risk management program that will help them secure 
resilience to the economic problems affecting the marketplace. 
2.1. To what extent is ERM a “New” concept? 
In the last years ERM has been gaining momentum as a new concept, a new trend, a MUST 
HAVE. But perhaps in the midst of everyone rushing-up to implement it, it is worth 
stopping for a second in order to understand its meaning and ask ourselves … is it really 
something new? 
ERM stands for Enterprise Risk Management but its real origin is unclear. Some associate 
the birth of this concept to the definition of the Integrated Risk Framework by the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) back in September 2004. Others believe 
that the starting point was in the 1970s when most of the Management theories arised. Being 
factual it would even be valid the mindset that it is a concept that has been in place since the 
beginning of times, when the Romans traded goods with the Carthagians. So if we agree 
that companies have managed risk forever the question here is what can Enterprises do 
better to manage Risk? Or what have been the best practices in risk management that 
companies have pursued to achieve recognized success? 
Anyone involved in line management makes risk based decisions on a daily basis. The 
desire of such decision makers would be to count on a reliable crystal ball that would allow 
them to opt for the choices that would derive profit maximization. 
Far from being the aforementioned magic tool, going down the road of ERM involves 
setting a structured approach or a reference framework to manage risk at companies. As of 
today, many companies have already understood the value proposition and experienced its 
benefits – which mainly tackle improved controls, better communications and decision-
making, and a common language for risks. [7]. Nevertheless, for other companies the 
concern is still there: is there significant justification for an ERM program? Would the 
company really make different decisions if it did have an ERM program? According to some 
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literature, a good ERM program has proven to enhance the company value through reduced 
costs, decreased variability in financial results, enhanced market reputation, and improved 
business decision-making. Such dimensions can even be measured and what is more, the 
Credit Rating Agencies have started considering these factors as part of their company 
assessment process. [8]  
3. Elements of a robust risk management framework 
Generally speaking, a robust risk management framework tackles five dimensions [9]: 
1. Organizational culture 
2. Processes 
3. Technology 
4. Risk measurement 
5. Monitoring 
3.1. Corporate governance = Positive risk culture 
Relying on strong corporate governance that diffuses a positive risk culture from the top to 
the bottom of the organization is an imperative to set up a robust risk management 
framework. Unless the employees of a firm are aligned and somehow willing to contribute 
towards improving risk management at their workplace, the organization will not be able to 
manage risk appropriately. The whole organization, from the last employee to the most 
powerful member of the Board of Directors should see some benefits in managing risk, and 
as long as this happens, a positive risk culture can be promoted across the overall 
organization.  
From another angle, a positive risk culture can also be understood as that which is 
characterized by individual accountability, creativity, transparency and honesty. As long as 
employees understand the importance of accomplishing the organization’s risk 
management approach, have a clear view of what such policies mean and believe they are 
transparent and honest, they will feel more creative and a healthy attitude of constant 
challenging of decisions and ideas will arise from them towards improvement the 
management of risk at their workplace.  
3.2. Policies = Procedures 
The second key element of a sound risk management framework is to have in place a set of 
policies and procedures, which are consistent with the organizational culture and clearly 
defined, with enough level of detail. 
In a simplified view, the output of a firm’s risk management strategy is determined by the 
balance between the firm’s commercial objectives (appetite for risk) vs. its risk contention 
goals (risk control). In other words, organizations look for profit maximization at the lowest 
risk possible. (Figure 1) 
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Figure 1. A company’s Risk Management strategy should balance its appetite for risk over its measures 
for risk control. 
Organizational processes are the means that a firm has to achieve its strategic goals. 
Therefore, firms’ corporate policies should be well assembled, known by all and periodically 
updated not only with industry best practices, but also with the new regulation. 
3.3. Data utilization = Efficient technology 
Technology is changing the way people access and exchange information [10]. Information 
related to a firm’s performance is a key success factor [11] and thus technological capability 
to extract such data can drive competitive advantage. [12]. 
Data collection and its enrichment are often tedious tasks but critical in any risk analysis 
phase. Such tasks have often a high manual processing component, which can be an 
inherent source of errors and productivity constraint. However, through technology and 
process automation, efficiency levels can significantly improve. 
Timely and accurate information ease decision making, and therefore, counting on a well 
structured information management flow that incorporates advanced technology 
developments contributes extensively towards minimizing lead times whilst increasing a 
firm’s level of pragmatism and effectiveness to meet its strategic objectives. 
Additionally, it is worth referring, not only to the information gathering and processing 
dimensions, but also to how and when the information is communicated. Only when the 
information reaches the target recipient it can be utilized and in this context it is relatively 
obvious that automation can play a key role – let’s assume that a piece of information is 
identified, checked, enriched and worked through; the outcome will only be useful if it 
reaches the right people at the right time which is achievable if there is for instance an 
automated process that can instantly distribute the information. 
3.4. Risk measurement = Value-at-risk 
The environment in which a firm operates is always subject to an uncertain level of risk, and 
it has to deal with it. A firm’s know-how to measure risk levels is one of its main assets to 
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understand to what extent it is worth to incur a certain risk and can even pre-empt a 
corporation from bankruptcy.  
There are several risk measurement techniques which have been used for long. Some of the 
most common ones in the banking industry are: 
 Size of open positions 
 Degree of maturity mismatch in the net position 
 Assets’ exposures 
The calculation of such measures often needs of many complex mathematical models. 
Furthermore, in some cases, their implementation at organizations is not easy. Therefore, 
since the late 1990s, companies have alternatively opted for another method: “Value-at-
Risk” (VaR).  
VaR calculates the risk of loss on a specific portfolio of financial assets. For a given portfolio, 
probability and time horizon, VaR is defined as a threshold value such that the probability 
that the mark-to-market loss on the portfolio over the given time horizon exceeds this value 
(assuming normal markets and no trading in the portfolio) is the given probability level [13]. 
See example in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Histogram of daily hypothetic profits and losses over a long-term contract [14] 
At this point it is worth highlighting that whilst VaR provides the quantitative perspective, 
it needs to be complemented by a more qualitative dimension resembling the market 
changes (“what-if scenarios” or “stress tests”). 
It is also worth pointing out that despite VaR is used in front of other methods which are 
perceived less powerful and more complex and difficult to understand, it is also constrained 
and only valid within a set of assumptions. This is one of the reasons why it is adviced that 
every VaR model is backtested, validating that the actual results are aligned to the forecasts. 
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3.5. Supervision = Ongoing monitoring 
The level of risk undertaken by a firm derives from its ability to monitor it. High capability 
to monitor risk helps to optimize the risk taking process. Risk monitoring should not only 
rely on the automated output of the VaR calculation, but should also be supported by a risk 
management function that is able to do a correct interpretation of the results. Risk 
monitoring aids in risk assessment and can result invaluable to senior management when 
they need to take a decision and they look for advice. 
At this point it is worth pointing out that although risk monitoring has mainly focused on 
risk avoidance, there is another dimension: “the upside” or opportunity aspects for risk. 
This dimension is scarcely looked at, but on the other hand it can, if appropriately managed, 
derive significant level of profits. 
Most frequent means to monitor risk consist on processes, reports, and discussion venues. 
However to ensure their reliability, these must be backed by a solid function of data 
management and a usable model. 
All in all, monitoring implies tracking and thus, the more effort and time consuming this 
task requires, the later the relevant information will pop up and the lower the level of 
responsiveness to potential problems. 
4. Approaching the economic crisis: 2008 – today… 
Although Risk Management has been for over a decade a central part of many 
organizations’ strategic management [15], the trend towards adoption of more sophisticated 
techniques and technology, together with the bet for new models that can improve firms’ 
Risk Management has been gaining pace. In general, the last years have seen rapid growth 
as concerns to the development and improvement of Risk Management tools which facilitate 
the evaluation of customers’ credit worthiness, prediction of customer behavior and 
propensity of default [16-21]. Until 2008, a significant amount of investigation efforts within 
the financial environment had been towards providing assistance to banking agents on their 
daily decisions [22], but with the emergence of the economic crisis, researchers and 
practitioners began to strive even further to excel at their developments and come up with 
innovative and more diversified portfolios of Risk Management tools. 
The economic downturn is seen as a worldwide phenomenon started in the US in 2008 and 
still ongoing. It is widely thought to be the result of a complex conglomerate of factors [23-
26]. (Figure 3) 
Such factors have been triggered by mistakes or defaults in Regulation and monitoring, as well 
as in the market behavior. Low interest rates jointly with financial innovation and globalization 
trends have evolved towards leverage and underestimation of liquidity and credit risk. The 
outcome of this mix has been excess indebtedness and excess asset valuation which has 
derived into a context characterized by: bankruptcy, recession, inflation, collapse in the Stock 
Markets, currency exchange volatility, dramatic decreases of monetary policy rates, slowdown 
of demand and consumption, boost of unemployment rates and shortages in profits. 
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Figure 3. Possible root causes of the crisis 
In order to recover from the crisis, regulators and country heads worldwide have convened 
on the need of regulatory changes to reform the market risk – Basel III. But restructuring the 
financial sector jointly with strengthening international regulation policies are necessary but 
not sufficient conditions to reverse the economic situation. These need to be supported by 
financial institutions’ risk management models. 
Consequently, awareness of the fact that a risk culture can constitute a very important 
safeguard against financial losses and collapse has risen amongst industry players. In 
particular, Banks and most financial entities have demonstrated particular high interest in 
the last years on the implementation of appropriate operational and control models aimed at 
an adequate management of risk. 
5. Seven dreadful mistakes in risk management 
Beyond looking at the economic crisis from a pessimistic angle, it is undeniable the 
existence of a brink of light considering the whole context – indeed the financial turmoil of 
the last years can be seen as an opportunity for change and learning from own or peer 
mistakes [27].  
 So, what are the lessons learned?  
 What have been the main mistakes that have led even former leading industry players 
to failure? (Figure 4) 
5.1. Excess = Aggressive policies in risk lending  
 “… lend, lend, lend … we’ll first get hold of the customers and afterwards make a fortune out of 
the interest rates …” 
Low interest rates
Financial innovation
Globalization
+
+
Leverage
Liquidity Risk
underestimation
Credit Risk
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+
+
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valuation
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Figure 4. Seven Dreadful Mistakes in Risk Management 
Excessive risk lending to others results in a sudden drought in available credit with 
catastrophic effects on business. Individuals are often more driven by their own interests, 
short-term impressive increases in market share and revenue, but under the assumption that 
this will continue for an indefinite period of time. Unfortunately, this attitude has a cost – 
forgetting the collective good of the whole group. 
5.2. Inefficiency = Inefficient risk scoring techniques  
“ … - This risk scoring model does not seem very accurate - … - Don’t worry, just apply the 
thumb rule - …” 
There is a high number of companies that use outdated, static or inflexible assumptions to 
elaborate their risk scoring models. It is key that such models are funded on the bases of a 
balanced combination of quantitative and qualitative data. On the one hand, quantitative 
data can be considered “the facts”, but complementarily, the use of qualitative data can 
contribute to a more flexible and dynamic risk assessment processes. 
Apart from that it is also a poor practice over-reliance on credit agency risk scoring. The 
right approach should be for companies to look for consistent and independent risk 
measurement methods, validating and challenging constantly their obtained results against 
those provided by others, for instance credit agencies. 
5.3. Faulty management = Illiquidity derived from faulty management of assets 
and passive  
“ … – ups, it seems the firm is losing liquidity – … well but competitors are going for it and as 
long as ASSETS = PASSIVE … it’s fine …”  
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Wheras risk should be aligned to capital or liquidity positions, one of the mistakes incurred 
by companies is the failure to access cross-information. Such lack of information flowing 
fluently preempts that risk is managed by incentivizing business lines and consequently, it 
cannot be ensured that internal pricing reflects the current bear risk. 
5.4. Disorders … in capital levels = Inadequate capital levels  
“ … if the capital level gets too low we’ll see later on how to inject more from another source …” 
Within an increasingly regulated market, Banks and financial institutions could be forced to 
build-up capital and liquidity buffers in the good times to secure their survival in a 
Financial Crisis. Many companies which have gone bankrupt in the last years, incurred this 
mistake and failed to have such buffers filled at the required levels. Therefore this is a clear 
area where former industry players should have learned the lesson. 
5.5. Uncovered counterpart = uncovered counterpart risk  
“ … have you considered your counterpart risk? … - Do I really need it?” 
Regardless the risk management function should be independent of day-to-day operations, 
risk components are not something that can be left out of the daily operations – risk limits, 
stop-loss limits, exposure limits and counterparty limits should be key elements covered by 
any business line and considered when defining targets and objectives.  
5.6. Too complex … = Complex valuation of structured products  
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The role of structured products is mainly aimed at the design of investment products and 
customers’ risk coverage. These products are highly subtle to market variations and 
therefore, too complex and time consuming methods for valuating these products allow 
more room for mistakes and less time to react to the volatility of the markets. 
5.7. Extreme scenarios = Lack of extreme scenarios  
“ … - what if …? - forget it; it will never happen ..” 
In a high competitive and changing environment, such as the financial sector, it’s an 
imperative for Banks and financial institutions to predict and prevent all potential 
challenges and threatening situations they may face at some point in time. Companies that 
have not defined severe, plausible and extreme scenarios in their management models have 
been more vulnerable and negatively affected by the crisis. Those organizations that have 
been better off, was because in the past the spectrum and range of possible risk scenarios 
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they considered was more complete and consequently in difficult times they have had more 
margin to react and launch mitigation actions. 
Having said this, the key to overcome such mistakes is based upon prudent management of 
risk, which entitles: 
1. An organizational culture funded on prudent risk management 
2. Prudent and anti-cyclic policies as concerns to provisions 
3. Proactive risk management initiatives covering the whole credit life cycle; putting 
special emphasis on risk admission and monitoring processes 
6. Six quick wins in risk management 
After analyzing the root causes of the economic downturn and the main mistakes, it is time 
to provide some tips that have proven to be successful for a leading European Bank that, 
despite the challenging environment, has managed to excel in performance and obtain the 
2011 Best Bank Award. 
For this player, the quality in risk management is one if its core identity signs and thus, a 
top 1 line of action. For over 150 years, The Bank has combined prudency in risk 
management and advanced risk management techniques which have fostered recurrent and 
healthy turnover and value creation for its stakeholders. 
The balance between The Bank’s appetite for risk vs. risk control is driven by its business 
model and core principles: 
 The Retail Business is the bulk of The Bank’s activity. The Bank is present worldwide 
and has significant market share (>10%) in all the main markets in which it operates. 
The Global Business practice is mainly developed in The Bank’s core markets. 
 Based upon strong capital and liquidity, The Bank’s business model enables recurrent 
profits and financial results. 
 The Bank formalizes its presence through autonomous subsidiaries, both in terms of 
capital and liquidity, compatible with a common corporate control model. The 
shareholders’ structure looks to be simple, minimizing the number of non-operative or 
instrumental subsidiaries. 
 The Bank relies on a powerful and advanced technology infrastructure and corporate 
tools – which enable an agile compilation and processing of the information – timely 
and in a standard format 
 The Bank’s activity is framed within its social and reputational commitment, fully 
aligned with its strategic objectives. 
All these principles are the main levers of The Bank’s risk management guidelines. These 
can be summarized in six quick wins that for other industry players have turned into best 
practices (Figure 5): 
1. Independent Risk Management Function 
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2. Heavily involved Executive Board 
3. Vanguard tools and systems  
4. Integrated risk control and management  
5. Sustainable risk quality 
6. Objective decisions 
 
Figure 5. Quickwins in Risk Management 
6.1. Independent risk management function 
The Risk Management function has to be separated from daily operations. In this sense, The 
Bank counts on a Risks Management Unit, with its own Head of Department reporting 
directly to the Executive Board. Such Unit is responsible for risk admission and monitoring 
processes and acts on an autonomous way and thinking Global. 
6.2. Heavily involved executive board 
The Senior Management of The Bank is aware of the importance of Risk Management and 
thus, inspires such culture and principles to the rest of the organization. 
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6.3. Vanguard tools and systems  
One of The Bank’s core principles is:  
“Technology drives Operations” 
Within the Risk Management arena, this translates into The Bank’s keenness on the use of 
vanguard tools and systems. Having the right technology allows The Bank to analyze and 
measure risks at an acceptable confidence level. 
6.4. Integrated risk control and management  
Risk must be identified, quantified and homogeneously managed according to a common 
magnitude (economic capital). The Bank tackles such risk control and management activities 
in an integrated way across the whole corporate structure:  
 every risk 
 in each Business line 
 at all geographic markets 
6.5. Sustainable risk quality 
In the last 20 years, The Bank has applied proprietary risk scoring methods to evaluate the 
risk of its customers and operations. Ensuring that The Bank does not incur risk over a pre-
defined threshold, guarantees the sustainable development of its business. 
6.6. Objective decisions 
Decisions taken must be objective, taking into account contrast of opinions and avoiding 
decision making being exclusively restricted to an individual. The Bank pursues man-
community decisions over credit operations both in the sales and risk areas. 
As the objective of this chapter is not to describe in detail each of the aforementioned risk 
management guidelines, the main takeaway is that it is indeed critical for a firm to have in 
place some sort of core principles aligning its strategic objectives with its risk management 
model. Which specific principles are best suited at each particular organization is an open 
item that requires the organization an internal analysis. 
For instance, although a risk management model could prove to be extremely successful for 
a leading player, it does not imply that the implementation of such guidelines by another 
competitor would prove the same degree of effectiveness. 
In general, following industry best practices, lead to superior results than other techniques; 
nevertheless, the achievement of enhanced performance will only come by hand of ad-hoc 
and particularized risk management strategy.  
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7. Conclusions 
This case study has outlined some reasons why Risk Management is important. Though the 
concept arised over a decade ago, the emergence of the economic crisis in 2008 has given 
thrust to organizations’ adoption of risk management policies, specifically in the financial 
sector. 
To date and during the downturn years we have evidenced common mistakes (the “seven 
dreadful mistakes”), that with the right risk management policies in place could have been 
avoided or at least ameliorated.  
Nevertheless, in the midst of pessimism and underlying financial turmoil there is still room 
for hype and there are not only lessons to learn, but also quick wins that firms can put into 
practice to ease their recovery from the current situation. 
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1. Introduction 
The Stock Exchange is a barometer of economic and financial life in any country, an 
indicator of world business and economic prospects. Its movement is reflected in the stock 
market indices that express the overall performance of the stock market or just a certain 
sector, and offers the investors the base of their investment decision on the markets. 
Therefore, the authors have proposed in this paper to summarize the results of research in 
order to highlight the most significant issues of the risk management on the Romanian 
capital market and to provide solutions to them. 
The first part highlights the role of stock market indexes in describing the state of the capital 
market, as well as the difficulties arising on their representation in the current financial and 
economic crisis. In order to reduce the risk of erroneous information to investors, the 
authors propose a composite index that summarizes the information from other indexes on 
the capital market in Romania. Finally, using the Risk Grades method, the authors make a 
comparative analysis of the risks on the Romanian capital market with those in the Czech 
Republic, Poland and USA capital markets. 
The second part outlines the main classes of risks that arise in the settlement of exchange 
transactions that dominate in the risk hierarchy of the stock operational management. After 
highlighting some international regulations on reducing the risk of stock trading settlement, 
the authors develop a broad range of solutions for reducing these risks on the Bucharest 
Stock Exchange. 
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2. Risk assessment of stock market indexes 
2.1. The role of stock market indexes 
In the economic literature, the stock exchange is often characterized as being a true "engine" 
of the economic life, which stimulates business activity and allows the development of 
large-scale investment projects. Through its existence and operation, the stock markets 
provide liquidity for financial assets, enabling the sale of securities previously purchased, 
thus turning them to money. Economic and financial crisis that has monopolized economies 
worldwide in recent years has had a negative impact on the development of stock markets. 
Thus, stock prices of large companies listed on stock exchanges fell dramatically, the 
liquidity of stock markets fell heavily, and on this basis, the transaction volume decreased 
due to the reduction of interest shown by investors and speculators. Indexes saw an overall 
decrease and a distortion of information provided to potential investors because of "interference" 
occurred in the structure of the companies participating in their training. By their developments, 
stock market indices are able to provide clues on the economic outlook whereas in countries 
with developed financial markets, leading companies have almost without exception status 
of listed companies. Thus, the indices themselves may be true barometers of economic 
development or they may be included in the calculation of aggregate economic indicators, 
with a high degree of complexity. 
Expressing the overall performance of stock markets or simply of a sector of the market, 
indices allow investors to perform analysis on yields of already performed transactions or 
on investment opportunities that may arise in the future. The existence of indices make the 
analysis of various stock markets much easier, even if the different methodologies used for 
calculating the indices affect to some extent the comparisons accuracy [1-3].  
On any stock market, the indices are a reference for each investor when assessing the quality of 
the management portfolio. Due to the fact that in many cases individual performance fail to 
exceed indices’ long-term growth rate, investors and fund managers especially were tempted 
to build their own portfolios using the precise structure and composition of the indices. 
2.2. Critical elements in building and managing indexes 
A first issue to be solved when considering the desirability of launching a stock index is if 
you choose to use a formula in the category of arithmetic or geometric average. Since the use 
of geometric replication creates difficulties when the stock index would be eligible as 
underlying for derivatives or as a benchmark for investment fund, managers will prefer to 
use a formula based on the arithmetic average. 
Also, the option to use weights in the calculation of indices involves an analysis of market 
characteristics to be described by the respective stock market index. The decision to weight 
the prices which is part of an index is itself a controversial: 
 the supporters of the unweighted variant believe that such an index only ensures equal 
treatment of each stock symbol which is part of an index; 
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 those who appreciate more weighted index say that the only way to avoid unwanted 
situation in which the relative change in price of shares issued by a company small in 
size will influence the stock index as much value as a change in the same type of the 
share price "Blue Chips". 
Another issue that arises is the choice of the weighting factor. In theory there may be 
various options for the weighting factors, but in practice have won two: 
 weighting by market capitalization (or the amount of the outstanding shares); 
 weighting the liquidity of the shares that make up a stock index. 
In the first case there is a risk that a relatively small number of companies - which have a 
market capitalization way above the market average - will decide the meaning and scope of 
developments in practice the whole index. It is a common situation in emerging markets. 
Therefore, it is often set a maximum level of the share capitalization of a single symbol that 
can play in the total capitalization of the symbols in the composition of a stock index. 
In practice, the liquidity is the most common alternative criterion to using market 
capitalization as the weighting factor. Attractiveness of the weighted indices to the liquidity 
lies in the idea that virtually any listed price of a share is a fiction as long as it materializes 
through a stock transaction. Therefore, prices become relevant only insofar as they are the 
result of a large number of transactions, which require (at least at first) the use of liquidity as 
a weighting factor in calculating the indices. The disadvantage of using liquidity as a 
weighting factor consists, however, in the presence of many differences from one day to 
another in the number of shares made with a specific symbol, which significantly alter its 
influence in the evolution of the overall index [4-5].  
In principle, a stock index is a tool for measuring aggregate price developments for the symbols 
which compose it, the sole result of supply-demand ratio of the market and the continuing 
process of reassessment of the price of each symbol individually [6-8]. Therefore is needed to 
incorporate the adjustment coefficients in the formula for calculating an index, allowing 
correction of artificial effects induced by certain events on the trading price of a symbol: 
 events which directly affect the trading price of a symbol: the provision of dividends, 
granting of rights to subscribe. 
 events that influence the number of shares taken into account: the change in share 
capital by increasing / reducing the number of the outstanding shares, split face value, 
strengthening the nominal value, granting free shares (bonus issues). 
 changes in the composition of a stock index: the inclusion of a new symbol, a symbol of 
exclusion. 
Payment of the dividends or issuing of preference rights involves reducing the value of 
traded shares of a company, unless the subscription rights have value “zero” or negative. 
When providing payment of dividends and share trading, price decrease is due to reducing 
the company's value by the amount allocated for dividends, while the rights issue of 
preference allocation occurs due to the decreased value of the company on a number of 
shares. These decreases in market value of a share are fully balanced by increasing the same 
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amount of portfolio investors as a result of amounts received as dividends or the sale of 
preference rights indices as a result of the above events has the advantage of simplicity, 
though in practice most indices are adjusted when there are such price changes. 
 Assuming that the granting of a certain amount as dividend per share produces a 
decrease in the share price with the exact amount of the dividend, the adjustment 
procedure will require adding value to the price of the stock dividend is taken when 
calculating the indices. Otherwise, you can use an adjustment factor, multiplied by the 
share price is taken when calculating the index. 
In the construction and management of indices there are other critical elements, which 
primarily aim to adapt to the concrete conditions of the stock market that they are going to 
describe. One such factor is the choice of a data base, which is preferably selected so that it 
does not belong to a period marked by turbulence or excessive volatility. As a general rule, 
the base date of an index must be chosen "in order not to overlap with a minimum or maximum 
market history”. 
The base value of an index is also an important element in building a stock index. It should be 
chosen so that the reporting of the current nominal value of an index value based may allow 
easy calculation of percentage change in that timeframe. Therefore, the most commonly 
used figures based on an index value are 100 and 1,000 points. 
In the case of adjusted indices, selecting a large number of shares to be part of an index 
basket involves assuming the possibility of relatively frequent cases of adjustment, thus 
reducing the transparency index. Also, a too extended composition raises serious problems 
for managers who use index funds as a "benchmark" or which suggest as investment 
strategy to make investments in securities index. 
If an index is used as underlying assets for the development of financial derivatives, its 
composition becomes more important. It is desirable that the selected symbols, especially 
those with high weight in the index, have a sufficiently high level of liquidity in order not to 
influence the price with the idea of obtaining a more favourable settlement value of futures 
contracts or options. The issue of settlement value of derivatives that are underlying indexes 
has been addressed and in terms of prices that are taken in calculating its value at the close 
of trading session. Intuitively, the last price recorded in a day by a certain symbol should 
generate and last values of stock market index. To avoid forcing the closure of certain levels 
of price indexes, administrators have considered closing the option that its value is 
determined either as the average of past values of the index calculated based on average 
prices in a given period time for each symbol in its composition. This concern for the 
accuracy of the closing price of the shares and hence the value of stock index led some 
stocks to decide to introduce at the end of the trading session of the tender period in which 
prices are determined on a multilateral basis, through a fixing algorithm. 
2.3. Improvement of the management of Bucharest Stock Exchange indexes 
Through the changes that were made in time upon the methodology of calculation and 
management of indices, the Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE) showed that it understands 
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their importance for the investors and the general public. However, according to the 
authors, there are still some aspects in the functioning of the indices in the future, as changes 
might occur, so that the indices calculated by the BSE to increase their representativeness 
and to become more attractive tools for use as benchmarks in management activity 
portfolio. 
The first change is imposed by the profile described by the historical values of the indices. As it 
may be seen on Figure 1, joining the five indices calculated by BSE in the same graphic 
deprives us of any opportunity to make a comparison. This is obviously due to objective 
factors, as as BET, BET-C, BET-FI, BETXT and BETNG were launched from different basic 
data. Moreover, the BET and BET-C had worked in a period when inflation was very high and 
the national currency exchange rate at the time of their release was lower than the current one. 
Therefore, it is required the denomination of all the BSE indices, so that on a specific 
reference date to have the same value for all indices. Bringing all indices at the same amount 
for a certain date, would open the way for a much easier tracking trends and comparison of 
their indices and market sectors they represent. 
 
Figure 1. BSE indices (denominated) in January 2007-8 September 2009 
To achieve this denomination, an important element consists in determining the reference 
date, which should be the first day of 2007, the day that marked the accession of Romania to 
the European Union, and thus integration of the regulated market operated by the Bucharest 
Stock Exchange in the unique European financial market. 
Once the indexes are denominated, it appears the following problem consisting in identifying 
their new base value. Since 2 January 2007 had already established that the reference date for 
two of the indices BSE - BETNG and BETXT – which were then calculated for 1000 points, a 
value which seems to be the most appropriate and which will greatly ease the adjustment 
values of Historical BET index, BET-C and BET-FI. Adjusted historical series for these three 
indices of BSE will be as one that can be quite easily associated with the original series. 
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Another problem to be solved is to develop a synthetic stock index describing the overall 
market share in Romania, as the Bucharest Stock Exchange also calculates a number of 
indices for Rasdaq: RAQ-I, RAQ-II and RASDAQ-C (which is a composite index). 
One of the main concerns of a stock market operator is to identify the most effective means 
by which information about the activities of the regulated market that he manages, reaches 
the participants, from potential investors or the general public. Indexes are highly effective 
tools in promoting or communication, and that is why special attention should always be 
given to their management. Regardless of the methodology used, the scope or the "brand" 
adopted, the indexes must reflect as closely as the stock market developments in a given 
period of time, and the investors and the general public should recognize this status. 
Therefore, we believe that the stock market in Romania would be even discussed whether to 
outsource the work associated with the major indexes by a specialized international 
company to calculate and disseminate indexes. Market indexes license is highly specialized, 
with a relatively small number of participants. Therefore, "rebranding" of BSE indices under 
the name of one of the leading players in this market (Dow Jones, FTSE or MSCI) it would 
significantly increase the international exposure of local indexes. 
2.4. Construction of a synthetic index for the stock market in Romania 
Currently, the shares of the Romanian companies are traded in two distinct market sectors 
(BSE - regulated market and Rasdaq), with the chance to add another market (alternative 
trading system). For historical, but also technical reasons, the two market sectors are 
currently covered by two families of indices: 
- “BET index family”, for the regulated market; 
- “Rasdaq index family”, for the RASDAQ section. 
Therefore, as stated, there is not a single synthetic indicator to describe the evolution of 
prices in the two market segments. Furthermore, in the "BET index family" there is a 
composite index, BET-C that does not include in its membership the five SIF symbols. So, 
even the most comprehensive index of the regulated market does not include the five most 
liquid stock market symbols, which normally accounts for almost half of the total 
transactions on the BSE [9].  
That is why, it is necessary to create a more comprehensive stock index, which describes the 
overall evolution of the quotations for all shares traded on markets and market sections 
administered by the BSE. A possible name for this could be ALL-X, and that structure will 
be an "index of indices". 
Once the objective is defined and the name is established, the next step is to clarify the 
composition of such an index, so there is no overlap, but at the same time to remain as few 
"areas" uncovered as well. From the analysis of the five indices of the “BET family” and all 
three of the "RASDAQ family” it is very clear that the optimal variant is that the 
composition of ALL-X to enter the next three BSE indices: 
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BET-C: reflects the price development of all companies listed on regulated market, Category 
I and Category II, except for the SIFs. BET-C is a price index weighted by market 
capitalization of companies in its composition. The maximum weight of a symbol in the 
BET-C composition is 20% 
BET-FI: reflects the overall trend in the shares prices issued by the five financial investment 
companies (SIF) on the regulated market. The maximum weight of a symbol in the 
composition of the BET-FI is 25% 
RASDAQ-C: includes all the shares traded on the "RASDAQ market" and follows the 
synthesized global trend in prices. 
Regarding the topic, the fact that the Rasdaq-C index is calculated at the end of the trading 
session (and not in real time) also requires that the ALL-X index to be calculated with the 
same frequency. 
Also, the type of formula chosen is relatively simple, since all three indices (Ii) use the 
arithmetic average. Therefore, the ALL-X index will use the same formula - weighted 
arithmetic average, as the relative importance of the three indices in the general stock 
market in Romania is very different, both in terms of market capitalization and liquidity of 
the shares in their composition. Therefore, it is necessary to use a weighted arithmetic 
average. 
For the price index, the most frequent weighting factors (Pi,t) are either capitalization or 
liquidity. Since all of the three indexes found in the composition of ALL-X are capitalization-
weighted price index, at least apparently the natural alternative is to use the same weighting 
criteria: capitalization. Moreover, the choice of the capitalization weighting factor ensures 
that the advantage of not requiring frequent rebalancing for an investor who decides to 
adopt a passive investment strategy in relation to the ALL-X index. 
Through its coverage, the ALL-X index will create replication difficulties. Therefore, in its 
construction, the focus should be on its descriptive issues and less on the investment. 
Consequently, it becomes important to find a variant that takes into account the weighting 
of liquidity, which has the disadvantage that the index can cause daily changes without 
evidence of membership to undergo changes, or changes in scope than the other induced 
increases or decreases in the BET-C index, BET-FI and Rasdaq-C. Such a compromise 
version could be given to the establishment of fixed predetermined weighting factors, which 
remain unchanged for a defined period of two consecutive data adjustment index ALL-X 
(one quarter). 
In calculating these predetermined weighting factors, both the capitalization and liquidity 
will be taken into account. The formula for calculating the determining factors will be: 
    ,
2
Ui ViPi t                                           (1) 
where: 
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Ui is the weight that the capitalization of the symbols within Ii index holds in the total 
capitalization of the market, at the time of reference; 
Vi is the weight that the value of transactions with the symbols of the Ii index holds in the 
total market turnover in the reference period (quarterly). 
To ensure a unified form to display all BSE indices, will opt for the next version of the 
equivalent representation: 
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where: 
Pt,i: weighting factor at time T, associated with each index in the composition of ALL-X; 
Ii,t: ALL-X indices, at time T (BET-C, BET-FI, Rasdaq-C). 
To ensure the possibility to compare the new ALL-X index with the main stock market 
index, BET, the start value will be 2901.10 points and the start date will be fixed for 
31.12.2008. The calculation of the weighting factor, Pi,t, will be done quarterly, on the last 
trading day of the final month of the quarter, and will enter into force on the first trading 
session of the next quarter [10].  
The main advantage of building the index ALL-X is that it can be obtained a simple and 
effective tool to provide an overview of the entire stock market development in Romania. 
The index is limited to the evolution of shares issued by the Romanian companies, while 
any direct influence induced by the prices movement of foreign securities admitted to 
trading on domestic capital market was being removed from the beginning. 
In the presented form, ALL-X index is defined primarily as a descriptive index and less like 
an investment. This deficiency can be corrected later, to the extent that the BSE will decide to 
use the same calculation methodology for all its indices, regardless of the section or market 
segment that is addressed: regulated market, Rasdaq market or alternative trading system. 
Moreover, in order to emphasize the character of investment, it will be necessary to modify 
the weighting factor (which may become the capitalization of each index), as well as the 
dates when its new value is calculated and effective. 
To calculate the ALL-X index values retrospectively, after the release date was determined 
(December 31, 2008) and the reference value at that time (2901.10 points), the first step is to 
determine the Ui and Vi factors for the first quarterly interval (January-March 2009). To this 
end it will determine: 
- capitalization associated to the symbols in the composition of the BET-C index, BET-FI 
and Rasdaq-C on the last trading sessions of December 2008, March 2009, June 2009, 
September 2009 December 2009, March 2010, June 2010, September 2010 and December 
2010 (RON);  
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Date BET-C BET-FI Rasdaq-C 
23-Dec-08 25,441,147,900 1,715,098,084 12,099,865,129 
31-Mar-09 20,494,699,824 1,473,851,929 11,799,297,770 
30-Jun-09 28,577,557,323 2,276,366,573 12,359,818,473 
30-Sep-09 35,329,737,297 3,454,691,266 12,868,187,477 
24-Dec-09 35,313,895,995 3,264,425,651 12,346,442,408 
31-Mar-10 46,106,028,659 4,391,516,633 14,104,548,987 
30-Jun-10 36,894,347,800 2,715,614,092 11,065,581,044 
30-Sep-10 41,488,093,266 3,282,932,587 11,556,865,887 
30-Dec-10 41,901,691,868 3,004,035,475 10,832,645,290 
Table 1. Capitalization associated to the symbols in the composition of the BSE indices 
- liquidity (total amount in RON) associated to the symbols in the composition of the 
BET-C index, BET-FI and Rasdaq-C in Quarter IV 2008, Quarter I 2009, Quarter II 2009, 
Quarter III 2009, Quarter IV 2009, Quarter I 2010, Quarter II 2010, Quarter III 2010 and 
Quarter IV 2010 (RON).  
 
Period BET-C BET-FI Rasdaq-C 
Oct - Dec 2009 435,647,850.34 468,296,885.00 186,402,641.20 
Ian - Mar 2009 423,175,985.74 203,780,032.70 86,885,606.44 
Apr - Jun 2009 668,823,417.53 658,946,311.40 102,202,564.63 
Jul - Sep 2009 600,539,594.05 728,518,117.60 94,069,608.81 
Oct - Dec 2009 485,044,466.85 691,750,042.50 113,518,426.21 
Jan - Mar 2010 691,952,816.70 735,425,007.50 148,602,226.21 
Apr - Jun 2010 695,515,698.95 1,039,348,556.50 130,801,236.36 
Jul - Sep 2010 331,670,219.85 407,212,194.50 57,407,872.87 
Oct - Dec 2010 352,178,129.60 304,259,023.50 87,486,365.49 
Table 2. Liquidity associated to the symbols in the composition of the BSE indices 
Based on the data presented in the previous tables, we will calculate the following elements: 
- weights associated with each index in the total capitalization for each final quarter; 
 
Period BET-C BET-FI Rasdaq-C 
Jan - Mar 2009 64.81 hicag30.82 30.82 
Apr - Jun 2009 60.69 4.36 34.94 
Jul - Sep 2009 66.13 5.27 28.60 
Oct - Dec 2009 68.40 6.69 24.91 
Jan - Mar 2010 69.35 6.41 24.24 
Apr - Jun 2010 71.37 6.80 21.83 
Jul - Sep 2010 72.81 5.36 21.84 
Oct - Dec 2010 73.65 5.83 20.52 
Table 3. Weights associated to the BSE indices in total capitalization (%) 
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- weights associated with each index in the total liquidity for each quarter; 
 
Period BET-C BET-FI Rasdaq-C 
Ian - Mar 2009 39.95 42.95 17.10 
Apr - Jun 2009 59.28 28.55 12.17 
Jul - Sep 2009 46.77 46.08 7.15 
Oct - Dec 2009 42.20 51.19 6.61 
Jan - Mar 2010 37.59 53.61 8.80 
Apr - Jun 2010 37.28 55.71 7.01 
Jul - Sep 2010 41.65 51.14 7.21 
Oct - Dec 2010 47.34 40.90 11.76 
Table 4. Weights associated to the BSE indices in total liquidity (%) 
Once the weights are determined, it will be necessary to calculate the weighting factors in 
the composition of each ALL-X index for each quarter: 
 
Period BET-C BET-FI Rasdaq-C 
 Ui Vi Pi Ui Vi Pi Ui Vi Pi 
Ian - Mar 2009 0.6481 0.3995 0.5238 0.0437 0.4295 0.2366 0.3082 0.1710 0.2396 
Apr - Jun 2009 0.6069 0.5928 0.5999 0.0436 0.2855 0.1646 0.3494 0.1217 0.2356 
Jul - Sep 2009 0.6613 0.4677 0.5645 0.0527 0.4608 0.2567 0.2860 0.0715 0.1787 
Oct - Dec 2009 0.6840 0.4220 0.5530 0.0669 0.5119 0.2894 0.2491 0.0661 0.1576 
Ian - Mar 2010 0.6935 0.3759 0.5347 0.0641 0.5361 0.3001 0.2424 0.0880 0.1652 
Apr - Jun 2010 0.7137 0.4391 0.5764 0.0680 0.4666 0.2673 0.2183 0.0943 0.1563 
Jul - Sep 2010 0.7281 0.3728 0.5504 0.0536 0.5571 0.3053 0.2184 0.0701 0.1442 
Oct - Dec 2010 0.7365 0.4165 0.5765 0.0583 0.5114 0.2848 0.2052 0.0721 0.1386 
Table 5. Weighting factors Pi,t 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of the ALL-X index vs. Evolution of BET index (Jan. 2009 – Dec. 2010) 
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The biggest weight in the ALL-X index is given by the BET-C composite index. The values of 
Pi,t associated with the BET-C for the full period 2009-2010 ranged between 0.5 and 0.6 
percent. 
2.5. Risk assessment indices 
Stock markets investors constantly face several risks, which is why researchers have focused 
their concerns on issues related to developing risk management improved models of 
assessment and management. Among the latest methods used in economic practice in 
assessing risk in financial markets the method Value at Risc (VaR) is required [11].  
Risk Grades indicator provides a synthetic image of the risk associated with a certain 
financial security, a portfolio or an index. This new way of measuring volatility is based on 
exactly the same data and analysis as VaR, while making it possible to translate the Risk 
Grades estimates in terms of VaR. Furthermore, Risk Grades methodology is intended to be 
more intuitive and easier to use than VaR. The characteristics of the Risk Grades are: 
 It is a dynamic method of measurement that adjusts to the market conditions 
 Allows comparison between different investment classes, regions and different areas, is 
a standardized method of measuring volatility 
 Allows comparison of different market indices. 
The Risk Grades formula for the financial asset i is: 
 ( )  100
i
i
base
RiskGrades x

                             (3) 
where: σi the volatility of the financial asset “i” 
 σbase the base volatility  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Evolution of DJIA between 1 Jan 2006 – 30 Dec. 2010 
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To determine the Risk Grades values associated to the main indices calculated by the BSE 
(BET, BET-FI, BET-C) it will be considered a decay factor λ = 0.98, which corresponds to a 
minimum number of records n = ln (0.1)/ln (λ) of 113. The series of values for indexes is 1 
January 2008 to 30 December 2010 and the index used as reference for determining the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) is σbase. 
We can notice in the above chart the negative effects of the financial crisis that occurred on 
the DJIA mainly by early 2009, when the North American stock market indexes registered 
multi-minimum (on 9 March 2009, the DJIA was calculated for 6547 points). Choosing the 
interval 1 January 2009 to 30 Dec.2010 for the series of values Risk Grades indices used in 
the calculation took into account to cover both a pronounced downward trend of the DJIA 
index and an increasing trend after March 9 2009. 
 
Figure 4. Risk Grades values for BSE indexes between 21 May 2009 - 30 Dec.2010 
The Risk Grades values determined for the BSE indexes confirms that the Romanian capital 
market is riskier than the North American capital market. Besides that, as one can notice 
from the above chart, the Risk Grades values of the ALL-X index are consistently positioned 
below the BET-FI sector index and above the associated BET and BET-C. 
If decay factor λ = 0,96 was chosen, the minimum number of records that we need is 228, 
sufficient for our purpose, consisting in comparing the risk associated with the capital 
market in Romania with those determined for other international stock markets or within 
the region. 
In order to make a comparative analysis of the risks on the Romanian capital market and the 
main indexes of the Central and Eastern Europe we took into consideration the main 
indexes of Poland and the Czech Republic capital markets, meaning the WIG20 and the PX. 
The WIG20 index is the underlying instrument for futures transactions listed on the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange and represents a modified capitalization-weighted index of 20 Polish stocks 
which are listed on the main market. The base value was set to 1000 points in April 16th 1994. 
The WIG20 index may not include more than 5 companies from a single exchange sector 
ALL-X BET BET-C BETFI
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and limits the maximum weight of one symbol included in the WIG20 to 15%. Currently, the 
most important companies included in the WIG20 index are PKO BP, KGHM, DAM and 
Bank Pekao.  
The PX Index is an index of major stocks that trade on the Prague Stock Exchange. The 5th of 
April 1994 was selected as the starting exchange day (a benchmark date) for the Index PX 50 
and its opening value was fixed at 1,000 points. At this time the index included 50 
companies traded on the Prague Stock Exchange, accordingly named PX 50. In 20 March 
2006 the PX 50 index was merged with PX-D into the PX index, having now 14 symbols of 
the Prague stock market in its composition. The maximum weight for a stock symbol 
included in PX was set to 20% and from the companies included in the PX index the most 
important are CEZ, Comercni Banka, Erste Group Bank and Telefonika. 
 
Figure 5. Risk Grades values for the main indexes in the region between 21 May 2009 - 30 Dec.2010 
When comparing the Risk Grades values of WIG20 index of the Warsaw Stock Exchange 
and of PX index of the Prague Stock Exchange with those of the Romanian Stock Exchange 
(see figure 5), we reach a surprisingly conclusion, that the Risk Grades values calculated for 
the main indexes in the Central and Eastern Europe do not show major differences. 
Although constantly the Risk Grades values are above those associated with the WIG20 and 
PX index, the difference is very small [12].  
3. Risk management in settlement of stock transactions 
3.1. Clearing and settlement of stock market transactions 
The risks managed by Institutions such as market operators, clearing houses and central 
depositories are not less important, but are maybe less visible to the public.  
It is known that stock market transactions are followed by a mutual transfer of ownership 
from seller to buyer, and the amount of money equivalent, from buyer to seller. Clearing 
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and settlement take into account that transfers of financial instruments and financial funds 
between parties are to be performed safely and with little cost. 
To prevent and to reduce the risks specific to the settlement of financial instruments 
transactions, direct access to clearing and settlement system is limited to those participants 
who meet a set of capitalization criteria, operational capacity and professional experience, 
which means that the settlement of an exchange transaction involves a given number of 
financial intermediaries. The more financial intermediaries are involved in the settlement of 
financial instruments transactions, the more complex is the settlement process. 
3.1.1. Clearing and settlement stages 
Clearing and settlement process begins immediately after a transaction with financial 
instruments is closed and goes through the following main steps: 
 Confirming the terms in which the deal was closed between the buyer and seller. 
Confirmation of transactions can be conducted directly between parties or using a system 
that generates such an acknowledgment. In the latter case, the terms of the transaction can 
be transmitted to the central system or automatically by the trading system, or separately 
by each party. Although apparently it is just a formality, confirmation of transactions is a 
significant milestone in the process of completing a stock transaction, since it can identify 
in due time differences that may affect the proper functioning of the system. 
 Compensation is an algorithm of obligations and / or rights accrued to the participant, 
after transactions were inserted in the system and confirmed. Usually, the calculation of 
obligations and rights of a participant can be made on a gross basis for the settlement of 
transactions, based on a bilateral net or multilateral net basis. Therefore, the calculation 
algorithm can result in one or more instructions to participants in the system that have 
to be respected. Only in the case of net multilateral compensation, the calculation 
algorithm results for each participant in only one instruction, that expresses (cash 
settlement level) either the obligation/ write to pay/ receive a certain amount. 
 The settlement itself, which is composed of:  
 obligation to deliver securities: falls to the seller that is part of a transaction or to 
the participant in the settlement that is in the position of a net debtor for a 
particular security; 
 obligation to pay an equivalent amount: falls to the buyer that is part of 
transaction or to the participant in the settlement with a debtor net quality in 
respect to financial funds. 
The last stages of the settlement imply the highest financial risk throughout the process of 
finalizing exchange transactions, one of the main criteria that measures the performance of a 
clearing system and securities settlement transactions refers to the method the connection 
between the mechanism of transfer of securities (obligation to deliver) and transfer mechanism 
of funds (payment required) is made. The systems within which the permanent transfer of 
securities are to take place, subject to an exchange transaction, only if the final and irrevocable 
payment of amounts is made, fulfilling one of the main conditions to measure performance: 
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delivery versus payment (Delivery Versus Payment - DVP). By using mechanisms that ensure 
DVP, one eliminates the most important component of all financial risks that accompany the 
settlement of transactions with financial instruments: principal risk. 
3.2. Risks in clearing and settlement systems 
As presented before, between the moment a transaction with financial instruments is closed 
and the ownership transfer certain stages are to be completed in a given time frame. The 
following risks are present and occur: 
CREDIT RISK, implies the possibility that one side of a transaction might not honor its 
obligations, or after maturity, in whole or in part. Types of credit risk: 
 Principal risk: is a consequence of time the difference between payment and delivery of 
securities as part of an exchange transaction. In case bankruptcy occurs between the 
two moments or insolvency of one parties involved in the settlement of that transaction, 
it is possible for one party to incur a loss equal to the transaction left unsettled. If such a 
risk occurs, the buyer might find itself in the position of having the financial securities 
acquired through market transactions paid, while the counterparty is no longer able to 
deliver those securities. The risk of the principal, from the perspective of the seller is 
described by the situation in which financial instruments have been delivered, but the 
buyer no longer has the opportunity to order the payment to the seller. 
 Replacement Cost Risk: refers to a situation where before a final settlement between 
the parties involved in securities transaction may not be able to complete the initial 
negotiated market transaction settlement, thus requiring a replacement of that 
transaction. Thus, parties’ involved in a transaction are equally exposed to loss due to 
the price change of the security that was object of the original transaction, the time 
interval between the time the original transaction (but not settled) and the transaction 
time for the replacing one. The buyer involved in a transaction takes over the risk 
associated with the replacement cost if the initial price of the transaction performed 
with a particular security is below the market price of that financial instrument once the 
transaction shall take place. Looking at the situation from the seller’s point of view, the 
same type of risk occurs when the transaction replacement loss is concluded at a price 
lower than that of the original transaction. The size of the losses due to the risk 
associated with the replacement of a stock transaction is directly proportional to the 
volatility of the securities that were part of the original transaction and with the time 
between the date of completion of the transaction and the time of the final settlement. 
The shorter this time frame is, the lower the probability for the risk to materialize. 
LIQUIDITY RISK refers to the situation where the seller of certain financial securities does 
not receive on the settlement date the amount from the buyer and thus he finds himself in a 
position to borrow or sell other financial assets to honor at its turn various other obligations 
assumed in view of collecting amounts from the original sale of securities. Liquidity risk 
arises in the case of the buyer as well if upon settlement it does not receive the securities 
purchased that were possibly involved in a transaction following the initial sale. The size of 
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the liquidity risk is inversely proportional to market liquidity: the more liquid the market is, 
the lower the liquidity risk costs are. Liquidity problems have a high potential to have 
negative influences on the entire settlement system, especially when occurring amid high 
volatility of shares market and any delay in completion of the settlement by a participant 
thus raising concerns about solvency. 
SYSTEMIC RISK refers to cascade spreading of a situation when settlement is impossible, 
from one participant to the clearing - settlement system to other members in the system (or 
all participants in the system). Institutions that operate clearing and settlement of exchange 
transactions are required to provide mechanisms and procedures to prevent expansion of 
liquidity or solvency problems from one participant to the whole system. Investor 
confidence in post-transaction systems is essential for liquidity growth of the stock market 
and is a prerequisite to entering a virtuous circle: a more liquid market significantly reduces 
the impact of risks that may arise in clearing and settlement system, which is reflected in 
increased market liquidity. 
OPERATIONAL RISK implies that defective processing of transactions by participants in a 
settlement system, failure of transactions, fraud, disruption of communications or any other 
operating problems turn into financial losses. 
Depending on the structure of clearing - settlement systems and transaction type, there 
might also be other risk categories, such as bankruptcy risks of the settlement bank, legal 
risk or custody risk. The probability that one or other of the above risks could materialize 
depends substantially on the following two main factors: 
 implementation of strict procedures to control risks in the clearing and settlement of 
securities transactions, procedures known collectively as "risk management"; 
 operation plan of the clearing and settlement system of transactions with financial 
instruments. 
3.3. Recommendations on the clearing and settlement systems to reduce risks 
Materialization of risks in clearing and settlement operations may have significant negative 
influences on a country's entire financial system [13].  
Moreover, given the internationalization of financial flows, where some of the affected 
participants in a clearing and settlement system operate simultaneously in multiple markets 
or operational links exist between two or more national clearing and settlement systems, this 
may cause contamination and spread of local problems internationally. Thus a set of 
recommendations was elaborated by specialized international institutions. 
3.3.1. G30 recommendations 
“G30 Recommendations” consists of a set of nine recommendations that should be 
implemented by all settlement systems: 
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 Confirmation of all transactions must be achieved by all direct participants in the 
market (for example: brokers/ brokers/dealers and other members) in T+0. Details of all 
confirmed transactions must be transmitted to clearing – settlement system. 
 Indirect market participants (e.g. institutional investors) should be informed on the 
implementation details of transactions in T +1. 
 Every country should have an operational central securities depository, organized and 
managed so as to encourage activity of the direct and indirect market participants. The 
range of financial instruments eligible to be registered in the central depository must be 
broad. Preserving or dematerializing financial instruments should be as extensive as 
possible. If on the same market there are several depositors, they should operate on the 
basis of compatible rules and practices, in order to reduce settlement risk and to allow 
use of funds and make available any financial securities pledged as collateral in an 
efficient manner. 
 Each market should be encouraged to reduce settlement risk by introducing "gross 
settlement in real time" mechanisms (Real Time Gross Settlement - RTGS) or by using 
compensation based on transactions that meet Lamfalussy recommendations. 
 DVP system should be used as a method of settlement for all transactions. DVP is 
defined as "simultaneous dismissal, final, irrevocable and immediate securities and 
funds continuously throughout the day." 
 Payments related to settlement of securities transactions and using a financial 
instrument portfolio should target all markets and financial instruments, the adoption 
of the "Same day fund" Convention. 
 A single cycle of implementation of the settlement should be adopted for all markets. 
Final settlement for all transactions should be made no later than T +3. 
 Loans of financial instruments should be encouraged as a method of developing 
financial instruments transactions settlement. Barriers and taxes that limit loan of 
financial instruments should be removed. 
Each country should develop a standard for messages related to financial instruments based 
on ISO Standard 7775. In particular, each country should adopt the ISIN coding system for 
securities, as specified in ISO Standard 6166. 
3.3.2. CPSS – IOSCO recommendations 
CPSS (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems) - IOSCO (International Organization 
of Securities Commissions) recommendations, completed in 2001, take and develop 
provisions of G30 recommendations, adapting them to the important changes occurring in 
the securities industry in recent years, but adding new ones. 
1. The legal system: the settlement of transactions with financial instruments must have a 
solid legal framework, clear and transparent. 
2. Confirming transactions: Confirming transactions between direct market participants 
should be completed as soon as possible after the time transactions are executed, but 
not later than the end of the trading day (T +0). When it is necessary to confirm the 
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transaction by indirect market participants (such as for institutional investors or global 
custodians), it must take place as soon as possible after execution of the transaction, 
preferably "T 0", but not later the "T +1". 
3. The settlement cycle: settlement transactions mechanisms must adopt the system by 
which the value date is set after a specified number of days from trade date ("rolling 
settlement system"). Final settlement must be made no later than "T +3". Costs and 
benefits of a shorter settlement cycle than "T +3" should be carefully evaluated. 
4. Central counterparty (CCP): costs and benefits of central counterparty mechanism 
should be evaluated. The introduction of this mechanism should always be 
accompanied by control of risk assumed by the institution which provides central 
counterparty services. 
5. Loan instruments: lending of financial instruments (REPO contracts or other equivalent 
transactions) should be encouraged to streamline the process of settlement of transactions. 
Barriers that inhibit the use of loan activities for this purpose should be eliminated. 
6. Central Depository (CSD): Preserving or dematerializing of securities and their transfer 
through electronic registration account must be used as widely as possible. 
7. Delivery versus payment (DVP): CSDs should eliminate principal risk by linking the 
transfer of financial instruments and transfer of equivalent financial funds so as to 
achieve delivery against payment (DVP). 
8. Complete Settlement: Completion settlement must take place no later than the end date 
of settlement. Successful settlement on the basis of a real-time settlement mechanism 
should be considered. 
9. Risk control: CSD providing credit facilities to participants, including CSDs that operate 
net settlement systems, should establish control of risks, ensuring at least successful 
settlement if the participant with the largest payment obligation can settle the payment. 
The best way to control risks involves the adoption of a set of measures that combine 
the use of collateral to limit exposure. 
10. Settlement money: Assets used for last payment obligation securities transactions 
should carry little risk or not be at all affected by credit risk or liquidity risk. If 
settlement scheme does not involve any use of central bank resources, measures should 
be taken to protect settlement system members of potential losses and liquidity 
constraints that may occur due to risk cash settlement agent used to complete 
transactions with financial instruments. 
11. Operational Safety: Sources of operational risk arising in the clearing and settlement 
should be identified and minimized by adopting an appropriate architecture for the 
system, through control and adoption of specific procedures. Systems must be safe and 
have adequate capacity. Action plans and emergency back-up should allow recovery of 
data and timely completion of settlement. 
12. Protect investors’ portfolio: Entities that have custody of financial instruments must use 
specific procedures to ensure full protection of investors' portfolio. It is essential to have 
investors' portfolios protected from creditors' claims on the entity that retains custody 
of financial instruments. 
13. Access: CSDs and CCPs should have objective and transparent criteria established for 
participants, allowing fair and open access to the system.  
 
Risk Management on the Romanian Capital Market 347 
14. Efficiency: Without affecting operations safety, securities settlement systems should 
ensure efficiency in terms of costs incurred by participants. 
15. Communication standards and procedures: settlement systems securities transactions 
must use or adopt procedures and standards to facilitate communication to facilitate 
efficient cross-border transactions. Providing conditions for all participants to 
communicate in a fast, safe and clear manner is of the outmost importance for the 
functioning of clearing and settlement systems. It is therefore recommended for all 
participants in the system to know and to use standard procedures in relation to the 
messages content, securities identification or other participants. In cross-border 
transactions is advisable to use international standards: ISO 6166 and ISO15022. 
16. Transparency: CSDs and CCPs should provide participants enough information for 
them to identify and evaluate risks and costs of using services provided by the central 
depository and central counterparty. 
17. Supervision: settlement systems securities transactions should be subject to transparent 
and effective supervision. Central banks and capital market supervisory authorities 
must work together or with other authorities with competence in the field. 
18. Risks associated with trans-border connections between central securities depositories. 
The CSD that establish inter-connections with another CSD to make cross-border 
transactions must design and operate such connections so as to reduce specific risks of 
cross-border settlements. Cross-border transactions carry most of and the most complex 
risks that you may encounter when conducting capital market investments. Besides, the 
costs of performing such transactions are not reduced. To reduce risks and costs 
involved in carrying out cross-border transactions of financial instruments that 
otherwise would be borne solely by investors; institutions responsible for the successful 
settlement of the different countries were involved in establishing relationships to 
facilitate these operations. Achieving inter-connections between different systems 
operated by Central Depository make life easier for cross-border investors, but involves 
close monitoring of such risks if transferred from investors to administrators of clearing 
and settlement systems. 
3.4. Risk management of settlement transactions at the Bucharest Stock Exchange  
The services traditionally offered by stock exchanges refer to admission to the stock 
exchange of the issuing companies, establishing criteria for maintaining a particular security 
traded, disseminating for the public such stock exchange market information, especially for 
ensuring mechanisms to concentrate liquidity for a particular security. But continuously 
exchanges were directly interested in the whole building technical and institutional 
infrastructure to ensure safe completion and cost of transactions traded on the stock market. 
Therefore, some scholarships have created their own departments through which to work 
out the full range of post trading: clearing, settlement and registration. This was the case 
with the Bucharest Stock Exchange, which since the resumption of operations (in 1995) has 
provided all operators on the stock market clearing and settlement services [14]. 
For settlement of stock exchange transactions, BSE chose from the beginning a variant of 
Model 2 settlement, which requires multilateral clearing and final settlement of funds applied 
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to the net basis, followed by settlement of securities traded, settlement being applied to the 
gross. The modular structure of the electronic system of BSE that includes trading module, 
clearing and settlement module and registry module allowed real-time interaction between 
each of these components, which provided a minimum exposure of the system to operational 
risk. The settlement cycle used in the stock market in Romania is "T +3" and the final 
settlement of funds is performed in a separate section of the national payment system (ReGIS), 
BSE being authorized by the NBR as a inter-banking clearing house since June 9, 1997. 
This brief presentation of the clearing and settlement of BSE is only an overview of its main 
features without revealing all relations established between participants on the stock market 
from the moment the transaction was closed on the exchange floor until settlement, meaning 
until the buyer settles all payment obligation according to the contract and the obligation to 
deliver the securities according to the contract stipulations, accrued to the buyer. To 
facilitate understanding of information flow that constitutes the transaction settlement 
system on the BSE it is useful to first review the following terms: 
 Trading Report: is that statement issued by BSE with terms and conditions of sale 
contracts of financial instruments concluded on the Exchange floor at a certain date, 
called the trade date; 
 Compensation Report: is that document issued by BSE reflecting financial obligations 
and rights of company's financial instruments or custodian agent resulting from the 
transaction; 
 Report of Settlement: is that document issued by the Bucharest Stock Exchange 
outlining duties and the pay of brokers or custodian agent, resulting from clearing 
transactions; 
 Settlement Banking Report: is that document issued by the Bucharest Stock Exchange 
based on the settlement report that outlines the duties and financial rights of each 
participating bank and brokers that have an open settlement bank account; 
 Balance for final settlement: the document issued by the Bucharest Stock Exchange, 
upon which BSE is entitled to introduce in ReGIS the payment instructions for 
settlement to be applied to the net basis. 
3.4.1. Participants in the clearing and settlement system 
Bucharest Stock Exchange is at the heart of the whole system of securities transactions 
settlement concluded on the stock market, interacting with each of the participants in the 
system: 
 intermediaries: are financial investment companies (SSIF) and credit institutions that 
have the right to trade on the BSE; 
 custodian agencies registered with BSE; 
 clearing participants: banks are authorized by the National Bank as credit institutions, 
that have a settlement contract with BSE, ReGIS participation contract and a set up and 
enforce securities agreement with NBR. Intermediaries have opened settlement 
accounts for exchange transactions at the level of the clearing participants. 
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 National Bank of Romania, which is the administrator of the Settlement Express 
Transfer (ReGIS) system within which the clearing participants hold settlement 
accounts and participate in the financial settlement transactions of securities concluded 
with BSE. 
3.4.2. Settlement mechanism 
Information flow and all the activities leading to successful settlement is achieved over three 
days (T +3). Presented sequentially, the process is done through the following steps: 
1. After the trading session is closed, the Stock Exchange prepares the Compensation 
Report and the Settlement Report related to securities transactions executed by each 
intermediary. Intermediaries and custodians registered with BSE agents are required to 
confirm the next day, the contents of clearing and settlement reports. 
2. BSE will issue and send by fax with delivery receipt or secured e-mail to the clearing 
participants (settlement banks) all bank settlement reports. 
3. Participants in the clearing and settlement system managed by BSE are required to 
check the reports taken from BSE system. If participants in the clearing and settlement 
system managed by BSE object to the reports, they will communicate this in writing to 
BSE. After complaints are settled by BSE staff and reports are amended by BSE, 
documents and operations resume the circuit described above and the brokers modified 
reports, custodians and that participants will be forwarded by the BSE in the same day. 
If no objections are raised regarding the data presented in the reports provided by BSE, 
these are considered to be confirmed. 
4. On transaction settlement date (T+3), debtor clearing participants will confirm BSE their 
consent to participate in the settlement, according to the amounts recorded in the Bank 
Settlement Report, by fax with delivery note or secured e-mail system. Also, participants 
will set up deposits equal to the net amount to be paid, in ReGIS in favour of BSE. 
5. Based on the final Settlement Balance, BSE will initiate the payment instruction to settle 
all net positions. 
6. National Bank will confirm to Bucharest Stock Exchange that final settlement was 
concluded by sending the document “Settlement report of net positions”. 
7. After payment confirmation is received, BSE will transfer financial instruments from 
the sellers’ accounts to the buyers, according to the concluded transactions. This will be 
accompanied by sending a message confirming to all clearing participants that 
settlement transaction was closed. 
Workflow described above is one in which all intermediaries and settlement system clearing 
participants honor their obligations that arise from the exchange transactions. Efficiency of 
clearing and settlement system is checked, but especially when during the settlement cycles 
a situation where one (or more) of the participants in the system cannot fulfil obligations. To 
prevent such situations and to solve them when they manifest, clearing and settlement 
system of the BSE has established a risk management mechanism. 
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3.4.3. Risk management 
Risks that can disrupt the transactions settlement flow have been identified both at the level 
of the brokers and custodian (first layer) and the clearing participants (second floor). 
Consequently, risk management measures are structured on two levels:  
 Risk management measures managed exclusively by BSE; 
 Risk management measures managed together with NBR. 
The main instruments to manage risk, available to BSE are the following: 
1. In order to limit default exposure on brokers’ obligations, BSE sets through procedures 
a trading limit for each broker. 
2. To limit exposure in case of no payment, BSE ask from clearing participants and brokers 
to give priority to clearing and disbursement of amounts necessary to cover their debit 
positions. 
3. If it is found that upon settlement date, the participant to the clearing and settlement 
system managed by BSE has limited solvability to cover payment obligations, the 
clearing participant with whom the broker holds an account may proceed to grant 
credit, under an agreement signed in advance. 
4. If the clearing participant grants participants in the clearing and settlement system 
managed by BSE a loan needed to cover the debit position, the participant in the 
clearing and settlement system managed by BSE was in position debtor may proceed to 
establish a claim pledge of financial instruments existing own account, both those 
settled, and of the pending settlement in favor of the credit granted. Clearing 
participant is required to present BSE documents stating the guarantee institution. 
5. If the participant does not grant credit or the loan does not fully cover the debit of 
participants in clearing and settlement system, than BSE shall be able to call the 
Guarantee Fund. 
BSE applies risk management measures as presented above. However, it should be noted 
that enforcing trading limits to each participant and using the amounts from the Guarantee 
Fund are the measures with the greatest impact on the entire system thus helping BSE to 
control risks in the settlement system 
3.4.4. Trading limit 
The trading limit is the maximum amount limit within each of the participants on the 
market regulated by BSE can operate over a single trading session. This limit is calculated in 
real time by the electronic system of BSE, for each intermediate, being affected by each 
completed transaction and not by the orders entered into the system by the participant. The 
trading limit is determined by a calculation formula and is affected by exchange transactions 
concluded on their own by each participant, both on their own name and on behalf of 
clients. 
The formula for calculating the trading limit is as follows: 
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            /       3 x CIFG CCFG VNC VGB VMj                  (4) 
where: 
CIFG = participant's initial contribution to the Guarantee Fund; 
CCFG = participant's current contribution to the Guarantee Fund; 
NPV = participant's net equity amount, included in the “Minimum net capital and 
indebtedness indicators"; 
VGB = amount by which the trading limit may be increased as follows: 
 for purchases - based on the amount deposited by the participant or his clients in the 
settlement account (or the accounts "clients") from the settlement bank or other banks, 
confirmed by presenting the statement of account or other bank documents (such as, for 
example, the payment order accepted by the bank); 
 for sales - depending on the amount of sales declared by the participant in writing that 
he would perform during the trading session 
VMj = value that has changed the total amount of loans to the participant and its customers 
and represents the more or less difference than the value previously reported by the 
participant. BSE will modify the participant's trading limit to this value. 
During the trading session, each time a participant concludes a transaction, the Stock 
Exchange electronic system checks that the following formula is applied: 
        /           3x CIFG CCFG VNC VGB VMj 3x CNCP VNCP VNCl CNCl  (5) 
where: 
CNCP = are financial instruments purchased by the participant in his own name in that 
trading session, expressed as values; 
VNCP = are financial instruments sold by the participant in his own name in that trading 
session, expressed as values 
CNCl = are financial instruments purchased by the participant in that trading session, in his 
own name and on behalf of his clients, expressed as values; 
VNCl = are financial instruments sold by the participant in that trading session, in his own 
name and on behalf of his clients, expressed as values 
To determine the trading limit, participants are required to submit monthly to BSE’s 
specialized department "Minimum net capital and indebtedness indicators statement" This 
statement will be sent to BSE within 10 working days from the end of the reporting month. 
If, during the time between two successive reports, the net capital varies more than + / - 15% 
compared to the last reports, the participant is required to communicate to BSE the new 
value immediately. 
If during a day, the transactions concluded by a participant affect the relationship of 
inequality, the participant exceeding his trading limits, the Exchange system will not allow 
the introduction or modification of the exchange orders on behalf of that participant, as their 
execution would lead to increase his exposure, and orders that are already in the market will 
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be suspended automatically by electronic system of BSE. Basically, if a participant that has 
completed operations which no longer meet the inequality relationship described above, 
will not be allowed to the market access till increasing the trading limit. In order to increase 
the trading limit is however necessary that the participant expressly requests this by sending 
a form by fax to BSE in this respect, also assuming responsibility for carrying out the 
settlement. However, the participant shall submit an estimate of the value of transactions he 
intends to carry out during the day when the limit was exceeded. 
In time, the usefulness of trading limits and especially the formula used to calculate it 
attracted much discussion at the level of the stock market participants. The main criticism 
concerns the fact that on the right side of the relationship of inequality the sales and 
purchases amounts made on behalf of clients are treated similarly and influence the limit in 
the same way. Even if by making a sale transaction the intermediary does not assume any 
risk regarding the cash settlement of transactions, however the value of sales transactions 
made on behalf of clients diminishes daily trading limit of the participant. In fact, you can 
even consider that sales transactions made by a participant does not induce any risk in the 
entire settlement system as long as before being accepted an order of sale by the Exchange's 
electronic system, in the account of the seller are performed verification of the securities, 
subject to trading order. Considered from the perspective of market participants and given 
the above considerations, the current formula for calculating the limit of transaction seems 
unduly restrictive. Intuitively, the limit of transaction reported only net amounts paid in 
settlement appears to be more reasonable and would create a much closer relationship of 
emerging risks into achieving financial settlement to the Guarantee fund.  
3.4.5. Guarantee fund 
As required by the regulations and procedures Bucharest Stock Exchange, "The Guarantee 
Fund”, "the Fund ", has as main objective to ensure necessary resources for proper 
functioning of the mechanism of settlement of exchange transactions." 
Sizing the Guarantee Fund and its constituent sources represent, for any settlement system, 
two central problems whose solutions can be found only by reference to at least the 
following elements: 
 Settlement model used; 
 Costs of setting up such a fund guarantee, costs supported mainly by direct participants 
in the settlement system; 
 Financial strength of the participants in the system, which is closely related to the 
overall stock market development; 
 The value of the transactions made on the stock market; 
 The performance of the compensation system (the degree of compensation), which 
ultimately generates the size of the exposures to settlement; 
 Other regulations of risk management; 
 Accepting that, in fact, financial risks are minimized and in very few cases are complete 
eliminated. 
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As explained earlier, for settling the exchange transactions, Bucharest Stock Exchange is 
using a variant of Model 2 Settlement (BIS classification), which requires multilateral 
clearing and final settlement of the funds on a net basis, followed by gross settlement of 
securities. For such a system, in the literature were directed two ways of determining the 
optimal value of a Guarantee Fund: 
1. For net settlement systems, there are six minimum requirements to be fulfilled. The 
fourth requirement of this report states that "as a minimum requirement, compensation 
schemes and multilateral net settlement shall be able to provide for the daily settlement, when it 
is impossible to honour the payment obligations by the participant with the highest exposure"; 
2. Another opinion is that the minimum requirement to be greater than or equal to the 
number of days of the settlement cycle (for BSE, three) plus one, multiplied by the 
greater of the net debtor position recorded in a recent period of time, e.g. last two 
weeks. 
As these recommendations suggest, the total amount of the Guarantee Fund has no absolute 
meaning, but must be interpreted in light of the whole system of risk management, value of 
transactions made on the stock market and especially the amount of exposure to settlement . 
These considerations were taken into account when establishing criteria for setting up and 
functioning of guarantee fund for settlement of negotiated transactions to BSE. 
Guarantee Fund of BSE was established based on initial contributions of all members of the 
Stock Exchange Association (later, with the transformation of BSE in a stock company, any 
intermediary agent, carrying out transactions at BSE became eligible to participate in the 
Guarantee Fund) as well as of all custodian agents authorized by the Stock Exchange. 
For the Guarantee Fund to be effective and achieve the purpose for which it was created is 
necessary that the component assets to have a high degree of liquidity. Therefore, in managing 
resources in the Fund should be prioritized the safe and liquid investment criteria, the yield 
obtained in the administration of the Fund represents only a secondary criteria. 
4. Conclusions 
To increase the accuracy which describes the development of the stock exchange in our 
country, it is necessary to build a synthetic index. Regarding the risk on the capital market, 
Risk Grades values determined for BSE indices show that the domestic capital market is 
more risky than the North American market. 
However, analyzing the Risk Grades values obtained for all indexes in the region we notice 
that they are very close and shows that the investors are not picking up the capital market in 
Romania as an excessively risky relative to other exchanges in the region. It confirms the 
hypothesis that the main problems of the capital market in Romania are not related to 
demand, but derive primarily from an inadequate supply. 
The risks managed by Institutions such as market operators, clearing houses and central 
depositories are very important, even though there maybe be less visible to the public. 
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Clearing and settlement services ensure that transfers of financial instruments and financial 
funds between the parties of an exchange transaction to be performed safely and with low 
costs. 
In order to prevent and to reduce the risks specific to the settlement of financial instruments 
transactions, direct access to clearing and settlement system is limited to those participants 
who meet a set of capitalization criteria, operational capacity and professional experience, 
which means that the settlement of an exchange transaction involves a given number of 
financial intermediaries.  
Since the highest financial risk throughout the process of finalizing exchange transactions 
take place in the last stage of the settlement process, an essential role is associated to the way 
the connection is made between the securities transfer mechanism (obligation to deliver) 
and the funds transfer mechanism (payment required). By using mechanisms that ensure 
Delivery Versus Payment (DVP), one eliminates the most important component of all 
financial risks during the settlement of the financial instruments transactions that is the 
principal risk. In order to limit the exposure to the risk of default of the intermediaries’ 
obligations, a trading limit is set for each intermediate part. 
Furthermore, the BSE requires its participants to prioritize the amounts necessary to cover 
their redundancy payment positions. From the market participants’ perspective, the current 
formula for calculating the transaction limit seems unduly restrictive. Intuitively, calculating 
the transaction limit based only on the net amounts paid in settlement appears to be a more 
reasonable assumption and could lead to a much closer relationship between the risks 
emerging in financial settlements and the guarantee fund. Meanwhile, for the Guarantee 
Fund to be effective and to achieve its purpose for which it was created it is necessary that 
the assets within it to have a high degree of liquidity. The transition process and the recent 
international financial crisis have significantly affected not only the evolution of stock 
markets in Central and Eastern Europe, but also significantly changed the outlook for their 
future development. 
That is why the stock market management should not only consider short-term measures in 
order to mitigate the crisis impact, but also to try to ensure the prerequisites for further 
development. The improvement of stock management in general and of stock market risks 
in particular, requires a medium to long-term perspective, similar to the opinions and 
contributions formulated by the authors in this chapter. 
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1. Introduction 
Life is full of risks for example risk is involved in simple things like turning on the gas at 
home or when dealing with life threatening medical emergency decisions. Risk plays an 
important role in the way we manage our economy, organization or our family.  Risk can 
be rather complex when household money is involved; such as for individuals or families 
– for example, mums and dads stand to either gain or lose large sums of money. The types 
of risks involved influence decisions on how to manage or invest money in shares, bonds 
or property. When faced with risks, the challenge is how well prepared are we to 
overcome risks. Risk awareness may be limited in which case there is a high likelihood of 
risk turning into hazard -leading to disastrous outcomes. Successful businesses make 
constant efforts to change or update their in house administrative polices and frameworks 
to allow for possible risks in their business requirements. Some decisions that are likely to 
have been factored into the component of risk are: rigid corporate governance 
requirement, human resource planning, succession planning, training and development, 
merger and acquisitions, adapting to different cultures, foregoing or discontinuing some 
existing products, outsourcing, new market development etc. No matter how important a 
decision is made, strategic alignment is critical in business decision making. New ideas 
should be implemented according to the business needs a company. The introducing of 
novel ideas should involve all personnel particularly during the decision making 
processes of development and setting of targets. A well-managed business is also well 
prepared one and thus able to confront challenges of the modern dynamic business 
environments. 
Yet managing risk is rather challenging for the world is mostly unpredictable. The processes 
are continuously changing and evolving in terms of resources that are available - 
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technology, innovation, human resources and time to name a few. In order to adequately 
address an impending risk, it is important to gather as much factual information as possible 
for analysis to help manage and thus minimize risk.  
Risk can be classified into both voluntary and involuntary [1]. This classification depends on 
how an individual or an organization judges the situation. For example, a person with a 
habit of smoking or drinking fails to associate the habits as involving risks; yet often the 
habit becomes hazardous and they can significantly affect a person’s quality life. 
Involuntary risk places a person or the organization in a state of ambiguity, where the 
people involved in the decision making process have not been exposed to a particular 
circumstance or they lack knowledge and awareness of the particular risk situation. The 
ability to deal with such risks is a crucial factor in determining successful outcomes 
irrespective of the stature of an individual or an organization.  
For some individuals, the ability to deal with risk appears to be built in their character but 
for the rest of us it seems, it is knowledge that can be acquired through training. In order to 
gain the skill set required so that one to deal with risk, it is important to step out of one’s 
comfort zone and be willing to change, learn, develop new skills, or be challenged to 
manage risk. Risk management is a methodical approach that could be taught and learnt by 
most. The general process and steps involved is presented in Figure 1. 
 
Source: Adapted from ISO Guide 73 
Figure 1. The process of risk management 
This paper is organized in the following manner: In the next few sections risk is defined and 
risk management explored focusing on types of risks associated with real estate market. The 
Australian real estate market is then reviewed and possible risks involved are explored in 
some depth particularly in terms the global financial crisis. The paper compares the market 
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with the rest of the world and summaries investor risks and rewards in Australian real 
estate market.  
1.1. Definition of risk 
In the international context, the ISO 31000/ISO Guide 73: 2009 [2] defines risk as the “effect 
of uncertainty on objectives” (p. 1). When there is a lack of knowledge or exposure to a 
certain event then such a situation can be termed uncertain. Taking decision on an uncertain 
event or situation may or may not be successful, which is what risk is about. Many 
definitions of risk exist in common usage [3-4]; however the ISO definition of risk was 
developed by an international committee representing over 30 countries and is based on the 
input of several thousand subject matter experts. 
Risk is defined in Australia by the Australia/New Zealand standard for risk management [2] 
as “the possibility of something happening that impacts on your objectives. It is the chance 
to either make a gain or a loss. It is measured in terms of likelihood and consequence…” (p. 
2). Risk can also be defined as the uncertainty of future events that might influence the 
achievement of one or more objectives such as an organization’s strategic, operational and 
financial objectives [3]. Risk management may produce positive opportunities for 
developers although the negative aspects of risk are usually the once that are emphasized 
[4]. 
Likelihood of risk occurring varies from industry to industry and how complex a job maybe. 
Some areas where there is a high chance of risk are construction, transport, mining, health 
care, sports, finance and banking, insurance and superannuation.  
Risk can be broadly understood and explained in three different scenarios [5]: risk versus 
probability; risk versus threat; and all outcomes versus negative outcomes. It is believed 
that any risk can be managed through the engagement of a proper risk management 
process. 
1.2. Risk management 
There seems to be an increasing demand of organizations to meet and exceed the financial 
expectations of shareholders. In the pursuit of growth, many organizations (for example: 
Toyota) have adapted and responded to expectations of the shareholders by becoming lean 
and efficient. It is always easy to think that risks and their potential consequences could 
have been predicted and managed. This is clearly not true when it comes to success in a 
business. Business success usually requires some acceptance of risk and, as such any risky 
strategy undertaken may lead to a failure. 
In large organizations and corporations there are designated personnel; namely, risk 
managers. Hillson [6] argued that risk is mostly managed “continuously, both consciously 
an unconsciously, though rarely systematically” (p. 240). Risk manager’s main role is to be 
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aware of the market, collect data and predict forthcoming threats so that a company can 
manage the risks in a successful manner. Risk manager duties include developing and 
communicating risk polices and process, building risk models involving market, conducting 
credit and operational risk analysis, coordinating with concerned stakeholders involved in 
the process and creating a risk awareness culture in the organization. 
Risk management not only prevents organizations from entering a dangerous and uncertain 
territory, which could lead to a catastrophic failures, but also ensure the development and 
growth of the business. The depth and clarity with which a risk is defined is critical for risk 
management. In an event where an organization has a low risk situation at hand and 
decides to postpone rather than resolve the issue involved for financial or other reasons, the 
risk may eventually become a threat of moderate to high level and this could prove to be 
disastrous for management. Ignoring the risks that apply to the business activities or the 
events that have been planned could impact on the following: 
 customer and public confidence in the organization; 
 credibility, reputation and status; 
 equipment and the environment; 
 financial position of the concerned; and 
 health and safety of employees, customers, volunteers and participants. 
A systematic approach to managing risk is now regarded as best management practice. The 
approach taken almost always benefits the organization irrespective of type of risk involved. 
Once the risk is identified it is documented in detail; subsequently the concerned stakeholders 
undertake possible risk management and mitigation processes. A comprehensive review of the 
situation and critical feedback are usually required that may ultimately lead to changes in the 
organizational polices and structures; particularly in case of a major events.  
Organizations that thrive to be successful constantly monitor themselves and willfully 
undertake only calculated risks. In doing so, they enjoy a competitive advantage in addition 
to meeting their business objectives. In era of globalization, companies are often expanding 
their business opportunities and in the process, they may undertake challenging and 
ambitious projects. In most cases, they need to take a number of risks. In this regard, 
businesses such as Microsoft, Google, and Wal-Mart appear to have been successful global 
players mainly because they were able to manage risk in a timely manner.  
Risk management decisions should be a part of business objectives. Every new project, 
policy or invention should include all the possible anticipated risks that one may possibly 
confront. Decision making process needs to consider threats identified, its impact and 
reaction on the business. By making a careful analysis, companies will have fewer surprises 
and thus may in the end spend less time recovering from the losses that may be inevitable at 
times. When companies do not have “a keen eye on the kind of risk”, risk retention can 
become a legitimate way of managing the risk. Figure 2 shows the six steps involved in the 
risk management process: establish the context, identify the risk, analyze the risk, evaluate 
the risk, and manage and review the risk.  
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1.3. The steps involved in managing risk 
 
Source: AS/NZS 4360:2004 
Figure 2. The steps in risk management 
1.3.1. Establish goals and context 
To establish context and define goals is an important step. Once the context is established it 
is critical that the risk is defined and the objectives are set. Also important is to know the 
limitations of the risk strategies proposed. An effective risk management team understands 
the needs of the organization and the way it operates. Once the goal is defined there is a 
need to identify the scope of the context. In general, these factors can be classified into 
strategic and operational risks. Strategic risk management includes economic, social, 
environmental, political, legal and public issues; while operational risk management 
includes technological, human resource, financial, reputation and other relevant strategic 
issues. Clearly, management may not be able to totally control the many factors but the risks 
posed by them could indeed be minimized.  
The process of risk management has to be simple, precise and effective. For it to be effective, 
organizations should consider strength, weakness, opportunities and threats (SWOT) type 
analysis of the situation. By conducting SWOT analysis, the management can identify and 
analyze different situations [7]. Once threats are identified, appropriate measures and 
decisions may then be taken to convert the threat into an opportunity. The organizational 
context provides an understanding of the organization, its capability and goals, objectives 
and strategies. In establishing the context the identification of stakeholders is critical; these 
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are individuals who may affect, or be affected by decisions made by the risk management 
team. For example, stakeholders may be employees, volunteers, visitors, insurance 
organizations, government agencies or suppliers etc. Each stakeholder will have different 
needs, concerns and opinions; therefore it is important to communicate with the 
stakeholders involved in the process of addressing risks. 
1.3.2. Identify risks 
Identification of risk involves a systematic process of examining situations and finding 
solutions. The process includes stages such as group discussions and brainstorming sessions 
to generate a variety of ideas. While all the ideas or issues generated may or may not be 
relevant, it is important to document all problems, possible impacts and solutions identified. 
There are four primary areas in which risk can occur in a general business environment: 
 financial: this could mean loss of funding, insurance costs, fraud, theft, fees etc.; 
 physical: this involves physical assets of the organization, personal injuries and 
environmental; 
 ethical or moral: involves a perpetuated, actual or potential harm to the reputation or 
beliefs of an individual or organization; and 
 legal: this includes responsibilities and adherence to the law, rules and regulations of 
governing bodies such as the federal, state or local governments. 
Risks can be identified by examining records of previous activities or events. Other ways in 
which risks could be identified are results from past experiences (personal, local or overseas) 
[8], through conduction interviews of stakeholders (example: Susilawati and Armitage [8]) 
or by analyzing specific real life or generated scenarios.  
1.3.3. Analyse risks 
This step determines and addresses the impact of threats that have been documented. 
Threats identified are rated according to the likelihood of occurrence. The potential of an 
identified risk can be estimated by the effect it has on financial and other resources. When 
analyzing a risk, one decides on the relationship between the likelihood of a risk occurring 
and the consequences of the risk identified. The level of risk is then defined and 
management of it is then explored. Managing risk can be done in several ways such as 
contingency planning, using existing assets or making an investment in new resources. The 
levels of the risks can be classified into 
 extreme: an extreme risk requires immediate action as the potential could be 
devastating to the enterprise; 
 high: a high level of risk requires action, as it has the potential to be damaging to the 
enterprise; 
 moderate: allocate specific responsibility to a moderate risk and implement monitoring 
or response procedures; and 
 low: can manage a low level of risk with routine procedures. 
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The tools most commonly employed to measure risks include qualitative techniques [10]. 
Melton [11] described the tools as probability and impact analysis tools and Webb [4] called 
these likelihood and consequences tools. A risk matrix presentation tool (qualitative 
technique) can provide better insights to the nature of a risk. Risk matrix is often used as a 
tool to display different risks once they have been analyzed. It allows an organization to mark 
a threshold above which risks will not be tolerated; or will receive additional treatment from 
the board or delegated staff. In Figure 3 the threshold is set at risks score of 5 or above. It is 
then important to ask the following questions in relation to each of the identified risks: 
 What is the likelihood of the risk occurring? 
 Are there any controls currently in place to manage the risk - if yes then, are there any 
remaining risks? 
 What are the consequences if the risk should occur? and 
 What is the level of the risk? 
 
Figure 3. Risk matrix Source: adapted from Austrac 
1.3.4. Evaluate risks 
In this step the tolerance of the risk is determined; that is, whether the identified risk is 
acceptable or unacceptable. The evaluation takes into account the following: 
 importance of risk management and possible outcomes of a risky activity; 
 potential and actual losses that may arise from the risk; 
 benefits and opportunities presented by the risk; and 
 degree of control one has over the risk. 
An acceptable risk is a type of risk that that a business can tolerate; a loss for example- the 
risk does not have major impact on business. An acceptable risk has to be constantly 
monitored, reviewed and documented so that it remains tolerable. A risk is deemed to be an 
acceptable risk because of following reasons: 
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 risk level is low and the benefits presented by the risk outweigh the cost of managing it; 
 risk level is so low that it does not warrant spending time and money to manage it; and 
 risk presents opportunities that are much greater than the threats posed by it. 
A unacceptable risk is when a business is bound to experience significant losses and such 
losses cannot be tolerated. In such an event it is important to address and treat the risk in an 
appropriate manner.  
1.3.5. Treatments of risks 
Risks may be dealt with in several ways; it can be avoided, reduced, shared or retained.  Risk 
is avoided when appropriate decisions are taken to eliminate all possible pitfalls thereby 
preventing the situation from occurrence. In most decision making processes, calculations are 
made and ideas are contemplated to strike a balance between the cost and effect. In such 
situations calculated risks are accepted and a high risk situation may be reduced by: 
 identifying options to treat the risk; 
 selecting the best treatment option; 
 preparing a risk treatment plan; and 
 implementing a risk treatment plan. 
In other cases, risk is shared between the stake holders in terms of how profits and losses are 
shared. This is done mainly to share the impact of a risky event when it occurs. For example, 
in the era of globalization it is challenging for the companies to enter new markets and 
countries. In order to minimize uncertainty and exploit business situations that may exist, 
companies often decide to share risk; careful consideration and research undertaken by the 
companies often suggest risk sharing. Risk sharing develops opportunities while engaging 
all partners in achieving strategic goals and the gains and loss are then shared accordingly. 
The nature of strategies to mitigate risk often depends on the experience of the risk manager 
who may consider one or more of the following [3]: 
 avoid the risk by deciding not to proceed with the activity or choosing another way to 
achieve the same outcome; 
 control the risk by reducing the likelihood of the risk occurring, the consequences of the 
risk or both; 
 transfer the risk by shifting all or part of the responsibility of the risk to another party 
who is best able to control it; and 
 retain the risk after accepting that the risk cannot be avoided, controlled or transferred. 
It seems the simplest of all methods of addressing a risk is by retaining an identified risk 
that may not potentially impact upon the operations of a business. It is important to 
continuously monitor such risks for in the absence of careful monitoring, the risks may 
become threats in due time.  
A dedication towards risk management often projects a wiser professional image to the 
community. In doing so, the stake holders recognize the fact that the concerned organization 
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has a keen interest in safeguarding its assets as well as that of its employees, visitors and 
volunteers among others. In the process of identifying, analyzing and evaluating risks an 
organization improves its management team’s ability to make educated decisions. 
1.3.6. Monitor and report effectiveness of risk treatments 
Every organization irrespective of size clearly strives to reduce the risks involved. In order 
to reduce risk organizations have to align their policies and structures in a consistent 
manner and constantly monitor business activities. Also, there is a need to allocate resources 
(financial, human resource, technology etc.) efficiently to improve performance and to win 
the approval of all stake holders. It is also important to ensure personnel working at 
different levels in the organization report to the appropriate authorities when a risk is 
identified. Such a culture enables an organization to document and then undertake suitable 
and timely measures to avert risks. In the risk management process, data capture and 
reporting can provide valuable insights into the risk management process. A sample risk 
management planning template is shown in Table 1. As discussed, risk management team 
play a vital role in identifying and addressing risks. 
 
Table 1. Risk management planning template 
It is necessary to constantly monitor and evaluate the strategies that are employed to manage 
risks. This is because risks do not remain the same - new risks are created, existing risks are 
increased or decreased, some risks may no longer exist and previous or existing risk 
management strategies may no longer be effective. In the end risks can originate from accidents, 
legal liabilities, natural causes and disasters, uncertainty in financial markets, credit risk, project 
 
Risk Management – Current Issues and Challenges 366 
failures (at any phase in design, development, production, or sustainment life-cycles), or 
events of unpredictable root-cause. Several risk management standards exist including those 
from the Project Management Institute, National Institute of Science and Technology, 
Actuarial Societies, and ISO standards. The risk management definitions, methods and goals 
vary widely according to the context of project management, security, engineering, industrial 
processes, financial portfolios, actuarial assessments, public health and safety and real estate.  
An important aim of the paper is to study and review the real estate market in Australia to 
identify risk and rewards as well as compare the Australian market conditions and 
performance with the rest of the world. Therefore, the focus of the next section is on risks in 
the real estate market. 
1.4. Types of risk associated real estate market 
 
Figure 4. Types of risk in real estate market 
As is the case with every other industry, there are several risks in the real estate market. For 
example, there exists a risk factor in land procurement; housing development; asset 
management; property management; tenancy management to name a few [13]. The risks 
may be classified as internal or external risks (Figure 4 ). In turn, the internal and external 
risks can be divided into various other risk categories shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 [14]. 
Builders, project managers, owners and investors who plan to make an investment or hold 
an investment in the property market may need to consider one or more of the following 
risks and then implement appropriate strategies for their projects to be successful.  
1.4.1. Internal risk  
Internal risk can be divided into financial management, human resources, property 
management, legislative compliance, corporate governance and housing management as 
shown in Figure 5.  
Financial management: A detailed analysis of any proposed or existing projects need to be 
conducted for project viability. It is also important to plan the cash flow and management of 
the same. A poor cost control may lead to a budget over shoot and the project may run into 
un-chartered territories. When it comes to servicing the debt due care needs to be given to 
income streams - to take into account either reduction or loss of future income streams. In this 
regard, banking organisations need to be diligent in testing the capacity to repay the loans that 
are being offered. Fraud often occurs in real estate market mainly involving the use of false 
documents regarding number of properties, outgoing fees or rates, income streams and so on.  
Risk   
Internal risk
External risk
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Figure 5. Internal risk Source: adapted from Sheryl and Adam [14] 
Insurance also plays a vital role in financial management of a project or investment. 
Adequate insurance is needed to cover the various risks that may be involved such as the 
type of property, its location, exposure to natural calamities etc. to name a few. Insurance 
also need to be updated with the changes in conditions.  
Property management of a construction project: During the construction of a new project 
the builders needs to plan their inventory and keep control of their stocks irrespective of the 
size of the project. Stock control starts from buying goods to using and maintaining them, 
and also reusing or reordering as required. Quality of the stock also plays a vital role in real 
estate business. To maintained quality several techniques are adapted. Just in time technique 
(where items are ordered when necessary and used immediately), minimum stock level 
technique and stock review technique.  
Contractors play an important role in success of a construction project. They are responsible 
for recruitment and supervision of employees working on the project. Contractors are also 
responsible for material management coordinating with suppliers thus acquiring necessary 
goods in time for the construction phases. Poor response from the contractors or failure to 
perform their duties will delay the project and overshoot budgets. 
Legislation compliance: Often a property holder has to disclose his personal and financial 
information to third party. Protecting information plays a key issue in this business. Once all 
the parties are ready to proceed it is necessary to have a privacy act is in place so that all 
information is secure. The corporation act provides the guidelines for conflicts or issues 
arising in construction or maintenance of a property. There are several agencies that provide 
comprehensive legal services to better understand the litigations involved. Anti-
discrimination law and disability service act also play an important role in real-estate. 
Property owners are liable for any discriminatory acts. 
Occupational health and safety (OH&S) also arises in real-estate and a number of OH&S 
compliance officers are usually assigned to monitor the safety and health; for example, 
conditions provided to the workers at construction sites. OH&S officer duties include 
Internal 
risk
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(construction)
Legislation 
compliance
Corporate 
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Housing 
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inspecting construction sites and providing support to internal clients. It is important to 
report any hazard or incident and all incidents should be attended to and documented for 
future reference.  
Corporate governance: Corporate governance plays an important role in risk management 
in the real estate industry. It is important to properly align the ideas, interests and decisions 
of managers to the interests of both internal and external shareholders. For example, failure 
to recruit appropriate personnel may lead to conflicts of interest. If the conflicts are not 
managed effectively they may have a substantial impact on the company bottom line. It is 
required and expected of the managements or boards of construction companies always 
carefully analyze performance in terms of the market so that they are able to keep track of 
their company’s performance and progress in a dynamic environment. It is also expected 
that the managements re-inspect and update their policies and procedures to meet the 
market trends and demands of all concerned stakeholders. 
Housing management: A holistic management of the investment made in real estate can be 
defined as housing management. Housing management includes keeping track of 
maintenance and financial arrangements. As a common and popular practice the management 
of an investment property is outsourced to property management companies who appoint 
property managers to manage and oversee duties as required. Property managers on a daily 
basis are responsible for taking maintenance requests, collecting rent, dues or other fees and 
are responsible for the overall upkeep of the property. They also perform routine property 
inspections and organize inspections for the owners. Poor performance of the property 
managers leads to more grievances for the tenants as well as the owners.  
1.4.2. External risk 
External risk depends on a number of factors such as economic risk, funding, regulation, 
environment, reputation, competition, partnerships and natural disasters (Figure 2.6). Each 
of the factors noted are discussed briefly in turn. 
 
Figure 6. Eternal risks Source: adapted from Sheryl V and Adam W, 2008 
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Funding: The availability of funding depends on a number of aspects such as the economic 
situation in general, market performance, and credit based upon any future cash flow. Some 
factors that influence economic performance are: change in political regime, rise in the price 
of raw materials, emergence of a new competitor and disruptions in production process. 
Market performance usually depends on changes in interest rates, changes in laws, and 
political and financial market factors. The risk of loss of principal or loss of a financial 
reward stemming from a borrower's failure to repay a loan or otherwise meet a contractual 
obligation falls under the funding risk. It is important to take into consideration as many of 
the previously mentioned factors while undertaking an investment decision, even when one 
already has an investment portfolio. Investors often anticipate future cash flow situations 
while borrowing money to pay a current debt. The failure of the anticipated cash flow leads 
to credit risk. However credit risk can be considered less likely since most often the 
investors are compensated by way of interest payments made by the borrower in end.  
Regulatory environment: Investors in real estate projects should be aware of the local, state 
and federal laws and regulations. These laws depend on economic, credit and market risk as 
explained above. Failure to comply with the rules and regulation often leads to delays or in 
the worst case - complete scrapping of the project; all of which may lead to a complete or 
partial loss of capital invested. 
Reputation: The reputation of a project developer often attracts investor attention and also 
provides favorable environment for investments. Joint ventures and partnerships are possible 
if the reputations are well known and have been built over time - providing partners the 
opportunities to win potentially new clients and investors, as well greater opportunities for 
new investments. An investor has to study the “people” perception of the organization and 
the credit history and rating of the project developer. An investment made into a company 
with poor credit history may end up losses of the principle amount invested. It could also be 
wise for an investor to know the value of the tangible and intangible assets and the market 
value of the organization into which an investment is being planned. 
Competition: Property market plays an important role in the economy. There are several 
players in the market who usually try to attract investors. While a healthy competition is 
good for growth in the industry, it is important for the investors to research exactly what 
they are being offered because the agents often utilize high pressure selling strategies to 
gain client’s cash. It is possible that in the process the investors may receive inappropriate 
financial advice. For example, consumers may not be aware of non-disclosed information 
pertaining to advice they receive. 
Partnership: Partnership plays an important role in investing, as it reduces the impact of 
potential risk on the individual or company investment. For an investor to be successful in a 
real-estate partnership it is important to know the partner well and therefore trust plays a 
vital role. The role of each partner does need to be well defined and documented. Having a 
clear legal document will protect the interest of all partners. It also important to plan and 
document an exit strategy for all involved, because personal situations may change over 
time. Clearly, before a partnership agreement is made it is necessary to conduct a detail 
research to become self-confident about the deal. 
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Natural disasters: In the real real-estate market, location plays an important factor in the 
investment decision. A property purchased at an appropriate location is expected to provide 
a good return on the investment. One of the main factors affecting location is the potential 
exposure to natural calamities such as bushfires, floods, sea level raise and erosion to name 
a few. If the location has a history or is likely to be exposed to a natural disaster it can be 
expected that the property prices will eventually be exposed to the risk. Therefore, it is wise 
to not be enticed into such toxic locations. Other factors that need to be accounted for are the 
costs of maintenance of properties and the nature and level of insurance required for risky 
locations, if chosen. 
1.5. Risk and reward 
The nature of risk definition and management process is such that it should be integrated 
into “the philosophies, practices and business plans” of any individual investor or large 
organization’s culture (Hillson [5], p.240). It is certain that there are many risks involved in 
real-estate market as mentioned. While real-estate provides variety of investment options 
every investor has to find their comfort level upon taking risks involved. It is not easy to 
decide if a selected property for investment is appropriate, but the decision should be made 
based on the consideration of all the factors discussed earlier. In the end however, the 
willingness to take risks largely depends upon individual preferences and circumstances.  
The elements that usually determine the scale of risk or reward are the amount of money 
that is invested, length of time investment, rate of return or property appreciation, 
depreciation, fees, taxes, inflation etc. While it is natural for the individual and organizations 
to invest and expect returns it is important the investors make the informed choice to reduce 
the odds of losing the principle invested. The potential risks and rewards in investing in the 
Australian real estate market are investigated next. 
2. Real estate scenario in Australia 
The speculation about Australian housing market has been intense since 2003. First it was the 
international monitory fund (IMF) which warned of the housing bubble in Australia “would 
bust” [15]. In mid-2008, IMF stated that the Australian property market was overvalued by 
about 25% [16]. In more recent times (April 2010), “The Economist” house price indicators 
estimated Australian house prices were the most overpriced in the world (56.1% overpriced - 
against long-run average of price to rents ratio) [17]. The US based analysts Jeremy Grantham 
(Boston-based hedge fund GMO analysts co-founder) and Heather Hagerty (Fidelity 
Investments), were also speculating whether or not the Australian residential market is 
experienced a housing bubble, after the US housing crisis. According to Edward Chancellor 
[18], a US-based investment strategist and financial author, Australia was "in the midst of an 
unsustainable housing bubble that could burst at any time" and the "house prices are more 
than 50% above their fair value - a once in 40-year event." (p.1). In 2011 Morgan Stanley’s global 
strategist Gerard Minack said that "we've had 20 years where the Australian consumers have 
been willing to borrow more to buy an asset that they believe always goes up in value. The 
classic sign of an asset bubble." and that "home prices are 30 to 40% above fair value [p.1, 19].  
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The house price-to-income ratio has been the main focus in Australia. The house price-to-
income ratio is comparatively high when compared to other countries. Also, the price-to-
income ratio in Australia since has been more than 40% higher than the long term average. 
In the next sections a discussion of the fundamentals that govern the house prices in 
Australian residential housing market is examined. Also, the potential risks and rewards to 
the investors are explored in terms of the risk analysis framework presented earlier.  
2.1. Introduction: How Australian real estate compares to the rest of the world. 
Since the U.S. housing crisis, analysts have been speculating about the potential housing 
bubble in the Australian residential property market. A report by Real Estate Institute of 
Australia (REIA) argued that analysts primarily focused their attention on the higher house 
price-to-income ratio in Australia as compared to other countries (REIA 2010). Moreover, it 
is observed that the house price-to-income ratio levels are at levels that are similar to that in 
the US before the housing market there crashed in 2008. The raise in the price-to-income 
ratio in Australia since 2003 by over 40% higher than the long term average adds fuels the 
speculation. However, it is important to analyze the fundamentals that govern Australian 
residential market price growth against the rest of world.  
2.1.1. Some aspects of the residential finance system in the U.S. and Australia 
In the US, the residential finance system played a significant role in the housing bubble of 2008. 
The regulation, residential finance institutional arrangements, and mortgage characteristics 
aided the excessive demand for housing finance. Housing finance was available and offered 
to borrowers with poor borrowing capacities. Consequently, excessive borrowing led to the 
housing bubble and the collapse of the financial system in the U.S in 2008. There are some 
fundamental differences in the lending practice in Australia when compared to the US [21]. 
In Australia the lending process is highly regulated by the institutional arrangement. The 
lending practices enforce the regulatory provisions on financial institutions forcing them to 
avoid excessive risk taking behavior. Table 2 outlines the characteristics of housing loans 
both in the U.S and in Australia. The table highlights the systemic susceptibility to riskier 
mortgages in the US and that availability of such funds to finance the mortgages were more 
common than in Australia. 
 
Australia US
Regulation is high on mortgage loans No full recourse of mortgages 
No negative amortisation of loans yes 
Securitization is low in housing finance Securitization is high in housing finance 
Non-conforming loans Subprime loans 
Full recourse of mortgages No full recourse of mortgages 
Source: RBA [21] 
Table 2. Mortgage characteristics of Australia as compared to US 
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In the US, the non-conforming housing loans represent 13% compared to 1% in Australia 
[21]. Negative amortization loans are common in the US but no such loans existed in 
Australia at the time of the crisis. In Australia the mortgages are “full recourse” lenders and 
hence the incentive that is offered to households to take out loans they cannot repay is 
reduced. This is also deters financial institutions from offering risky loans. These primary 
differences stand out to support and contribute to a relatively strong performance of the 
housing loans in Australia when compared to the US. It is important to note that the share of 
non-performing loans in Australia were less than 1.5% even during the financial crisis. 
Another fundamental difference is that there is no government sponsored enterprise (GSE) 
in Australia while they exist in the US. The GSE in the US holds a guarantee of the loans that 
are offered. This potentially provides an impression that bad loans offered to borrowers 
with poor repayment capacity would be covered by the Federal Government [23]. This is not 
so in Australia where commercial banks provide 90% of all housing loans. The commercial 
banks are mainly funded by the bank deposits, short term and long-term wholesale debt 
[24]. The absence of the so called Federal guarantee restricts Australian banks from any 
excessive risk taking behavior. In 2007, at the beginning of the financial crisis, GSE’s 
possessed 90% of these securities. The shadow banking system in which the financial 
institutions have a greater participation and the GSE’s can be said to have led the excessive 
risk taking behavior and practices in the US [21]. In addition, according to the RBA [21], the 
regulation level of financial institutions in Australia is about 80% while in the US only 50% 
of all the financial institutions are regulated [21].  
 
Figure 7. Non-performing housing loans Source: Real estate Institute of Housing America 
The Loan to Value Ratio (LVR) refers to the amount of money borrowed against the total 
value of the property in a home equity loan. For example, a $50,000 loan against a home 
worth $200,000 has a Loan to Value Ratio of 25%. In Australia, loans with an LVR exceeding 
80% require mortgage insurance - the risk of the borrower defaulting is far too great for the 
lender. The value of the property is determined by the lender and is often significantly less 
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than the purchase price, which often surprise first-time borrowers. Typically, the amount 
that lenders have been prepared to lend for housing has been restricted by one or both of the 
following: 
 scheduled repayments should not exceed some fixed share of the borrower’s income – 
the repayment-to-income, or serviceability, constraint; and 
 the loan should not exceed a certain proportion, most commonly 80% [21] of the 
property’s purchase price – the LVR constraint. 
2.2. Australian real estate market compared to the rest of the world 
The analysis presented in the previous section shows that Australia is fundamentally 
different to the US when it comes to the residential housing market. But, how does Australia 
compare to the other countries in the world? New research conducted by Lloyds TSB [27] - 
International Global Housing Market Review, shows that Australia just made it into the top 
10 list of countries with the highest house price increases over the past decade (Table 3). 
Four of the six top performing housing markets since 2001 were in the emerging economies 
of the world. India with a booming real estate market tops the list - house prices rise by 
284% over the last decade; Russia coming second - house price increase of 209% over the 
same period. China faired only marginally when compared to other major economies - 
ranked 14th with a 47% growth rate since 2001. 
 
Country Real house price 
change % 1 year 
Real house price 
change % 10 year 
Real house price change 
% 10 year per annum 
India 8.7 284 14.4 
Russia -24.3 209 12 
South Africa -1.1 161 10.1 
Lithuania -1.3 143 9.3 
Hong Kong 13.6 125 8.4 
Bulgaria -10 106 7.5 
France 4.3 82 6.2 
New Zealand -2.1 79 6 
Australia -5.7 76 5.8 
Norway 6.9 72 5.5 
Belgium 0.4 69 5.4 
Source: Lloyds TSB International [27] 
Table 3. Real house price changes – A global comparison. 
According to the findings of the report Australian house prices increased by 76% and had 
the ninth fastest growing house prices during 2001-2011. During the same period house 
price declines were seen in the world’s largest economies such as Germany, Japan and the 
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United States. Japan registered the largest house prices fall of 30%, while house prices in 
Germany and US were down 17% and 2% respectively during the same time. Other major 
findings of the research include: 
 housing markets have typically risen fastest in countries with the fastest growing 
economies. On average, the countries with the biggest rises in house prices since 2001 
have seen GDP increase by more than 100%. Countries that had large rises in pre-crisis 
times lost the most after the GFC affected their economies; and 
 house prices within countries that form part of the Euro have climbed an average of 23 
percent since 2001. France saw the largest increase with 82%, Belgium rose 69%, Spain 
26% and Italy was up 31%. But Spain has seen a major decline in 2012. 
The performance of the established house prices in Australian housing market provided by 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) is presented in Figure 8. The Australian housing 
over the past five years has seen some corrections. The period can be divided into pre-global 
financial crisis (GFC), during GFC and post GFC. Prior to GFC, there has been a 
considerable growth in the established housing prices. This growth pattern however 
changed course and reached the worst levels in August 2008 when the GFC was setting in. 
However, the prices of established homes climbed steeply during the peak of the GFC when 
markets around the world were playing havoc. This defiance could be mainly attributed to 
the management initiatives taken by the RBA [21] and government of Australia. The RBA 
drastically reduced the interest rates to a record low of 3.25% supported by the federal 
government incentives such as economic stimulus plan, which included substantial increase 
in first home grants among others.  
This financial incentive was “too good to miss” for anyone considering their first home 
purchase. This led to flood of first home buyers entering the market that drove the prices up 
against all odds. Since the time the incentives have been wound back, and the market and 
investor sentiment took over. This led to a fall in the growth when compared to the 
preceding three years and has been mostly in the low sentiment in the past two years. 
Therefore, although Australian market prices are influenced by the global events, a collapse 
similar to that seen in markets elsewhere seems appears a distant possibility. This can be 
attributed to the underlying government incentives to manage the risks during the crisis. 
Other micro-economics aspects also helped manage the downturn. 
2.3. Australian house prices and the fundamental influences 
Australian housing demand has been strong and can be also attributed to the following: 
 strong overseas migration from 2004 to 2007; 
 housing shortages due to a rapidly growing population; 
 Australian household sizes are shrinking; 
 lending standards stricter than most advanced economies including the US; and 
 interest rates at record lows. 
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Source: ABS 
Figure 8. Australian annual house price change in the last decade  
2.3.1. Trend of net population increase and net overseas migration increase 
House prices have been underpinned by a chronic housing shortage in Australia. This was 
brought about by an ever increasing population and constraints placed on housing supply 
over time. Figure 9 shows the increase in population growth from both natural growth and 
migration since 2006. From 2006 to September 2010 natural population growth has only seen 
a marginal increase, but during the same period the net overseas migration growth has been 
substantial.  
 
Source: ABS 
Figure 9. Trend of natural population increase and net overseas migration 
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Figure 10 shows that there has been an increase in the total population by about 1.6 million 
people 2006–2010. During the same period, the Net Overseas Migration (NOM) accounted 
for 1.02 million people compared to only 600 000 increase in natural population. However, 
given that there has been a large influx of people into Australia, the question was whether 
there was enough housing infrastructure in place.  
 
Source: ABS 
Figure 10. Net overseas migration and components of population change  
2.4. Trend in the number of dwellings commenced and population 
Figure 11 shows the trend in the population and dwellings commenced from January 2007 
to October 2010. As shown earlier, the population growth showed an upward trend over the 
entire period. The number of dwellings commenced shows a rather distressing trend. Figure 
11 shows the commencement of new dwellings significantly fell short and did not keep pace 
with the rapid growth in population. For an addition of 1.25 million people during this 
period only about 235 000 new homes were built demonstrating a significant shortage in the 
housing market. Interestingly, this situation presents a case for more property investment as 
people search for a place to live.  
2.5. Demand and supply scenario 
Historically, Australia has been behind in the demand versus supply of residential 
dwellings, but more so in the last decade than any time earlier. Figure 12 shows the 
dwelling gap in the previous decade. Australia continues to run large annual deficits in 
housing supply - the underlying demand for dwellings and the completion of dwellings has 
not matched. In view of this it can be expected that in the longer term Australia’s housing 
market is underpinned by insufficient supply in addition to robust underlying demand. 
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Source: ABS 
Figure 11. Trend in the number of dwellings commenced and population  
 
Source: NHSC 
Figure 12. Estimated dwelling gap in the last decade  
National housing supply council (NHSC) estimates a demand versus supply gap of 
approximately 640 000 houses in 2030; and an increase in the gap from 250 000 in 2012. 
Figure 13 shows the projections in the supply gap to 2030. The figure shows an increase over 
time till 2015, and indeed a higher rate of increase predicted from 2015till 2030.  
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Source: NHSC 
Figure 13. Supply and demand gap projections to 2030  
To examine whether the situation is the same throughout Australia or mainly confined 
to a few states, data from all the states are explored in more depth. Figure 12 and Figure 
14 both show that not all states have an acute shortage of housing such as South 
Australia (SA), Tasmania (Tas) and Australian Commonwealth Territory (ACT). Their 
data runs against the trend for the last decade but more so during 2009-2010. The larger 
states of New South Wales (NSW), Victoria (Vic), Queensland (Qld) and Western 
Australia (WA) all continue to have high deficits year after year and the deficit is 
increasing – however, Victoria being an exception in 2009-2010 where it managed to go 
against the trend temporarily (Figure 14). To further understand the nature of the 
differences between states, the net population increase in the demand across states needs 
to be compared. Figure 15 shows the state by state net change in population as well as 
housing issues. The states with a high influx of population showed higher dwelling 
demand.  
Not surprisingly, the high demand has led to a rather strong rental market particularly 
in the larger states and this has provided an impetus for higher rental returns and an 
ideal time for new investors to consider for the longer term. With recent housing 
approvals declining, this demand supply gap can only be expected to widen. Clearly, 
the population increase cannot only be driving the market. Therefore, other aspects 
need investigation such as house price to income ratio; and house hold debt to income 
ratio. 
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Source: NHSC 
Figure 14. Housing demand and supply by states  
 
 
Source: ABS 
Figure 15. Net population change - state by state over 2000-2011  
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2.6. House price-to-income ratio 
The house price-to-income ratio is generally calculated using average income of the whole 
population. This method of calculating house price may not be appropriate in that a set of 
buyers whose incomes are above the average income of the wider population, and have the 
ability to service the loans tend to bid in the auctions there by inflating house prices [28]. 
Such competition is visible across all capital cities but more so in Sydney, Melbourne, Perth 
and Canberra than other cities. Figure 16 shows the median change in the house prices 
across eight capital cities since 2007. 
Figure 16 shows that the increase in house prices in the major capital cities have been greater 
than those of other cities. This suggests the increase in house prices in Australia over the past 
five years was driven mostly by house prices in the most expensive cities, where home buyers 
tend to be higher income earners. The house price-to-income ratio does not seem to pick up the 
distributional differences. The household debt to disposable income ratio can provide valuable 
insights while assessing the vulnerabilities. Therefore, disposable incomes of people need to be 
considered when assessing the vulnerability of an average mum and dad investor. 
 
Figure 16. Dwelling prices in capital cities in Australia Source: ABS 
2.7. Owner- Occupier debt 
Figure 17 shows the distribution of debt to income since 2006. The data indicates that the 
debt to income ratios has been fairly high – but consistent around 160% for the total debt, of  
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Figure 17. Owner occupier debt Source: RBA 
 
Figure 18. Annual change in established home prices Source: ABS 
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which close to 140% is towards the mortgage. An indication to the scale of vulnerability can 
become salient when the house hold income to debt and the annual change in established 
home price are compared. Figure 18 shows that there has been a somewhat volatile situation 
in the housing market in all capital cities during 2006-2011; yet, during the same period, the 
debt to income ratio seem to be approximately constant over time. The comparison shows 
the average households are not so vulnerable to at least a change in their income situation 
given there was volatility in house price changes over time. 
3. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to define risk and risk management in terms of real estate 
investment thus demonstrating the in depth nature and complexity of the process. Another 
aim was to conduct risk analysis of the Australian real estate market in particular, in terms 
of the global financial crisis – pre GFC, during GFC and post GFC. The review shows that 
risk analysis involves a number of steps with each step in turn involving another set of 
procedures. Risk analysis is a process that it is often ignored by investors particularly by 
the individual or smaller investors who tend to be more vulnerable. Similarly, risk 
management involves a number of processes and stages with steps and these have been 
outlined in the paper. A risk analysis is conducted here for investors in Australia real estate 
market. The results are rather interesting in that several conditional differences exist 
between Australia and the rest of the world. The factors identified that influence 
Australia’s house price are different from the rest of the world; including for example the 
rather stricter and well regulated lending practices of Australia’s financial institutions. A 
tight financial system regulation in Australia means a highly disciplined financial sector. 
The tougher regulation of the industry therefore prevents financial institutions from taking 
on excessive risks, contrary to the US counterparts. In fact, increasing house prices was 
identified in Australia after the crises of 2007-8; and this was associated with the changes in 
mortgage lending rates, rising family income, increasing overseas migration demand, 
government incentives to name a few. Together the market situation suggests that 
Australia is unlikely to face a US style housing bubble. The results of the risk analysis show 
that: 
 rising incomes and population growth ensure the demand for housing outpaces current 
supply, thereby increasing the prices; 
 high capital growth in larger cities where there has been large population migration 
such as Perth, Sydney and Melbourne; 
 high demand still exists for residential and commercial real estate to accommodate 
growing expatriate working community; 
 increased property prices has to many Australians increasingly seeking rental 
accommodation, making housing investment a healthy growth area for investors; 
 higher growth rate in property investment in Australia - superior to most OECD 
countries, including the UK, Spain and the US; and 
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 foreign exchange rate changes have been favorable, making property purchase in 
Australia a valuable option; that in turn driving property prices higher. This has 
changed in 2011-12 when the higher Australian dollar has posed interesting challenges 
for the Australian investments. 
The findings are in line and relate to that of the Australian housing and urban research 
institute’s findings [29], which further suggest:  
 investors are motivated to invest in the private rental market for a number of reasons 
such as financial factors, personal goals (retirement or future home for children at 
university), and household circumstances (proximity to their own dwelling); 
 investors use their own measures of quality and personal preference when selecting a 
dwelling even though they will not be living in the property; 
 investors perceive property as a long-term, safe and stable investment that is low risk 
and will produce guaranteed returns; 
 investors largely expect capital gains from investing rather that rental yield only and 
this is how success is measured; and 
 informality characterizes investor approaches to the housing market where property 
is considered familiar, relatively easy to invest in when compared to other 
investments. 
In summary, Australian housing industry continues to experience significant housing 
shortages in major cities due to a rapidly growing population; in particular, the growth has 
been fueled by strong overseas migration during 2004-2007, but the Australian current 
government immigration laws suggest that the strong levels of immigration will continue 
for some time due to the lack of skills in the labor market. The housing demand is further 
supported by the fact that the size of the Australian household appears to be shrinking 
adding to the pressure on housing both in rental and investment. The demand of rental 
housing together with somewhat lower house prices in recent times (buyer marker) has 
lured many new investors in the market. This aspect, the negative gearing benefits, and the 
first home ownership schemes supported by significantly lower interest rates have all led to 
a favorable and stronger real estate market in Australia. All of this has occurred within a 
framework of a stronger, tightly regulated financial sector that has been more-stricter than 
most advanced economies including the US. Such a regulated real estate market appears to 
have kept the mortgage repayment failure and housing related bad debts at a minimum in 
Australia.  
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1. Introduction 
Pharmaceuticals play an important role in keeping people fit, but they can also put live at 
risk if they don’t have the required quality. Contamination and mix-up may have a great 
impact on them because of their tiny active doses and because of the often precarious state 
of health of the patients, not to mention the existence of routes of administration, which skip 
certain defense barriers of the body. 
To cope with this problem “Good Manufacturing Practice” (GMP) was introduced in the 
1960s with the intention of providing a kind of common quality baseline for all laboratories. 
GMP, however, consists of general rules, and as such, it can neither give an answer to every 
practical situation, nor replace the need to study and understand processes in depth, as 
some people wanted to believe. 
This is why the American FDA initiative on GMP, launched in 2002, underlined the need of 
taking decisions based on knowledge and science “in [1]”. 
The ICH (International conference on harmonization of technical requirements for the 
registration of pharmaceuticals for human use) has given world-wide diffusion to this 
initiative and put it into practice by publishing several closely related Q (quality) guidelines 
“in [2-5]”. 
These guidelines have to be applied conjointly in order to ensure that the quality of a 
product is, first of all, developed and, then, monitored within a quality management system. 
This pharmaceutical quality system, as defined by ICH guideline Q10, has two “enablers”: 
knowledge management and quality risk management. 
Knowledge management is defined as a systematic approach to acquiring, analyzing, storing, 
and disseminating information related to products, manufacturing processes and components. 
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Whereas, quality risk management is described as a systematic process for the assessment, control, 
communication and review of risks to the quality of the medicinal product across the product lifecycle. 
They are called enablers because they constitute a tool or process which provides the means to 
achieve an objective. 
The importance of quality risk management (QRM) is such that a whole ICH guideline, Q9, 
has been devoted to it. 
Thus, QRM combined with GMP and science is a kind of “magical potion”, which we can 
use to become “wizards” ensuring quality. However, this is only true if we understand what 
QRM is and use it in the right way. 
Unfortunately practice shows that the real role of QRM is not always understood and as it 
has already happened in the recent past (e.g., with validation) it can become something that 
is only done, because it is required by the Authorities, but that it does not yield what it 
might and is just written for the occasion, shown and filed. And this is not something 
unimportant because resources which are misused here become resources that lack there… 
Let us then review some key points for making the most of quality risk management (QRM). 
2. Knowledge is the base of everything 
QRM is a powerful machine but to move has to be filled with a kind of fuel called “knowledge”. 
If we don’t know anything about our product or process, we cannot manage risk. Risk, by 
definition, is the combination of the probability and severity of a hazard. And if we don’t 
know the hazards, not to say their likelihood and importance, there is no way for QRM. 
 
Figure 1. Hazard – Risk - Harm 
This explains why knowledge management is put beside QRM as an enabler. Experience 
shows that more often than not information on the products and on the processes is “lost”, 
either because it is not duly registered and disappears or because it is just kept away by a 
given person and never diffused within the company. The result is that in many cases there 
is or there was information but it is not available when needed by the persons of the 
company who have to take a decision. 
And the fact is that if we cannot gather information on the product or process, either in 
house or outside it (other sites, publications, courses, etc.) it is very unlikely that we might 
follow a QRM approach. In other words, both enablers are linked and thus, the amount and 
Hazard Risk Harm 
The potential 
source of harm 
Damage to health, including the 
damage that can occur from loss 
of product quality or availability. 
The combination of the probability 
of occurrence of harm and the 
severity of that harm. 
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characteristics of the knowledge at our disposal will be one of the main factors which will 
dictate how to perform our QRM. 
 
Figure 2. Quality risk management steps 
QRM is the result of a certain number of operations or steps, which can be summarized in 
different ways differing only slightly one from the other. The first part of QRM is evidently 
devoted to the quality risk analysis (QRA), that is, to the estimation of the risk associated with 
the identified hazards, whereas the second one concerns, properly speaking, the 
administration of this risk. Any QRM process has to start by defining its goal (what is 
intended) and by gathering information. All other steps are shaped by this first one. 
But, speaking in practical terms, what kind of knowledge we need? Let us try to respond to 
this question by considering three different cases. 
2.1. Product 
If we are dealing with a product, we might need to be familiar with: 
 Its characteristics and specifications 
 Its CQAs (critical quality attributes), that is physical, chemical, biological or microbiological 
properties or characteristics that should be within an appropriate limit, range, or distribution to 
ensure the desired product quality “in [4]”. 
Define objectives and 
gather information 
Quality risk 
analysis 
(QRA) 
Quality risk 
management 
(QRM) 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Define the procedure 
Perform the analysis 
Modify as necessary 
Revise the analysis 
Draw consequences 
Write a report 
Follow-up 
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 The factors that might affect its quality 
 The likelihood of these factors and the effects of the loss of quality 
And this can only be achieved by people possessing or gathering this knowledge and 
analyzing it subsequently by means of brainstorming. A table like the following one can be 
helpful in performing this. 
 
Problems (what can 
affect its quality?) 
Causes (what might 
provoke this 
problem?) 
Likeness (is 
that likely to 
happen?) 
Preventive measures (what could 
we do to control or mitigate this 
problem?) 
Particle size Inadequate particle 
size 
Yes Provide the supplier with detailed 
specifications 
Contamination 
(bioburden / 
pesticides) 
Product of natural 
origin 
Maybe Tight control of the sources of 
product 
Degradation Too high temperature Probable Determine acceptable temperature 
range 
Note: The contents of this table are just given as an example; they don’t intend to represent any real situation. 
Table 1. Table for product brainstorming 
Several approaches have been proposed to facilitate this brainstorming, such as, 
 Imagine different situations (e.g. change of supplier, lack of electricity, flood, error, mix-
up, etc.) and then answering to “what would happen”? 
 Ask people working or having worked in this situation. 
 Inquire regulatory authorities. 
 Review technical literature and attend congresses. 
2.2. Process 
If we are dealing with a process we might need to be aware of: 
 Its flow-chart; 
 Its equipment; 
 Its CPPs (critical process parameters), that is process parameters whose variability has an 
impact on a critical quality attribute and therefore should be monitored or controlled to ensure 
the process produces the desired quality “in [4]”. 
 The factors which can affect them and the ways for doing this; 
 The likeness and the consequences of these deviations. 
Exactly as said above, this has to be done by people possessing or gathering this knowledge. 
In this case, the table might appear like this one. 
The approach to be followed is the same that was mentioned before. 
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Process 
stage 
Problems (Deviations 
from the normal 
situation?) 
Causes (what 
might provoke 
this problem?) 
Likeness (is that 
likely to 
happen?) 
Preventive measures (what 
could we do to control or 
mitigate this problem?) 
#1 Wrong weight of 
starting material 
Error Maybe Scales will be provided with 
a printer 
#3 Irregular dosage of vials 
because dose is very low
Filler has not 
enough capacity 
Yes Qualify filler and organize a 
monitoring system for filled 
vials 
#8 Lack of leaflet Leaflet fell outside 
the box 
No A weighing machine 
controls each box 
Note: The contents of this table are just given as an example; they don’t intend to represent any real situation. 
Table 2. Table for process brainstorming 
2.3. Comparison 
And finally, if we are comparing two different situations, then we should identify: 
 Their characteristics (their main attributes and sub-attributes); 
 The elements likely to influence them; 
 Our needs / requirements. 
 
Attributes Sub-attributes Influence (which role 
they may play?) 
Preventive measures (what could we do to 
control or mitigate this problem?) 
Premises HVAC 
configuration 
Risk of cross-
contamination 
Dedicated HVAC system without recycling 
Pressure 
differentials 
Protection of the 
environment 
Containment of the product by negative 
differential pressure surrounded by positive 
differential pressure 
Personnel Training High risk of error / 
confusion 
Ensure adequate training 
Protection Manipulation of active 
products 
Introduce isolators where product is exposed 
Note: The contents of this table are just given as an example; they don’t intend to represent any real situation. 
Table 3. Table for comparing two different situations / elements 
In this case brainstorming can be facilitated by: 
 Carefully analyzing the attributes and sub-attributes (e.g., the factors which intervene in 
the constitution of this situation / element). 
 Ask people about their experience on this. 
 Inquiring regulatory authorities. 
 Reviewing technical literature and attending congresses. 
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3. GMP and QRM 
An interesting question that might arise as a consequence of the application of QRM is about 
precedence. What is more important a GMP statement or the result of a QRA? This is 
however a completely false question because if GMP can be considered the logic baseline in 
pharmaceutical production, then how can QRA be anything different? 
 
Figure 3. Problem management 
In fact QRM is complementary to GMP because it provides the frame for taking a decision, 
whereas GMP proposes us some practical and well known solutions. It is important to 
understand that “good manufacturing practice” has been, and still is, accompanied by some 
amount of “bad practice”. And this is the result of seeing in GMP as a kind of oracle which 
will provide us with magical solutions. 
No solution for a problem should be looked for, before having defined it perfectly. This 
assertion might seem surprising but experience shows that analysis is often left aside 
because all attention is eagerly focused on the quick search of a solution. 
Once the problem is well understood and its causes and likely effects have been determined 
is when the search for a solution can be started. In any case this requires, as said before, 
possessing knowledge. It is evident that GMP has to be taken into account, but only when 
the problem has been analyzed and understood in depth. Then, an answer to the problem 
can be found and it is evident that it will be science and knowledge-based and GMP 
compliant. 
4. Selection of tools 
There are different tools which can be used in QRM, both unspecific and specific for this 
task “in [2, 6]”. In reality, and very unpleasantly for some people, tools just organize in a 
more or less sophisticated way the information that we have. They will neither provide us 
with the knowledge that we don’t have nor liberate us from the task of thinking about the 
question. Brainstorming will always be inevitable. 
Problem / question / doubt 
1st Define it 
2nd Look for its cause/s 
5th Look for possible solutions 
3rd Establish its effect/s 
Adopted solution / approach 
4th Gather information on it 
6th What about GMP? 
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According to their function QRM tools can be classified in three main groups: risk analysis, 
risk comparison and statistical support. 
Risk analysis tools are either inductive or deductive. The first, starting with the normal 
operation, try to detect possible problems. The second, starting with the problem, try to find 
the chain of events that led to it. It is also very common to talk about formal and informal 
tools. In fact the former have really been devised for this purpose, whereas the latter are just 
data given in a certain way and they can be only considered “tools” in a loose sense. 
It might seem surprising to explain that there are QRM tools that do not consider risk, but 
hazard. Although this is discussed in more detail below, here we need only point out that 
“risk analysis or management” is a general concept which can consider just hazards or their 
associated risk too. 
 
Characteristics Tools
Tools for 
risk 
analysis 
Inductive 
/ single 
factors 
Basic / Informal 
Simple 
organization 
of data
Flowchart / Process map / 
Checklist/ Ishikawa diagram 
(fishbone), etc. 
Formal 
Identification of 
hazards and 
their potential 
effects 
Risk is not 
estimated 
PHA (Preliminary Hazard Analysis) 
Risk is 
estimated 
PRA (Preliminary Risk Analysis) 
Evaluation of 
failure modes 
and of their 
potential effects
Risk is not 
estimated 
FMEA (Failure Mode Effects 
Analysis)
Risk is 
estimated 
FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects and 
Criticality Analysis) 
Evaluation and monitoring of 
hazard
HACCP (Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Points) 
Analysis of deviations by means 
of “key words”
HAZOP (Hazard Operability 
Analysis) 
Deductiv
e / 
multiple 
factors
Identification of real or potential 
problems 
FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) 
Tools for risk comparison Risk Ranking and Filtering 
Supporting statistical tools 
Control charts / Design of 
experiments / Histograms / Pareto 
charts / Process capability analysis 
Table 4. Basic classification of tools used in QRM 
Even if it is true that specific tools have been developed with an intended objective, and this 
somewhat restricts their scope of use, there is often overseen that they can have a wider 
utility. In fact tools are at our service and we should use them to organize information in 
order to get the most of it. Except in those cases when there is a need for coordination, e. g., 
different sites of the same group, or a requirement by the Authorities we should feel free in 
the way we use QRM tools. 
In practice, it is possible to distinguish six basic cases in QRM: 
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1. As it has been indicated before the presentation of data is a basic need in QRM, hence 
informal tools, such as flow charts are necessary. 
2. A first task in any QRM is hazard assessment and for doing this PHA is the right tool. 
3. If risk assessment is desired, then FMECA is what we need. 
4. HACCP is an appropriate tool for the monitoring of processes by means of their 
parameters. 
5. When the search for the root cause of an event is required then FTA will do. 
6. RRF allows for comparisons. 
These six cases will cover practically all the needs regarding QRM. Understanding and 
using them can thus be considered a must. 
 
QRM tool Practical utilization 
 Check lists, reports, graphs, etc. 
 Diagrams (flow, Pareto, Ishikawa), histograms, etc.
Basic data presentation 
PHA (Primary hazard analysis) Basic hazard assessment 
FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects & Criticality Analysis) Risk assessment 
HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points) Process monitoring 
FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) Root cause identification 
RRF (Risk ranking and filtering) Comparison 
Table 5. QRM most common tools and their practical utilization 
4.1. Basic data presentation 
Any system may be used to gather and present data and further on we provide some 
examples. Ishikawa and Pareto diagrams not only show data but the first organizes them at 
a certain level and the second treats them statistically. This is why they are also mentioned 
for the root cause identification. 
4.2. Basic hazard assessment 
In every situation (product, process, etc.) there is a period of time, in the beginning, when 
knowledge is very limited and unsure. Suppositions count more than facts. Then, there is a 
very simple tool, perfectly adapted to this situation: PHA (Primary hazard analysis) “in [2, 6]”. 
It is developed by using a table, which might vary slightly according to specific needs or 
requirements, but which considers basically these items: hazards, causes, effects and 
preventive measures. Note that often it is not necessary to consider the “effects”, as they are 
either evident or are already somewhat included in the “hazard”. 
The hazards which put the quality of the products at risk during their manufacturing may 
belong to five categories: 
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 Contamination (external): Any contamination of a material or of a product not related 
to other materials or products manufactured in the factory (e. g., pollen, sand, hair, 
scales, dandruff, fibers, microorganisms, etc.) 
 Cross-contamination: Contamination of a material or of a product with another material 
or product. 
 Environmental contamination: Contamination of the production rooms, the operators 
or the surroundings of the pharmaceutical unit because of the voluntary or accidental 
liberation of materials or products 
 Mix up / error: Operation inadequately performed (error) or where one thing is taken 
by another one (mix up) 
 Degradation: Loss of quality of the product because of inadequate conditions 
The following table uses this approach: 
 
Hazard Cause Preventive measures Comments 
Contamination 
(outer) 
Inflow of dirty air 
Separation of production 
areas and air control 
Airlock doors are interlocked. 
Air is filtered. 
Cross-
contamination 
Inadequate CIP 
cleaning 
Vessel is dirty Cleaning is validated. 
Dust liberation Dust extraction system 
Effectiveness of extraction is 
verified 
Mix up / Error 
Transfer of wrong 
material 
Inadequate product 
Double verification. 
Materials are controlled and 
registered while entering and 
while being used. 
Environmental 
contamination 
Isolator is not kept 
at depression 
Room and people 
contaminated 
Isolator is provided with a 
pressure gauge. 
Isolator has an alarm system for 
pressure. 
Degradation 
Inadequate 
temperature 
Air conditioning Temperature is controlled 
Inadequate 
humidity 
Air conditioning with 
control of humidity 
Relative humidity is kept ≤ 30% 
Note: The contents of this table are just given as an example; they don’t intend to represent any real situation. 
Table 6. PHA table 
4.3. Risk assessment 
In order to analyze quality risks in the operations, when there is a significant amount of 
operator participation, the choice tool is FMECA (failure mode, effects and criticality 
analysis) “in [2, 6, 7]”. It is performed by using a table possessing these main headings: 
 Failure mode: the way an element can have a potential failure (in relation to 
specifications) or do not develop its functions. They are detected as an answer to the 
question “what might go wrong? It has to be pointed out that a simple function may 
have several failure modes. 
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 Cause: the grounds which provoke a failure. 
 Effect: the results which appear when the failure mode comes out. 
 
# 
Operation / 
Process 
stage 
Failure mode 
S 
(Severity)
Cause 
P 
(Probability)
Existing 
controls 
D 
(Difficulty 
of detection)
Risk 
priorisation 
(PR = S x P x 
D) 
Risk accepted? 
(comments) 
3 Agitation 
Speed < 1.400 
rpm 2 Failure 1 
Monitoring 
by 
computer 
1 2 
Yes (a tachymeter is 
in place; speed can 
vary without 
sensible effect) 
5 Dissolution Degradation 3 
Temperature > 
80ºC 1 
Monitoring 
by 
computer 
1 3 
Yes (T is controlled 
and materials are 
not affected) 
9 Filling Inadequate 
dosage 
3 
Failure / 
wrong 
adjustment 
1 
Every tube 
is weighed 
after filling
1 3 
Yes (equipment is 
qualified and scales 
are calibrated) 
Note: The contents of this table are just given as an example; they don’t intend to represent any real situation. 
Table 7. FMECA table 
This table may include risk reduction and be used as an instrument of risk management. 
 
 
# 
Operation / 
Process 
stage 
Failure 
mode 
S Cause P Control 
in place 
D RP Risk 
accepted? 
Actions 
Reevaluation Risk 
accepted? S P D PR 
                
Table 8. FMECA table for risk reduction 
4.4. Process monitoring 
It is evident that if a process is well understood it is possible to identify its CPPs and if we 
can keep them under control by a process monitoring system then the quality of the 
products will be ensured. 
 
Figure 4. HACCP rationale 
Definition of the product / process / system
Hazard identification
Risk analysis 
and evaluation
Acceptable? 
CCP management 
and periodical review
Implement measures for a 
better process control and 
for reducing risk 
Application of control measures
Define CCPs and 
establish control 
limits for them
CCP monitoring
Establish corrective measures to be implemented 
when a CCP is out of range
Inacceptable? 
Risk reduction Risk evaluation 
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HACCP (hazard analysis and critical control points) is a method that detects the hazards for 
the quality of the products (or for the safety) and then their “critical control points” (CCP) 
“in [2, 6, 8]”. The rational of HACCP is exposed in the annexed figure. 
The flow chart is studied to identify potential hazards, which might affect the quality of the 
product. Then these hazards have to be assessed. Do they have to be controlled? 
 
 
Seriousness of harm
Insignificant Minor Severe Critical Catastrophic 
Probability 
of harm 
Always     High risk 
Frequently 
(probable) 
     
Sometimes   Medium risk   
Rare (improbable)      
Non observable Low risk     
Table 9. Example of risk evaluation 
This leads to the determination of the CCPs. 
 
Operation / 
Process stage Potential hazard 
Is risk 
significant? Why? 
Preventive 
measures 
Is it a 
CCP? 
Test for endotoxin 
in water 
Presence of endotoxin 
in water 
Yes 
Endotoxin is not 
allowed 
Monitoring Yes 
Measure of pH pH outside range Yes Precipitation Verify pH Yes 
Filter sterilization 
Viable microbes in the 
filter Yes Product not sterile 
Process validation 
and monitoring Yes 
Note: The contents of this table are just given as an example; they don’t intend to represent any real situation. 
Table 10. HACCP – I: CCP establishment 
The rationale for the establishment of CCP can be summarized as follows. 
 
Figure 5. Rationale for the establishment of a CCP 
Is there in this stage a hazard with enough probability and seriousness to make it necessary its control? 
It is not a CCP 
Modify as necessary 
Is there a control measure for this hazard?
Yes No 
Is it necessary to control this stage in order 
to reduce / eliminate the hazard? 
Is it necessary to control this stage in order to 
ensure the quality of the product 
It is a CCP It is not a CCP
Yes No 
Yes No Yes No 
It is not a CCP 
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Then, for each CCP are defined alert and acceptance limits. As a consequence, monitoring 
procedures are established and they are accompanied by the set up of corrective actions in 
case of deviation. Finally as in any monitoring system it is necessary to define how it will be 
managed and periodically reviewed to verify that it performs as expected. 
 
CCP Acceptable 
range 
Monitoring
Corrective actions 
Who? How? When 
Test for endotoxin in 
water 
< 0,25 U. QC technician LAL test 
Before 
starting the 
production 
Stop production and call 
the supervisor 
Measure of pH pH = 6-7 
Production 
supervisor pH-meter In process 
Call the supervisor. Add 
more sodium hydroxide 
Filter sterilization Sterile Production technician 
Control process 
parameters (P, T and t) 
After 
sterilization 
Stop production and call 
the supervisor 
Note: The contents of this table are just given as an example; they don’t intend to represent any real situation 
Table 11. HACCP – II: CCP monitoring 
4.5. Root cause identification 
When a deviation is detected it is necessary to implement corrective and preventive actions 
(CAPA system), But this is only possible if the root cause has been identified. To do this we 
can use several tools, both unspecific (such as Ishikawa or Pareto diagrams) and specific 
(FTA). 
 
Figure 6. Diagrams of Ishikawa and Pareto 
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EFFECT 
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Factors which contribute to the effect 
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Pareto 
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Two simple tools can be used for a primary analysis of causes. 
The first one is the diagram of Ishikawa, also known as cause-effect or fishbone diagram, 
which shows in a graphical way cause relations and their interaction to provoke an 
effect.  
The second one is the diagram of Pareto, which orders the data in relation to their 
importance and this allows for the distinction among frequent and infrequent causes of 
failures. It is prepared by listing all the elements and determining their frequencies. Then, 
the elements are classified in relation to their cumulative frequency. 
FTA (fault tree analysis) is a deductive tool which uses a pictogram to represent in an organized 
way the factors (causes) which produce or contribute to the production of an undesirable event 
“in [2, 6, 9]”. 
The tree is started by placing the top event. Then the events which contributed to it are 
analyzed. Events are united by gates, which show the relation amongst them. 
Gates can be very varied, but the most common ones are the “and” and “or” gates. 
Although there are specific gate symbols defined by an international standard, in practice 
for most cases it would suffice to represent them by a circle and write inside to which type 
they belong. 
 
 
Figure 7. FTA diagram 
 
 
Figure 8. FTA: Examples of “and” and “or” gates 
Contaminated object
Dirty gloves Glove contact
and 
Faulty sterilization Inadequate manipulation
or 
Contaminated environment 
Contaminated vial 
Basic event: It initiates a 
failure and does not need 
further development. 
Intermediate event: 
It connects the top 
event to the basic 
events. 
Event
Gate: It connects the events 
defining their causality reports
Top event: The failure or 
deviation, which starts the AAP 
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Figure 9. RRF: Example of hazard or problem decomposition (factors intervening in cleaning) 
4.6. Comparison 
RRF (Risk ranking and filtering) is a tool specifically devised for the comparison of different 
sets (units, processes, companies, etc.) possessing varied levels of risks “in [2, 6, 10]”. Once 
they are reduced to a common denominator they can be compared and this allows for the 
establishment of priorities. 
As in any method, it is necessary to individualize first the hazards or problems and then the 
different attributes, components or elements, which contribute to them. 
Then each attribute, component or element is evaluated in terms of risk. 
 
Figure 10. RRF: Risk estimation 
It is possible to get a comprehensive evaluation taking into account all the intervening 
elements. This allows for the ranking of the problems or hazards, which can be filtered. 
Problem / Hazard 
Classification Evaluation Low Middle High 
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
Supplier compliance (example) 
Element Classification Evaluation Low (1) Middle (2) High (3) 
GMP Deficient Acceptable Certified 2 
Q system Deficient Acceptable Certified 1 
Audits None By other By us 3 
Documents Deficient Good Excellent 2 
History >5 problems <5 problems No problems 2 
    10 
 
CLEANING 
… 
Product 
manufactured 
previously 
Solubility in water 
Therapeutic single dose 
Adsorption to surfaces 
Particle size 
Moisture 
Stability 
Batch size 
Product 
manufactured 
afterwards 
Maximum daily dose 
Batch size 
Characteristics of 
the manufacturing 
process 
Moisture 
Dispersion 
Time befor cleaning 
Surface extension 
Type of surface 
Material of construction
Design 
Mode of use 
Type of automatisation 
Characteristics of the 
equipment used 
Type of automatisation 
Temperature 
Time 
Products used 
Characteristics of the 
cleaning process 
Time remaining dirty 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
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Figure 11. Hazard – Risk - Harm 
It is also possible to rank and filter risks by using tables combining the three well-known 
factors (probability, severity and difficulty of detection). 
 
Figure 12. RRF: Combination of the risk factors 
5. Is it really necessary to determine risk in QRM? 
This is not the kind of stupid question that, at first sight, might seem. And in fact this is not 
a question, but two. The first one might be related to the fact that in everyday’s life we 
somehow tend to mix-up hazard and risk. As the latter is the consequence of the former, we 
tend to consider both practically as synonymous. The second one comes out because of the 
fact that identification of hazards is a prerequisite for the determination of their risk, and 
risk allows for an assessment of hazard. Thus, why to limit ourselves to something of “low 
level” like hazard when we can get something “better” like risk? Unfortunately this is not 
correct. By definition, to determine risk we have to start by knowing the probability of 
occurrence of the hazard. And this is often very difficult and in the end it turns to be just an 
inference. Then, we should know the seriousness of the harm and, although this is usually 
clearer, it is neither an easy task and often requires some degree of imagination. 
Consequently, in many cases, risk is not more than an estimation, that has to be improved 
along the time as more experience is collected. The case might be that hazard, usually a 
concrete thing, is substituted by risk, an estimated value and this can hardly be something 
better. 
In practice, our first aim should be to determine hazard and then, only if there is an objective 
possibility of estimating risk, do it. Speaking in general terms the evolution should be 
hazard detection > qualitative risk estimation > quantitative risk estimation. In projects or 
new processes we would move towards the left (hazard), whereas as we gain process 
knowledge we might move towards the right (risk). 
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Summarizing, although we talk about QRM it is perfectly acceptable just to determine 
hazard and manage it in terms of making the appearance of harm an unluckily event by 
applying corrective measures. It is better to limit a QRA to the hazards that trying to 
estimate risk without having enough information for doing it. 
6. How to determine risk? 
Risk is determined by the combination of the two already mentioned factors, probability 
and severity, to which a third one, detection, can be added when a system of detection is in 
place. This gives us the classical formula: 
Risk = Probability of occurrence of the harm x Severity of the harm x Detection of the harm. 
Instead of probability it is often used the term frequency, pointing out that most of times 
what we really know is how often it happened in a well established process. It is evident 
that even if we don’t know how to estimate probability, if we really do know that harm 
never happened in our process we can affirm that probability is very low. 
Severity is easier to understand because we are only asked to assess the importance of harm. 
The capacity of detection of harm is linked to the existence of a system for its detection. 
Thus, its assessment tends to be more objective, as it is related to the equipment. This factor, 
however, has a marked particularity: risk increases when the capacity of detection 
decreases; it is an inverse factor. This is not a problem if we bear in mind this fact, but it can 
be easily overcome by changing the way we express it, for instance, instead of talking about 
“detection of the harm” we could say “difficulty of detection of the harm”, thus turning it a 
direct factor like the other two. 
7. How to better evaluate risk? 
All three risk factors can be evaluated either qualitatively or quantitatively. Again, a 
quantitative estimation of risk (e.g. of 45 over 50, say) might appear much more satisfactory 
than a qualitative one (e.g. middle), but this might be too, and often is, misleading, because 
it provides a false sensation of precision. 
As it was discussed above, the main objection one can do regarding risk is that its 
determination is too subjective and this makes it unreliable. Although there is some amount 
of truth in this, we may, however, counterattack by explaining that the objective of assessing 
risk is not getting a faithful estimate of it, but obtaining a risk baseline to be used as an 
indicator for future improvement. This is why what really matters is providing a good deal 
of information on the rationale which led to the estimation of the factors of risk. 
Independently from that, it is necessary to determine how many risk levels will be estimated 
for each hazard. The simplest case and maybe the commonest too is the utilization of three 
levels, a very intuitive approach, as we are talking about “a lot” (high), “medium” (middle) 
and “little” (low). More levels allow for a better classification, but they turn more complicate 
the assessment. 
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Another point that needs to be discussed, when using quantitative evaluation, is the 
relation between these levels. Beside the normal series of values (1, 2, 3, etc.), we might use 
other with wider gaps between the levels, either regular (e. g., 1, 3, 5, 7) or even irregular 
(e. g., 1, 3, 7, 12). These last cases would give more weight to the higher levels, thus 
increasing the sensation of higher risk. It is not necessary to insist on the fact that any type 
of characterization of the levels is acceptable, provided that it is clearly defined and 
indicated and that it is not used to take false conclusions regarding higher evaluations of 
risk. 
7.1. Qualitative evaluation 
For instance in three levels: 
 
Evaluation PROBABILITY SEVERITY 
DIFFICULTY OF 
DETECTION 
High The failure /accident occurs 
frequently 
The consequences of the failure 
/accident are important 
The failure /accident will very 
likely not be detected 
Medium The failure /accident occurs 
periodically 
The consequences of the failure 
/accident are moderate 
The failure /accident might be 
detected 
Low The failure /accident occurs 
rarely 
The consequences of the failure 
/accident are low 
The failure /accident will very 
likely be detected 
Table 12. Example of qualitative evaluation in three levels 
More than three levels: 
 
Evaluation PROBABILITY SEVERITY DIFFICULTY OF DETECTION 
Very high Always Catastrophic It cannot be detected 
High Often (probable) Critical It can only be detected when the process is already finished 
Medium Sometimes Serious It can be detected during one of the stages of the process 
Low Rare (improbable) Minor It can be detected during the stage in process 
Very low Non observable Insignificant It can be detected instantaneously 
Table 13. Example of qualitative evaluation in five levels 
An important inconvenient of the qualitative evaluation of the factors appears when 
determining risk. Everybody would agree that low x medium x high = medium, but the 
score of low x low x high is not so evident (medium?). And this becomes even more unclear 
if we consider more than three levels. 
This is however less important that it might seem at first sight. As we have seen above, risk 
estimation, and particularly the qualitative one, is likely to be more a rough approximation 
than a very exact value. Thus, adding some more roughness should not be considered 
critical. In any case, this inconvenient can be overcome by using a complementary table 
which would provide a homogeneous estimation. 
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Risk = Low x Low x Low = Low Risk = Medium x Medium x Medium = Medium 
Risk = Low x Low x Medium = Low-Medium Risk = Medium x Medium x High = Medium-High 
Risk = Low x Medium x Medium = Medium-Low Risk = Medium x High x High = High-Medium 
Risk = Low x Medium x High = Medium Risk = High x High x High = High 
Risk = Low x High x High = Medium-High ---- 
Table 14. Example of table for the qualitative estimation of risk 
It is evident that if the risk factors are estimated by using more than three levels, then the 
table becomes more complicated. 
7.2. Quantitative evaluation 
If it is done in three levels, then the approach might be exactly the same that shown above 
for the qualitative estimation, but instead of low, medium and high there will be used 
numbers (1, 2, 3) and this will facilitate calculation (e. g., 3 x 1 x 2 = 6). 
The next table provides an example of quantitative evaluation in five levels, both 
following the natural series of numbers and an irregular (or “enhanced”) one. Both are, of 
course, acceptable, but it is necessary to bear in mind that the final risk quantification will 
depend on the system which has been chosen and thus comparisons have to take this into 
account. 
 
Evaluation (two 
options) PROBABILITY SEVERITY 
DIFFICULTY OF 
DETECTION 
1st 2nd 
1 1 Expected >80% of times. Batch is OOS and it is rejected. No detection. 
2 3 Expected between >50% 
and ≤80% of times 
There are deviations and batch 
is investigated and rejected. 
Detection but only when the 
process is finished 
3 5 Expected between >10% 
and ≤50% of times. 
There are deviations and batch 
is investigated but accepted. 
Detection during a stage of the 
process, before finishing it. 
4) 7 Expected between >1% 
and ≤10% of times. 
A trend is detected, but limits 
are not exceeded and the batch 
is not investigated. 
Detection during the stage in 
process. 
5 9 Expected ≤1% of times. There is no trend and limits are 
not exceeded. Batch is not 
investigated. 
Instantaneous detection. 
Table 15. Example of quantitative evaluation of the factors of risk in five levels 
8. How to introduce QRM in a company? 
One might tend to think that what matters is to teach people how to use QRA tools and how 
to evaluate risk. Although this is something that has to be done, it is necessary to bear in 
mind that this is only second to the understanding of the purpose and practical utility of 
QRM. 
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QRM is not just a kind of new task in a company. It is, in fact, a new way of looking at 
things, a new approach in analyzing the problems and in proposing solutions to them. This 
is why the most important and basic task is to make up the mind of people. 
 
Figure 13. Introduction of QRM in a company 
To simplify matters it is generally agreed that a good practice is to prepare a detailed 
protocol describing how the company intends to develop and to apply QRM. 
9. Is there a way to facilitate QRA? 
Everybody can have a personal approach towards QRA, but experience shows that there are 
no simple ways. As said above a good knowledge of the subject is essential, then some dose 
of experience is helpful and a big amount of patience is necessary. 
It has already been described the paramount importance of getting information on the 
subject and how this can be done. It has also been explained how to choose and use the 
more common (and practical) tools. Thus, getting an adequate QRA is just a question of 
work. Get a first draft, review it and improve it little by little until getting something 
satisfactory. There are no rules, but the approach of working by progressive “retouches” is 
certainly very appropriate. 
It is worth to mention that while working on QRA one of the most puzzling aspects is the 
frequent confusion that one tends to experience regarding “hazard”, “cause” and “effect”. This 
can be overcome in two complementary ways. Firstly by understanding well the meaning of 
these terms and applying them carefully to the elements being analyzed and secondly by 
reviewing the draft after a few hours of rest. Normally what is not seen clear now, it will be later. 
10. Why QRA is worthy? 
QRA provides us with a systematic and deep knowledge of the problems faced by the 
process under study. In this sense QRA can help us to overcome one of the main troubles 
derived of the application of GMP, their being seen as a kind of “tables of the law”. The 
consideration of GMP as the golden principles supposed to provide the answer for every 
problem, has often led to a passive attitude. We had a problem and then we looked up in 
Explain what QRM is and why is important and 
Prepare a QRM procedure
Remember that the 
documentation of the QS has 
to take into account QRM 
Provide training
Introduce progressively QRM
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GMP. Now, QRA means that we analyze and understand well our problem. It is not 
necessary to say that this is extremely important and worthy. 
QRA is also a key element in the introduction of improvement in the pharmaceutical 
industry. Without the concept of QRA, improvement would not be understood. In the past 
improvement didn’t exist, because we didn’t accept risk. Now when we recognize risk and 
accept that it is inevitable we can also say that improvement exists and that it consists of the 
reduction of this risk. 
11. Some common problems solved by using QRA 
QRA is a powerful instrument, which may help to solve typical problems faced by the 
technicians working in a pharmaceutical laboratory and in this sense the ICH Q9 guideline 
provides many examples regarding the potential applications of QRA “in [4]”. It is however 
worthwhile to study in detail three very common problems: documentation, 
inspections/audits and handling of active products. 
11.1. Documentation 
“Which documents do I need?” or “tell me which documents I have to prepare and I will do 
it” are much heard questions. And this is so because GMP does not provide an answer. An 
impossible answer, anyway, because documentation is closely related to every particular 
situation and this is why GMP just mentions the documents directly associated with the 
products (specifications, formulae, processing instructions, etc.) and some general 
documents (sampling, testing, release, etc.). Documents have to be established on a case by 
case base, even if in the end all laboratories finish by having about the same documents and 
the basic difference relies on their extension and on how information is organized and 
grouped. 
Documentation is used to attain two basic goals, information on how to perform operations, 
in general, and confidence in the control of critical operations, in particular. The first 
determines basically the number of documents to be written, whereas the second focuses on 
their contents. 
Write a list of the processes of your company and then prepare flow charts for each of them. 
By doing this a number of operations will appear. Procedures have to describe these 
operations. There is no rule of thumb about how many are needed. Neither very long nor 
very short procedures are practical. Consequently a certain level of grouping is necessary 
and each company has to decide how to do it. Factors which might help in this decision are 
basically related to logistics, organization and personnel. 
Once you have these flow charts perform on them QRA using a very basic tool such as PHA. 
This will allow detecting hazards and will oblige thinking of the related control measures. 
And then, these control measures will have to appear in the documents describing the 
operations. 
 
Quality Risk Analysis: Value for Money in the Pharmaceutical Industry 407 
 
Figure 14. The documentation virtuous circle 
11.2. Inspections / Audits 
Inspections and audits worry always personnel. They remind them of the student days and 
consequently they ask themselves again “how can I pass them successfully”? In the school 
the obvious answer would have been “learn well the lessons of the program”, but in the 
pharmaceutical industry the program is less obvious and “lessons” are not so clearly stated. 
They have to take into account GMP, of course, but also other things (GLP, regulations, 
guidelines, unwritten expectations, company standards, etc.). Here again QRA can help us. 
As summarized in the figure below our approach should focus in showing that we know 
our hazards and we keep them mastered. 
 
Figure 15. How to face an inspection/audit 
Pharmaceutical company
Objective: Ensure the quality of the 
products
Course of action: Identify the hazards 
and their causes and implement control 
measures
Measures: Write procedures (SOPs) and 
train people
Results: Hazards are controlled and the 
quality of the products is ensured
Auditor / Inspector
Objective: Convince herself / himself that 
the quality of the products is ensured 
Course of action: Verify that hazards 
and their causes have been identified 
and that control measures are in place 
Measures: Verify that procedures (SOPs) 
exist, that they are appropriate and that 
personnel has been trained
Results: It has been verified that hazards 
are controlled and that the quality of the 
products is ensured
Identify processes
Find control measures
Prepare flow-charts
Perform PHA
Identify operations
Identify hazards
Write procedures
Continual improvement
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11.3. Handling of active products 
GMP establishes the need for dedicated facilities in some cases (production of penicillin or 
live microorganisms) or requires separation for certain products (antibiotics, hormones, 
cytotoxics, etc.). Most products are however manufactured in multiproduct facilities, where 
products share utilities and equipment, after performing the required validations. As 
products and processes can be very varied it is evident that the orientation provided by 
GMP can’t be very detailed. This is why a QRA approach is very useful. 
Among both extremes, a dedicated building (with separated equipment and utilities) and a 
multiproduct facility, there are less radical solutions, such as, for instance, separated areas 
(rooms or set of rooms with their own air-locks and changing rooms), provided with 
separate equipment and utilities, within a multiproduct unit. Also, when this is feasible, a 
simpler way of preventing cross-contamination might be the use of specific parts of 
equipment (e.g., filters, sieves), instead of dedicated equipment. 
Another approach would be segregating the process from its environment by using isolation 
technology (i.e. production equipment within isolators or closed equipment instead of 
separating the rooms). 
Campaign manufacturing, which certainly requires appropriate validation, is also a way to 
prevent cross-contamination. 
The application of quality risk assessment to the products and to the processes to be 
performed within a pharmaceutical unit, allows for their rational design. 
 
Figure 16. Handling of active products: QRA approach 
QRA 
Product: Toxicity, physical properties, etc. 
Premises: Flows of materials/personnel, isolator technology, dedicated (separated) buildings/areas/rooms, etc. 
Process: Flows, batch size, changeover frequency, sequences, etc. 
Equipment: Dedicated/non dedicated, open/closed, product contact materials. 
Utilities: Design, dedicated (separate), etc. 
Complementary activities: Cleaning, maintenance, sewage/refuse handling, etc. 
Intrinsic severity of substances 
(Characteristics of starting materials and of the product)
Pr
ob
ab
il
it
y 
of
 o
cc
ur
re
nc
e 
(C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
of
 th
e 
pr
oc
es
s)
 
Dedicated facility, 
equipment and 
utilities. 
Containment design of 
facilities, equipment, 
and utilities.
Working 
by
Dedicated rooms or suites 
of rooms, equipment, and 
utilities.
Isolators
LOW RISK
Normal, multi-product 
facility, equipment, and 
utilities.
MIDDLE RISK 
HIGH RISK 
 
Quality Risk Analysis: Value for Money in the Pharmaceutical Industry 409 
The appraisal of the hazard can be performed by using primary hazard analysis (PHA) as it 
was previously described. In this case from the five categories of hazards mentioned only 
two have to be taken into account: environmental contamination and cross-contamination. 
 
Hazard Cause Preventive measure Comments
Environmental 
contamination 
Release of dust, 
particles, 
droplets, 
aerosols, 
effluents and 
waste 
Manufacturing areas are 
isolated 
Clean-rooms are isolated from the environment 
Products are isolated Product containment inside closed systems 
Air handling HEPA-filtered air 
Pressure differentials 
Negative pressure impedes the diffusion of 
particles 
Effluent treatment 
Cleaning effluents are treated before being 
released to the sewer 
Waste control Wastes are disposed of in an adequate manner 
Control of dust 
Release of dust is kept under control (closed 
systems / dust extraction) 
Personal protective equipment (PPE) 
Note: The contents of this table are just given as an example; they don’t intend to represent any real situation. 
Table 16. Handling of active products – QRA – Environmental contamination 
Although in both cases the causes are similar, the array of control measures is very varied 
and concerns different systems. 
 
Hazard Cause Preventive measure Comments 
Cross-
contamination 
Release of dust, 
droplets, particles, 
aerosols, during 
operations 
Manufacturing areas are separated Different pharmaceutical forms are completely 
separated 
Products are physically separated Only one product at a time 
Environments are separated 
HVAC system provides environment cleanliness 
(classification) and separation (pressure 
differentials) 
Access of personnel across specific 
changing rooms 
There is an specific change room for each area 
Transfers across air-locks 
All materials and products are transferred across 
air-locks 
Air treatment HEPA-filtered air 
Differential pressure / Airflows 
HVAC system provides environment cleanliness 
(classification) and separation (pressure 
differentials) 
Use of closed systems Production is performed in closed systems. 
Temporal separation of products Campaign working allows for a simplification in 
cleaning. 
Residues on equipment 
“Sanitary” design and construction Clean-rooms follow GMP-design 
Cleaning / sanitation Validated cleaning procedures 
Dust / particles on 
clothing 
Use of specific clothing Clothing is related to the type of operation, which is 
carried out 
Note: The contents of this table are just given as an example; they don’t intend to represent any real situation. 
Table 17. Handling of active products – QRA – Cross-contamination 
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1. Introduction 
A better understanding of risk management processes and practices within a government 
agency is crucial for enhancing the project delivery process and for implementing formally 
risk management. This chapter outlines the whole implementation process carried out with 
the risk management team formed from different functional units and backgrounds. In 
addition, a discussion is held over the critical steps and aspects for performing project and 
enterprise risk management in the real world. 
Risk management is not new for the transportation industry in the United States, specifically 
in highway projects. The California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), a leading 
authority in public transportation projects in the US, has used basic project management 
principles along its statewide Districts offices. Risk management has been part of the project 
management menu; nevertheless its application was limited only to developing a risk 
register and a qualitative analysis at the most. The Office of Statewide Project Management 
Improvement (OSPM), has developed a Project Risk Management handbook which is a 
guide for project managers at Caltrans for using risk management. Unfortunately, the latest 
version of the manual which is from 2007, did not included a detail explanation of the 
benefits for performing quantitative risk analysis while determining the risks impacts into 
the project objectives, in terms of cost and time. The term quantitative risk analysis is merely 
described, lacking a sound description of the tools and methodologies that have been in 
place and use in the industry for many years and even with other government agencies 
around the world. Cost overruns caused by a lack of using risk management in the practice 
for infrastructure and transportation projects, has been mentioned in the literature for many 
years. However, only few examples of how risk management can be use in the real life are 
available, including how can a risk team be formed and how to educate the team for 
performing a sound and trusted risk management exercise. 
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2. Risk management planning 
As any other process in project management, risk management has to be planned in order to 
forecast the total effort required by the project team for developing the full scope of risk 
management. The California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), developed a Project Risk 
Management Handbook which is being used as a reference for planning the steps for applying 
risk management into specific projects. The purpose of the study, roles and responsibilities, the 
scope of the Risk Register, risk identification, analysis methods, implementation period, 
schedule and budget allocation need to be defined with the plan. Special attention should be 
placed into the human resource (method selection) aspect and in identifying the right phase of 
the project to initiate with the study. The roles of the Project Manager (PM) and the Risk 
Manager (RM) are critical for developing a realistic implementation plan (Figure 1). In addition, 
before starting working wit the RMT, the PM and RM should ensure that important project data 
is available. For example the project report, cost estimate, project plan, etc. 
 
Figure 1. Planning the risk management plan 
It is ideal to have the project charter for developing the risk management plan, since in the 
charter it is possible to identify critical information about the project like scope, conceptual 
cost estimate, delivery milestones, conceptual risks, stakeholders, etc.  
3. Risk management training and education 
Caltrans’s Project Risk Management Handbook (California Department of Transportation 
[Caltrans], 2007) is the reference for performing training to the project risk management 
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team. It covers the basics of risk management applied to transportation projects. 
Nevertheless, additional knowledge is provided to the team members for assessing properly 
the risks and opportunities during the qualitative and quantitative analysis. Although there 
are considerable resources for learning about risk management, Caltrans has adopted this 
process into its project development process (Figure 2). This approach has assisted for 
providing on the job training for the Project Development Team (PDT). 
 
Figure 2. Risk management process flow diagram (Caltrans, 2007) 
It is important to notice, that the risk assessment is responsibility of the PM and the project 
team. Nevertheless, it is recommended to use whenever is possible a RM. The RM is a 
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neutral element of the project team and can reduce the bias, which can seriously affect the 
outcome of the risk management study. 
4. Risk manager role 
The relevance that a risk manager plays during the implementation phase is crucial for the 
success of the study. The RM as a risk expert should be able to lead, coordinate, educate, 
explain, convince, propose, monitor and evaluate the entire process; plus he or she needs to 
be able to have experience in leading teams from different backgrounds and coming from 
different functional units and agencies. Vose (2008) enounces the following as the 
characteristics of the risk analysts: creative thinkers, confident, modest, thick-skinned, 
communicators, pragmatic, able to conceptualize, curious, good at mathematics, a feel for 
numbers, finishers, cynical, pedantic, careful, social and neutral. The reality is that we not 
always can find individuals that have all the virtues mentioned before, therefore; we need to 
select the most critical characteristics that a risk manager should have. Definitely a risk 
manager should be a good communicator, must have an analytical mind and needs to be 
able to think outside the box. The skills of a risk manager are somehow related to the project 
manager’s, in the sense of managing and controlling. However, the risk manager needs to 
deal with risk assessment that in the quantitative arena requires analytical modelling skills 
that the project manager is usually not trained for.  
It is a demanding list and indicates; that risk analysis should be performed by people who 
have a proven track record of doing risk management for several projects ideally. It is also 
rather unlikely to find these skills in one person: the best risk analyst units with which we 
work are composed of a number of individuals with complementary skills and strengths 
Vose (2008). 
The Washington State Department of Transportation ([WSDOT], 2010) in their Guidelines for 
CRA-CEVP Workshops, enlisted some of the risk manager responsibility: risk elicitation, risk 
modelling, cost validation/review, lead meetings, and provides reports and Develops or 
implements workshops on topics such as project definition, and risk identification and 
management. The California Department of Transportation (Caltrans, 2007) describes the risk 
manager (Risk Officer) responsibilities as risk management planning, identification, qualitative 
and quantitative analysis, risk response and risk monitoring and control. See Figure 3. 
It is very important to take into consideration that the person selected or named to become 
the risk manager, should be someone that in addition of having the minimum capabilities, 
should be a neutral team element that can guide the risk team towards a non biased risk 
assessment of the project. 
Although the position of RM in public agencies and private companies is rather new; 
currently the importance of having such an expert formally within the organization 
structure has become more formal and demanded. It has been realized that the benefits of 
having such an expert are much higher than the losses caused by not properly assessing and 
managing risks. 
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Figure 3. Risk management key responsibilities (Caltrans, 2007) 
5. Project stakeholders 
Due to the nature of the transportation projects, several stakeholders are usually involved. 
In particular, there is a closed communication between other local, regional and federal 
agencies which need to be involved and provide assessments and feedback. Caltrans as a 
state agency, deal internally as well with several stakeholders coming from the different 
functional units or divisions.  
For the above reasons, it is extremely important to develop project communication plans, so 
the right stakeholders can be identified, together with investigating the best ways of 
communication with them critical project information for decision making. Figure 4 shows a 
typical stakeholder analysis used at Caltrans, which is part of the project communication plan.  
As can be seen, the stakeholder analysis aid in selecting those stakeholders that could play a 
relevant role in the project. For the PM, is important to know which is the prefer way for 
communicating with each stakeholder, since he needs to keep them informed at all times. 
The frequency is another factor which needs to be addressed carefully, some people like to 
be informed about every change or movement in the project and others, only want to receive 
updates related to considerable changes in scope, time or cost for example. 
6. Subject matter experts 
The Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) have two objectives along the risk management study; 
firstly they provide specialized knowledge about specific project risks and uncertainties and  
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Name Function Contact 
Information
Preferred 
Method of 
Communication
Goals on 
this project 
Frequency 
Project 
Sponsor 
Progress/Status 
Report 
email email Budget Monthly 
Project 
Manager 
Progress/Status 
Meetings and 
Report. 
Information 
sharing and 
issue resolution 
email email Time, cost, 
quality 
Monthly 
Project 
Manager 
Assistance 
Progress/Status 
Meetings and 
Report. 
Information 
sharing and 
issue resolution 
email email Time, cost, 
quality 
As occurs 
Table 1. Stakeholder analysis (Caltrans, 2007) 
secondly; in lieu of having a set of data available, they can fill the gaps of insufficient data 
while defining the uncertainty of a project variable. In practice and with transportation 
projects, usually two or three variable values are asked to the SMEs. For other type of 
projects or industry this approach may be different for example if the project is very unique 
and complex, like an energy plant or even an oil platform. 
If for example the goal is to work with two values for defining the uncertainty behaviour for 
a particular risk variable, then the probability distribution called Uniform Distribution is 
used, which assumes all the values between the minimum and the maximum values have 
the same probability of occurring. In this case, a worst and best case scenarios are asked 
from the SMEs for defining a minimum and a maximum value of the risk. The other 
common probability distribution function use in this field is the triangular distribution 
function. This function assumes that there are three different values assigned to a variable of 
risk; a minimum, a most likely and a maximum. It is difficult to define which function is 
better for obtaining the data from the SMEs, since it will depend of their experience, the type 
of project and the project data available at the moment of the study. In general, the uniform 
distribution is the most popular since it is rather easy to estimate only two values.  
A key part for soliciting the information for the SMEs, are the questions asked by the Risk 
Manager or Risk Facilitator. In some cases, the SMEs are reluctant to participate and 
optional methods should be place on the table by the risk manager for getting the opinion 
needed from the SME. An alternative and perhaps a highly recommended approach is to 
have one on one interviews with the SMEs for asking the questions and getting the answers. 
However, the recommendation is to have this information during the meetings, so the rest 
of the team can discuss and in some cases even do they can challenge the SMEs opinion, 
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which is a very productive and healthy action for the project. The downside of conducting 
these interviews is that they are rather time consuming. 
In some cases, we can get different SMEs opinions for the same variable or risk as mentioned 
by Vose (2008). Experts will sometimes produce profoundly different probability distribution 
estimates of a parameter. This is usually because the experts have estimated different things, 
made differing assumptions or have different sets of information on which to base their 
opinion. However, occasionally two or more experts simply genuinely disagree. 
 
Figure 4. Combining three dissimilar expert opinions (Vose, 2008) 
As can be observed, from the input contribution to the risk model from the SMEs is a 
combination distribution. This is not a common situation but there is always a chance for 
encountering these types of challenges. Especially for complex projects where a considerable 
expertise is required. Figure 4 illustrates an example of combining three differing opinions, 
but where expert A is given twice the emphasis of the owing to the greater experience of 
that expert (Vose, 2008). 
It is relevant to notice that not all the SMEs are willing to participate actively in a risk 
management exercise at the first time, especially if they have no been exposed before into 
one. When SMEs are first asked to provide probabilistic estimates, they usually won’t be 
particularly good at it because it is a new way of thinking (Vose, 2008). 
For overcoming this and in order to provide the SMEs some sort of support in the field of 
the probabilistic risk management, we held a sort of training and educational meeting with 
all the RMT and SMEs. 
It can be noted from Figure 5 that the expert’s knowledge can extend beyond the knowledge 
base into the absolute truth area as a result of creativity and imagination of the expert. 
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Therefore, the intersection of the expert’s knowledge with the ignorance space outside the 
knowledge base can be viewed as a measure of creativity and imagination. Another expert 
(i.e., Expert B) would have her/his own ellipses that might overlap with the ellipses of 
Expert A, and might overlap with other region by varying magnitudes (Ayyub, 2000). 
 
Figure 5. Knowledge and Ignorance of Humans (Ayyub, 2000), 
SME`s are crucial for giving credible data for the risk model. If SMEs are not part of the risk 
management study, the results will not be trusted, causing this a failure of the process, the 
PM and the team. 
7. Risk management team elicitation 
The selection of members for the Risk Management Team (RMT), is not an easy task at all. A 
depth analysis of background and education was carried on for selecting the potential 
members of the team. The analysis, brainstorming, experience, background of the RMT 
members is critical not only for the risk management identification; it is for all the process 
including the monitoring and control. Eliciting the risk team members can be such a critical 
milestone for success or failure for the rest of the risk management process and the project 
itself. At the end, risk management is an input-output process that if wrong data or knowledge 
is feed into, then the results expected, most likely would be trustless or would included biases 
which at the end affect seriously the integrity and best practices in risk management.  
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Figure 6. Overview of the Expert Elicitation Process (USEPA, 2011) 
Expert Elicitation (EE) is a multidisciplinary process (Figure 6) that can inform decisions by 
characterizing uncertainty and filling data gaps where traditional scientific research is not 
feasible or data are not yet available. Although there are informal and nonprobabilistic EE 
methods for obtaining expert judgment. The goal of an EE is to characterize, to the degree 
possible, each expert’s beliefs (typically expressed as probabilities) about relationships, 
quantities, events, or parameters of interest. The EE process uses expert knowledge, 
synthesized with experiences and judgments, to produce probabilities about their 
confidence in that knowledge. Experts derive judgments from the available body of 
evidence, including a wide range of data and information ranging from direct empirical 
evidence to theoretical insights. Even if direct empirical data were available on the item of 
interest, such measurements would not necessarily capture the full range of uncertainty. EE 
allows experts to use their scientific judgment transparently to interpret available empirical 
data and theory (Ayyub, 2011). 
As mentioned by Vose (2008), it is usually impossible to obtain data from which to determine 
the uncertainty of all the variables within the model accurately, for a number of reasons: 
 The data have simply never been collected in the past 
 The data are too expensive to obtain 
 Past data are no longer relevant (new technology, changes in political or commercial 
environment, etc) 
 The data are sparse, requiring expert opinion “to fill in the holes” 
 The area being modelled is new 
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The uncertainty in subjective estimates has two components: the inherent randomness of the 
variable itself and the uncertainty arising from the expert’s lack of knowledge of the 
parameters that describe that variability. 
In cases where there are no subject matter experts available, it is recommended to even hire 
external experts for obtaining the uncertainty ranges per variable or risk. Caltrans’s practices 
towards project management and the project delivery process use a Project Development 
Team (PDT) which changes alongside the phases of the project. These teams are rather big in 
size and usually integrate stakeholders, subject matter experts and individuals coming from 
the same or different functional units (right of way, environmental, design, construction, 
etc.). Firstly, the downside of using such a team like the PDT is the size since it could be 
complicated for the RM to facilitate the meetings for obtaining better results towards 
assessing the uncertainty. In addition, the team members should feel free to talk about risk 
and in some cases having more than one member coming from the same division of 
functional unit, can cause some limitations for discussion and brainstorming.  
In general, risk teams are rather small in compare with the traditional project teams. As a 
general rule, to invite a representative from each department or division is recommended. 
This approach definitely will help the whole process and will assist the RM to maintain the 
team focused in talking only about risk. 
8. Risk identification, analysis and response 
The whole process of risk management was implemented for three different projects. 
Regardless of the project scope, cost, schedule, location, type of funding, etc; the same steps 
were followed in order to determine the overall risk cost 8cost contingency). Figure 7 shows  
 
Figure 7. Risk identification 
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the risks identified for each project; it can be observed the source of risk, which in Caltrans 
relates to the functional units (e.g. environmental, right of way, design, project management, 
construction etc.) 
Project A was a Historical Bridge, Project B a Direct Access Ramp (DAR) with a Transit 
Station (TS) and Project C a standard bridge. The main goal of the risk analysis for each 
project was to determine the cost risk contingency associated to each project risk register. 
Figure 10 shows the critical risks obtained for each project once the qualitative analysis was 
performed. The qualitative assessment matrix (Figure 9) used for ranking the risk criticality, 
forms part of Caltrans standard process for risk management. 
The risk sources indicated in Figure 7 are: design, right of way (rw), environmental (env), 
program project management (ppm), construction (const), exterior (ext), engineering (eng) 
and organizational (org). 
 
Figure 8. Risk matrix (Caltrans, 2007) 
The RM was responsible for educating the RMT along each phase of the risk management 
implementation. For the qualitative risk analysis in particular, it was useful to provide 
tangle examples to the team before and during the meeting. 
As can be observed, the critical risks are only a few ones in compare with all the risks 
identified at the initiation phase. The purpose of the qualitative risk analysis was to select 
those risks that represent a major negative or positive impact into the project objectives. A 
critical part for performing the qualitative analysis was to define the probability and impact 
ranges. The impacts were defined in terms of cost only for these projects. In addition, 
construction, engineering and organizational risks were not part of the quantitative risk 
analysis, since there were not scored as critical in the qualitative risk analysis. 
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Figure 9. Qualitative risk analysis 
The output of the qualitative risk analysis formed the basis or inputs for conducting the 
quantitative risk analysis. A set of cost ranges where developed for each project for 
matching the impact value selected. A model was built for running the Monte Carlo 
Simulation technique for obtaining the risk cost contingency for each project. Figure 10 
shows the contingency values obtained per project. It is important to notice that instead of 
assigning a randomly selected contingency percent, these values are based directly on the 
critical risks identified with the Risk Registers. 
 
Figure 10. Quantitative risk analysis 
The cost contingency per project assessed with the quantitative analysis provides a 
substantial support for justifying the overall project uncertainty. It was a common practice 
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at Caltrans to assign a merely flat rate for risk contingency, without referring to specific 
project risks or by justifying the percentage upon a formal risk management study. 
For each project, a set of risk responses were developed by the RMT and placed with the 
Risk Register. A Risk Owner was named for implementing the responses. It is recommended 
to match the risk owner with the source of the risk. In other words, if the risk has a source in 
construction, then the best suitable risk owner should come from that division. 
The whole risk management implementation, including the risk identification, analysis and 
response was conducted in three meetings with the RMT. This is a standard set at Caltrans. 
The time and effort invested from the RM is not included since most of this work is done 
outside the meetings. 
9. Risk management meetings 
It was not common at all at Caltrans to have risk management meetings for the PDT 
members and even for executives. What is a reality is that those meetings are critical for 
performing in depth thoughts about what can go wrong with the project. The most critical of 
the meetings is the planning meeting; which usually includes educating the RMT. Questions 
like: why a risk management exercise is needed? What could be the possible project risk 
contingency? What are the restrictions? What is the overall project uncertainty rate? Need 
answers for properly doing a risk management study. 
The following aspects are quite relevant in order to keep an order and sense within the risk 
management planning meeting (Vose, 2008):  
 Rank the questions that need answering from “critical” down to “interesting” 
 Discuss with the risk analysis the form of the answer 
 Explain what arguments will be based on these outputs 
 Explain whether the risk analysis has to sit within a framework 
 Explain the target audience 
 Discuss any possible hostile reactions 
 Figure out a timeline 
 Figure out the priority level 
 Decide on how regularly the decision-maker and risk analysis will meet 
It was interesting to notice along the meetings that when the meetings were held, the 
invitees were already prepared just to talk about risk. In some cases, critical project issues 
were discovered thanks to the risk discussions. 
The risk management meetings were properly planned, one for the identification, analysis 
and results. No meeting took more than two hours and instead of meeting minutes, the Risk 
Register was used as the deliverable for discussion and follow up. 
10. Risk monitoring and control 
Risk monitoring and control has been mentioned as one of the most common failures of risk 
management. In part because the follow up process is usually forgotten by the project and 
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risk manager and as results, there is no comparison between the baseline and actual Risk 
Registers or risk results. Risk metrics are fundamental for determining and assessing how 
risk management is contributing or enhancing the project delivery process. If the benefits of 
risk management are tangible and can be promoted with management and executives, the 
chances for formalizing the risk management process are very high. Otherwise, there will be 
less interest and support for keeping such a program.  
Figure 11 shows the risk contingency behaviour for a given project. As can be notice, the 
contingency is dynamic thought the project delivery process. For example, in can be 
assumed that the baseline risk contingency was the one marked in grey colour. Then, after 
the risks responses implementation, risks are mitigated and the contingency is reduced (red 
colour). Nevertheless, the monitoring and control process continues and a new risk arises, 
increasing again the project contingency (blue colour).  
 
Figure 11. Risk contingency behaviour 
Caltrans has implemented risk monitoring through the project development team meetings, 
where the project manager and the risk manager address any changes within the current 
risks or document new risks. In addition, an alternative way for risk monitoring has been 
through email. In this case, the risk manager is in charge of contacting the risk owners for 
updates and feedback regarding their risks. 
Risk status reports have been developed with the purpose of maintaining informed the 
executive though a proper risk management communication. These reports are developed 
by the RM and are updated every time there is a change with the Risk Register. 
Risk monitoring and control must be maintain through the project life cycle until the 
closeout phase, were the lessons learned can include feedback from risk management. The 
PM and RM should put extra care in keeping a constant review of the baseline Risk Register 
with the purpose of actively managing the project contingency and for assessing the 
effectiveness of the risk responses. 
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11. Risk management system 
A risk management system could be considered the ultimate tool for managing risks for a 
portfolio of projects. In might be a powerful instrument for communication, monitoring and 
control. In addition, the basis for a future risk management database could be established.  
In practical terms, for having a risk management system it is necessary to have developed a 
sufficient number of risk management studies and to have performed formal training to 
project managers. By having a set of projects in which risk management was previously 
implemented, the system can be fulfilled with data, including lessons learned. This data can 
provide an additional support for developing new risk management plans. A system can 
represent a considerable advantage for executives and project managers since can provide 
risk management status reports for a set of projects for specific data dates. The project 
manager can view, edit and direct actions to the team while using the system. Alternately, 
the RM can use the system for the risk management implementation. The following figure 
shows a view of Caltrans risk management system. 
 
Figure 12. Caltrans Risk Management System 
The RMT can view all the information for their project(s). In addition, some members for 
example the project manager, the design manager or the risk manager can have rights for 
edition. Usually with these systems, electronic alerts or messages are sent via email to keep 
all the team informed. As well, reports can be generated for supporting the decision making 
process. 
Although a risk management system is a great tool for supporting the decision making 
along the project delivery process. It is recommended first to start risk management with 
education, a pilot project and training. After several studies, the role of a system can be 
justified for enhancing the overall process of risk management and its communication. 
12. Caltrans enterprise risk management 
Although the term of enterprise risk management (ERM) is not new, Caltrans started 
looking into its current process for doing business. The nature of risk management is 
intimately related to Caltrans functional units. Program Project Management, Construction, 
Environmental, Design, Right of Way and Surveys are the most representative functional 
divisions existing at Caltrans. Each division plays a role with the project delivery process; 
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usually representatives of each division formed the project development team (PDT) which 
has the responsibility of carried on the project since the initial phase until the closeout.  
Caltrans has four major risks. These are project risk, program risk, operations risk, and 
organizational risk. Taken together, management of these components constitutes a 
Department-wide Risk Management Strategy. In some organizations, this is known as 
“Enterprise Risk Management.” Each of these risk components relate directly to the different 
types of the work performed by the Department’s functional areas. For example, project risk 
is related to the project delivery process; those things that, if they occurred, could impact a 
project’s schedule, cost, or scope. Project Delivery staff can assess and take intelligent risks in 
delivery because taking intelligent risks fosters innovation and responsible decision-making. 
But, at the same time, Caltrans needs to follow its project-related processes and controls to 
manage that risk. Caltrans must monitor the quality of our performance over time, and 
evaluate any deficiencies and adjust our processes accordingly. Actively incorporating the 
concept of Risk Management into Caltrans’s programs and activities is a dynamic process 
and must be constantly evaluated and adjusted to meet the strategic goals of the Department.  
According to the Minesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT, 2012), ERM is a risk-based 
approach to managing an enterprise, incorporating concepts of internal control, planning and 
budgeting. It addresses the needs of various stakeholders who want to understand the broad 
spectrum of risks facing complex organizations so they can be appropriately managed. 
 
Figure 13. Enterprise Risk Management System (MnDOT, 2012) 
The ERM at the Minesota Department of Transportation (Figure 13) is a clear example of 
how risk management can evolve for an organization. It is important to notice that outside 
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of the common risk sources (corporate, programmatic, project and operations); other 
variables such the quality of life indicators, market research and performance measures are 
included. These variables have a direct impact into the risk sources, which at the end could 
influence the results and benefits of risk management.  
Risk management has to be implemented for projects or within projects, but this is only the 
first step. Risk management means a change of doing business. For that reason, the culture 
of implementing Risk management should be brought by the executives and the company’s 
policies. Risk management has evolved into the “Enterprise Risk Management” (see Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14. Risk Management evolution (Protiviti, 2006) 
This new methodology explains that there are different philosophies about risk management 
with their own methods and focus; these are normally classified in four different types. 
 the Risk Silo Management (Operational Risks), 
 the Integrated Risk Management (Economic and Capital Risks), 
 the Risk and Value Management (Management and Performance) and 
 the Strategic Risk Management (Senior Management and Strategical Risks), 
ERM is in charge to unify all this philosophies and confer the determination of one whole 
risk in a corporation. One of the most important topics handled by the ERM is the 
determination of the Risk Appetite. The Risk Appetite is: “the quantum of risk that the firm 
is willing to accept within its overall capacity” (Barfield, 2008). 
In order to propitiate the ERM in every company, the standard “ISO 31000:2009 Risk 
management - Principles and guidelines” is a comprehensive guide of how companies 
should implement a formal risk management process. It sets out principles, a framework 
and a process for the management of risks that are applicable to any type of organization in 
public or private sector. It does not mandate a "one size fits all" approach, but rather 
emphasizes the fact that the management of risk must be tailored to the specific needs and 
structure of the particular organization. It depends at the end of the company’s desire to be 
competitive and willing to manage proactively risks and opportunities. 
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Caltrans` goal towards ERM is related directly to its current position as a leader in the 
United States in the field of transportation projects. Caltrans expects to implement ERM in a 
near future with the intention of reinforcing its project and business processes. 
13. Conclusions 
Caltrans has evolved considerably in the past five years in the field of project risk 
management. The most common project risk management techniques used in the private 
sector are currently part of Caltrans project delivery process. The implementation of project 
risk management has assisted Caltrans executives and project managers in assessing 
properly the project contingency cost based upon specific identified risks. Enterprise Risk 
Management is still new in Caltrans. Nevertheless, management is taking currently formal 
steps in implementing it through all the state of California with the intention of managing 
and controlling not only project risks. The goal is to standardise the best practices in risk 
management from an enterprise perspective. 
Author details 
Pedro Maria-Sanchez 
California Department of Transportation, District 11 San Diego, USA 
14. References 
Ayyub, B. (2000). Methods for Expert-Opinion Elicitation of Probabilities and Consequences 
for Corps Facilities. IWR Report 00-R-10. Prepared for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
Institute for Water Resources, Alexandria, VA. Available from  
 http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/docs/iwrreports/00-R-101.pdf 
Barfield, R. (2008). Private Waterhouse Coopers. Risk appetite - How Hungry are you. 07. 07 
2008, Available from  
 http://www.pwc.com/uk/eng/about/svcs/vs/pwc_risk-appetite.pdf 
Caltrans. (2007). Project Risk Management Handbook, Threats and Opportunities, (2nd Ed.), 
Office of Statewide Project Management Improvement, Sacramento, CA, USA, May 2, 2007 
MnDOT. (2012). Enterprise Risk Management. 2000-2012, Available from  
 http://www.dot.state.mn.us/riskmanagement/index.html 
Protiviti. (2006). Guide to Enterprise Risk Management - Frequently asked questions. 24. 06 
2008, Available from  
 http://www.protiviti.de/portal/site/pro-us 
USEPA. (2011). Expert Elicitation Task Force White Paper. August 2011, Available from 
http://www.epa.gov/stpc/pdfs/ee-white-paper-final.pdf 
Vose, D. (2008). Risk Analysis, A quantitative guide, (3rd Ed.), John Wiley & Sons, ISBN 978-
0-470-51284-5, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, England 
WSDOT. (2010). Project Risk Management, Guidance for WSDOT Projects, Olympia, WA, 
USA, July, 2010 
Chapter 19 
 
 
 
 
© 2012 Banaitiene and Banaitis, licensee InTech. This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits 
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. 
Risk Management in Construction Projects 
Nerija Banaitiene and Audrius Banaitis 
Additional information is available at the end of the chapter 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/51460 
1. Introduction 
The financial and economic crisis has had an adverse impact on the Lithuania’s economy 
and construction industry. The GDP of Lithuania grew slightly in 2010, in contrast to a 
decrease of 14.7% in 2009. Lithuania’s GDP increased from 1.3% in 2010 to 4.6% in 2011. 
Annual GDP growth decreased from its highest point of 6.7%, reached in the third quarter, 
to 4.4% in the last quarter of 2011 [1,2]. Some industries, such as construction; trade, 
transport and communications; and the industry sectors were most affected by the crisis. In 
2010, the gross value added within the construction sector decreased by 43.3%, and in the 
trade, transport and communications sector – by 16.6%. In 2011, a positive change in the 
gross value added was observed in all groups of economic activities. The largest growth in 
the gross value added was observed in enterprises engaging in construction (by 15%) and 
trade, transport and communication services (7.3%) [1,3]. The construction sector, one of the 
engines of economic growth in Lithuania over the last decade, is now facing with serious 
challenges as companies’ closures, rising unemployment, and postponed or even cancelled 
investments. These events also have changed the clients’ and construction companies’ 
behaviour. A reduced demand and shortage of orders dramatically increased a competition 
between companies of the construction sector. This increased pressure to improve quality, 
productivity and reduce costs, and the need for project strategies and management that can 
appropriately and effectively manage project risk. 
Risk management is one of the nine knowledge areas propagated by the Project 
Management Institute [4]. Furthermore, risk management in the construction project 
management context is a comprehensive and systematic way of identifying, analyzing and 
responding to risks to achieve the project objectives [5,6]. The benefits of the risk 
management process include identifying and analyzing risks, and improvement of 
construction project management processes and effective use of resources. 
Construction projects can be extremely complex and fraught with uncertainty. Risk and 
uncertainty can potentially have damaging consequences for the construction projects [7,8]. 
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Therefore nowadays, the risk analysis and management continue to be a major feature of the 
project management of construction projects in an attempt to deal effectively with 
uncertainty and unexpected events and to achieve project success. 
Construction projects are always unique and risks raise from a number of the different 
sources [9,10]. Construction projects are inherently complex and dynamic, and involving 
multiple feedback processes [11,12]. A lot of participants – individuals and organisations are 
actively involved in the construction project, and they interests may be positively or 
negatively affected as a result of the project execution or project completion [4]. Different 
participants with different experience and skills usually have different expectations and 
interests [13]. This naturally creates problems and confusion for even the most experienced 
project managers and contractors. 
Cost of risk is a concept many construction companies have never thought about despite the 
fact that it is one of the largest expense items [14]. Risk management helps the key project 
participants – client, contractor or developer, consultant, and supplier – to meet their 
commitments and minimize negative impacts on construction project performance in 
relation to cost, time and quality objectives. Traditionally, practitioners have tended to 
associate construction project success with these three aspects of time, cost and quality 
outcomes. 
The current economic downturn and challenges in a highly competitive Lithuania’s 
construction sector require contractors to manage risks by themselves. This paper reports 
the research that aims to examine the risk analysis and risk management practices in the 
Lithuanian construction companies. 
2. Literature review 
In today’s post-crisis economy effective risk management is a critical component of any 
winning management strategy. Risk management is one of the nine knowledge areas 
propagated by the Project Management Institute (PMI). The PMBOK® Guide recognises 
nine knowledge areas typical of almost all projects. The nine knowledge areas are [4]: 
1. Project integration management. 
2. Project scope management.  
3. Project time management. 
4. Project cost management. 
5. Project quality management. 
6. Project human resource management. 
7. Project communications management. 
8. Project risk management. 
9. Project procurement management. 
Although these knowledge areas are all equally important from a project manager’s point of 
view, in practice a project manager might determine the key areas which will have the 
greatest impact on the outcome of the project.  
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Each PMI knowledge area in itself contains some or all of the project management processes. 
For example, project risk management includes [4]: 
 Risk management planning; 
 Risk identification; 
 Qualitative risk analysis; 
 Quantitative risk analysis; 
 Risk response planning; 
 Risk monitoring and control. 
Risk management is probably the most difficult aspect of project management. A project 
manager must be able to recognise and identify the root causes of risks and to trace these 
causes through the project to their consequences. Furthermore, risk management in the 
construction project management context is a comprehensive and systematic way of 
identifying, analyzing and responding to risks to achieve the project objectives [5,6]. The use 
of risk management from the early stages of a project, where major decisions such as choice 
of alignment and selection of construction methods can be influenced, is essential [15]. The 
benefits of the risk management process include identifying and analyzing risks, and 
improvement of construction project management processes and effective use of resources. 
The construction industry is heterogeneous and enormously complex. There are several 
major classifications of construction that differ markedly from one another: housing, non-
residential building, heavy, highway, utility, and industrial [16]. Construction projects 
include new construction, renovation, and demolition for both residential and non-
residential projects, as well as public works projects, such as streets, roads, highways, utility 
plants, bridges, tunnels, and overpasses. The success parameters for any project are in time 
completion, within specific budget and requisite performance (technical requirement). The 
main barriers for their achievement are the change in the project environment. The problem 
multiplies with the size of the project as uncertainties in project outcome increase with size 
[17,18]. Large construction projects are exposed to uncertain environment because of such 
factors as planning, design and construction complexity, presence of various interest groups 
(owner, consultants, contractors, suppliers, etc.), resources (manpower, materials, 
equipment, and funds) availability, environmental factors, the economic and political 
environment and statutory regulations.  
Construction projects can be unpredictable. Managing risks in construction projects has 
been recognized as a very important process in order to achieve project objectives in terms 
of time, cost, quality, safety and environmental sustainability [19]. Project risk management 
is an iterative process: the process is beneficial when is implemented in a systematic manner 
throughout the lifecycle of a construction project, from the planning stage to completion. 
In the European Union construction is the sector most at risk of accidents, with more than 1300 
people being killed in construction accidents every year. Worldwide, construction workers are 
three times more likely to be killed and twice as likely to be injured as workers in other 
occupations. The costs of these accidents are immense to the individual, to the employer and 
to society. They can amount to an appreciable proportion of the contract price [20].  
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Construction activities in Lithuania provided employment to an estimated 93.7 thousand 
persons in 2011, while an annual turnover in excess of EUR 1.91 billion [21]. Construction is 
one of Lithuania’s largest industries. Unfortunately it has also the occupational health and 
safety problems. More construction workers are killed, injured or suffer ill-health than in 
any other industry. In 2011, 13 construction workers killed whilst at work, compared to 7 
industrial workers and 4 agricultural workers. In comparison with 2010, the number of fatal 
accidents in construction enterprises increased by more than 2 times, i.e. from 6 to 13 cases 
has been reported [22]. 
The risk analysis and management techniques have been described in detail by many 
authors [23-27]. A typical risk management process includes the following key steps [28]:  
 Risk identification; 
 Risk assessment; 
 Risk mitigation; 
 Risk monitoring.  
Risk identification is the first and perhaps the most important step in the risk management 
process, as it attempts to identify the source and type of risks. It includes the recognition of 
potential risk event conditions in the construction project and the clarification of risk 
responsibilities [29]. Risk identification develops the basis for the next steps: analysis and 
control of risk management. Corrects risk identification ensures risk management 
effectiveness. Carbone and Tippett [30] stated that the identification and mitigation of 
project risks are crucial steps in managing successful projects. 
The PMBOK® Guide [4] defines a project risk as “an uncertain event or condition that, if it 
occurs, has a positive or negative effect on at least one project objective”. There are many 
possible risks which could lead to the failure of the construction project, and through the 
project, it is very important what risk factors are acting simultaneously. As stated by Raz et 
al. [31], too many project risks as undesirable events may cause construction project delays, 
excessive spending, unsatisfactory project results or even total failure.  
Many approaches on risk classification have been suggested in the literature for effective 
construction project risk management. Tah and Carr [32] categorized risks into two groups 
in accordance with the nature of the risks, i.e. external and internal risks. Combining the 
fuzzy logic and a work breakdown structure, the authors grouped risks into six subsets: 
local, global, economic, physical, political and technological change. According to Wang et 
al. [33], the classification of the risks depends mainly upon whether the project is local or 
international. The internal risks are relevant to all projects irrespective of whether they are 
local or international. International projects tend to be subjected to the external risk such as 
unawareness of the social conditions, economic and political scenarios, unknown and new 
procedural formalities, regulatory framework and governing authority, etc.  
According the PMBOK® Guide [4], the risks are categorized into such groups: technical, 
external, organizational, environmental, or project management. Some categories of risk that 
affect a construction project are similar to risks for other investment projects, whether it is an 
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investment in common stocks or government bonds, and some are specific to construction. 
The risk identification process would have highlighted risks that may be considered by 
project management to be more significant and selected for further analysis [34]. Risk 
identification is an iterative process because new risks may become known as the project 
progresses through its life cycle and previously-identified risks may drop out [35]. 
Construction projects carry complex risks for all involved—including owners, consultants, 
contractors, and suppliers—that can increase when construction takes place near an active 
facility or congested area. Risks include geological or pollution-related conditions, 
interference with ongoing operations, construction accidents, as well as design and 
construction faults that may negatively impact the project both construction and when the 
project is complete. 
Generally two broad categories, namely, qualitative and quantitative analysis are 
distinguished in literature on risk assessment. A qualitative analysis allows the key risk 
factors to be identified. Risk factors may be identified through a data-driven (quantitative) 
methodology or qualitative process such as interviews, brainstorming, and checklists. It is 
considered as an evaluation process which involves description of each risk and its impacts 
or the subjective labelling of risk (high/medium/low) in terms of both risk impact and 
probability of its occurrence [19]. Qualitative risk analysis assesses the impact and likelihood 
of the identified risks and develops prioritized lists of the risks for further analysis or direct 
mitigation. Carr and Tah [36] introduced a hierarchical risk breakdown structure (HRBS), 
and the HRBS represents a formal model for qualitative risk assessment. Quantitative 
analysis involves more sophisticated techniques and methods to investigate and analyze 
construction project risks. Quantitative risk analysis attempts to estimate the frequency of 
risks and the magnitude of their consequences by different methods such as the decision 
tree analysis, the cost risk analysis, and Monte Carlo simulation [37]. The application of the 
quantitative risk analysis allows the construction project exposure to be modelled, and 
quantifies the probability of occurrence of the identified risk factors as well as their potential 
impact.  
Various risk management tools are available, but unfortunately they are not suitable for 
many industries, organizations and projects [38]. Although today’s organizations appreciate 
the benefits of managing risks in construction projects, formal risk analysis and 
management techniques are rarely used due to lack of knowledge and to doubts on the 
suitability of these techniques for construction projects.  
There are four alternative strategies – risk avoidance, risk transfer, risk mitigation, and risk 
acceptance, for treating risks in a construction project. As stated by Hillson [39], risk 
mitigation and risk response development is often the weakest part of the risk management 
process. The proper management of risks requires that they be identified and allocated in a 
well-defined manner. This can only be achieved if contracting parties comprehend their risk 
responsibilities, risk event conditions, and risk handling capabilities [40]. 
Before the crisis (2004-2008), due to a lack of contractors’ responsibilities and control in 
various steps of a project’s development, the time and quality performance levels of 
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construction projects in the Lithuania were generally inadequate or even poor. In 
construction projects, many parties are involved such as owner, consultant, contractor, sub-
contractor, and supplier. Each party has its own risks. Risk transfer means the shift of risk 
responsibility to another party either by insurance or by contract. Wang and Chou [29] 
reported that contractors usually use three methods to transfer risk in construction projects:  
 through insurance to insurance companies; 
 through subcontracting to subcontractor; 
 through modifying the contract terms and conditions to client or other parties. 
Construction projects can be managed using various risk management tools and techniques. 
Ahmed et al. [23] reviewed techniques that can be used for development of risk 
management tools for engineering projects. Techniques for context establishment, risk 
identification, risk assessment and treatment were provided. Application of risk 
management tools depends on the nature of the project, organization’s policy, project 
management strategy, risk attitude of the project team members, and availability of the re-
sources [12]. A risk assessor model (RAM) presented by Jannadi and Almishari [41] was 
developed to determine risk scores for various construction activities. The model provides 
an acceptability level for the risks and determines a quantitative justification for the 
proposed remedy.  
Risks and uncertainties, involved in construction projects, cause cost overrun, schedule 
delay and lack of quality during the progression of the projects and at their end [28,29,42]. 
As stated by Baloi and Price [43], poor cost performance of construction projects seems to be 
the norm rather than the exception, and both clients and contractors suffer significant 
financial losses due to cost overruns.  
Oyegoke et al. [44] discusses the problems of managing risk and uncertainty in construction 
project due to the owner dissatisfaction in project outcome and dynamism within agile 
construction environment. The authors identified some areas in supply chain processes 
which are prone to greater risks and uncertainty and propose an agile management 
principle based on the concept of integration and fragmentation in product development 
and execution processes respectively.  
Many authors have reviewed problems on time performance in construction projects 
[43,45,46]. Aibinu and Odenyinka [46] investigated and assessed the causes of delays in 
building projects in Nigeria. The nine factor categories evaluated include: client-, contractor-, 
quantity surveyor-, architect-, structural engineer-, services engineer-, supplier-, and 
subcontractor-caused delays, and external factors (i.e. delays not caused by the project 
participants). Finally, ten overall delay factors were identified, namely: contractors’ financial 
difficulties, client’ cash flow problems, architects’ incomplete drawings, subcontractors’ 
slow mobilization, equipment break-down and maintenance problems, suppliers; late 
delivery of ordered materials, incomplete structural drawings, contractors’ planning and 
scheduling problems, price escalation, and subcontractors’ financial difficulties. The authors 
pointed the poor risk management as one of the principal delay factors and concluded that 
actions and inactions of construction project participants contribute to overall project delays.  
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According to Baloi and Price [43], the construction contractors highlight that delay in 
payments is common both in private and public projects, with the public sector being the 
worse defaulter. Moreover, most types of contracts presume compensation clauses for 
delay in payments, but clients rarely agree to pay the interests due to the contract. Nasir 
et al. [47] analysed schedule risks and developed a comprehensive construction schedule 
risk model is referred to as Evaluating Risk in Construction–Schedule Model (ERIC-S). 
The ERIC-S model provides decision support to project owners, consultants, and re-
searchers as a project delay prediction tool. Similarly, the Cost-Time-Risk diagram (CTR) 
proposed by Aramvareekul and Seider [48] helps project managers consider project risk 
issues while monitoring and controlling their project schedule and cost performance in 
one diagram.  
The performance by the project management team highly influences the success of a 
construction project. Some of the incidental risks associated with poor project management 
performance are [49]: 
 Unclear or unattainable project objectives; 
 Poor scoping; 
 Poor estimation; 
 Budget based on incomplete data; 
 Contractual problems; 
 Insurance problems; 
 Delays; 
 Quality concerns; 
 Insufficient time for testing. 
Many authors have recognized the value of trust within the project business. Lewicki and 
Bunker [50] emphasize that trust is a critical success element to most business, professional, 
and employment relationships. Trust is argued to improve the inter-organizational 
relationships among principal actors in project development, such as owners, contractors, 
and suppliers [51]. According by Krane et al. [52] trust between project owners and project 
managers is crucial for project success.  
In business relations, as stated by Kaklauskas et al. [53], the global economic crisis brought 
about distrust of other stakeholders. Trust reinforces the relationships of the critical 
stakeholder that often determine the success of a project [51,54,55]. Ward and Chapman [56] 
concluded that stakeholders are a major source of uncertainty in construction projects. 
Smyth et al. [57] note that trust provides an important resource for creating greater 
probability and certainty. Wilkinson [58] found that project management companies need to 
overcome problems in their relationships with other professionals on the project team and 
with the client. For the success of construction projects, there is a need for alignment of the 
project owners’ interests and the project management team's interests and trust between 
them.  
Construction projects are tendered and executed under different contract systems and 
payment methods [59]. According by Zaghloul and Hartman [60], there is no possibility to 
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eliminate all the risks associated with a specific project. All that can be done is to regulate 
the risk allocated to different parties and then to properly manage the risk. Chapman and 
Ward [61] argue that the contract choice decisions are central to both stakeholder 
management and the management of risk and uncertainty. The authors proposed an 
integrated approach based on a balanced incentive and risk sharing (BIARS) approach to 
contracting as well as a best practice approach to risk management in terms of the whole 
project life cycle. 
Contractors generally aim to make an acceptable range of profit margin. Profit margins in 
the industry have been low for most contractors on projects in recent years. Correct 
understanding and allocation of risk helps for contractors to avoid erosion of the profit 
margin. Ökmen and Öztas [62] proposed a new simulation-based model – the correlated 
cost risk analysis model (CCRAM) – to analyse the construction costs under uncertainty 
when the costs and risk-factors are correlated. The CCRAM model captures the correlation 
between the costs and risk-factors indirectly and qualitatively. Baloi and Price [63] 
determined the most critical risk factors affecting construction cost performance. The 
authors stated that global risk factors pose more challenges to contractors, which are less 
familiar with them. The authors introduced a fuzzy decision framework for a systematic 
modelling, analysis and management of global risk factors affecting construction cost 
performance from contractor’s perspective and at a project level. Similarly, Ismail et al. [64] 
provide a ‘Level-Severity-Probability’ approach to determine the critical risk source and 
factors. Fuzzy logic is used in the proposed methodology for evaluation of the risk level, 
severity and probability. As stated by Zeng et al. [65], the application of fuzzy reasoning 
techniques provides an effective tool to handle the uncertainties and subjectivities arising in 
the construction project.  
The review of the literature revealed a wide range of risk types and sources in construction 
projects, and that various risk management methods and techniques can be employed in the 
management of construction projects in order to control potential risks. 
3. Methods and data 
The aims of the research were: first, to identify contractors’ opinion on the significance of the 
construction projects risks; and second, to explore the risk analysis and risk management 
practices in the Lithuanian construction companies. 
The initial survey was distributed during February through March 2008. A second, similar 
questionnaire was distributed during February through March 2009. A questionnaire 
containing three sections was developed to facilitate data collection. The first section 
includes the respondents’ opinion on the risk factor in terms of its probability and impact to 
overall construction project success. The second section includes the respondents’ opinion 
on the risk consequences for construction project performance measures as well as the risk 
assessment and response practices. The third section aims to collect the background 
information of the respondents, e.g. their age, gender, position, education, work experience 
and professional background. 
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The questionnaire of first survey was distributed either personally or via e-mail to 40 
members of top and middle management in the construction companies. A sample of 40 
practitioners received the questionnaire and 38 valid questionnaires were returned for 
analysis with a response rate of 95%. The second questionnaire was distributed either 
personally or via e-mail to 35 members of top and middle management in the construction 
companies. Of the 35 questionnaires distributed in the second survey, 35 were returned, but 
5 were incompletely completed and so were excluded from the data analysis. The response 
rate was 86%.  
In both surveys, the baseline characteristics of the respondents were relatively similar. Of 
the 38 respondents in the first study, site managers comprise 29%, project managers 26%, 
other position senior managers 21%, civil engineers 16%, and designing engineers 8%. Of 
the 30 respondents in the second study, site managers, project managers, and other position 
senior managers comprise 80%.  
The Likert scale was selected to obtain the probability of the risk factors in construction 
project that are identified in the literature review. A 5-point Likert scale was adopted, where 
1 represented “rare”, 2 “occasional”, 3 “somewhat frequent”, 4 “frequent”, and 5 “very 
frequent”. Likewise, the Likert scale was selected to obtain the impact of the risk factors in 
construction project that are identified in the literature review. A 5-point Likert scale was 
adopted, where 1 represented “very low”, 2 “low”, 3 “moderate”, 4 “high”, and 5 “very 
high”.  
The latest survey was carried out in December 2010-January 2011. In a subsequent study, the 
role of risk factors at a project level was addressed. A questionnaire containing three 
sections was developed to facilitate data collection. The first section includes the 
respondents’ opinion on the risk consequences for construction project performance 
measures as well as the risk assessment and response practices. The second section includes 
the respondents’ opinion on the risk factor in terms of its probability and impact to overall 
construction project success. The third section aims to collect the background information of 
the respondents, e.g. their age, gender, position, education, work experience and 
professional background. 
The third questionnaire was distributed either personally or via e–mail to 23 members of top 
and middle management in the construction company and 23 valid questionnaires were 
returned for analysis in time to be included in the analysis (100% overall response rate). Of 
the 23 respondents in the study, site managers, project managers, and other position senior 
managers comprise 91%. 
In all surveys, the majority of the respondents have more than 15 years’ experience in 
construction/project management or working knowledge of construction/project 
management activities. Based on work experience and employment position, it was inferred 
that the respondents have adequate knowledge of the activities associated with construction 
project risk. This makes them as reliable and credible sources of information which is crucial 
to satisfy the research goal. The procedure, findings, and relevant discussion of the analyses 
are detailed in the following section. 
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4. Results 
As outlined in Section 2, risk factors on construction projects can be split into two major 
groups: 
1. Internal risks, which fall within the control of clients, consultants and contractors. 
2. External risks, which include risk elements that are not in the control of key 
stakeholders. 
The potential risk sub-factors were adapted from studies by Chapman and Ward [25], Tah 
and Carr [32], Perera et al. [40], Pinto et al. [51], Baloi and Price [63], Kartam and Kartam 
[66], Lahdenperä [67], Majamaa et al. [68], Mbachu and Nkado [69], Mitkus and Trinkūnienė 
[70], and Yang et al. [71].  
In order to illustrate the respondents’ opinions regarding the importance of analysed risk 
factors, an average was calculated for each factor. Next, the Kendall coefficient of 
concordance W [72,73] was calculated to test the reliability of the responses, and significance 
testing was based on the Chi-square distribution at the 1% significance level. The W 
coefficients were calculated for each defined group of risk factors created by the analysis 
perspectives. 
In both surveys, the respondents agree as regards the external risks impact and probability. 
The respondents agree as regards the external risks impact, what can be judged by values 
W=0.183; χ2=34.7 (α=0.01), in the first survey; W=0.10; χ2=12.4 (α=0.01), in the second survey. 
The identified external risks according to their potential effect on construction project 
objectives were ranked. In the first survey, the top three important external risks identified 
are:  
1. Natural forces;  
2. Inflation and interest rate;  
3. Fiscal policy.  
In the second survey, the top three important external risks identified are:  
1. Fiscal policy;  
2. Natural forces;  
3. Political controls.  
Probability assessment of risks of the external project constrains is reflected in Fig. 1. Impact 
assessment of risks of the external project constrains is reflected in Fig. 2. 
The risk management perceivers are the project participants, and a contractor is any entity 
which has the power to influence project decision making directly. Related to experience, 
only 11% of the respondents affirmed that they have experience in risk management. Most 
of them are project manager and have more than 15 years’ experience; it proofs that the 
relationship between risk perception and experience of respondents. And even 34% of the 
respondents affirmed that they have no experience in risk management, while 55% of the 
respondents affirmed that they do not have enough experience in risk management. And 
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97% of the respondents answered that risks must be managed at the early stages of the 
construction project. 
 
Figure 1. Probability assessment of external project risks 
 
Figure 2. Impact assessment of external project risks 
In terms of the sources and providers of the data and information required in the risk 
analysis, the most frequently used technique is experiential or documented knowledge 
analysis with 92% of the respondents’ agreement in the first survey, and 93% of the 
respondents’ agreement in the second survey (Fig. 3). And the project documentation 
reviews, project team brainstorming, and analysis of other information resources are 
frequently used in the risk assessment.  
Comparison between the two surveys in terms of risk analysis showed a decrease in reviews 
of project documentation, from 63% in the first survey to 47% in the second survey, as well 
as greater use of experts’ judgement, from 26% in the first survey to 43% in the second 
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survey, and project team brain-storming, from 45% in the first survey to 53% in the second 
survey, in the risk assessment. 
 
Figure 3. Risk analysis practices in construction projects 
 
Figure 4. Risk response techniques employed for construction projects 
In terms of the risk response tools and techniques, the most frequently used tool is 
performance bonds and warranties with 95% of the respondents’ agreement in the first 
survey, and 77% of the respondents’ agreement in the second survey (Fig. 4). And the some 
resource reservation, insurance, and risk transference to another project party are frequently 
used risk response techniques.  
Comparison between the two surveys in terms of risk response tools and techniques showed 
a decrease of performance bond and warranties, from 95% in the first survey to 77% in the 
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second survey, and resource reservation, from 61% in the first survey to 50% in the latter 
survey; as well as greater use of risk transference to another party, from 50% in the first 
survey to 53% in the second survey, and insurance, from 55% in the first survey to 57% in 
the latter survey, for the risk responses. 
In last survey (2010-2011), the respondents agree as regards the project level risks impact, 
what can be judged by values W=0.54; χ2=51.3 (α=0.01). As regards the assessment of the 
project level risks probability, respondents also agree what can be judged by values W=0.51; 
χ2=48.5 (α=0.01). The identified project level risks according to their potential effect on 
construction project objectives were ranked. The top three important categories of internal 
risks identified are:  
1. Construction risks; 
2. Design risks;  
3. Project management risks.  
Overall assessment of risks of the internal project risks is reflected in Fig. 5. Risk priority is 
utilized during response planning and risk monitoring. It is critical to understand the 
priority for each risk as it allows the project team to properly understand the relative 
importance of each risk.  
 
Figure 5. Assessment of project level risk categories 
Table 1 shows that the controllable risk sources as identified in the study could be further 
broken down into seven sub-categories: design risks, external risks, environmental risks, 
organizational risks, project management risks, right of way risks, and construction risks 
which fall within the control of the project team. 
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 Categories 
Likelihood 
1 (rare)-5 (very 
frequent) 
Impact 
1 (very low)-5 
(very high) 
Design risks 
D1 Design errors and omissions 4 5 
D2 Design process takes longer than anticipated 3 4 
D3 Stakeholders request late changes 3 3 
D4 
Failure to carry out the works in accordance with 
the contract 
3 3 
External risks 
Ex1 New stakeholders emerge and request changes 2 4 
Ex2 Public objections 1 3 
Ex3 Laws and local standards change 1 3 
Ex4 Tax change 1 4 
Environmental risks 
En1 Environmental analysis incomplete 2 4 
En2 
New alternatives required to avoid, mitigate or 
minimize environmental impact 
2 4 
Organizational risks 
O1 Inexperienced workforce and staff turnover 3 3 
O2 Delayed deliveries 3 3 
O3 Lack of protection on a construction site 2 4 
Project management risks 
PM1 
Failure to comply with contractual quality 
requirements 
3 4 
PM2 Scheduling errors, contractor delays 4 4 
PM3 Project team conflicts 3 3 
Right of way risks 
R1 Expired temporary construction permits 1 4 
R2 Contradictions in the construction documents 2 3 
Construction risks 
C1 Construction cost overruns 4 4 
C2 Technology changes 2 4 
Table 1. Risk categories 
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Im
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Very high 
High PM2, C1 D1 
Moderate   
D3, D4, O1, 
O2, PM3 D2, PM1  
Low   R2 
Ex1, En1, En2, 
O3, C2  
Very low Ex2, Ex3 Ex4, R1 
 Rare Occasional 
Somewhat 
frequent Frequent Very frequent 
 Likelihood 
Figure 6. Risk matrix 
Once the risks and probabilities are determined, the risk score can be calculated. Risk score 
is detailed in Table 1. The probability and impact matrix (Fig. 6) illustrates a risk rating 
assignment for individual risk factors in the identified risks categories. The risk matrix 
shows the combination of impact and probability that in turn yield a risk priority (shown by 
the red, yellow, and green colour). Qualitative risk analysis can lead to further analysis in 
quantitative risk analysis or directly to risk response planning.  
Twenty risk factors were established to be significant under the internal risks categories. 
Under the design risk category, design errors/omissions and design process delays were the 
most frequently mentioned risk factors attributed to the contractors. Under the project 
management risk category, scheduling errors and failure to comply with contractual quality 
requirements were the most frequently mentioned risk factors. Under the construction risk 
category, construction cost overruns and technology changes were the most frequently 
mentioned risk factors attributed to the contractors. Respondents believed that these risk 
events are responsible for poor quality of work, delays and associated losses. Risks with 
high impact and high probability, such as D1 (design errors and omissions), C1 
(construction cost overruns), and PM2 (scheduling errors, contractor delays) are required 
further analysis, including quantification, and aggressive risk management. 
5. Conclusions 
An effective risk management process encourages the construction company to identify and 
quantify risks and to consider risk containment and risk reduction policies. Construction 
companies that manage risk effectively and efficiently enjoy financial savings, and greater 
productivity, improved success rates of new projects and better decision making.  
Risk management in the construction project management context is a comprehensive and 
systematic way of identifying, analyzing and responding to risks to achieve the project 
objectives. The research results show that the Lithuanian construction company significantly 
differ from the construction companies in foreign countries in the adoption of risk 
management practices. To management the risk effectively and efficiently, the contractor 
must understand risk responsibilities, risk event conditions, risk preference, and risk 
management capabilities.  
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The lack of experience makes it very difficult to change Lithuanian contractors’ attitude 
towards risk management. Nevertheless, the construction companies need to include risk as 
an integral part of their project management. In our view, the use of risk management in the 
Lithuanian construction companies is low to moderate, with little differences between the 
types, sizes and risk tolerance of the organizations, and experience and risk tolerance of the 
individual respondents. 
Qualitative methods of risk assessment are used in construction companies most frequently, 
ahead of quantitative methods. In construction project risk management, risks may be 
compared by placing them on a matrix of risk impact against a probability. Mitigation 
options are then derived from predefined limits to ensure the risk tolerance and appetite of 
the construction company. 
The risk management framework for construction projects can be improved by combining 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies to risk analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
Risk in agriculture is pervasive and complex, especially in agricultural production.(1, 2) 
Farmers confront a variety of yields, unstable output and input prices and radical changes in 
production technology as inherent in their farming operations. These affect the fluctuation 
in farm profitability from season to season and from one year to another.(3, 4) The sources of 
risk and level of its severity can vary according to the farming systems, geographic location, 
weather conditions, supporting government policies and farm types. Risk is a major concern 
in developing countries where farmers have imperfect information to forecast things such as 
farm input prices, product prices, and weather conditions, that might impact the farms in 
the future.(2, 5, 6) The types and severity of risks that farmers face differ from place to place. 
Incorporating and understanding the effects of risk at the farm level will benefit policy 
makers who develop appropriate strategies that can help farmers survive the numerous 
risks they confront.  
Sources of risk in agriculture are classified into business risk and financial risk.(1, 7) Business 
risks can be classified further into a) production or yield risk, b) marketing or price risk, c) 
institution, policy, and legal risk, d) human or personal risk, and e) technological risk. On 
the other hand, financial risk occurs when farmers borrow to finance farm activities as 
farmers often face variations in interest rates on borrowed funds, inadequacy of cash flow 
for debt payments and changes in credit terms and conditions.(8, 9)  
For several decades, agricultural production in Thailand has faced many risks such as 
variability in yields, product-prices and cost of inputs.(10-12) Thai farmers typically grow their 
crops in rain-fed conditions due to poor irrigation systems.(13) The annual rainfall fluctuates 
widely each year, and pests, diseases and poor soil fertility affect the yields of cash crops in 
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Thailand. In addition, agricultural commodity prices rise and fall annually depending on 
the demand and supply in both local and international markets, which are out of the 
farmer’s control. Similarly, the costs of farm inputs also vary each year and may negatively 
affect farm production costs. 
Agriculture contributes approximately 7.86 per cent to Thailand’s GDP and 8.98 per cent to 
exports in 2008.(14, 15) However, large numbers of farmers in rural Thailand still live below 
the poverty line. In 2007, Thai farm households earned an average income of 129,236 
baht/year (US$ 3,692) but only 39 per cent or 50,370 baht/year (US$ 1,439) is from farm 
activities.(16) Thai farmers are basically smallholders and the national farm size is 
approximately 7.72 acres.(17) Most farmers have limited diversification potential, face 
resource problems, environmental variability, lack of soil fertility and water shortages 
especially smallholder farmers in the north-east region.(18) In addition, smallholder farmers 
in Thailand also face various sources of risk that vary both seasonally and annually.  
Knowledge of the characteristics of risks that influence smallholder farmers is the key to 
developing appropriate strategies to deal with risks. However, empirical studies on farmers’ 
responses to risks and how risk affects farmers’ income, especially in rural Thailand are 
limited. The aim of this chapter is to examine the sources of risk for smallholder farmers in 
the central and northeast regions of Thailand and their risk management strategies. We will 
also relate the farmers’ socioeconomic characteristics to their perceived sources of risk and 
their favoured risk management strategies to gain a deeper understanding of their choices.  
2. Sources of risk and risk management strategies on farm 
There is much literature on risk sources that impact farming operations and their risk 
management strategies. Flaten et al. argued that the assessment of farmers’ perceptions and 
how they respond to risk are very important because this can describe the decision making 
behaviour of farmers when faced with risky situations.(19) Similarly, Hardaker et al. states 
that “the welfare of the farm family and the survival of farm business may depend on how well 
farming risks are managed”.(1) 
The lack of relevant information on farmers’ risk perceptions and their risk behaviour 
present a challenging task for policy makers and researchers who want to create a proper 
risk management system to help farmers.(19, 20) Extant literature shows that there is no 
agreement about the most appropriate methods to describe sources of risk and risk 
responses on farms. However, the Likert-scale rating method has been regularly applied in 
previous research. In most of those studies, the respondents were asked to rate the sources 
of risk that affected their farm and the risk management strategies they used on a five-point 
scale (where 1 is not particularly important and 5 is highly important).  
Boggess, Anaman, and Hanson examined farmers’ awareness of risk in crop and livestock 
production in northern Florida and southern Alabama.(21) The respondents were asked to 
define risk and then to rank the sources of risk and risk management strategies based on 
how important each risk was to their farm. The results showed that most respondents 
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defined risk as the probability of a negative outcome. The respondents ranked rainfall 
variability, pests and diseases, and crop price variability as the primary sources of risk for 
crop production. Livestock price and weather variability and livestock diseases were 
perceived as important sources of risk for livestock production.  
Patrick, Wilson, Barry, Boggess and Young studied farmer attitudes towards risk and risk 
management among mixed crop and livestock farmers in the US.(22) A total of 149 farmers in 
12 states were interviewed. The respondents were grouped into five types of farm; mixed 
farming; cotton; corn, soybean and hogs; small grain and ranch. The results showed that 
changes in weather, output price and input costs were rated as the three most important 
sources of risk in both crop and livestock production.  
A nationwide mail survey was used to examine the sources of risk and the risk management 
strategies of New Zealand farmers by Martin(23). The survey covered eight types of farm 
including sheep and beef, dairy, deer, pip fruit, kiwifruit, cropping, vegetables and flowers. 
The results showed that marketing risk (such as change in product prices and change in 
input costs) was ranked as a very important source of risk by all farmers. Conversely, 
production risks (such as rainfall variability, weather, and pests and diseases) were 
regarded differently depending on geographical location, farm type and product.  
Pellegrino studied rice farmers’ perceptions of the sources of risk and risk management 
responses in Argentina.(9) Using size of the respondents’ farms as large, medium, and small 
farms, the author argued that a farmer’s awareness of the sources of risk varied depending 
on farm size. The small size farm group tended to have a higher awareness of production 
risks than the other two groups. 
Meuwissen, Huirne, and Hardaker identified price and production risks as the most 
important sources of risk for livestock farmers in the Netherlands.(24) An insurance scheme 
was rated as the appropriate strategy to manage risk. Flaten et al. compared risk perception 
and the risk responses of conventional and organic dairy farmers in Norway.(19) The results 
revealed that the institutional (such as government support policies) and marketing risks 
were classified as the principal sources of risk for the organic dairy farmers. The authors 
ranked production cost variability and animal welfare policy as the greatest worries for 
conventional dairy farmers.  
Hall, Knight, Coble, Baquet and Patrick found severe drought and meat price variability as the 
primary sources of risk perceived amongst cattle farmers in Texas and Nebraska.(25) In a recent 
study, large-scale South African sugarcane farmers perceived land reform regulations, labour 
legislation and crop price variability as the three most important risk factors.(20)  
In terms of risk management strategies, Boggess et al. and Patrick et al. reported that 
‘placing of investments’, ‘obtaining market information’ and ‘enterprise diversification’ 
were the most important strategies that the sampled crop and livestock farmers use to 
handle risk in the US.(21, 22) Meuwissen et al. found that ‘cost of production’ and ‘insurance 
schemes’ were regarded as important risk strategies among livestock farmers in the 
Netherlands.(24) Similarly, Flaten et al. noted that organic and conventional dairy farmers in 
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Norway perceived ‘increasing farm liquidity’, ‘disease prevention’, ‘buying farm insurance’ 
and ‘cost of production’ as the most important strategies used to deal with risk on their 
farms.(19) On the other hand, New Zealand farmers used a mix of risk management strategies 
to reduce risk. The strategies varied among the groups of farmers depending on the nature 
of the product, market structure and conditions, farmer characteristics, dynamic risk 
adjustment considerations and the regulatory situation.(23)  
Despite the fact that the evaluation of farmers’ risk perceptions and risk management 
responses are essential to better understand their risk behaviour and managerial decisions, 
few studies have explicitly investigated awareness of risk among Thai farmers. Akasinha, 
Ngamsomsuk, Thongngam, Sinchaikul and Ngamsomsuk examined risk perceptions among 
rice farmers in Payao and Lampang provinces in the northern region.(26) In their study, the 
Participatory Risk Mapping (PRM) technique was used to elicit sources of risk. The authors’ 
results showed that rice farmers in Payao faced five major sources of risk including 
‘outbreak of rice disease’, ‘insects causing damage to rice’, ‘high input costs’, ‘flooding’, and 
‘shortage of water supply’. Farmers in Lampang typically faced ‘drought’, ‘insects causing 
damage to rice’, ‘low output prices’, ‘pests’, and ‘high input costs’.  
3. Data and methodology 
The sources of risk and their preferred risk management strategies are obtained from face-
to-face interviews of 800 farmers, 400 each in the central and northeast regions of Thailand. 
The central and north-east regions differ in terms of resources, economic development and 
income distribution. The central region has a farming area of 8.61 million acres or 19.2 per 
cent of the total farming area. In 2007, the average monthly income per farm in this region is 
15,271 baht.(16) The central region is known as the ‘rice bowl of Thailand’ and more than half 
of the country’s irrigation systems are located in this region known for wet-rice 
cultivation.(27) In contrast, the north-east region is defined as the ‘poorest region’ with a long 
dry season and an annual rainfall that fluctuates widely each year.(13, 18) Approximately 45 
per cent of the total farming area in Thailand is located in this region. In 2007, the average 
monthly income per farm in this region is 8,344 baht.(16)  
A smallholder farmer is defined as a farmer who has a farming area less than 30 rai (4.8 ha). 
Purposive random sampling was employed to classify a particular group of respondents 
from a certain portion of the population. The sample selection process is as follows. First, the 
provinces in each region were separated into two main groups: (a) the provinces with large 
and medium irrigation systems and (b) the provinces in the rain-fed area. Second, purposive 
sampling was employed to select smallholder farmers in each group. This procedure 
ensured that the sample covered smallholder farmers of both the irrigated and rain-fed 
areas in the central and north-east regions. 
The information on the sources of risk and risk management strategies perceptions obtained 
from the respondents using a five-point Likert scale were analyzed in two steps. First, 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was used to capture the information on the interrelationships 
among the set of variables. This technique enabled the researcher to manage and reduce the 
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number of original variables into a smaller group of new correlation dimensions (factors), 
which are linear combinations of the original variables.(28, 29) The Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin (KMO) 
method measured the appropriateness for factor analysis of both data sets. The KMO index 
varies from 0 to 1, with results of 0.6 or greater suitable for factor analysis. The latent root 
criterion (eigenvalue > 1) was estimated to identify how many factors in each data set to 
extract. After the number of factors had been identified, the orthogonal (varimax) rotational 
method was performed in order to minimize the number of variables that have high loadings 
on each factor. A factor loading of ± 0.4 was employed as a cut off criterion to determine the 
inter correlation among the original variables. In addition, Cronbach Alpha was employed to 
evaluate the internal consistency of each factor.(28) 
The relationships between the socioeconomic variables and the perception of risk sources 
and risk management strategies of the smallholder farmers were also analyzed. Multiple 
regression was employed to evaluate the influence of farm and farmer characteristics on the 
smallholder farmers’ risk perception and risk management responses. Diagnostic tests were 
carried out to verify that there was no violation of the multiple regression assumptions. The 
model specification for the farmer’s perception of risk source with socioeconomic variables 
is postulated as follows: 
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The model for risk management responses with socioeconomic variables is given as follows:  
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where: 
Si is source of risk i (from factor analysis); Ri is risk management strategy i (from factor 
analysis); AGE= 1, if the respondent’s age is over 40 years old, 0 otherwise; GEN= 1, if the 
respondent is male, 0 if female;EDU = 1, if the highest education of the respondent is high 
school and higher, 0 if primary school education or less; EXP= 1, if the farming experience is 
over 30 years, 0 otherwise; OFFW= 1, if the respondent has off-farm work, 0 if no off-farm 
work; FSIZ is farm size; INCM is net farm income; LOC= 1, if the respondent’s farm is 
located in central region, 0 if a farm located in north-east region; FINC= 1, if farm has a loan, 
0 if farm without a loan; AHIN= 1, if the annual household income greater than 90,001 baht, 
0 otherwise; HSIZ is household size; and e is error term. 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1. Socioeconomic characteristics of the farmers 
The household and farm characteristics of the central and north-east region farmers are 
presented in Table 1. Table 1 shows that except for gender, household size and finance used for 
the farm business, central and north-east region farmers generally differ in terms of personal 
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and farm characteristics, and income distribution. The age group distribution indicates that the 
majority of the farmers in both regions were over 40 years old. Around 40 per cent of the north-
east region farmers were over 60 years old, whereas 42 per cent of the central region farmers 
were between 41-50 years old. The age distribution between the farmers in both regions was 
significantly different with the north-east region farmers more likely to be older than the central 
region farmers. Nearly half of the farmers in the north-east had been involved in agricultural 
work for over 40 years which  implies that younger farmers are rare especially in the north-east. 
This may be a result of the rural-to-urban migration problems in Thailand.  
Around 75 per cent of the farmers in both regions graduated with a primary education and 
about three per cent were illiterate. The result indicates that the central region farmers had 
higher levels of education than the north-east farmers (P<0.01). Mustafa argued that the 
educational level of farmers affected their decision making capacity.(30) A higher educated 
farmer was expected to perform better than an uneducated farmer in terms of management 
skills and farm resource allocation to maximize farm profitability.  
The average farm size of the farmers in the central region was 21.40 rai (3.42 ha) of which 30 
per cent was self-lease operated. In contrast, farmers in the north-east had an average farm 
size of 14.80 rai (2.37 ha) of which 90 per cent was self owned. This result indicates that the 
central region farmers hold average farm sizes larger than north-east farmers (P<0.01). This 
is consistent with the Office of Agricultural Economics who reported that farmers in the 
central region usually had an average farm size larger than the north-east farmers.(16) 
The results for the average net farm income between the farmers in the central and north-
east regions were statistically significant at the one per cent level. This result indicated that 
the average net farm income of the central farmers was larger than for the north-east 
farmers. In 2008, the central farmers had an average net farm income of 166,445.05 
baht/household, whereas the average net farm income of the north-east farmers was only 
42,632.80 baht/household. 
In addition, approximately 63 per cent of the central region farmers worked off-farm, which 
was significantly more than for the north-east farmers (P<0.01). The results also showed that 
central farmers had significantly higher annual household incomes than north-east farmers.  
In terms of farmer access to credit, nearly 70 per cent of the farmers in the central and north-
east regions had loans and nearly half of them borrowed from the Bank of Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives. In addition, eight per cent of the farmers used their own savings 
to operate their farm business. Only about four per cent had loans from commercial banks. 
The majority of the farmers obtained short-term loans (see Table 2). This finding supports 
Limsombunchai, who argued that smallholder farmers in rural Thailand lacked investment 
funds due to a credit accessibility barrier.(31) 
Nearly 50 per cent of the farmers had small debts. Further, 30 per cent of the farmers in the 
north-east had outstanding debts of less than 30,000 baht during the 2008 crop year. 
Similarly, 27 per cent of the farmers in the central region had debts between 31,000-50,000 
baht. An average of 72.6 per cent of the loans were used in operating the farm business, such 
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as purchasing farm equipment, seeds and fertilizers, but the balance was spent on the 
farmer’s personal and household consumption, for example, food and clothing.  
 
Item Unit 
Region Overall 
(n=800) 
 
Test of 
differrence 
a 
Central 
(n=400) 
North-east 
(n=400) 
Gender % 0.66 
Male 73.3 75.8 74.5  
Female 26.8 24.3 25.5  
Age group % 67.14*** 
Less than 30 years old 1.5 0.5 1.0  
31-40 years old 10.3 7.3 8.8  
41-50 years old 42.0 22.3 32.1  
51-60 years old 30.0 30.5 30.3  
Over 60 years old 16.3 39.5 27.9  
Marital status % 12.52*** 
Single/Never married 4.0 2.0 3.0  
Married 87.5 86.3 86.9  
De factor relationship 0.8 4.3 2.5  
Divorced/separated 7.8 7.5 7.6  
Highest education % 17.79*** 
Illiterate 3.3 2.0 2.6  
Primary school 69.5 81.8 75.6  
Secondary school 23.5 14.0 18.8  
Vocational training 2.3 0.8 1.5  
Bachelor degree 1.5 1.5 1.5  
Farming experience % 105.69*** 
Less than 10 years 12.8 6.5 9.6  
11-20 years 29.3 10.0 19.6  
21-30 years 22.5 16.0 19.3  
31-40 years 19.5 22.8 21.1  
Over 40 years 16.0 44.8 30.4  
Household size Persons 4.36 4.28 4.32 -0.66 
Total farm size rai b 21.40 14.80 18.09 -10.10*** 
Land ownership status % 168.93*** 
Owner-self operated 64.8 89.5 77.1  
Lease-self operated 29.3 2.0 15.6  
Tenant 0 8.5 4.3  
Other 6.0 0 3.0  
Finance farm business % 0.15 
Yes 69.3 68.0 68.6  
Average net farm income c baht 166,450 42,632 104,541 -19.26*** 
Working off-farm % 43.29*** 
Yes 63.3 40.0 51.6  
Annual household income % 113.16*** 
Less than 10,000 baht  0 1.3 0.6  
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Item Unit 
Region Overall 
(n=800) 
 
Test of 
differrence 
a 
Central 
(n=400) 
North-east 
(n=400) 
10,001-30,000 baht  0.8 14.3 7.5  
30,001-50,000 baht  5.0 16.3 10.6  
50,001-70,000 baht  11.0 15.8 13.4  
70,001-90,000 baht  11.5 11.0 11.3  
More than 90,001 baht  71.8 41.5 56.6  
a Test of differences of the central and north-east household and farm characteristics based on chi-square and 
independent t test; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%  
b 1 rai = 0.16 ha. c Net farm income is based on the 2008 crop year. 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
Table 1. Household and farm characteristics of the farmers in central and north-east Thailand 
 
Item 
Region Overall 
(n=800) 
 
Central 
(n=400) 
North-east 
(n=400) 
Sources of finance a    
Bank of Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperative 
57.5 34.3 44.6 
Cooperatives 23.7 15.9 19.4 
Village funds 11.8 25.4 19.4 
Personal funds 3.2 12.4 8.3 
Commercial bank 6.8 0.3 3.9 
Duration of credit    
Less than 1 year 65.0 72.8 68.9 
Greater than 3 years 6.9 20.6 13.7 
Outstanding loan debt    
Under 30,000 baht 14.4 29.4 21.9 
31,000-50,000 baht 27.4 23.2 25.3 
Over 91,000 baht 13.7 21.0 17.3 
Average percentage of loan used    
On-farm activities 79.8 65.1 72.6 
Household expenses 20.1 34.7 27.4 
a Multiple responses 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
Table 2. Financial background of the farmers in central and north-east Thailand 
4.2. Farmers’ perceptions of sources of risk and risk management strategies 
4.2.1. Sources of risk  
The mean scores of each source of risk were ranked and the standard deviation (SD) was 
used to indicate the variation in the ratings. Independent sample t-test was employed to 
compare mean score differences between the farmers in the central and north-east regions. 
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Table 3 summarizes the results of the most important perceived sources of risk for the 
farmers in the central and north-east regions. The table shows that marketing risks 
associated with ‘unexpected variability of input prices’ and ‘unexpected variability of 
product prices’ had the highest and second highest mean scores for sources risk, 
respectively rated by the farmers in both regions. The SDs of both sources of risk in each 
group were less than one and this indicates that those sources of risk gained a high level of 
consensus among the farmers in both regions.(24)  
 
Source of risk Overall 
(n=800) 
Central 
(n=400) 
North-east 
(n=400) 
Test of 
diff. b 
 Mean a SD Rank Mean a SD Rank Mean a SD Rank  
Unexpected 
variability of input 
prices 
4.22 0.910 (1) 4.09 0.901 (1) 4.34 0.904 (1) 3.92*** 
Unexpected 
variability of 
product prices 
3.82 0.926 (2) 3.83 0.861 (2) 3.82 0.988 (2) -0.11 
Diseases and pests 
that affect plants and 
animals 
3.52 1.153 (3) 3.70 1.014 (3) 3.34 1.252 (3) -4.47*** 
Changes in 
Thailand’s economic 
and political 
situation 
3.48 
 
1.080 
 
(4) 
 
3.44 0.992 (4) 
 
3.53 1.161 (4) 
 
1.28 
Unexpected 
variability of yields 
3.47 0.946 (5) 3.58 0.965 (5) 3.36 0.915 (5) -3.35*** 
Changes in national 
government laws 
and policies 
3.38 1.090 (6) 3.38 1.024 (6) 3.39 1.154 (6) 0.16 
Natural disasters 
such as heat, fire, 
flood, storm 
3.38 1.345 (7) 3.47 1.092 (7) 3.29 1.554 (7) -1.92* 
Changes in the 
world economic and 
political situation 
3.30 1.097 (8) 3.27 1.029 (8) 3.32 1.161 (8) 0.71 
Excess rainfall 3.27 1.293 (9) 3.59 1.017 (9) 2.95 1.453 (9) -7.16*** 
Deficiency in rainfall 
causing drought 
3.11 1.441 (10) 3.09 1.372 (10) 3.13 1.508 (10) 0.44 
Problems with hired 
labour 
3.02 1.259  2.95 1.161  3.10 1.347  1.72* 
High level of debt 2.84 1.075  2.90 1.052  2.77 1.095  -1.75* 
Accidents or 
problems with 
health 
2.74 1.145  2.56 1.007  2.91 1.245  4.34*** 
Changes in interest 
rates 
2.73 1.106  2.86 1.054  2.60 1.144  -3.28*** 
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Source of risk Overall 
(n=800) 
Central 
(n=400) 
North-east 
(n=400) 
Test of 
diff. b 
 Mean a SD Rank Mean a SD Rank Mean a SD Rank  
Changes in 
technology and 
breeding 
2.52 1.089  2.49 0.952  2.55 1.211  0.75 
Changes in land 
prices 
2.47 1.222  2.56 1.241  2.38 1.198  -2.03** 
Risk from theft 2.19 1.179  2.57 1.144  1.82 1.094  -9.44*** 
Changes in family 
situation such as 
marital status, 
inheritances, etc. 
1.98 
 
1.032 
 
 2.11 0.966  1.85 1.081  -3.52*** 
Being unable to meet 
contracting 
obligations 
1.82 1.046  2.13 1.038  1.52 0.965  -8.50*** 
a Likert scale is used from 1 (not important) to 5 (extremely important). 
b The mean scores of central and north-east farmers are significantly difference at *P<0.1, **P<0.05 and ***P<0.01 based on 
independent samples t test. 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
Table 3. Ranking of perceptions of sources of risk by sampled farmers in central and north-east 
Thailand 
The survey results showed that the uncertainty of input prices and product prices have 
become increasingly worrying among smallholder farmers in the central and north-east 
regions. This is probably due to the fact that both sources of risk are out of the farmers’ 
control but directly affect their farm incomes. The prices of the major cash crops in Thailand, 
such as rice, cassava and sugarcane, are unstable; they depend on supply and demand in 
both local and international markets. Similarly, the average prices of the major farm inputs 
such as fertilizer NPK 16-20-0, which is widely used by rice farmers, fluctuated from 9,485 
baht/tonne in 2006 to a peak of 19,386 baht/tonne in 2008 and then dropped to 16,199 
baht/tonne in 2009.(16)  
This finding is consistent with those of Patrick et al., Martin, and Flaten et al. who argued that 
marketing risks associated with the variability of product and input prices were the most 
important sources of risk considered by the farmers in their respective study areas.(19, 22, 23)  
The production risks related to ‘diseases and pests affecting plants and animals’, ‘excess rainfall’ 
and ‘natural disasters such as floods’ were ranked third, fourth and sixth, among the farmers in 
the central region with mean scores of 3.70, 3.59 and 3.47, respectively. The results reflect the 
heavy floods that inundated the central provinces during September 2008. Following this 
incident, 100,000 rai (16,000 ha.) of farmland in the central region were damaged.(32)  
Institutional risks related to ‘changes in Thailand’s economic and political situation’ and 
‘changes in national government laws and policies’ were ranked third and fourth, among 
the north-east region farmers, respectively. This finding revealed that smallholder farmers 
were concerned about the effect of the political conflicts in Thailand on their farm operation.  
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‘Unexpected variability of yields’ was ranked the fifth most important source of risk in both 
regions. In addition, the financial risks associated with ‘changes in interest rates’ and ‘high 
levels of debt’ were considered as ‘quite important’ by all farmers.  
Sources of risk that obtained low mean scores included ‘changes in technology and 
breeding’, ‘changes in land prices’, ‘risk from theft’, ‘changes in the situation of farm 
families’ and ‘unable to meet contracting obligations’. 
Comparisons of risk perception between the farmers in the central and north-east regions 
showed significant differences in most sources of risk. This interesting finding might be 
attributable to the fact that sources of risk vary depending on the farm’s geographical 
condition, farm type, the environmental impact and the country’s political and economic 
situation. Evidently, the small farm business may be affected in different ways by changes in 
these sources of risk. 
4.2.2. Risk management strategies 
Table 4 summarizes the results of the perceptions of risk management strategies elicited 
from the farmers in the central and north-east regions. Production and financial strategies 
were considered more important managerial responses to risk than marketing strategies by 
the farmers in both regions.  
Among the production strategies perceived by the central region farmers, ‘purchase farm 
machinery to replace labour’ was the most important with an average rating of 3.45. Nearly 
60 per cent of central region farmers reported using this strategy to cope with hired 
agricultural labour problems on their farms. From the survey, farm machinery, such as hand 
tractors and four-wheel tractors, was widely used among the central region farmers. This 
reflects the imbalance problem between agricultural and industrial labour forces in 
Thailand. This finding supports Ahmad and Isvilanonda who argued that the rural labour 
force preferred to work in the industrial sector more than in the agricultural sector due to 
the gap in wage rates.(33) This may be caused by the lack of agricultural labour especially in 
the central region, which has many factories located there. 
‘Storing feed and/or seed reserves’ and ‘have a farm reservoir for water supplies in dry 
season’ showed significant differences in importance between the farmers in the central and 
north-east regions (P<0.01). North-east farmers perceived the importance of these two 
production strategies higher than central region farmers. They rated ‘storing feed and/or 
seed reserves’ as the most important production strategies and ‘having a farm reservoir for 
water supplies in dry season’ was ranked third with mean ratings of 3.61 and 3.47, 
respectively. Over 80 per cent of the north-east farmers preferred ‘storing feed and/or seed 
reserves’ in managing their small farm operations and approximately 65 per cent of them 
preferred using the ‘having a farm reservoir for water supplies in dry season’ strategy on 
their farm. This indicates that the north-east farmers were confronted with the variability of 
input prices and severe droughts. 
‘Having diversified crop, animal or other enterprises’ and ‘planting several varieties of 
crops’ were the least important production strategies for both groups. The north-east 
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farmers considered these two production strategies as ‘important’ but the central region 
farmers rated them as ‘quite important’, which is statistically significant different (P<0.01). 
The results indicated that the lack of farm resources may affect the diversification 
performance of the farmers in both groups. 
Financial strategies associated with ‘holding cash and easily converted cash assets’ and 
‘working off farm to supplement household income’ were considered ‘important’ by the 
farmers in the central and north-east regions. Approximately 60 per cent of the farmers in 
both regions reported that they used these two financial strategies. However, the north-east 
farmers perceived the importance of ‘holding cash and easily converted cash assets’ 
significantly higher than the central region farmers. In addition, ‘reduce debt level’ was 
given greater importance by the north-east farmers, whereas ‘investing in non-farm 
businesses’ was more important among the central region farmers. In terms of marketing 
strategies, north-east farmers assigned significantly greater rating scores than central region 
farmers to ‘obtaining market information’, ‘spread sale over several time period’ and 
‘selection of crop and/or animal varieties with low price variability’.  
 
Source of risk Overall 
(n=800) 
Central 
(n=400) 
North-east 
(n=400) 
Test of 
diff. c 
 Mean a % b Rank Mean a % b Rank Mean a % b Rank  
Production 
strategies: 
          
Purchase farm 
machinery to replace 
labour 
3.44 61.6 (1) 3.45 58.8 (1) 3.43 64.5 (5) -0.26 
Storing feed and/or 
seed reserves 
3.40 60.9 (3) 3.20 40.8 (6) 3.61 81.0 (1) 5.49*** 
Apply pests and 
diseases program 
3.23 53.9 (7) 3.26 53.8 (4) 3.19 54.0 (9) -0.89 
Have a farm 
reservoir 
3.06 47.9 (10) 2.65 35.5  3.47 60.3 (3) 9.40*** 
Having diversified 
crop, animal or other 
enterprises 
2.94 
 
33.4 
 
 2.84 26.0 
 
 3.05 40.8 
 
 2.65*** 
Planting several 
varieties of crops 
2.86 30.0  2.71 19.5  3.01 40.5  3.64*** 
Marketing 
strategies: 
          
Obtaining market 
information 
3.27 65.3 (5) 3.09 51.8 (7) 3.46 78.8 (4) 4.89*** 
Spreading sale over 
several time periods 
3.19 41.6 (8) 3.01 31.5 (9) 3.39 51.8 (6) 4.48*** 
Selection of crop 
and/or animal 
varieties with low 
price variability 
2.70 
 
24.8 
 
 2.61 21.0 
 
 2.79 28.5 
 
 2.46** 
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Source of risk Overall 
(n=800) 
Central 
(n=400) 
North-east 
(n=400) 
Test of 
diff. c 
 Mean a % b Rank Mean a % b Rank Mean a % b Rank  
Use forward 
contracts 
2.13 12.4 2.32 12.3 1.95 12.5  -4.59*** 
Financial strategies:   
Holding cash 3.41 64.8 (2) 3.31 60.0 (3) 3.52 69.5 (2) 2.98*** 
Working off farm 3.28 63.3 (4) 3.33 68.8 (2) 3.24 57.8 (8) -1.07 
Reduce debt level 3.27 60.0 (6) 3.20 48.5 (5) 3.33 71.5 (7) 1.73* 
Leasing farm 
machinery 
3.13 48.9 (9) 3.08 38.5 (8) 3.17 59.3 (10) 1.17 
Investing in non-
farm businesses 
2.64 31.3 2.92 42.3 2.36 20.3  -6.30*** 
Miscellaneous 
strategies: 
  
Able to adjust 
quickly to weather, 
price and other 
adverse factors 
3.02
 
42.6
 
2.98 42.0
 
(10) 3.06 43.3
 
 1.18 
a Likert scale is used from 1 (not important) to 5 (extremely important). 
b The percentage of farmers using each risk management strategy. 
c The mean scores of central and north-east farmers are significantly difference at *P<0.1, **P<0.05 and ***P<0.01 based on 
independent samples t test  
Source: Field survey, 2009 
Table 4. Ranking of perceptions of risk management strategies by sampled farmers in central and 
north-east Thailand 
‘Use forward contracts’ was the least important marketing strategy considered by most 
central and north-east regions farmers. Only 10 per cent of the farmers in both regions had 
used this strategy to manage risk. This suggests that the agricultural production under 
forward contracts in Thailand is still in its developmental stages and is not popular among 
the smallholder farmers in rural areas. However, the central region farmers perceived the 
importance of this marketing strategy significantly more than the north-east farmers 
(P<0.01) with the mean scores of 2.32 and 1.95, respectively. 
The perceptions of risk responses between the farmers in the central and north-east regions 
were statistically different in many strategies similar to their perceived sources of risk (see 
Table 4). The findings from the survey revealed that the smallholder farmers in both regions 
used a mix of risk strategies to manage and reduce the sources of risk they are confronted 
with. The findings support Martin, who argued that the farmers’ selection criteria for risk 
management strategies varied depending on farm type, climatic conditions, marketing 
factors and agricultural rules and regulations.(23) 
4.3. Factor analysis 
In this section, the results of the factor analysis of sources of risk and risk management 
strategies are discussed. Exploratory factor analysis with varimax orthogonal rotation 
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was applied to the data using SPSS version 15. Exploratory factor analysis is used to 
reduce the number of sources of risk and risk management strategies for each group of 
farmers.  
4.3.1. Sources of risk 
The rotated factor loadings of risk sources for all farmers in the central and north-east 
regions, obtained from the principal component analysis and a varimax orthogonal rotation, 
are discussed in this section. The KMO measure of data sufficiency was 0.779 and the 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity achieved statistical significance (χ2 = 4927.58, P<0.01), both 
indicating that the data set was appropriate for factor analysis. However, the preliminary 
results indicated three sources of risk including ‘accidents or problems with health’, 
‘deficiency rainfall’ and ‘changes in technology or breeding’ should be eliminated from the 
factor analysis because of their low communalities (<0.40).(28) Following this, iteration of 
varimax orthogonal rotation was performed. 
The results are presented in Table 5. Latent root criteria (eigenvalues > 1) were specified for 
six factors (AS1-6) from the 16 sources of risk variables for all farmers in both regions. These 
six factors can explain almost 71.2 per cent of the total variance. The Cronbach’s Alpha 
values for factors AS1-5 ranged from 0.671 to 0.899, which exceeded the minimum 
requirement of 0.6. This demonstrates an adequate reliability among those factors. However, 
the alpha value was somewhat lower (0.426) for factor AS6. Factors AS1-6 can be labelled in 
accordance with the significant loading variables that were obtained for each factor and 
explained as follows: 
Factor AS1: this factor is named ‘economic and political’ because of the relatively high 
loadings on the sources of risk variables with the changes in Thailand and the world 
economic and political situations and changes in the government laws and policies that 
affected the small farm operations.  
Factor AS2: this factor incorporates a number of sources of risk related to the farm business 
environment, including risk from being unable to meet contracting obligations, problems 
with hired labour, theft and changes in land prices. Moreover, risk from changes in family 
situation (also as personal risk) loaded highly on this factor. Therefore, this factor is named 
‘personal and farm business environment’.  
Factor AS3: this factor consists of the significant loading of ‘excess rainfall’ and ‘natural 
disaster’. Factor AS3 is labelled ‘natural disaster’. 
Factor AS4: this factor can be interpreted as the ‘financial situation’ because of the high 
factor loadings on the changes in interest rates and high level of debt.  
Factor AS5: this factor is related to the risk from unexpected variability in yields and the 
unpredictable product prices. Thus, this factor is classified as ‘yields and product prices’. 
Factor AS6: this factor is labelled ‘input prices’ because of the highest factor loading of the 
unexpected variability in input prices in this factor. 
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Source of risk Factors a Commu-
nality 
AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AS6  
Changes in Thailand’s 
economic and political 
situation 
0.923 0.091 0.005 0.092 0.134 0.053 0.890 
Changes in the world 
economic and political 
situation 
0.875 0.064 0.066 0.164 0.030 0.050 0.804 
Changes in national 
government laws and 
policies 
0.833 0.220 0.003 0.048 0.179 0.094 0.786 
Changes in family situation 0.087 0.748 0.097 0.079 0.126 -0.176 0.629 
Being unable to meet 
contracting obligations 
0.009 0.747 0.121 0.285 0.042 -0.082 0.663 
Risk from theft 0.107 0.700 0.078 0.203 0.151 0.108 0.583 
Problems with hired labour 
and contractors 
0.132 0.616 -0.170 -0.147 -0.127 0.427 0.646 
Changes in land prices 0.315 0.559 -0.014 0.242 0.107 0.087 0.489 
Excess rainfall 0.018 0.050 0.895 0.086 0.085 -0.039 0.821 
Natural disasters 0.033 0.077 0.862 -0.056 -0.007 0.190 0.789 
Changes in interest rates 0.119 0.261 -0.024 0.827 0.065 0.162 0.797 
High level of debt 0.169 0.220 0.070 0.825 0.064 0.010 0.768 
Unexpected variability of 
yields 
0.141 0.103 0.053 0.071 0.846 0.017 0.755 
Unexpected variability of 
product prices 
0.131 0.122 0.033 0.046 0.823 0.135 0.730 
Unexpected variability of 
input prices 
0.077 -0.094 -0.014 0.064 0.115 0.852 0.758 
Diseases and pests that 
affect plants and animals 
0.073 0.104 0.329 0.135 0.071 0.579 0.483 
        
Eigenvalues 4.35 1.83 1.71 1.22 1.21 1.07  
Per cent of total variance 
explained 
27.17 11.46 10.70 7.61 7.55 6.69  
Cumulative per cent of the 
variance explained 
27.17 38.63 49.33 56.95 64.49 71.19  
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.889 0.743 0.776 0.763 0.671 0.426  
Number of variables 3 5 2 2 2 2  
a Factors AS1-6 are labelled as AS1=economic and political, AS2=personal and farm business environment, AS3=natural 
disaster, AS4=financial situation, AS5=yields and product prices and AS6=input prices.  
‘Accidents or problems with health’, ‘deficiency in rainfall causing drought’ and ‘changes in technology and breeding’ 
are deleted from the analysis due to these sources of risk have low communalities.  
Factor loadings for an absolute value greater than 0.4 are in bold. 
Source: Field survey, 2009  
Table 5. Varimax rotated factor loadings of sources of risk for all sampled in Thailand farmers (n=800) 
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4.3.2. Risk management strategies 
Factor analysis was employed to reduce the risk strategy categories as perceived by the 
farmers in both the central and north-east regions. The KMO measure of data sufficiency 
was 0.887. In addition, Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was statistically significant at the one per 
cent level (χ2 = 3301). This indicates that the data were suitable for factor analysis.  
The first iteration of factor analysis resulted in the removal of ‘able to adjust quickly to 
weather, price and other adverse factors’ and ‘purchase farm machinery to replace of 
labour’, because these variables exhibited low communalities. Following this, the second 
rotation was performed with 14 risk strategies.  
The final results of the varimax rotated factor loadings for each risk strategy are documented 
in Table 6. Factor analysis grouped the 14 risk management strategies into four factors. These 
four factors explained almost 58.33 per cent of the variance.  
With regard to reliability, the Cronbach’s Alpha values for factors AR1-3 were 0.742, 0.711 
and 0.642, respectively. The alpha value for factor AR4 was 0.596, which is very close to the 
minimum cut-off level of 0.6. The factors AR1-4 can be named according to each factor 
structure as follows: 
Factor one (AR1): this factor has a relatively high loading of the risk strategy variables 
related to ‘apply pests and diseases programme’, ‘storing feed and/or seed reserves’, ‘have a 
farm reservoir for water supplies in dry season’, ‘spreading sale over several time period’ 
and ‘obtaining market information on prices forecast and trends’. This factor is named ‘farm 
production and marketing management’. 
Factor two (AR2): this factor is described as ‘diversification’ because there were significant 
loadings of risk strategy variables related to ‘having diversified crop, animal or other 
enterprises’, ‘planting several varieties of crops’ and ‘selection of crop and/or animal 
varieties with low price variability’. 
Factor three (AR3): this factor is loaded highly on ‘investing in non-farm 
investment/business’ and ‘working off farm to supplement net farm income’, which 
represent the influence of off-farm income. Thus, factor three is named ‘off-farm income’. 
Factor four (AR4): this factor is interpreted as ‘financial management’, which is concerned 
with ‘reduce debt level’, ‘leasing farm machinery rather than owning them’ and ‘holding 
cash and easily converted cash assets’. 
 
Risk management strategy Factors a Communality 
AR1 AR2 AR3 AR4 
Apply pests and diseases program 0.655 -0.035 0.318 0.047 0.533 
Storing feed and/or seed reserves 0.651 0.162 -0.025 0.339 0.565 
Have a farm reservoir for water supplies in dry 
season 
0.641 0.288 0.022 0.031 0.495 
Spreading sale over several time period 0.618 0.301 0.183 0.159 0.531 
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Risk management strategy Factors a Communality 
AR1 AR2 AR3 AR4 
Obtaining market information on prices forecast 
and trends 
0.505 0.363 0.259 0.280 0.532 
Having diversified crop, animal or other 
enterprises 
0.211 0.796 -0.030 0.147 0.700 
Planting several varieties of crops 0.252 0.742 0.093 0.095 0.632 
Selection of crop and/or animal varieties with 
low price variability
0.387 0.505 0.345 -0.039 0.525 
Investing in non-farm investment/business 0.172 -0.001 0.807 0.124 0.696 
Working off farm to supplement net farm 
income 
0.341 0.058 0.711 0.143 0.646 
Use forward contracts -0.121 0.441 0.590 0.076 0.563 
Reduce debt level 0.094 0.117 0.061 0.787 0.645 
Leasing farm machinery rather than owning 
them 
0.164 -0.023 0.111 0.715 0.551 
Holding cash and easily converted cash assets 0.117 0.440 0.177 0.559 0.552 
      
Eigenvalues 4.69 1.28 1.19 1.01  
Per cent of total variance explained 33.48 9.14 8.48 7.24  
Cumulative per cent of the variance explained 33.48 42.62 51.09 58.33  
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.742 0.711 0.642 0.596  
Number of variables 5 3 3 3  
a Factors AR1-4 labelled as AR1=farm production and marketing management, AR2=diversification, AR3=off-farm 
income and AR4=financial management.  
‘Able to adjust quickly to weather, price and other adverse factors’ and ‘purchase farm machinery to replace of labour’ 
are deleted from the analysis due to these risk management strategies have low communalities.  
Factor loadings for an absolute values greater than 0.4 are in bold. 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
Table 6. Varimax rotated factor loadings of risk management strategies for all farmers sampled 
inThailand (n=800) 
However, in factor AR3, factor analysis grouped the ‘use forward contracts’ variable, which 
is unrelated to the definition of this factor. Therefore, the ‘use forward contracts’ variable 
was deleted from factor AR3 and the Cronbach Alpha coefficient slightly improved from 
0.642 to 0.697. This result illustrated that factor AR3 had a stronger internal consistency after 
‘use forward contracts’ variable was deleted. 
4.4. The association between the farmers’ characteristics and source of risk and 
management perception of risks 
Multiple regression analysis was employed to investigate the relationship between the 
farmers’ socioeconomic characteristics and the perceptions of sources of risk and risk 
management strategy components obtained from the factor analysis. The summated scales 
of sources of risk and risk strategy factors of each group of farmers were summed up and 
averaged based on the relevant variables in each factor structure and their internal 
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consistency. Before performing multiple regression analysis, all models were assessed for 
normality, linearity, multicollinearity and homoscedasticity to ensure the appropriateness of 
the equations.(29) 
4.4.1. Sources of risk 
Table 7 shows the relationship between all farmers’ socioeconomic status and the different 
perceptions of sources of risk components. Models 1-4 are statistically significant at the one 
per cent level. However, the coefficients of determination (R2) of most of the models are low. 
This result is consistent with the findings of Flaten et al. and Meuwissen et al. who found 
low explanatory power of regression models between the perceptions of sources of risk and 
risk strategies with the farmers’ characteristics.(19, 24) Both authors argued that the lower R2 in 
the regression models implies that the farmers’ perceptions of sources of risk and risk 
strategies differed from farmer to farmer.  
Gender is negatively related to the ‘personal and farm business environment’ and ‘natural 
disaster’ risks on farm. This implies that female heads of farm households are likely to 
perceive these sources of risk as significantly more important than male household heads. 
Similarly, the age of farmers and farm size are negatively related to the ‘natural disaster’ 
risk, which means young farmers and farmers who have smaller farm sizes tended to 
perceive ‘natural disaster’ as a higher on-farm source of risk. This finding may be 
attributable to the severe floods across Thailand in 2008. 
The highest educational level is positively related to the ‘personal and farm business 
environment’ risk, which indicates that more educated farmers perceived this source of risk 
as significantly more important in farming. The reason is because the more educated 
farmers realized that the family farm situation and the changes in farm business 
environment, such as high labour wages and relatively high prices of agricultural land, may 
indirectly affect their farm operations. 
The number of years in farming is negatively related to the ‘economic and political’ risk 
perceptions. However, the annual household income and the size of farm household 
exhibited a positive relationship with this source of risk. This result suggests that less 
experienced farmers, farmers who have higher annual household income and farmers with 
larger household size tended to perceive risk related to ‘economic and political’ as highly 
important. This finding may have resulted from the instability of Thailand political situation 
since September 2006.  
Farm business finance is positively related to the ‘financial situations’ risk factor and is 
statistically significant at the one per cent level. This suggests that farmers who have loans 
are more likely to pay more attention to the changes to their farm financial situation, such as 
interest rates and level of debt. In addition, farm business finance is positively related to the 
‘natural disaster’ risk factor. This implies that farmers who have loans perceived this source 
of risk as highly important. This may be due to the ‘natural disaster’ risk damaging their 
farm crops, which results in insecurity of their farm income and debt repayment capacity. 
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Risks related to the ‘economic and political’ and ‘personal and farm business environment’ 
were perceived as highly important by farmers who had off-farm work. This suggests that 
farmers who have off-farm work are very concerned about those risks that can disrupt their 
off-farm income.  
With regard to the farm location variable, the regression result showed a strong relationship 
with more than half of the risk factors. Farmers in the central region perceive the ‘personal 
and farm business environment’, ‘natural disaster’ and ‘financial situation’ as more 
important risk factors than north-east farmers; north-east farmers are more concerned about 
‘economic and political’ risk. This finding suggests that the sources of risk on small-holding 
farms differ significantly between these two regions. 
 
Independent 
variables 
Risk source components b 
AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 
Constant 3.170*** 1.943*** 3.287*** 2.466*** 3.619*** 
Age c -0.039 -0.079 -0.306** -0.056 -0.118 
Gender d -0.024 -0.199*** -0.182* -0.063 -0.056 
Highest  
education e 
0.068 0.233*** 0.123 0.122 0.123 
Farming 
experiences f 
-0.139* 0.024 0.134 -0.098 0.013 
Off-farm work g 0.135* 0.281*** 0.037 0.067 0.092 
Farm size -0.003 0.005 -0.011** -0.004 0.001 
Net farm income -2.37E-07 -9.81E-07*** 1.35E-06** -6.90E-07 -2.77E07 
Farm location h -0.166* 0.301*** 0.313*** 0.196** 0.079 
Finance farm 
business i 
0.028 -0.038 0.294*** 0.408*** 0.027 
Annual household 
income j 
0.231*** 0.068 0.009 0.130 0.100 
Household size 0.063*** 0.051*** 0.008 0.023 0.001 
R2 0.034*** 0.124*** 0.064*** 0.061*** 0.021 
a Variables and models significant at *P<0.1, **P<0.05 and ***P<0.01; 
b Factors AS1-6 are labelled as AS1=economic and political, AS2=personal and farm business environment, AS3=natural 
disaster, AS4=financial situation, AS5=yields and product prices and AS6=input prices; 
c 1, if the farmer’s age over 40 years old, 0 otherwise;  
d 1, if the farmer is male, 0 if female; 
e 1, if the highest education of the farmer is high school and higher, 0 if primary school education or less;  
f 1, if the farming experience over 30 years, 0 otherwise; 
g 1, if the farmer has off-farm work, 0 if no off-farm work; 
h 1, if farmer’s farm is located in central region, 0 if a farm located in north-east region; 
i 1, if farm has a loan, 0 if farm without a loan; and 
j 1, if household income greater than 90,001 baht and 0 represent otherwise. 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
Table 7. Multivariate regression of the source of risk components and household and farm 
characteristics of all sampled Thai farmers (n=800) a  
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4.4.2. Risk management strategies 
Table 8 summarizes the multiple regression models of the risk management strategy 
components and the socioeconomic variables for all farmers. The goodness-of-fit coefficients 
of all models were rather low, except for model three where the coefficient explained 
around 27 per cent of the variation of the dependent variable. Models 1-4 are statistically 
significant (P< 0.01).The age variable is insignificant in relation to the risk strategy 
components of all farmers. 
Gender was negatively related to ‘off-farm income’, which means that female household 
heads perceived this risk strategy as more important than male household heads. The 
reason is because the female farmers or wives can easily find off-farm work, such as 
weaving and/or handicrafts that are widely found throughout the north-east region, to 
supplement their household income. 
The highest educational level was positively related to the ‘farm production and marketing 
management’, ‘diversification’ and ‘off-farm income’ risk strategies. This implies that the 
more educated farmers perceived these risk management strategies as highly important. 
This finding is similar to that of Mustafa who argued that the more educated farmers 
performed better in managing their farm business compared with less educated farmers.(30)  
The length of farming experience was negatively related to the ‘farm production and 
marketing management’, ‘diversification’ and ‘financial management’ risk strategies. This 
suggests that less experienced farmers were more likely to be interested in employing these 
strategies to manage risk on their farms than the more experienced farmers. 
Off-farm work was positively related to all four risk strategy components. These 
relationships may be due to the farmers who have off-farm work to enhance their farm 
income; they are willing to adopt such strategies to improve and maintain their farm 
income. Similarly, the net farm income coefficient shows a negative relationship with all 
four risk strategy components. This suggests that the farmers who have a lower net farm 
income believe that these risk strategies can help to increase their farm income. 
Farm size was positively related to the ‘diversification’ strategy. Farmers with larger farms 
perceived a diversification strategy as highly important. It should be noted that farm size is 
one of the constraints to diversification, that is, farmers with a small holding have limited 
ability to diversify their farm activities.(33) 
Farmers who had higher annual household incomes perceived the ‘financial management’ 
strategy as highly important. In contrast, they perceived the ‘diversification’ strategy as less 
important than farmers who had lower annual income. In addition, risk management 
strategies related to ‘farm production and marketing management’ and ‘off-farm income’ 
were perceived as less important by the farmers who had loans. Farmers with larger 
households perceived ‘farm production and marketing management’ as slightly more 
important than smaller household farmers. 
The farm location coefficient was negatively related to ‘farm production and marketing 
management’, ‘diversification’ and ‘financial management’ risk strategies. This may imply 
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that farmers in the north-east region perceived these risk strategies as more important than 
the central region farmers. This is because most north-east farmers are poorer. 
 
Independent variables 
Risk strategy components b 
AR1 AR2 AR3 AR4 
Constant 3.310*** 2.956*** 2.523*** 3.428*** 
Age c 0.054 0.124 0.003 -0.002 
Gender d -0.019 -0.107 -0.136* -0.047 
Highest education e 0.258*** 0.167** 0.378*** 0.110 
Farming experiences f -0.132** -0.238*** -0.100 -0.121* 
Off-farm work g 0.249*** 0.227*** 0.944*** 0.150** 
Farm size 0.001 0.015*** 0.003 -0.004 
Net farm income -1.11E-06*** -1.98E-06*** -7.67E-07* -7.32E-07** 
Farm location h -0.383*** -0.143* 0.092 -0.160** 
Finance farm business i -0.126** -0.039 -0.202*** -0.026 
Annual household income j 0.023 -0.275*** 0.054 0.158** 
Household size 0.033* 0.002 0.026 -0.001 
R2 0.146*** 0.138*** 0.267*** 0.053*** 
a Variables and models significant at *P<0.1, **P<0.05 and ***P<0.01; 
b Factors AR1-4 are labelled as AR1=farm production and marketing management, AR2=diversification, AR3=off-farm 
income and AR4=financial management; 
c 1, if the farmer’s age over 40 years old, 0 otherwise;  
d 1, if farmer is male, 0 if female; 
e 1, if the highest education of the farmer is high school and higher, 0 if primary school education or less; 
f 1, if the farming experience over 30 years, 0 otherwise; 
g 1, if the farmer has off-farm work, 0 if no off-farm work; 
h 1, if the farmer’s farm is located in central region, 0 if a farm located in north-east region; 
i 1, if farm has a loan, 0 if farm without a loan; and 
j 1, if household income greater than 90,001 baht and 0 represent otherwise. 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
Table 8. Multivariate regression of the risk strategy components and household and farm 
characteristics of all sampled Thai farmers (n=800) a 
5. Implication of the results 
Farmers in both regions perceived ‘unexpected variability of input prices’ as the most 
important sources of risk on the farm. In addition to the prices of chemical fertilizer, the 
increase in wage rates and higher land rental rates are the main factors that pushed the farm 
production costs upward. Over the past decade, the intervention of the Thai government in 
agricultural input policies had actually declined. The distribution of chemical fertilizers at 
reduced cost was the only scheme that the government organized to assist poor rural farmers. 
However, this scheme has recently been terminated due to limited government budget and 
this consequently reduced opportunities for the farmers to control production costs. 
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The results of the sources of risk perceptions,  showed that ‘unexpected variability of 
product prices’ was the second most important source of risk among the central and north 
east region farmers. The Thai government operated a pledging scheme for the major cash 
crops such as wet rice, dry rice, cassava and maize.(34) This scheme aimed to help farmers 
when commodity market prices fluctuated early in the harvesting season. However, the 
pledging scheme has been widely debated among policy experts, especially for rice.(35-37) 
The advantage of the rice pledging scheme is that farmers can obtain low-interest loans 
from the government when they decided to pledge their rice to the Bank of Agriculture 
and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) at the pledging prices and the rice will be 
transferred to storage at the Public Warehouse Organisation. The government allowed the 
farmers to redeem and sell their rice in the market when market prices increased above 
the pledging prices. The pledging price was set by a government announcement and 
generally the pledging period is approximately five to seven months each year.(38) 
Conversely, some economists argued that the pledging scheme would have long-term 
negative impacts on the efficiency of the country’s rice market and it seems that the 
management of the scheme is shaped by political forces.(35) The pledging scheme 
persuaded farmers to increase their production, but the quality of the products was 
frequently ignored.(39) Some economists also suggested that the government should 
discontinue this highly-interventional price policy and should encourage farmers to sell 
their products using futures contracts to reduce the risk of price and income volatilities.(40, 
41) This challenged policy makers to create mechanisms to stabilize agricultural prices at 
levels that are economically reasonable for both farmers and consumers. In addition, the 
effects of price policies such as the pledging scheme should be assessed cautiously to 
improve the effectiveness of the scheme. Direct access to futures trading markets may 
perhaps be too complicated for smallholder farmers in Thailand. Hence, government 
agencies such as Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Ministry of Commerce and 
The Agricultural Futures Exchange of Thailand should develop strategies that would 
increase small farmers’ access to the futures market. 
The development of a national agricultural crop insurance scheme should be one of the Thai 
government’s priorities. Crop insurance is, theoretically, an efficient instrument in 
managing risks and can facilitate efforts to protect farmers from either the loss of their crops 
or farm income caused by natural disasters or drops in commodity prices. To date, a new 
crop insurance scheme for Thai farmers that has been operated by BAAC since 2008 is still in 
the pilot project stage.(42) The government expects this crop insurance scheme will continue 
to develop to cover all farmers and crops countrywide in the near future.(43) In addition, 
there are some obstacles that policy makers should consider for the successful 
implementation of the crop insurance schemes.(1, 42, 44) 
First, the crop insurance scheme itself should not be too complicated because it could lead to 
high administrative costs for the scheme. Second, the appropriate insurance premiums and 
coverage accessibility under the scheme for each crop must be carefully considered. Low 
premiums may not always cover all the losses from the large-scale disasters, but the high 
insurance premiums will lead to increased farm production costs. Lastly, the government 
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should promote the benefits of crop insurance schemes that could increase farmers’ 
understanding and participation. 
Strengthening the role of farmer groups or cooperatives should be considered as part of 
agricultural risk reduction policies in Thailand. This is because farmers’ groups or 
cooperatives can help farmers to improve their negotiating power. Higher product prices 
and lower input prices can then be achieved more easily due to economies of scale.(1) 
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1. Introduction 
Climate can be viewed in a number of ways. As a constraint or setting, climate provides the 
broad boundary conditions within which a range of ecosystems services function. Climate 
may be considered a determinant in that it may be part of a causal chain of direct or indirect 
events leading to a particular impact or outcome. Climate can also be viewed as a resource; 
this notion implies that climate has a value, could be managed and manipulated and by 
extension could be allocated. More often than not, climate is viewed as a hazard. Whichever 
of these views of climate is adopted, it is clear that climate has a close relationship with 
nature and society and therefore climate variability and change may pose a range of risks 
for environments, societies and economies. 
As our understanding of the climate system and our ability to predict it into the future have 
improved, and as society has become more aware of the possible costs and benefits of 
managing (including adapting to) climate risks (see Box 1. ‘Climate risk definition’), 
individuals, communities and organisations are seeking suitable information, tools and 
techniques to enable appropriate management decisions to be made. These need to be 
accessible, dependable, usable, credible, authoritative, responsive, flexible and sustainable.  
The generic process of applying such information to climate risk decision making, 
including identification, assessment and prioritization of the risks followed by a 
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coordinated and sustainable application of resources to reduce, monitor and control the 
probability and or impact of detrimental effects, is known broadly as Climate Risk 
Management (CRM).  
 
There are a number of challenges for CRM. Climate risks pose what has been termed a 
wicked problem1. Wicked problems do not have set solutions; instead, greater 
understanding of the wicked problem and partial solutions to the problem evolve iteratively 
within the social contexts of the scientists/analysts, intermediary agents, and end users. As 
well, there is no commonly accepted methodology for assessing and prioritising climate 
risks, identifying key thresholds in these risks, or for considering what are important criteria 
for managing these risks.  
Current challenges for climate risk decision makers include identification of and assessing 
timely, reliable and appropriate climate risk information and then using that information 
to make well informed decisions. These are not simple processes given the complexity of 
the social and institutional mechanisms, the multiple potential sources of climate 
information (not all of which is consistent or authorative or easy to understand), and the 
multi-faceted nature of information, that are often involved in such decisions. 
Appropriate approaches and principles should be adopted to foster collaborations among 
climate risk information users and providers, and enable the implementation of effective 
management actions. 
The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and partnering agencies have recognized 
the needs of users of all kinds for relevant, actionable climate information for CRM and are 
taking steps to address those needs. Thousands of scientists and decision makers from 
climate and other disciplines met at World Climate Conference-3 (WCC-3, 31 August to 4 
Box 1. Climate risk definition  
There are many definitions of ‘risk’ depending on the application 
and context. Based on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change definition of disaster risk (IPCC, 2012), climate risk can be 
defined qualitatively as the likelihood of unfavourable impacts 
occurring as a result of severe climate events interacting with 
vulnerable environmental, social, economic, political or cultural 
conditions.  
It can also be defined more quantitatively, as the product of the 
probability of a given climate event occurring and the adverse 
consequences of this. As such, climate risk originates from a 
dynamic combination of climate hazards (e.g. extent and duration of 
extreme temperatures or rainfall) and the vulnerabilities (propensity 
or predisposition to be adversely affected) of exposed elements (e.g. 
communities, economic or societal sectors or ecosystems). 
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September, 2009, Geneva, Switzerland) to discuss the issues, and concluded that a Global 
Framework for Climate Services (GFCS) was needed to organize and provide users with the 
climate information, products and services appropriate to their requirements. Following 
WCC-3, a major report (WMO-No 1065) on the GFCS outlined, inter alia, current capabilities 
around the world, the needs and opportunities for climate services and recommendations. 
The GFCS is designed to mainstream climate science into decision making at all levels and 
help ensure that every country and every climate-sensitive sector of society is well equipped 
to access and apply relevant climate information, enabling an adjustment of planning and 
decisions to optimize the given situation. The application of climate services must therefore 
involve close interaction between all stakeholders including the providers and the users, 
and requires concerted multi-disciplinary efforts2. The ultimate goal of GFCS is to: “Enable 
better management of the risks of climate variability and change at all levels, through 
development and incorporation of science-based climate information and prediction into 
planning, policy and practice.” 
In 2011, the WMO agreed to implement the GFCS, and is working with partnering agencies 
to develop or strengthen the many contributions to the GFCS, in terms of observations, 
monitoring, research, services and capacity development, all with a user focus and 
engagement. As part of this effort, experts from around the world are collaborating to scope 
requirements for CRM, develop methods for interacting effectively with user communities, 
and improve applications of climate information for user benefit. 
Motivated by the need to ensure the effectiveness of the GFCS, and the associated 
requirement to improve the practical application of CRM at local levels, in order to reduce 
climate impacts, build resilience to climate variability and change and contribute to poverty 
reduction and development, the WMO Task Team on Climate Risk Management (TT-CRM) 
organized a CRM Symposium in Guayaquil, Ecuador in October 2011. Experts in a wide 
range of climate and risk disciplines from all the continents and key agencies working with 
WMO on the GFCS implementation attended. The overarching aim of the Symposium was 
to help both providers and users of climate information in the development and application 
of information on climate variability and change, in an operational ‘no regrets’ sense, for 
minimizing climate-related risks and maximizing any opportunities that may. As a result of 
this international meeting, innovative approaches for CRM were discussed, practical 
examples of best practice were highlighted, and guidance for appropriate processes, tools 
and techniques to adopt were proposed.  
In this chapter, key points and outcomes from the WMO Symposium on CRM are 
highlighted, including proposing a definition of CRM (see Box 2. ‘Climate Risk 
Management (CRM)’), and recommendations on CRM for WMO Members. The aim is to 
provide a useful document to all who are interested in establishing or improving CRM 
processes and systems at the local level (particularly village to country scales). 
Throughout the chapter, conceptual discussions are complemented with real-life case 
studies and lessons learnt and shared by experts who are involved in CRM across 
different sectors and in academia.  
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2. The process of CRM 
Many CRM frameworks, that include different key steps and elements (actors, tools, 
techniques etc.), have been developed to provide guidance and a degree of consistency for 
applying risk management to a range of climate-related issues3,4,5,6. These frameworks tend 
to be conceptual and general so that they can be easily applied to a wide range of concerns 
by both technical and non-technical users, and may vary in their foci and level of detail 
ranging from international to local, or general to sector specific.  
Despite the variety of frameworks and tools for assessing and managing climate risks, 
utilisation of the output to enable decision making is advancing rather slowly7. Continued 
guidance by risk management experts to begin the CRM process with user and provider 
engagement and collaboration has often not been considered, and assessments are still 
typically conducted by scientists and then the information is handed to users in a one-way 
exchange - the so called top-down approach - that often does not promote effective decision 
making. It is important to continue to promote collaboration between assessors and 
stakeholders (providers and users of climate information) at all stages of the CRM process, 
to enable all parties to understand the steps involved in the knowledge to action pathway, 
and therefore to facilitate effective and sustainable CRM responses.  
The WMO Symposium on CRM discussed various CRM frameworks and steps, which has 
enabled the TT-CRM to identify the following key steps that are considered essential to 
consider in a CRM process. These should not be regarded in a linear manner, but rather 
combined in an iterative or cyclical order: 
 User and provider engagement and collaboration  
 Climate risk assessment 
 Communication and dissemination of climate risk knowledge, information and tools 
 Adaptation and capacity development  
 Monitoring, evaluation and improvement 
Some of the key points for each of these steps are highlighted below, and practical examples, 
to demonstrate good practice on how they have been applied to real-life CRM projects, are 
provided.  
Box 2. Climate Risk Management (CRM) 
The World Meteorological Organization Task Team on Climate 
Risk Management (TT-CRM), based on the expert guidance from 
the Symposium on CRM, proposes a definition of CRM as a 
systematic and coordinated process in which climate information 
is used to reduce the risks associated with climate variability and 
change, and to take advantage of opportunities, in order to 
improve the resilience of social, economic and environmental 
systems. 
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2.1. User and provider engagement & collaboration  
Breuer and colleagues8 compared the traditional research model, in which researchers 
develop new technologies or tools that extension agents (professionals trained in skills such 
as communication and group facilitation, and usually also in technical areas of the sector 
they serve) deliver to end users, to a pipeline that delivers water. They proposed an 
alternate loop model, in which the loop encircles end-users, extension agents, and 
researchers with diverse opportunities for interactions among this co-learning community. 
The symposium supported this approach, and further recommended that science-based 
learning communities or communities of practice use as many methods as possible for 
engagement and collaboration.  
In this section the engagement of agricultural stakeholders, particularly through experiences 
with the Southeast Climate Consortium of the United States of America (USA) (SECC), is 
emphasized. However, the same principles could be applied successfully for CRM decision 
makers in other sectors, for example water resource managers, coastal community planners, 
or wildlife managers.  
The work of extension agents has been particularly successfully applied in the agricultural 
sector. Opportunities to engage end-users, e.g. farmers, in the process of developing a 
decision support system have included surveys, interviews, sondeos, workshops, focus 
groups, working groups, presentations and displays at association meetings, and on-line 
feedback8,9,10. An example of good practice in this sector has been the SECC, who developed 
AgroClimate (see http://agroclimate.org/), an on-line decision support system for extension 
agents and end users, using all of the engagement opportunities described above8,11,12 . 
 
The most important points for engaging farmers and outreach workers as research 
collaborators identified through the experiences of SECC are straightforward: 1) knowing 
which questions to ask; and 2) listening to the answers. The various methods that were used 
for engagement with end users follow the basic iterative steps outlined in Box 3. ‘Steps for 
engaging farmers and outreach workers’, but each is unique in terms of the depth and 
breadth of information that they can evoke.  
Box 3. Steps for engaging farmers and outreach workers  
1. Ask what they want. 
2. Listen. 
3. Give them what you think they asked for.  
4. Ask them whether you’ve given them what they need. 
5. Listen. 
6. Observe whether they use the information or tools that you have 
given them. 
7. Modify what you have provided. 
8. Go back to step 4. 
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By providing a range of engagement methods, individuals can self select how they will 
engage in the community, depending on their level of interest, availability of time, and 
willingness to commit to an activity. This ability of community members to select the 
engagement activities in which they will participate applies to nearly all members of the 
community, including end-users, extension agents, and researchers. The exception to the self 
selection clause is a core team of three or more individuals who are fully committed to the 
community. The SECC strives to have a team that includes at least one social scientist 
(anthropologist or rural sociologist), climate scientist, and agricultural scientist. The ability 
of this committed team to work together will be the most critical factor in the success of the 
engagement. 
Two of the engagement methods noted above – sondeos and working groups (both 
powerful and less commonly used in other reported participatory research approaches) – 
are further described: 
2.1.1. Sondeos 
A sondeo (Spanish for sounding) is a semi-structured discussion in which a two- to three-
person multi-disciplinary team engages one or two people from the target audience in 
conversation8. Most of the sondeos conducted for the SECC have been part of a graduate 
course in field research methods. The students and their instructors meet to discuss the 
problem of interest and to agree on a general set of questions to ask. These questions are a 
guide to conversation, rather than a formal questionnaire. The course members divide into 
small multi-disciplinary teams to conduct their conversations, typically at the residence or 
place of work for the people of target audience. For the agricultural community, extension 
agents have been vital in helping identify people from diverse target audiences, where the 
targets have included small and large farms, vegetable growers at farmers markets, farmers 
with and without irrigation, and others. 
An important benefit to a conversational approach is that it often elicits key issues that the 
researcher could not have anticipated, issues that would likely have been missed with an 
interview or survey that has a list of pre-established questions. In keeping with its 
conversational nature, the researchers do not take notes during the conversation. Rather, 
when the conversation is completed, each researcher writes their own synthesis of the 
discussion. In one day, a single team can usually complete three or four discussions, which 
typically last about one hour, followed by note writing.  
At the end of each day, all teams assemble to discuss their findings and to identify new 
questions that will guide conversations on the following day. Some questions may be 
retained throughout the sondeo in order to provide continuity, but the discussions evolve 
day-by-day as teams engage in conversations, learn, share their learning, and modify their 
conversation guide questions. After one week of field work, the course identifies a leader to 
write the sondeo report. Examples of SECC sondeo reports can be downloaded from 
http://SEClimate.org/pubs.php. 
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2.1.2. Climate working groups 
A working group includes members from science and the broader community who meet 
regularly, typically 3 or 4 times per year, to engage in dialogue on the new findings from 
science, information and technology needs of the broader community9. The steps for 
building and nurturing a climate working group are outlined in Table 1. The SECC has 
successfully established working groups for agricultural and water supply utility 
communities. Both have about 25 to 30 members and both are highly productive, yet each 
has distinct features that reflect the differences among the communities.  
A key element to the success of a climate working group is commitment, both on the part of 
the individual members of the groups and the institutions that they represent, if any. For 
example, most members of the water supply utility climate working group represent a 
particular water provider, city, or agency. If a member of any particular institution is not 
able to attend a meeting, the participating institutions identify an alternate who can attend. 
This policy provides both continuity and assures that the institutions have also committed 
to the working group.  
 
Phase 1:  
Exploratory 
 Identify key stakeholder groups and individuals 
 Assess climate-related concerns and priorities 
 Map network of stakeholder groups 
 Discuss interest in development of a climate working group 
 Identify potential participants and assess their interest in working 
together 
Phase 2:  
Group building 
and goal setting 
 Identify convener and facilitator for an exploratory meeting 
 Convene stakeholders to exchange information and explore scope 
for a climate working group 
 Discuss expectations and establish short- and long-term goals 
 Define group norms and roles 
Phase 3: 
Implementation 
 Develop a work plan and timeline 
 Identify gaps in expertise and experience 
 Develop sub-groups as needed to address specific topics 
Phase 4:  
Monitoring and 
feedback 
 Define outcome and process criteria to track progress 
 Include time for reflection and feedback for iterative group 
adaptation  
Table 1. Phases and activities for the building and nurturing a climate working group. Source: Bartels 
et al. (2011)9. 
By far, these climate working groups demand the greatest level of commitment from the 
learning community for any of the engagement methods that have been tested, but it is 
precisely this commitment that helps them advance science. The climate working groups 
help researchers build collaborative relationships with different stakeholder groups for on-
going learning, both by the scientists and the stakeholders. They link research with real-
world decision needs to help improve resource management strategies of stakeholders as 
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well as improving the research and education programs of the science community. Most 
importantly, climate working groups engage members from diverse stakeholder groups that 
might not otherwise interact and promote the legitimacy of the science community as a 
source of information and technology that is relevant to solving the wicked climate 
problems that society faces.  
2.2. Climate risk assessment 
As with the definition of climate risk, or CRM, there are many definitions of risk assessment. 
A common theme across most is the requirement for a process and/or technique that 
provides information with which to assess the key risk or risks. For example, the Society for 
Risk Analysis proposes that: “Risk assessment is the process of establishing information 
regarding acceptable levels of a risk and/or levels of risk for an individual, group, society, or 
the environment” (see: http://www.sra.org/resources_glossary_p-r.php).  
Risk assessments involve analysis techniques, methodologies and tools that have the key 
quality of assessing uncertainty (a common quality of risk), either quantitatively or 
qualitatively, and representing this as some measure of likelihood and/or probability. 
Climate risk assessment is used to help decision makers optimize resources for responding 
to climate-related disasters and reducing risks and impacts associated with current and 
future-projected climate variablity and change. It is one of the first stages of CRM, and 
involves identification and synthesis of hazard and vulnerability information/data that is 
relevant to the specific climate-related risks identified through the ‘User and provider 
engagement and collaboration’ step. One very important consideration in all climate risk 
assessments is the balance between the quantification of climate hazards (intensity, 
frequency and/or duration) and the approach to estimate the main elements of vulnerability 
on the ground i.e. level of exposure, poverty, exclusion, education, organizational capacity, 
infrastructure among others. Both hazard and vulnerability estimations may be validated 
using historical information of climate events and changes in socio-economic vulnerabilities 
and associated impacts. However, such assessment may encounter problems, for example, 
in some cases quality of data may be poor, data may not be available, skill of forecasts at 
different scales can be low. As well, even if the climate information is complete and correct, 
the user may not access it, or may not understand or know how to apply it. 
Indicators of climate-related risks (impacts, hazards and vulnerabilities) are often used to 
focus a risk assessment on the specific areas of interest for the decision maker. Indicators are 
values that can be monitored (and/or modelled) to assess changes in the state of a system, 
and are important tools for simplifying complex processes, with potentially multiple drivers 
and feedbacks, into useful and accessible information. Defining which indicators are 
appropriate for decision makers, as well as climate monitoring or projection purposes can be 
a complex process, and many different approaches have been adopted13,14,15,16. One of the 
more common approaches used for indicator-based studies uses the driving force-pressure-
state-impact-response (DPSIR), pressure-state-response (PSR) or driving force-state-
response (DSR) which organize indicators in the context of a causal chain17,18,19. 
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Climate risk assessments typically include statistical analyses of historical climate 
indicator records and assessment of information on climate-sensitive impacts, together 
with understanding of the climate mechanisms and the cascade of processes leading to 
these impacts. Geographical information and mapping may also be used to assess the 
zones where impacts are recurrent and are associated with human losses and/or 
infrastructure damages. Temporal changes of impacts and their related climate hazard 
characteristics are also often a key part of climate risk assessment, and may be directly 
linked with social, economical or environmental variables which may change exposure 
and resilience. In an ideal world, there would be millions of meteorological stations 
contributing to development of an accurate idea of the historical evolution of climate 
variables. The reality is, however, that there are not enough meteorological stations, the 
available stations are not evenly distributed in time and space, available data are not 
always digitized or shared, and there can be problems in some cases in the quality, 
completeness or homogeneity of the available data. Notwithstanding such issues, 
individual climate records measured at specific places integrate the history of the complex 
interactions between land, air, sea, ecosystems, and community in those locales. The final 
result is expressed in those climate records and consequently the history of this whole 
interaction process is reflected in time series of the measured values, or of their 
departures from a chosen reference period.  
Analysis derived from climate indices/indexes, such as that provided by the 
CCl/CLIVAR/JCOMM Expert Team (ET) on Climate Change Detection and Indices 
(ETCCDI) (see http://www.clivar.org/organization/etccdi/etccdi.php) is a powerful tool that 
can be applied at local level. In places where high quality climate records (preferably long 
period, minimal gaps, and homogeneous) are available, the information that can be 
delivered through such climate analysis is absolutely useful, in conjunction with social and 
economic and other information for that locale, in DRR, adaptation and CRM processes. 
Such information is more accurate and in most cases more appropriate than that generated 
by downscaled models, but in zones where there are no available stations, information 
generated by downscaling is the next best alternative.  
Climate risk assessment may also include a future element, utilising climate change 
projections and/or ‘what-if’ scenarios to explore the potential impacts of future scenarios of 
change. Practical obstacles to using information about future conditions are diverse, ranging 
from limitations in modeling climate system complexities (e.g. projections having coarse 
spatial and temporal resolution, limited predictability of some relevant variables, at scales 
that matter for decision making and forecast skill characterization), to procedural, 
institutional, and cognitive barriers in receiving or understanding climatic information, and 
the capacity and willingness of decision-makers to modify actions20,21. In addition, 
functional, structural, and social factors inhibit joint problem identification and collaborative 
knowledge production between providers and users. These include divergent objectives, 
needs, scope, and priorities; different institutional settings and standards, as well as 
differing cultural values, understanding, and mistrust22,23.  
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Figure 1. Climate-related risk map for agriculture in the highlands of Ecuador. Color scale: Red: high 
risk; Light green: low risk; Grey: no data. Source: MAE (2012) www.ambiente.gob.ec 
A fundamental part of risk assessment is related to vulnerability. However, it is very 
difficult to provide a unique formulation or set of indicators for vulnerability, as these will 
vary across sectors, geographically and in reponse to socio-economic conditions. A typical 
view of vulnerability considers the combination of several elements: the level of exposure 
(of an element which must be specified, e.g population, livelihood, infrastructure, etc.), the 
level of susceptibility which is a degree of how much the natural hazard can affect it, less or 
divided by the coping capacity of the exposed element which includes all the factors of 
resilience in the community, livelihood, infrastructure, etc.). While increases in the level of 
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exposure and susceptibility both increase vulnerability, increases in coping capacity reduce 
it. This approach mixes physical exposure (i.e. the presence (location) of people, livelihoods, 
environmental services and resources, infrastructure, or economic, social, or cultural assets 
in places that could be adversely affected by physical events and which, thereby, are subject 
to potential future harm, loss, or damage) with the social determinants of vulnerability. 
According to the most recent IPCC-SREX Report (2012)22, the IPCC describes vulnerability 
as the propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected. Every location on the planet has 
its own vulnerability profile and a specific evolution pattern. Historically this vulnerability 
pattern can be approximated with some social or economical indicators, statistics of disaster 
or land use multi-temporal comparison. The central focus of climate risk assessment is to 
understand the relevant climate hazards and their evolution over time, together with the 
vulnerabilities and how these have evolved, and a likely to change in the future, in a 
particular area. It is not possible to implement CRM or adaptation actions only with climate 
scenarios. This information must be complemented with the estimation of current 
vulnerability and potential future evolution.  
No single, consistent approach for conducting risk assessments has emerged, instead a 
range of different techniques have been used24. The choice of a particular technique is 
influenced by several factors, including: the goal of the assessment, the exposure units to be 
studied (an exposure unit is defined as the sector, location or activity being assessed), 
availability of data, choice of models suitable for the projection of future outcomes, and the 
time frame involved. A major challenge for future climate change assessments is the 
uncertainty associated with future projections and the propagation of this uncertainty 
throughout an impact assessment3. One approach has been to give a range of uncertainty 
bounded by low and high scenarios of climate change. However the outcomes of such 
analyses may be too broad for planning effective adaptation.  
An example of a successful climate risk assessment for the agricultural areas in 
the highlands region of Ecuador was developed in 2011 by the International Research 
Center on El Niño (CIIFEN), Ecuador. This was requested by the Ministry of Environment 
as part of the National Plan for Adaptation. For the assessment, agricultural areas were 
identified based on up-to-date satellite information, and specific field verification. 
Information and indicators for agriculture aptitude, erosion, hydrological deficit, level of 
access to water for irrigation, type of soil, were considered, and social and economical 
indicators were selected. All information was analyzed spatially at parish level and 
combined to produce a vulnerability map covering the Ecuadorian highland region. This 
was further combined with historical climate hazard maps of “dry consecutive days” and 
“high temperature indexes”, as reported in the Second National Communication of 
Ecuador to the UNFCCC, 200925. The resultant map of the climate risks for the agricultural 
sector in the highlands of Ecuador (Fig. 1) is currently used by national and local 
authorities to assign priorities, allocate resources and address the key elements involved 
in the vulnerability of the agriculture sector to cope with the potential climate hazards 
based in the historical trends. 
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2.3. Communication and dissemination of climate risk knowledge, information 
and tools 
The term ‘risk communication’ as used here, refers to intentional efforts on the part of one or 
more sources (e.g. international agencies, local government, communities) to provide 
information about hazards and hazard adjustments through a variety of channels among 
themselves or to different audiences (e.g. the general public, specific at-risk communities), 
for the purpose of influencing the recipients to apply the information and take appropriate 
action. It also includes efforts of local communities to characterize and communicate their 
risk-based experiences. Lindell and Perry (2004)26 summarized the available research as 
indicating message effects include pre-decisional processes (reception, attention, and 
comprehension). Several studies have identified the characteristics of pre-decisional 
practices that lead to effective communication over the long-term27,28,29.  
Communicating and disseminating risk information can be very challenging. One of the first 
steps for effective communication is to ensure two-way communication channels, where 
information providers and users can interact equally and explain misunderstandings. Before 
starting a CRM process, it is paramount to build and apply “climate information chains”30, 
as discussed above. This involves a complex network of institutions involved in the end-to-
end process of CRM, i.e. National Meteorological and Hydrological Services (NMHSs), 
disaster management agencies, national and local authorities, the media, private sector, 
community representatives, and public and private agencies of strategic sectors such as 
agriculture, health, water resources. Such a complex network requires diverse means of 
communication, which has included web-based GIS tools with, inter alia, real time 
information updates, e-mail distribution lists, text alerts and high-frequency radio 
transmission which is useful for remote locations. A climate information chain should have 
legitimacy, credibility and be interactive. It is a kind of “living mechanism” that must be 
kept operational. To get people and institutions engaged in this chain, dialogues, meetings 
and agreements are also necessary. One example of an operational mechanism for 
communicating and disseminating risk information would be regional or national climate 
outlook forums (RCOFs and NCOFs). In these forums, climate information providers and 
users meet (either face-to-face or virtually), usually on the release of a seasonal climate 
forecast. The opportunity to share information, discuss issues and build knowledge has 
proven invaluable in many parts of the world (for further information and references, see 
http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/wcp/wcasp/wcasp_home_en.html). 
Once climate information chains are set up, the information to be disseminated should 
consider that climate knowledge should optimally combine scientific knowledge and 
indigenous knowledge. Both are necessary to ensure the effectiveness of their application. 
Science is not enough to contribute practical and effective solutions for CRM, but when it is 
linked with the local culture and experience of the communities, fantastic responses can be 
obtained. This is exemplified by a young member of a remote community in Ecuador 
drawing a risk map for his location based on all the experiences, impacts and weaknesses 
their community has evidenced, but with a better understanding of how the vulnerability 
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was built and the main climate hazards that threaten this community31. There is indeed 
considerable evidence to show that if communities at risk are actively involved in 
information collection and analyses then they are far more likely to rely on that information 
than if it is just provided to them from ‘outside’30. Information is also regarded as credible to 
local actors if it is collected and reported by individuals recognized by the central 
bureaucracy and locals as responsible observers with minimal political motive, such as 
teachers or extension workers32. One effective way to consolidate climate information chains 
is through their usefulness. If such informaiton chains become operational and communities 
respond effectively during planning, early prepardness and response, users become 
engaged and empowered by the system because they feel they are part of it. 
Examples of risk information generation and diffusion efforts within disaster research and 
response communities include interpersonal contact with particular researchers, planning 
and conceptual foresight (as in Red Cross/Red Crescent brochures), outside consultation on 
the planning process (as per the Federal Emergency Management Agency of the USA 
(FEMA)), and user-oriented transformation of information and individual and 
organizational leadership. The characteristics of risk communication messages involve 
information quality (specificity, consistency, and source certainty) and information 
reinforcement (number of warnings) that have significant impacts on adoption of 
adjustments33,34. Messaging should also aim to foster ‘no-regrets’ actions, in which the 
recipient of the information takes climate-related decisions or action to maximize positive 
and minimize negative outcomes of climate variability and change. 
2.4. Adaptation and capacity development 
The IPCC definition of adaptation to climate change is the “adjustment in natural or human 
systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates 
harm or exploits beneficial opportunities”35. From a conceptual point of view adaptation 
and capacity development are part of the overall CRM approach. In practical 
implementations of adaptation projects these two compartments often become 
indistinguishable, for example, Monsoon Forum meetings, which focus on preparedness 
planning for monsoon season climate variability across Asia (see http://www.rimes.int 
/societal/monsoon-forum), often also involve training sessions to build capacity across the 
community. However, there is a strong tendency to try to separate and manage adaptation 
and capacity development independently of each other, as well as from the other steps 
involved in CRM. This can cause a negative effect on implementation and makes the 
institutional information framework which is necessary to get effective responses in human 
systems more complex.  
In accordance with the Global Adaptation Partnership (www.climateadaptation.cc), 
compelling climate change evidence has prompted the development and implementation of 
national adaptation plans around the globe, and these have generated specific within-
country actions related with vulnerability and risk assessments including long-term climate 
observations or projections. In some places, these actions overlap with CRM (as well as 
 
Risk Management – Current Issues and Challenges 490 
other risk management) plans of national disaster management or other government 
agencies. For example, the UK government Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs’ (DEFRA) Climate Change Risk Assessment was one of the requirements from the 
UK government’s Climate Change Act (for further details see http://www.defra.gov.uk 
/environment/ climate/government/risk-assessment/). 
One of the key issues for adaptation is its local nature. CRM or adaptation processes require 
ownership by communities, not only their authorities, for successful implementation. Such 
ownership is strongly connected with the perception that individuals have about the risks, the 
current impacts over them and how they are able to affect their integrity and progress. To 
encourage this perception, climate risks must be clearly identified and presented to 
communities, and this information must be validated with local data, information and local 
community feedback with experiences of how the population has coped with recent climate 
impacts. Setting up practices and mechanisms for coping with climate variability in the here-
and-now is an important step in preparedness for future climate changes. NMHSs are 
important partners for providing such local climate and meteorological information to inform 
adaptation. Given a local perception of climate risk, it is easier to generate adaptation 
strategies and solutions with the community and negotiated with the authorities, and 
implement action plans designed by the community. Particularities in local plans are key 
points from the cultural and social point of view. By adopting a local focus to CRM, adaptation 
is necessarily a bottom up social construction implemented by local communities. 
Past experience in capacity development for CRM suggests that providing a single recipe to 
conduct capacity development efforts has limitations. Some principles for a more 
comprehensive and effective approach, based on good practice, are therefore proposed as 
guidance: 
 Consider sustainability of capacity development through continual rotation of technical 
staff in national and local agencies; 
 Design training strategies under a “train the trainers approach”; 
 Prepare educational material combining scientific and indigeneous knowledge; 
 Ensure a robust institutional and stakeholders network to support the capacity 
development process (with multi-level stakeholder coordination and communication); 
 Consider blended training courses, with both face to face activities supported by e-
learning systems; 
 Implement accountability mechanisms for both capacity development implementers 
and beneficiaries; 
 Ensure an effective and long-term monitoring and evaluation mechanism involving 
national and local institutions; 
 Keep accessible databases of people trained and the impact of the capacity development 
in their current activities; 
 Develop a long-term strategy for education (alongside shorter courses), such as the 5-
year Climate Change Adaptation Degree and Master of Science (integrated) programme 
including agriculture, animal sciences, fisheries, forestry, biodiversity, water resources, 
health which has been launched by Kerala Agriculrural University, India; 
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 Co-share capacity development efforts with beneficiaries; 
 Encourage allocation of financial support from national, local or private stakeholders to 
support CRM capacity development; 
 Develop the capacity of information providers to deliver improved information, 
services and products, through, for example, improving the observing networks and 
climate risk modeling capability. 
2.5. Monitoring, evaluation and improvement 
Monitoring, evaluation and improvement are important elements in CRM. Monitoring 
could cover organizational, financial, operational, political, regulatory and other issues. It is 
required to collect relevant information and data to help quantify the risks, and to assess the 
success (or not) of adaptation or other interventions. Evaluation is the means by which the 
accomplishments are compared with the expected goals and what improvements are 
required to complete the iterative cycle proposed for CRM, within which there is an implicit 
assumption that progress should be continually sought. 
Before implementing any monitoring, evaluation and improvements for CRM, some key 
indicators should be set up. It is unlikely that one single indicator can be identified to 
monitor all the risks (hazards and vulnerabilies) necessary to monitor the CRM process. 
However, to be practical, a few key indicators should be identified with the following 
attributes - quantitative (e.g: number of victims and cost of impacts), quality controlled 
based on standards (e.g: ISDR guidelines for design of EWS), and time limited. 
The monitoring, evaluation and improvement step enables key oversight bodies (such as a 
NHMS, a regional health organization or other stakeholder) to track progress against initial 
conditions, and assess areas where corrective action is required. It can also be an important 
tool for the pursuit of resources to address gaps and deficiencies in the process, and to 
facilitate the dialogue between the relevant stakeholders in the risk management process at 
various levels, which is an essential part of a feedback loop between relevant stakeholders. 
Through this step the focus is kept on results – on reaching the desired goals – as well as on 
continual learning. It must be flexible, allowing for and even anticipating new challenges or 
opportunities, or new methods and understanding in the theory and application of CRM.  
3. Role of early warning systems and adaptation planning within the 
context of disaster risk reduction and CRM  
"Neither society nor the environment are static. Consequently, neither is the risk" (Alan Lavell) 
It is clear that CRM may encompass a wide range of temporal and spatial scales, depending 
on the nature of the risks and their socio-economic context. Both climate and disaster risk 
are considered as some integration of hazards, vulnerabilities and exposures (see Section 1), 
and EWSs may be integral to the adaptation measures used to manage these risks. An 
important concept for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) taken from ISDR Glossary, 200936 
concerns "the risk of disaster", which is usually expressed as ‘the probability of life loss or 
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property destruction or damage in a given period of time’. The action of DRR usually refers 
to the socio-economic objective of reducing that risk. In comparison, CRM is focused more 
towards the longer-term application of climate information and tools in a multidisciplinary 
scientific context to address both the positive and negative impacts of climate variability and 
change on society, infrastructure and life. The concepts of DRR and CRM are therefore 
complementary, both including a focus on risk management, and there are mutual 
advantages involved in designing integrated DRR and CRM projects. 
If the integration requirements of DRR and CRM are considered according to impact scales 
(local, regional or global), it is clear that even if some climate phenomena relate to global 
causes they are materialized through locally-specific contexts, causing damage or losses 
depending on existing capacities in those local areas. Hence, the need to focus on improving 
the management capabilities of both DRR and CRM is especially important at local scales. 
Early Warning Systems (EWS) are often central to DRR and CRM, particularly over 
relatively short time scales (minutes to weeks), whereas other systems and tools that focus 
on longer-term adaptation planning tend to be more appropriate for CRM at longer time 
scales (months to decades). All such measures have the common aim of reducing 
vulnerability, increasing resilience and improving response capacities of people, economies 
and ecosystems at risk.  
The UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) defines early warning as 
“the provision of timely and effective information, through identified institutions, that 
allows individuals exposed to a hazard to take action to avoid or reduce their risk and 
prepare for effective response”. Governments often maintain EWS to warn their citizens and 
themselves about impending hazards, resulting for example, from health, geologic, or, 
climate and weather-related drivers. Traditional assumptions are that effective functioning 
of EWS requires only prior knowledge of risks faced by communities and other users of the 
early warning information. Under a CRM framework EWSs are expanded to other 
adaptation planning measures, including technical monitoring and warning services for 
highlighting the risks and their potential impacts, effective strategies for dissemination of 
understandable warnings to those at risk, and finally, knowledge and preparedness to act37. 
Two additional elements have been introduced, 1) awareness that risks are changing (and 
which new risks may arise) and, 2) the need for constructing and communicating new 
knowledge about future conditions that can be understood, trusted and used38,22. One goal is 
to be prepared to use windows of opportunity for engaging and providing leadership, and 
for legitimizing risk management and successful communities of practice that have arisen 
during but also between events.  
Given the links between near- and long-term climate variability and change, the early 
warning construct also applies to more extended timescales. For example, WMO ‘Climate 
Watch’ systems utilise near real-time and historic climate observations with proactive 
mechanisms for interacting between users and NMHSs to provide alerts on major  
climate anomalies and extremes (see http://www.wmo.int/pages/themes/climate/climate_ 
watch.php). Improving the institutional organization of the EWS as well as the associated 
strategic response to crises are closely linked to developments in understanding of climate 
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vulnerability and governance39,40,22. Countries or regions that have developed such systems 
may also use them to develop and inform strategic adaptation response options to climate 
changes, thus developing broader institutional flexibility and preparedness, and reducing 
societal vulnerability. 
For most locations early warning is still a linear process based on a “sender-receiver” model 
of risk communication. In this section, the term “early warning information system” is used 
to describe the more integrated process of risk assessment, communication and decision 
support, of which an “early warning” is a central output. An early warning information 
system involves much more than development and dissemination of a forecast, it is the 
systematic collection and analysis of relevant information about and coming from areas of 
impending risk that: (a) Informs the development of strategic responses to anticipate crises 
and crisis evolution; (b) Provides capabilities for generating problem-specific risk 
assessments and scenarios, and (c) Effectively communicates options to critical actors for the 
purposes of decision-making, preparedness and mitigation. Central to the implementation 
of this more comprehensive vision of “early warning information systems” is a detailed 
examination of the root causes of the lack of early action41. 
Numerous international and national EWS’ exist 42,43,44. In addition, many early warnings 
directly and indirectly activate other warning systems in affected sectors and communities, 
a process that has been referred to as a cascade of early warnings45. For the most part, EWS’ 
have been interpreted narrowly as technological instruments for detecting and forecasting 
impending hazard events and for issuing alerts. This interpretation, however, does not 
clarify whether information about impending events is actually communicated and used to 
reduce risks44,22,46.  
An example of good practice with an EWS is provided by the Climate Forecast Application 
in Bangladesh (CFAB) project. Heavy rainfall episodes in the Ganges-Bhramaputra basin 
(combined drainage area ~1,662,000 km2) cause human suffering almost every year. Webster 
& Hoyos (2004)46 showed the possibility of using physically based statistical schemes to 
predict rainfall with lead times of more than 10-days in the monsoon region. Based on this 
and subsequent research the CFAB project, supported by Office of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID/OFDA), was 
launched during the monsoon of 2003 and 2004. Long-lead forecasts for rainfall in the river 
basin were given using the UK-based European Centre for Medium Range Weather 
Forecasts (ECMWF), Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) and other datasets47. The 
Program was a collaboration (see Fig. 2) of the following agencies: Atmospheric and Oceanic 
Sciences at the University of Colorado, Boulder, Georgia Institute of Technology, ECMWF, 
Bangladesh Meteorological Department (BMD), Bangladesh Flood Forecast and Warning 
Centre (FFWC), and Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) in Thailand. Coordinated 
efforts by ADPC, BMD and the Institute for Water Modeling (IWM) resulted in the 
development of 1-10 day discharge forecasts at major stations of two rivers (Hardinge 
Bridge, on the Ganges and Bahadurabad, on the Bhramaputra). The FFWC was responsible 
to produce local-level forecasts in other locations along these rivers. The Center for 
Environmental and Geographic Information Services (CEGIS)48 disseminated flood forecasts 
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to communities during the monsoon season, working in close coordination with the Disaster 
Management Bureau (DMB) and the Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE). With the 
additional lead times and tailored warnings, community level flood risks were better 
managed. Communities were able to mobilize in advance (e.g. move livestock to higher 
ground, secure their fishing nets) in order to protect their livelihood assets. The project ran a 
second phase from 2006 to 2009 with support from USAID Bangladesh through CARE-
Bangladesh. The objective was to transfer technology from the USA to Bangladesh and to 
build the capacity of national and local institutions for a sustainable end-to-end generation 
and application of flood forecast products in high-risk locations.  
 
Figure 2. Institutional linkages for 1 to 10-day forecast of rainfall in Climate Forecast Application in 
Bangladesh (CFAB) project. Solid lines denote forecast/product flow and broken lines indicate 
coordination between the institutions: Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC); University of 
Colorado; Georgia Tech – Earth Atmospheric Sciences (EAS); Bangladesh Meteorological Department 
(BMD); Flood Forecasting and Warning Centre (FFWC) of Bangladesh Water Development Board 
(BWDB), Disaster Management Bureau (DMB); Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE); Center for 
Environmental and Geographic Information Services (CEGIS); and CARE Bangladesh.  
The disaster research and emergency management communities have shown that warnings 
of impending hazards need to be complemented by information on the risks actually posed 
by the hazards and likely strategies and pathways to mitigate the damage in the particular 
context in which they arise. Effective “early warning” thus implies information is 
introduced into an environment in which much about risk and vulnerability is assumed49. 
Vulnerability analysis provides a contextual basis for early warning by identifying 
structural, water, energy, and food insecurity attributable to disruption of primary means of 
access including informal community safety nets50. As is long-recognized by the disaster, 
food and water security communities, and more recently the climate adaptation research 
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communities, successful early warning information systems integrate "input" and "output" 
indicators. Input indicators include measures of production potential, including rainfall, soil 
conditions, heat and crop and livestock growth. Output indicators include nutritional 
indices, behavioral indicators, and signals of economic activity, that deal with the food, 
water and other supply situations or changes in demand that result from scarcity51. The 
timing and form of climatic information (including forecasts and projections), and access to 
trusted guidance to help interpret and implement the information and projections in 
decision-making processes may be more important to individual users than improved 
reliability and forecast skill. 
Experience provided by the U.S. National Integrated Drought Information System (NIDIS) 
and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Famine Early 
Warning System (FEWSnet) drought early warning information systems developed in the 
USA has led to the following recommendations for developing EWS: 
 Develop a Governance structure. 
 Frame the goals and objectives of international and country and intervention strategy 
from a securities perspective (water, food etc), e.g FEWSnet, NIDIS. 
 Strengthen the scientific and monitoring foundations to support early warning.  
 Specify of reliable information provided by forecasts, especially for key climate features 
i.e. ENSO. 
 Improve understanding of the modulation and combined impacts of interannual and 
decadal-scale variations on agricultural and meteorological drought duration and 
severity. 
 Place multiple indicators within a statistically consistent triggering framework-cross-
correlation among units for rapid transitions (e.g. climate and vegetation mapping) 
before critical thresholds are met from onset to severity. 
 Develop risk and vulnerability profiles of drought-prone regions and locales including 
impact of climate change adaptation interventions on food and water availability, 
access, and use. 
 Develop indicators and methodologies to assess the risk to environmental services, 
value and costs of environmental degradation, and impacts of water and crop subsidies.  
 Inventory and map local resource capabilities (infrastructure, personnel, and 
government/donor/ngo-supported services) available to complement food and water 
program operations. 
 Conduct gaming scenarios with planners and decision makers for selected past and 
projected events to: 
 Improve understanding on whether and how best to use probabilistic information 
with scenarios of potential surprise and cumulative risks at each scale. 
 Map decision-making processes and identify policies and practices that impeded or 
enable the flow of information among information system components. 
The NIDIS and FEWSnet experience also provides a good example to demonstrate that 
successful drought early warning information systems have explicit foci on: (1) integrating 
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social vulnerability indicators with physical variables across timescales, (2) embracing risk 
communication as an interactive social process and, (3) supporting governance of a 
collaborative framework for early warning across spatial scales46. Forecasts need not be 
perfect to make early warning useful. For longer-term EWS, it is also important to note that 
although a trend in the drought-based indicators may serve as a warning, the actual point of 
transition or threshold (e.g. dune mobilization) to increased severity remains difficult to 
predict.  
Traditional warnings, with justification, remains an important source of climate information 
in many rural communities. At the community level, farmers in Zimbabwe and Malawi 
have identified local language radio programs as credible and accessible mechanisms to 
deliver forecasts if they occur with follow up meetings with extension agents or other 
intermediaries52. Internet based tools, such as Google maps, and graphical tools are already 
being used for participatory, large-scale information development. However, these tools are 
inherently limited in communicating the relevant local context and the consequences 
(positive and negative of information use). For most locations, the governance context in 
which EWSs are embedded is also key. The links between the community-based approach 
and the national and global EWSs are weak at present53. Improving the complementarity 
and legitimacy of both approaches is a new challenge to address especially in developing 
the institutional foundations for global climate early warning information systems 
envisioned by the Global Framework on Climate Services (see section 1. Introduction).  
There is a critical need to approach and support early warning through DRR and Climate 
Change Adaptation (CCA)54,22, and the overarching processes involved in CRM. This 
requires a framework that uses climate change scenarios not above but within risk and 
vulnerability profiles, thereby capturing the nature of capabilities and decision-making 
networks. These form the basis for effective EWS design and implementation. The cases 
above, and other efforts, have demonstrated that social protection and early warning 
information interventions can provide DRR while helping to meet the goals of adaptation to 
changes in extreme events. Furthermore, sustainable development prospects are very 
dependent on the effectiveness of the many networks of EWS’57. In these networks, subtle 
rules of interaction emerge that shape the context in which resource-related decisions are 
taken, and the rules are negotiated and made55,56.  
To ensure that DRR and CRM are integrated utilising appropriate systems, information and 
tools, some transversal capacities need to be established between the scientific community 
studying and analyzing the climate information (at timescales relevant to both DRR and 
CRM), and the decision-makers who are required to consider the full spectrum of the 
impacts of climate variability and change. Decision makers across all facets of society also 
need to be aware of the changes, risks and impacts threatening their societies and find 
appropriate ways to adapt to and protect these from the most damaging changes. They 
should also consider climate as a resource, with beneficial aspects that can be exploited, 
through application of timely and appropriate climate information, tools and products.  
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4. Case studies demonstrating effective CRM practices 
CRM is designed to be a practical process to be implemented on the ground. People, 
policies, environmental issues, governance, information, cultural aspects among other 
elements should be organised to communicate in an appropriate manner to deal with 
extreme weather- and climate-related risks. There is no single CRM solution for a particular 
situation in any part of the world. However, over time, there are increasing success stories 
demonstrating good practices for a wide range of CRM situations. The following case 
studies are examples of such good practice in CRM for different locations and development 
sectors. 
4.1. CASE STUDY 1: Using probabilistic seasonal forecasting to improve 
farmers’ decision in Kaffrine, Senegal (Ousmane Ndiaye, Robert Zougmoré, Jim 
Hansen, Aida Diongue, El Hadji Seck) 
Although agriculture and pastoralism occupy 80 per cent of the population in the Sahel, 
climate information is not yet widely integrated into farm management decision systems. 
However, many efforts have been made in the region to produce climate information such 
as the yearly climate outlook forum preceeding the incoming rainy season57. Yet, this hasn’t 
benefitted the user community, particularly the most vulnerable to climate variability and 
change. This paper documents one ongoing demonstration project in Kaffrine, Senegal, 
within the peanut growing basin, where rural communities, policy-makers and relevant 
institutions are testing the use of probabilistic seasonal forecasts for managing climate risk. 
The process, from training the farming community to evaluating the use of the forecast 
information, is outlined. 
4.1.1. Background 
Rainfall in the Sahelian region of West Africa experiences strong variability over time-scales 
ranging from intra-seasonal (including long dry spells and false onset) to inter-annual and 
decadal. At the longest time scale, climate change is shifting the desert boundary and 
altering the landscape. This strong variability has an impact on many sectors, including 
health, agriculture and water management. The major impacts of climate variability in this 
region make CRM an imperative for the livelihoods of Sahelian communities. Each time 
scale of variability requires a specific climate risk plan.  
As is the case in most French colonized countries in Africa, ANACIM, the national weather 
service of Senegal, is in charge of providing meteorological services to the country. 
ANACIM, in partnership with the CGIAR research program on Climate Change, 
Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS), initiated a pilot project in 2011 to test the 
usefulness of probabilistic seasonal forecast information to peanut farmers in Kaffrine. In 
addition to ANACIM, the key stakeholders participating in the project include local 
government technical services, local farmers and NGOs. A big challenge in the training was 
to go through many key and important steps in achieving good CRM, including producing 
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skillful seasonal forecasts at district level, presentation of probabilistic seasonal forecasts 
using easy-to-understand terminology, training farmers with the new information for them 
and translate this into decisions. This study concludes with lesson learned during the initial 
year of the project. 
4.1.2. Building trust 
The approach used in the project was to help the various stakeholders identify strategies for 
successful CRM using seasonal forecasting. The project sought to build the trust of farmers, 
while working with all relevant local organizations. In West African’s culture, trust is the most 
important requirement in order to be effective in a viable partnership. A common saying 
states, “the manner to give is better than what is given”. In order to build trust with farmers 
and foster a sustained relationship, a workshop that included 30 farmers from 6 villages 
around Kaffrine was planned. Since ANACIM does not have the legal mandate to implement 
any agricultural strategy, partnership with the local agriculture department representative 
(SDDR) was ensured. The SDDR has the mandate to monitor activities related to the farming 
system, and also has arbitration authority in case of conflicts over issues such as farm 
allocation, fertilizer subsidizing, buying harvest products. SDDR was a natural contact point 
with farmers, since they had already developed a long time partnership and has their trust. It 
was very important that the project team not appear as a stranger in the system, but work 
through a known entity. Association was developed with other local technical services 
including agricultural advisers from the national agency for agricultural and rural advice 
(ANCAR), which has a presence nationwide at district level and a mandate to advise farmers 
in term of agricultural strategies. Volunteers from World Vision, a Christian charity that assists 
children and invests a lot in agriculture in the district of Kaffrine, also participated. 
Participants included individual farmers, and members of farmer organizations such as 
JAPPANDO. Women represented about 30 per cent of those participating. 
4.1.3. Training 
Consistent with the strong oral tradition, time was reserved during the workshop to allow 
farmers to interact with the experts team. On the first day of the workshop, the floor was 
given to farmers to describe their experiences with forecasting the weather and climate. The 
technical experts started with differentiating the concepts of weather (imminent) and 
climate (longer term), as these concepts are interchangeable in the local language.  
4.1.4. Connecting with farmers’ indigenous knowledge 
A challenge for the CRM approach was to enable farmers to trust and use scientific 
information. There was a clear need for a common ground, where farmers would use the 
new scientific seasonal forecasting approach proposed to them without feeling that their 
indigenous approaches to seasonal forecasting were being rejected. In this culture, the 
scientists would lose credibility if the farmers were to think the scientists were saying that 
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their elders were wrong and only the scientists were right. The strategy was to listen to them 
and understand the aspects of their traditional knowledge that might be climate related. The 
farmers were welcomed as guardians of knowledge passed from generation to generation, 
and invited as experts to share their indigenous climate knowledge. According to their 
tradition, being elder means possessing wisdom. The farmers were asked to specify whether 
each indicator was for immediate weather, or for climate conditions for the upcoming 
season. Some of the indicators were clearly just coincidental events with no apparent link to 
the climate, but many were very much related to climate and specifically with the high 
humidity and high temperature associated with the monsoon system (Table 2). After 
carefully listening, the scientists acknowledged the farmer’s memories and explanations.  
 
Climate variability Indicators
Onset of the rainy 
season 
When the wind changes direction to fetch the rainfall 
Apparition of stars shaped as elephant 
Birds crying as if it calls men to go to field and woman to stay at 
home 
Early flowering of many trees species: Néré, dimb, tamarinier, sone 
Butterflies and libellees are numerous 
Some persons feel heavy in their body 
Hot night time  
Major rainy event When wind is shifting direction 
When dark clouds become white 
Good rainy season When snakes and frogs are more numerous than usual 
The shooting star direction indicates which zone will receive excess 
rain this year 
Net appearance of seven stars in the sky 
Good cropping 
season 
When the rain is settled in June the 24th and we start the millet 
around the 14th of July we can expect good harvest 
End of the season When frogs start chanting 
When the sky is high 
When we observed dew in the morning 
Table 2. Quotes from farmers on their perceived climate variability indicators 
4.1.5. Explaining the basis of seasonal forecasting 
Another challenge was how to explain to farmers, in easy-to-understand terms, how climate 
forecasts work. Many farmers knew about weather forecasts, communicated through the 
weather bulletin on national TV. But the real challenges were to convince them that the rain 
could be forcast one to two months ahead, and to help them to understand the probabilistic 
nature of forecasts at this lead-time. The basis of seasonal forecasting was explained to the 
farmers by calling upon their intuition. When asked, “When it is hot, why do people go to 
the beach?” they responded that the sea breeze brings fresher air. They were then asked, 
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“Then why? Isn’t it the same sun that heats both land and ocean? Why then does the ocean 
get cooler in summer?” It was explained that ocean has better memory of the past compared 
to the continent. Ocean remembers the heat of the past days and weeks. That’s why, on a 
very hot day people go to the beach to benefit from ocean memory of the past weeks. 
Similarly, when it is cold, the ocean still remembers recent warm days. The ocean’s heat 
memory is the basis for seasonal forecasting. As rain comes from clouds, clouds come from 
water vapor, and most water vapor from the ocean, they could see how ocean temperature 
could control rain. The farmers were also informed that satellites are used to monitor ocean 
temperature throughout the world, and computers quantify the likelihood of rain in 
Senegal. This very simplistic explanation helped them to make sense of scientific seasonal 
forecasts, and was sufficient to convince them to trust the forecast during this first contact. 
4.1.6. Getting past the technical language barrier 
The next challenge was to explain the probabilistic nature of the forecast, which is less 
intuitive than a deterministic rainfall amount. To start with, the farmers were asked to 
recollect from their memory the last 5 rainy seasons and rank them from the wettest to the 
driest. With a pluviograph (Fig. 3), it was explained how rainfall is recorded in millimeters, 
and what 1mm of rain means. One mm of rain was poured into the soil, then the farmers 
were asked to compare it with the quantity of rain that they consider sufficient to plant their 
crops. They indicated that they plant when the soil wetting front is greater than the span of 
an average man’s hand. To help them interpret what a seasonal total means, a discussion 
was held on how the temporal distribution of rain relates to the seasonal total. It was clear 
for the farmers that a seasonal forecast gives an idea of the total, but no information about 
its distribution in time. One farmer explained the difference between a good rainy season 
and a good cropping season, which was a clear indication that they understood the seasonal 
forecast output. The farmers were informed also what could potentially be forecast and 
what could not.  
 
Figure 3. Training farmers to read a rain gauge. 
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4.1.7. Probability of exceedance graphs 
It was decided to express the forecast as a probability of exceedence of rain instead of the 
probability of occurrence of the three tercile categories that meteorological services in West 
Africa officially issue in their seasonal forecasts. Farmers understand the notions of 
uncertainty and probability, but understanding and acting on formal probability formats is 
challenging. To help them understand the new probability of exceedance format, an exercise 
of classifying the last 5 years of rainfall that they recollected from memory was conducted 
(Fig. 4). A chart of 30 years of Kaffrine rainfall data was provided. The farmers could see 
that it is very likely that they would get at least as much rainfall as the driest year, and very 
unlikely that they would get more than the wettest year. The middle years represent 
“normal” conditions. How to identify the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of rainfall from the 
graph was discussed. The idea that a dry forecast would shift the distribution toward the 
left and wet forecast to the right was introduced. Hypothetical wet and dry forecasts were 
discussed until the farmers appeared to understand what they meant. As the probability of 
exceedence is a cornerstone of the training, the farmers were divided into four groups. Two 
groups were given probability of exceedence forecasts for hypothetical dry years and the 
other two groups were given hypothetical wet years. The farmers were asked to discuss 
what they would do differently if this were the actual forecast for the upcoming season. 
Each group reported back on their forecast and strategies. The whole group was encouraged 
to comment on these strategies. 
 
Figure 4. Farmers sorting seasonal rainfall. 
4.1.8. Communicating the forecast 
After the training, the next step was to build a communication strategy to ensure that the 
information will reach the farmers effectively. A discussion of the best way to communicate 
the seasonal forecast revealed a number of options. Among the means identified, cell phones 
appeared first as a cheap technology. This option is accessible, since most of the farmers 
have a cellular phone, and is consistent with the traditional use of oral communication. 
Local radio was the other promising means of communicating forecast information. All of 
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the participating farmers listen to the radio, but the listening quality of the radio is very 
poor when they are on the farm. Some NGOs and farmers association leaders recommended 
e-mail as a possibility. The administrative authority who was present mentioned the 
government’s network of heads of village. In case of an extreme event, this can be used to 
reach each village within an hour. The local authority showed his support and promised to 
help with access to this facility. To avoid conflicts between farmers’ organizations, other 
farmers recommended sending the information through the SDDR, who knows how to 
contact them. 
4.1.9. From theory to practice 
A week after the training work, ANACIM sent a group of experts to call a meeting to 
communicate the actual July-September 2011 seasonal forecast with the farmers. Twenty-
two attended. Some key points from the training were revisited: good rainy season versus 
good cropping season, probability of exceedence interpretation, plausible management 
response strategies, definition of 1mm. Rain gauges were distributed to some 
representatives of farmers’ organizations who expressed need for this tool, and the meaning 
of a millimeter of rain was again demonstrated. The forecast was presented with an 
explanation on how to interpret it (Fig. 5). The forecast in this case was “normal to above-
normal.” As the year before, 2010, had been exceptionally wet – the highest on record – it 
was indicated that rainfall this year (2011) would probably be less than 2010. Some 
explanations about what the seasonal forecast did not say were also offered. 
Recommendations on any particular management strategies were not made, but rather it 
was left open to each farmer to decide. Considering that this was a first contact with them, it 
was preferred to build trust first before offering recommendations.  
 
Figure 5. Training on interpreting the probability of exceedance. 
4.1.10. Keeping in touch 
Through this project, funds were available to undertake two field visits during the season, 
and also to call selected farmers from time to time. When the first big rainy event occurred, 
some farmers were asked if they planned to use the seasonal forecast, whether they spread 
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the word, how the rain was, etc. It was not a forecast but rather a monitoring exercise. It was 
good to touch base. During the first field trip in selected villages (October 12-13 2011), some 
farmers made major decisions, such as borrowing money from the bank to invest more in 
their farm, or hiring workers. Another field visit was made around the end of the cropping 
season (October 18-22, 2011) to conduct surveys on expected yield.  
4.1.11. Evaluation of the seasonal forecast 
In January, three months after the rainy season, when farmers have sold their crops and 
finished their farming work, an evaluation workshop was organized in Kaffrine to assess the 
use and usefulness of the seasonal forecast strategy. Local extension services were present, 
as well as farmers’ organizations. Fifteen of the farmers who attended the training 
workshop in June were invited back, along with 13 other farmers who hadn’t received 
information about seasonal forecasting. During the January workshop, participants assessed 
both 2011 seasonal rainfall and the performance of various crops grown in the district. The 
participants took the opportunity to discuss in three groups, and interpret the information 
presented. One group included 12 farmers that had received the forecast and adjusted some 
decisions in response to the forecast (group I). The next groups included 3 participants who 
did receive the forecast but didn’t make any adjustment to their farming practices (group II), 
and the last group consisted of 13 farmers who had never received any climate forecast 
information (group III). They were asked to document actions taken, problems encountered, 
and recommendations. Group I understood from the workshop that a short cycle crop was 
suitable because the season was to be less than 2010, but rainfall would be enough. The main 
problems they listed were: the high spatial variability of the rainfall, the late occurrence of 
the first rainfall which made it difficult to judge when to start planting, a long dry spell, and 
early termination of the season. They wanted to know or get: the starting date, finer forecast 
information in space, a weather bulletin each two weeks, and more training to better 
understand the forecast. Group II did not use the seasonal forecast because they had already 
bought their seeds at that time which made it difficult to change any of their farming 
strategy. Group III, who had never received any climate information, indicated that they 
had thought 2011 would be like 2010. They missed the opportunity of a long season in 2010, 
and were prepared to catch up the next year by choosing a long cycle variety, buying 
fertilizers and hiring wage laborers. The group members concluded that their problem was 
that they didn’t know anything about the course of the rainy season and needed to be part 
of the group that received seasonal forecast training. 
4.1.12. Lesson learned and way forward 
The Workshop participants were given the chance to evaluate the whole process – from 
farmer selection, to organization of the workshop, to training agenda – in order to identify 
what is needed for improvement. There is a need to improve the communicating system by 
using already existing channels. World Vision recommended that training more trainers 
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would be the best way. Overall, the farmers appreciated the experience of last year and 
welcomed more training. 
Seasonal climate forecasts could have considerable potential to improve agricultural 
management and livelihoods for smallholder farmers. But constraints related to 
legitimacy, salience, access, understanding, capacity to respond and data scarcity have so 
far limited the widespread use and benefit from seasonal predictions in the Sahel region. 
The existing constraints reflect inadequate information services, policies or institutional 
processes in the region. However there is great potential to overcome these constraints. 
An approach is suggested that packages: i) seasonal and onset forecasts, ii) opportunity 
for farmers to implement strategies, and iii) insurance tools in case of extreme variable or 
dry years. Even when the seasonal rainfall or onset matches the forecast, poor farmers 
wouldn’t profit if they don’t have access to funds or crop varieties to implement any 
forecast-based strategy. And it turns out that in Kaffrine, there is often false start of the 
rainy season, making it imperative to provide farmers with alternatives, for example 
through index insurance.  
As work with farmers in Kaffrine on the forecast continues, research is being conducted 
and a working group on improving prediction of intra-seasonal variability has been set 
up. Crop producers and seed bank will be invited into the process, to allow farmers to 
access suitable varieties for forecast-based strategies. There is some work on index 
insurance in the region, and it is planned to reach out to involve such groups in this effort. 
Through this approach it is hoped to gain success, avoid frustration and build long-term 
partnerships. 
4.2. CASE STUDY 2: Climate risk management of plantation crops in the humid 
tropic region of Kerala, India (G.S.L.H.V. Prasada Rao) 
The global economy has adversely been affected to a considerable extent due to weather 
related disasters which are not uncommon in the recent past. It is true in the case of the 
Indian economy too. The year 2010 was the warmest year ever recorded, followed by 2009 in 
India.  
Climate model simulations indicate that a marked increase in rainfall and temperature over 
India could be seen during the current century. The maximum expected increase in rainfall 
is likely to be 10-30 percent over central India, with temperatures projected to increase 
between 2 and 3oC by the end of the 21st century.  
More frequent storm surges and increased occurrence of cyclones in the post monsoon 
period, along with increased maximum wind speed are also expected along the coastal 
belt. As a result, the occurrence of floods and droughts, cold and heat waves and sea level 
rise may adversely affect the food security to a large extent across India, as seen in 2009, 
2002 and 1987. Such impacts also influence plantation crops, which are predominantly 
grown in the humid tropics like Kerala, in the southwest of India (between latitudes 
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8°15`N and 12°50`N and longitudes 74°50`E and 77°30`E). The location map of Kerala is 
given in Fig. 6.  
 
Figure 6. Location map of Kerala. Source: www.mapsofindia.com  
4.2.1. Rainfall and thermal regimes of Kerala  
The annual rainfall across Kerala is highly variable, averaging about 3000mm, but varying 
between less than 1000mm to greater than 5500mm.  
Seasonally, rainfall is bimodal, due to the influence of both the summer and winter 
monsoons, with maximum monthly rainfall (>600mm) during the summer monsoon in June 
and July, and winter monsoon rainfall (200-300 mm) during October. Heavy rainfall during 
the summer monsoon, followed by a prolonged dry spell is a characteristic feature of the 
humid tropics, which is particularly prominent in the case of the northern districts, 
including Kasaragod, where the influence of winter monsoon is negligible (Fig. 7).  
Annual average surface air temperature varies between 25 and 30°C, with a seasonal range 
between around 18°C in winter and 35°C in winter. The altitude across Kerala varies from 
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below mean sea level to above 1500m, and temperature varies significantly with altitude. 
Accordingly, a sequence of crops is grown across the altitudinal range (see Table 3).  
 
Figure 7. Mean weekly rainfall and pan evaporation at RARS, Pilicode, Kasaragod District, Northern 
Kerala, India. 
 
Class Region Temperature conditions Altitude (amsl) Crops 
Mega- 
therms 
Low 
land 
High to Moderate temperature 
throughout the year  
0 -10 m  Coconut, arecanut and 
cashew  
Meso- 
therms 
Mid land Moderate temperature 
throughout the year, winter 
temperature 
 relatively low  
10 -100 m  Coconut,cocoa arecanut, 
rubber, 
cashew and black 
pepper  
Micro- 
therms I  
High 
land 
Moderate to Low temperature 
throughout the year, winter 
temperature low  
100 -500 m Rubber, coconut, 
cashew, arecanut and 
black pepper 
Micro- 
therms II  
High 
land 
  
Low temperature throughout the 
year  
500-1000 
m  
Coffee (arabica), rubber, 
arecanut and black 
pepper 
Micro- 
therms III  
High 
ranges 
Low temperature throughout the 
year, winter temperature is 
occasionally goes below 0°C 
1000-2500 
m  
Tea, Coffee (arabica) and 
Cardamom  
Table 3. Altitudinal sequence of crops in Kerala. 
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Since rainfall is abundant during the monsoon season, surplus water during the first crop 
season leads to waterlogging which is detrimental to crop growth. In comparison, the 
second and third crops often suffer from soil moisture stress, and crop failure is a common 
phenomenon if irrigation is not assured. Erratic rainfall distribution during the monsoon, 
coupled with failure of the northeast monsoon, may result in drying up of surface reservoirs 
during summer, which are the major water resources in the region. In recent years, 
meteorological droughts during the monsoon and summer droughts are not uncommon 
across Kerala, with the summers of 1983 and 2004 particularly prominent (Fig. 8).  
 
Figure 8. Water deficit in Kerala from Sept to May 1982-83 and 2003-04. 
4.2.2. Impact of summer drought on plantations  
The prolonged summer droughts, coupled with high temperature and low atmospheric 
humidity, in Kerala during 1983 and 2004 adversely affected production of many plantation 
crops, particularly rainfed coconut palms, arecanut, cardamom, coffee and black pepper and 
as a result the economy of the state was impacted. For example, monthly nut yield declined 
by up to 50 per cent (depending on management practices) in the year following drought, 
cardamom yield reduced by 30 per cent in Idukki dristrict and several black pepper gardens 
were wiped out in Wayanad district. Cocoa yield was also adversely affected due to high 
temperature in the absence of soil moisture. The impacts of these droughts on the 
agriculture and economy of Kerala highlighted the need to manage the risks posed by 
climate variability and change in this region, including other climate hazards such as floods, 
cold temperatures and heat waves). Various measures are now in place and being 
developed to pro-actively manage these risks, particularly at local levels. In the next section 
two of these measures are highlighted: 1) Scarce water resource management specifically 
through effective management of irrigation; and 2) Weather forewarning and dissemination. 
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4.2.3. Climate risk management  
Scarce water resource management – irrigation: Management of irrigation during the 
summer months under scarce water resources is one of the key tools available for 
managing the adverse impacts of summer drought on crops. Various methods can be used 
to assess the irrigation requirements for different crops and time periods throughout a 
season, e.g. estimate weekly water deficit/surplus by taking the difference between 
weekly rainfall and open pan evaporation, or through calculations of potential 
evapotranspiration.  
In the RARS, Pilicode location of Kerala, the irrigation requirement for coconut was 
estimated using the FAO’s CROPWAT decision support tool for estimating crop irrigation 
water requirements based on soil, climate and crop data (see: http://www.fao.org/nr/ 
water/infores_databases_cropwat.html). According to CROPWAT, the monthly average 
irrigation requirement for coconut in this region varied from 1106 litres/palm/month in 
December to 1488 litres/palm/month in April. The total irrigation requirement from 
December to May was estimated as 7807 litres/palm (Table 4). These values have provided 
guidance to coconut growers in the region on the general amount of irrigation water 
required to improve yield during average summer months. 
 
 
Month ETo (mm) Water requirement (mm)(ETo x 0.75) 
Irrigation requirement (1) 
(πr2h) 
December 3.79 2.84 1106 
January 3.95 2.96 1154 
February 4.56 3.42 1204 
March 5.01 3.76 1464 
April 5.26 3.95 1488 
May 4.76 3.57 1391 
Total   7807 
ETo-Reference evapotranspiration; 0.75-Crop coefficient; r-Radius of coconut basin in m2 
Table 4. Estimated irrigation requirements for coconut in the RARS, Pilicode location of Kerala. 
More detailed seasonal irrigation advice to coconut growers has been provided by field 
experiments in which coconut palms were either irrigated at a rate 450 litres/palm/week for 
differing periods between December and May, or irrigated according to a climatic water 
balance approach, or not irrigated (Table 5). Results showed that the yield improved in all the 
irrigated treatments when compared to that of pre-treatments yield or no irrigation, as a result 
of reduction in the duration of water stress. Irrigation applied as per the climatic water balance 
approach (T6) showed one of the largest percentage yield increases, indicating that the 
preferred irrigation treatment for coconut yield is as required during the whole summer. 
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Treatment 
Pre-treatment 
yield (1976-89)
(A) 
Post-treatment 
yield (1991-97)
(B) 
Difference in 
yield 
(A – B) 
% increase 
over pre-
treatment 
yield 
Whether 
significant 
over pre-
treatment yield 
T1 103 122 19 18.4 S 
T2 103 112 9 8.7 S 
T3 94 107 13 13.8 S 
T4 87 120 33 37.9 S 
T5 92 115 23 25.0 S 
T7 91 95 04 4.4 S 
T6 60 82 22 36.7 S 
T1- Irrigating the palms @450l/palm/week during December and January 
T2- Irrigating the palms @ 450l/palm/week from December to February 
T3 – Irrigating the palms @450l/palm/week from December to March 
T4 – Irrigating the palms @ 450l/palm/week from December to April 
T5 – Irrigating the palms @ 450l/palm/week from December to May 
T6 – Irrigating the palms as per climatic water balance procedure 
(150 l/palm/week in December, 200 l/palm/week in January, 300 l/palm/week in February, 
350 l/palm/week in March, 400 l/palm/week in April, 450 l/palm/week in May) 
Table 5. Duration of soil moisture stress on coconut yield of WCT. 
Agro climatic zonation: Based on climate variables such as precipitation and potential 
evapotranspiration, the agro climatic zonation can be delineated using the water balance 
techniques. Such agro-climatic zonation if delineated on crop wise, climatic risks can be 
mitigated to a considerable extent. In the case of cardamom across the Western Ghats, 
Zone I & II are superior when compared to that of Zone III, where climate risk is high in 
terms of high temperature, prolonged dry spells and less length of crop growing season 
(Fig. 9). Similarly, cashew can be extended from northern districts of Kerala to south of 
Maharastra along the West Coast and North of Tamil Nadu to Orissa along the East Coast 
and inland areas away from the Coast. However, tea mosquito bug incidence along the 
West Coast and cyclones along the East Coast are the constraints for obtaining better 
cashew production. Similarly, simulation models can very well be used to simulate 
production potential of various crops in a given watershed area through which the 
climate risk can be minimized with proper crop management practices. In addition, 
agroadvisory service based on weather forecasting will go a long way in sustenance of 
crop production. Another multidisciplinary project launched by the Government of India, 
that is FASAL, is a classical example to help in GIS based watershed planning in 
Agriculture as a part of climate risk management. 
Weather forewarning and dissemination: A reliable and clearly disseminated  
weather forecast is a very important tool for forewarning crop managers of potential 
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weather hazards. The India Meteorological Department is constantly working to improve 
forecast skill and help disseminate the forecast in a suitable form to aid farm level 
decisions.  
To improve dissemination of weather forecasts in a timely manner to agricultural villages, 
Village Resource Centres that are linked online to an Agro Advisory Service (AAS) have 
been established (under the ISRO programme) across the Kerala region. AAS’ base their 
advice on the latest weather forecasts and agricultural expertise. The economic impact of a 
weekly AAS based on medium range weather forecasting has been assessed for different 
crops and regions (Table 6). This showed that the percentage increase in yield varied from 
6.4 – 19 per cent depending upon the crop in the case of AAS farmers compared to the non-
AAS farmers. Furthermore, it indicated that seasonal crops need intensive advisory, 
followed by less intensive for biennials and perennials. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Agroclimatic zones of cardamom across the Western Ghats.  
Improving Climate Risk Management at Local Level –  
Techniques, Case Studies, Good Practices and Guidelines for World Meteorological Organization Members 511 
Season Crop Yield (t/ha) 
% increase over 
in yield over 
non-AAS 
farmers 
% increase 
in net return 
over non-
AAS 
farmers 
Rabi 2003-04 
Paddy 3.7 3.0 19.0 30.0 
Banana 31.8 27.9 12.2 11.5 
Coconut* 13460 11025 18.1 13.2 
Kharif 2004 
Paddy 2.8 2.6 7.1 31.6 
Banana 22.8 20.5 10.1 7.9 
Rabi 2004-05 
Paddy 3.0 2.7 7.5 34.1 
Banana 31.3 29.3 6.4 11.9 
Kharif 2005 
Paddy 2.7 2.5 6.5 38.5 
Banana 25.3 22.4 11.2 7.1 
Rabi 2005-06 
Paddy 3.3 2.9 13.6 36.0 
Banana 27.8 24.5 11.8 12.3 
Kharif 2006 
Paddy 2.8 2.5 9.0 29.4 
Banana 24.5 21.6 11.9 10.0 
Rabi 2006-07 Paddy 3.2 2.9 9.4 34.7 
* nuts/ha in the case of coconut 
Table 6. Impact of AAS on crop yields from 2003-04 to 2006-07. 
4.2.4. Lessons learned 
Adaptation strategies and awareness raising are particularly important for managing the 
risks posed by climate variability and change, not only on crops but also across all sectors 
that are sensitive to weather and climate. Various agroclimatic techniques have been used in 
the Kerala region of India to effectively manage some of the risks posed by climate to crop 
productivity. Expansion and further development of such techniques will be vital for the 
continued sustenance of agricultural production in humid tropical regions and particularly 
monsoonal regions. As pointed out by Prof. M.S. Swaminathan “India’s strength lies in its 
ability to manage monsoons” instead of saying ”Indian agriculture is a gamble of the 
monsoon”. 
4.3. CASE STUDY 3: Climate risk management through structural adjustment 
and regional relocation: A case of rice industry in Australia (S. Mushtaq, G. 
Cockfield, N. White, and G. Jakeman) 
Climate change poses significant challenges to the Australian agricultural sector due to 
likely increased climate variability and increased frequency of extreme events. Climate 
change projections suggest that the southern part of Australia will generally become drier, 
while there is a likelihood of increased rainfall and the frequency and intensity of extreme 
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events in parts of the north58. The possibility of climate change leading to less rainfall in 
southern mainland Australia, and as a result on-going water policy reforms, has triggered 
robust CRM strategies by agriculture sector, particularly in the rice industry. The success of 
any CRM strategy depends on risk management systems that reflect a more detailed 
understanding of the complexity inherent within human-environment interactions with 
more reliable future climate information and associated risks. This case study evaluates 
climate risks strategies employed by the rice industry in Australia. 
4.3.1. Climate risk management in rice industry: Challenges and opportunities  
The Australian rice industry has a relatively small number of producers, mostly within the 
Riverina (southern New South Wales), generating considerable export income. The rice 
industry and rice growers have adopted a risk-averse approach. CRM in the rice industry is 
based on a systematic process of managing climate and water availability risks to take 
advantage of opportunities to improve financial, economic, social and environmental 
systems. The rice processor has a global supply-chain that ensures continuous rice supplies. 
During years of low water availability, growers trade water and shift to low water intensive 
or dry land farming. This has resulted in highly variable domestic rice production. Water 
will probably become more expensive, less available and allocations will be less secure. The 
production capacity of the domestic rice industry will be significantly influenced by 
droughts and environmental water buy-backs. One strategy for Australian growers is to 
increase production in areas like the Burdekin (north Queensland) that have a sustainable 
water supply. 
4.3.2. Evaluating structural adjustment as a CRM in Rice Farming System  
Rice farmers are continually faced with pressures to adjust to changing environmental, 
climatic and economic conditions. Structural adjustments reflect the decisions by rice 
growers to adjust the size and farming operations to manage climate, environmental and 
economic risks59. The following sections provide empirical evidence of structural change in 
rice farming.  
Farm sizes, irrigated area and rice area: Rice farmers have greater flexibility in farm 
adjustment and structural change than dryland farmers. This allows them to reduce rice 
area and maintain farm income from dryland crops. It is hypothesised that increased water 
scarcity in the Riverina has resulted in an increase in farm size while total rice and irrigated 
area have reduced. Fig. 10 shows that water availability has a significant impact on rice 
production and irrigated area and that the total operated farm area is increasing 
significantly. The increase in farm area can be attributed to the decreasing number of farms 
and temporary and permanent water trading. 
Crop shifting: An assessment of the Riverina (Fig. 11) indicates that farmers are 
continuously adapting to climate variability and climate change by changing crop mixes and 
farm restructuring. Rice area per farm is generally declining and being replaced by winter 
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dryland wheat. Some farmers have adjusted their farming operation by shifting from rice to 
wheat along with a larger area of dryland wheat. The reduction in rice and the increase in 
wheat area will have an industry-wide impact, e.g. rice mills and storage depots were closed 
as a result of the lower level of rice supply during 2007-08. 
 
Figure 10. Area operated per farm, p=0.001, (left); rice area, p=0.003, and total irrigated area, p=0.01, 
(right) as a function of water availability and in Riverina, NSW, Australia; Source: ABARE Farm Survey. 
 
 
Figure 11. Wheat, p<0.001, and rice, p=0.01, production by area per farm as a function of water 
allocation in Riverina from 1992-2009, NSW, Australia; Source: ABARE Farm Survey. 
Water trading: Water movement to more efficient and higher value commodities results in a 
consolidation of farms without showing evidence of a corporate takeover of the industry60 
showed that water markets facilitate the process of farm adjustment and structural change 
within the irrigation industry. To maintain a liveable income during drought periods some 
farmers adjust their operations by temporarily trading water to other growers to take 
advantage of higher water prices. Fig. 12 shows the relationship of water trading to rice area 
in the Coleambally Irrigation Area (CIA), Riverina (NSW). However, over the last 5 years 
the CIA is trading-out water to satisfy the demand of high value crops such as rice. In some 
instances rice farmers have had to purchase temporary groundwater in order to satisfy 
forward contracts61.  
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Figure 12. Relationship of net water trading and rice area in the Coleambally Irrigation Area, Riverina, 
NSW, Australia, p<0.001; Source: Source: ABARE Farm Survey; Coleambally Irrigation, 2009 62 .  
Financial impact: The reductions in available water have significantly influenced farm 
business profit and overall family income (Fig. 13) and income is sustained through off-farm 
activities. During 2007-2008 (<10 per cent water allocation) overall average family income 
per farm and farm business profit was –$27,893 and –$109,536, respectively. Clearly, this is 
not sustainable in the long-run. Under the anticipated climate change considerable 
adjustment in terms of cropping pattern or off-farm activities will be required to sustain a 
reasonable family income. Alternatively, relocation of farms or some of the production 
could be an option. 
 
Figure 13. Relationship of water availability and farm business profit, p=0.003,and total family income, 
p=0.03, Riverina, NSW, Australia; Source: ABARE Farm Survey; Where: Farm business profit ($): Farm 
business profit equals farm cash income plus build-up in trading stocks, less depreciation expense, less 
the imputed value of the owner manager, partner(s) and family labour. Total family income ($): Family 
share of farm cash income less family share of depreciation plus all off- farm income of owner manager 
and spouse.  
4.3.3. CRM Potential from regional relocation  
A potential CRM strategy under climate change is to relocate rice production to regions with 
plenty of water such as the Burdekin. The CGE model was used to estimate the regional 
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economic impact of such strategy. The model compared the net impact of shifting rice 
production from Riverina to Burdekin on fallow sugarcane land, assuming with no 
competition and displacement of sugarcane land, under 2030 and 2070 future time periods. 
4.3.4. Economic impact regional relocation CRM strategy  
The macroeconomic impact of relocating rice production from the Riverina to the Burdekin 
is presented in terms of changes in real output and real income. Relocation also affects a 
range of other variables (notably employment) but these are not presented here.  
Table 7 summarises the projected changes in real output and real income for each region. 
The loss of water and consequent switching from rice to wheat is projected to reduce the real 
economic output and income of the Riverina. Using a 4 per cent real discount rate a 
cumulative decrease of –$915 million over the 59 years to 2069-70 has been estimated. The 
decrease in 2069-70 represents an average decrease in real economic output of around $550 
per person projected to be living in the Riverina at this time (295,000 people).  
As a result of rice relocation on fallow sugarcane land, real economic output increases in 
Burdekin. A cumulative increase of total of $759 million is projected over the 59 years to 
2069-70. The increase in 2069-70 represents an increase in real economic output of around 
$7,000 per person projected to be living in the Burdekin at this time (18,500 people). The net 
movement of labour is primarily between the Riverina and Burdekin with minimal net 
movement of labour to/from the Rest of Australia. Consequently it is projected that there 
will be minimal impacts (a cumulative total of –$211 million) on the Rest of Australia.  
 
 Real economic output ($m) Real income ($m) 
 2029-30 2069-70 
NPV (2010-11 
to 2069-70) 
2029-30 2069-70 NPV (2010-
11 to 2069-70) 
 2010-11 2010-11 2010-11 2010-11 2010-11 2010-11 
Southern Rice –45 –139 –915 –72 –161 –1,298 
Burdekin LGA 35 131 759 58 178 1,149 
Rest of 
Australia 
–1 –21 –54 6 –26 9 
Total Australia –11 –29 –211 –8 –9 –140 
Table 7. Cumulative change in real economic output and real income under scenario 1, relative to 
reference case for 2010-11. 
4.3.5. Lessons learned and implications for CRM  
With the expected reduction in water allocation, losses in rice production cannot be wholly 
offset by productivity gains given current production techniques and increasing 
temperatures and rainfall variability. The reduction in output will reduce net exports and 
have some impact on Gross Domestic Product (GDP), especially because of the extensive 
value-adding that occurs in Australia. Relocation to Burdekin is one potential risk 
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management option, but limited agronomic knowledge and uncertainty associated with the 
future climate and associated financial risk pose barriers to relocation. The displacement of 
an existing intensively-produced crop, such as sugar would result in a much larger net 
national loss, also meaning that there would be a net reduction in regional income and 
outputs. It is concluded that there is unlikely to be a rapid increase in rice production in the 
north without more reliable future climate assessment to build confidence for making 
informed relocation decisions, infrastructure support, and R&D and extension support to 
enhance rice productivity and better communication. 
4.4. CASE STUDY 4: Climate risk management and health: A call for user 
friendly climate information (Alexander von Hildebrand) 
Climate change poses significant threats to climate-sensitive health outcomes, for example, 
through increasing the risk of malnutrition due to reduced access to food, waterborne 
diseases resulting from flood- or drought-related contamination of food and water, and 
physical and psychological from trauma following more frequent and hasher extreme 
events.  
The appearance of infectious diseases in new geographical areas in response to warmer 
temperatures, increases in precipitation, and/or other climatologically-related changes, will 
increase the burden of  malaria and dengue, and the “combination of increasing vulnerability 
and risk of weather-related hazards are expected to result in more extreme events and disasters”63. 
Children, the elderly, the poor – and amongst them, women – are expected to suffer most. 
To assess the risks to human health posed by climate change and take appropriate actions to 
reduce their impacts, national health authorities need to know the current and potential 
future burden of climate-sensitive health outcomes, in order to adapt to the resulting 
demand for more and climate resilient health services. For this purpose, WHO has 
developed a Vulnerability and Adaptation Assessment Tool63. In order to implement it, user 
friendly climate and meteorological information is vital. This section will therefore discuss 
the importance and the urgent need for the availability of science-based climate and 
meteorological information as a pre-condition for managing climate risks to protect health 
from climate change. 
4.4.1. Role of CRM in health 
While the effects of climate on health are becoming better known, more needs to be done to 
achieve stronger engagement of the health sector and health professionals in climate-change 
action66. One key issue is managing uncertainty in climate and health sensitivity 
information, which poses significant problems for the health community in decision making 
processes. “Climate and meteorological information are a major component of climate adaptation. 
Tools and knowledge systems which clarify and reduce uncertainty about the climate sensitivity of 
diseases, will be essential inputs to disease control policies such as malaria elimination, as well as 
preventing health risks from extreme weather events and climate variability.”67. Therefore, to adapt 
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well to predicted changes of the climate system, “climate and meteorological information must 
be taken into greater consideration in health science, practice, and policymaking”66. To this end, the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) works with partners and collaborating Centres to 
develop tools, information resources, and dialogs which facilitate climate informed 
management of health risks. 
4.4.2. CRM in the World Health Organization 
“Each year, about 3.5 million people die from malnutrition, 2.2 million from diarrhoea, 800 000 from 
causes attributable to urban air pollution, and 60 000 in climate-related disasters, mostly in low 
resource settings and also frequently in humanitarian emergency situations. Climate change brings 
new challenges and costs to the control of infectious diseases as some are highly sensitive to 
temperature and rainfall, including cholera and the diarrhoeal diseases, as well as vector borne 
diseases including malaria, dengue and schistosomiasis. Climate change threatens to reverse the 
progress that the global public health community has been making against many diseases, and 
increase the challenges for the humanitarian community to respond to natural, biological and social 
emergencies.”64.  
It is clear that climate factors play an important role in the definition of some human 
diseases. For other diseases where climate is only considered as one of many determinants, 
WHO have stated that it is also important to understand the various causal pathways from 
climate change through to health outcomes, in order to identify opportunities to address the 
environmental determinants of poor health outcomes.  
WHO promotes “measures to reduce the health impacts from climate risks and associated climate 
change, such as strengthening public health systems based on partnerships with multi-sectoral actors, 
enhancing capacity of health systems to reduce risks and respond to public health emergencies, 
protecting hospitals and other health infrastructure from climate risks and effects of climate change, 
strengthening surveillance and control of infectious disease against climate risk, improving the use of 
early warning systems by the health secto and building public health interventions at local level to 
increase community resilience.”65. Climate information is needed and should be available in ways 
that users in each country can understand, especially at the local level. This would facilitate the 
development of, for example, “health action plans to enhance early warning and effective response 
over a range of time scales: from hours or days (for flood or heat wave warnings), to weeks (for seasonal 
epidemics of vector-borne disease), to months (seasonal forecasts of precipitation anomalies allowing 
planning for flooding or drought), to years (for drought and associated food insecurity).”63.  
4.4.3. The WHO’s Vulnerability and Adaptation Assessment Tool  
The Vulnerability and Adaptation Assessment Tool was developed by WHO to help 
manage climate risks to health (Fig. 14). It departs from gathering information on the extent 
and magnitude of current and future importance of climate dependent health outcomes, in 
order to identify policies and programmes that can prevent or reduce the severity of future 
health impacts.  
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A basic premise for the effective definition and, more importantly, implementation of a 
CRM process is to ensure the involvement and empowerment of the various stakeholders 
who will be responsible for implementing and assessing the results of the various actions to 
be undertaken is to establish an iterative process for monitoring and managing the health 
risks of climate change. Furthermore, to establish plans for communicating the CRM process 
“The credibility and legitimacy of the assessment results will be increased if stakeholders and the 
intended end-users have been informed of and included in discussions throughout.”63.  
 
Figure 14. WHO Vulnerability and adaptation assessment tool 
The three steps conducted in a particular assessment using the Vulnerability and 
Adaptation Assessment Tool will start with a description of the current burden of climate-
sensitive health outcomes and of the most vulnerable populations and region. It is important 
at this step to address the question: What factors other than weather and climate determine 
vulnerability of populations and health systems? The second step involves description of the 
current capacity of the health sector and other sectors to address these risks to climate-
sensitive health outcomes. The analysis of results from steps 1 and 2 will demonstrate gaps 
in the existing health system response. The third step tries to define how the burden of 
climate-sensitive health outcomes is likely to change over the coming decades, in order to 
asses the climate change vulnerabilities and their key drivers. This is done firstly 
irrespective of climate change, and then secondly taking into account the likely health 
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impacts of climate change, including the most vulnerable populations and regions, over the 
next decades and in the longer term. The analysis of results will help determine how well 
the health system is, or is not, prepared for example to changes in demand due to changes in 
the geographical distribution, and incidence or timing of climate-sensitive health outcomes. 
Gaps in health system response identified earlier, in steps 1 and 2, may be expanded upon 
during this step.  
The information provided from implementation of the Vulnerability and Adaptation 
Assessment Tool enables the appropriate health experts to define the nature of additional 
public health policies and programmes that will likely be needed for effective health 
management, in order to address possible additional burden of adverse health outcomes 
due to climate change, and to define what policies and programmes are needed in other 
sectors to protect health.  
Throughout the assessments, it is important to take into account that “Future vulnerabilities 
may be different from current vulnerabilities because of changes in public health and health-care 
policies, governance and institutions, socioeconomic development, availability of human and financial 
resources, and other factors. Impacts can change with both changing vulnerabilities and 
environmental changes. Public health policies, programmes and interventions to address 
vulnerabilities and impacts will need to be revisited regularly to ensure continuing effectiveness in a 
changing climate”63. 
4.4.4. The need to improve integration of baseline health and climate data for CRM 
To implement well the Vulnerability and Adaptation Assessment Tool climate and weather 
data resources are required that are appropriate for health sector applications. This 
information is key to enable adequate answers to be established for the following questions: 
 Which regions and populations in a country are the most vulnerable to climate and 
climate change?  
 What are the health risks posed by climate change over the next decades and the longer 
term?  
 How well is the health system prepared for changes in demand due to changes in the 
geographical distribution, incidence or timing of climate-sensitive health outcomes? 
To enable the analysis of relationships between current and past weather/climate conditions 
and health outcomes, relevant data is required both on health and climate. To date there 
have been only a few studies which have combined the most appropriate health and 
weather/climate data available, for example, from ministries of health and national 
meteorological and hydrological services, respectively. Improved integration of these data 
and the expertise that their host organizations provide would significantly improve the 
analyses necessary for CRM. 
The Vulnerability and Adaptation Assessment Tool invites the use of spatial mapping to 
describe the geographical distribution of current or projected future vulnerabilities and 
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hazards. “A geographical perspective and the use of geographical information systems (GIS) offer 
opportunities to show current distributions of, for example, vulnerable populations and the spatial 
relationship to disease vectors, river basins prone to flooding, health facilities, and other important 
variables of interest to public health officials”63. 
It is important to keep in mind the following caution when models are used to project the 
health risks of climate change. “Modeling can be a complex undertaking requiring highly technical 
expertise and specific data inputs that take time and effort to acquire. The capacity to design and run 
models to project health impacts can be developed through training courses and other mechanisms. A 
goal of the assessment could be to build research capacity and increase the availability of models to 
project health impacts in future studies”63. 
It is all about what happens locally. “Risk management works best when tailored to local 
circumstances. Combining local knowledge with additional scientific and technical expertise helps 
communities reduce their risk and adapt to climate change (robust evidence, high agreement)”63.  
The health impacts that may occur in a particular location will depend on the actual climate 
and climate changes experienced and the vulnerability of the community and region. 
Qualitative data may allow changes to be assessed over short time periods, but, it is clear 
that “Models are generally used to quantitatively estimate how the health risks of climate change 
could increase or decrease over time, particularly for longer time periods”70. Indeed, “models can 
explore the range of potential impacts of a changing climate in the context of other drivers of 
population health to better understand where, when and in what population groups’ negative health 
outcomes could occur.”63.  
For decision-makers, it is important to have certainty that their decisions are “climate-
proof”. The availability and use of locally specific climate and meteorological information 
relevant to health outcomes is vital for these decisions63. 
4.4.5. Examples of good practice in CRM for health 
WHO developed a Technical Document on Vulnerability and Adaptation Assessment Tool 
with input from over 20 countries that designed to provide basic and flexible guidance on 
conducting national or sub-national vulnerability and adaptation assessments. The 
document provides examples and references for users63. Some examples of practice 
provided in this document that would benefit from better access to climate information are 
the following: 
Exercise to plot climate-sensitive diseases in geographically defined 
populations: 
Motivated by concerns about health vulnerabilities related to climate change, a  
joint WHO/WMO/UNEP/UNDP workshop was conducted in the Hindu Kush–Himalaya 
regions66. Only crude estimates of the current burden of climate-sensitive diseases  
were available because of the lack of health surveillance data at the local level. Therefore, a 
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qualitative assessment was conducted as a first step to generate this information.  
Expert judgment was used to determine the extent to which climate-sensitive diseases could 
be a concern in populations in mountainous and non-mountainous regions of six countries 
(Table 8). 
Country Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan China Nepal India 
Heatwaves  M-P P - P P P 
Flood 
deaths/morbidity P P P P P P 
Glacial lake floods M-P - M-P M-P M-P M-P 
Flash floods M-P P M-P M-P M-P M-P 
Riverine floods  P P - P P P 
Vector-borne disease P P P P P P 
Malaria  P P P P M-P P 
Japanese encephalitis - P - P P P 
Kala-azar  P - - - P P 
Dengue – P P P – P  
Waterborne diseases M-P M-P M-P M-P M-P M-P 
Water scarcity, quality M-P P P M-P M-P M-P 
Drought-related food 
insecurity M-P P – M-P – M-P 
M-P health determinant or outcome occurs in mountainous and non-mountainous (i.e. plains) areas;  
P health determinant or outcome occurs only in non-mountainous areas;  
– health determinant or outcome is not present in the country (WHO/SEARO, 2006). 
Source: Kristie L. Ebi, Rosalie Woodruff, Alexander von Hildebrand and Carlos Corvalan (2007). Climate change-
related health impacts in the Hindu Kush-Himalayas. Ecohealth, 4:264–27067  
Table 8. Current climate-related health determinants and outcomes in the Hindu Kush–Himalaya 
regions  
Qualitative estimates of future health impacts of climate change using expert 
judgment: 
During the assessment of health risks and responses in the first Portuguese national 
assessment, a qualitative assessment was conducted of the possible impacts of climate 
change on vector-borne diseases, including malaria, West Nile virus, schistosomiasis, 
Mediterranean spotted fever and leishmaniasis; the latter two are endemic to Portugal.  
Although human cases of vector-borne diseases have generally decreased over recent 
decades, many competent vectors are still present in Portugal. Disease transmission risk was 
categorized qualitatively based on vector distribution and abundance and pathogen 
prevalence. Four brief storylines of plausible future conditions were constructed based on 
current climate and projected climate change, and assuming either the current distribution 
and prevalence of vectors and parasites, or the introduction of focal populations of parasite 
infected vectors. These storylines were discussed with experts to estimate transmission risk 
levels. For Mediterranean spotted fever, the risk of transmission was high under all 
 
Risk Management – Current Issues and Challenges 522 
storylines, suggesting that climate change is likely to have a limited impact. For the other 
diseases, the risk level varied across the storylines. For example, the risk of leishmaniasis 
varied from medium under current climate to high under both climate change storylines. 
The risk of schistosomiasis varied from very low (current climate and current vector 
distributions) to medium (climate change and focal introduction).68 
Climate and health observatory: Innovations in data sharing, communications 
and partnership building in Brazil, by Christovam Barcellos, FIOCRUZ Brazil: 
Given the complexity of processes that drive climate change impacts on human health, it is 
necessary to gather data from different institutions in order to understand monitor and 
project these outcomes. These data include not only climatic and human health variables but 
also trends in socio-demographic and environmental factors and institutional capacity. The 
experience of the Brazilian Climate and Health Observatory demonstrates how to bring 
multiple institutions and stakeholders together to support actions to decrease human health 
vulnerability to climate change. The observatory has the following functions: gathering 
available data on climate, environment, society and health; conducting situation analyses 
and identifying trends and patterns related to climate change impacts on health (e.g. semi-
qualitative graphs and maps); providing information to national alert systems and for 
monitoring health emergencies associated with extreme weather events; supporting 
research and development on climate and environmental changes and associated health 
impacts; promoting the active participation of civil society and citizens on issues related to 
climate change, environmental degradation and health impacts (e.g. news reports, 
commentaries, photographs). 
The observatory project is supported by the Brazilian Ministry of Health and PAHO and is 
coordinated by the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation. Through workshops, participants developed 
institutional agreements for sharing data and identified specific data formats, timescales and 
spatial resolution to be used at the observatory.  
Climate change and health impacts to be addressed first include direct impacts from 
heatwaves, floods and droughts; the expansion of vector-borne diseases; the vulnerability of 
water supply and sanitation systems, and the increasing risk of water-related diseases; and 
the interaction between climate change and impacts on air pollutants that increase the risks 
of respiratory diseases. 
City of Quito, Ecuador Climate change mitigation and adaptation plan: 
In 2012, the Municipal Council of the city of Quito, Ecuador developed a climate change 
mitigation and adaptation plan. It aims at reducing GHG emissions by 15 per cent relative to 
projected growth, and social environmental and economic climate vulnerability by 20 per 
cent. The plan will create innovative mechanisms for reducing the carbon footprint of the 
private sector. The municipal plan strengthens the generation and management of climate 
information and knowledge in close collaboration with the national climate institution, 
National Institute of Meteorology e Hydrology (INAHMI). Source: http://www. 
quitoambiente.gob.ec/home/noticia.php?idNoticia=108 
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Capacity building: Climate Information for Public Health: 
In collaboration with the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO), the International 
Research Institute for Climate and Society, in partnership with the Center for International 
Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) and the Mailman School of Public Health 
initiated a two-week course on Climate information for Public Health in 200869. It is held 
annually and “provides a balance of concepts and methods from the health and climate communities 
using an approach deeply oriented toward methodology, gathering and using evidence for decision-
making in order for the participants to get in-depth knowledge and skills in decision-making for 
health-care planning of climate sensitive diseases”70.  
The course helps participants to recognize the role climate plays in driving the infectious 
disease burden and public health outcomes, understand management and data integration 
as an opportunity to improve the decision making process in Public Health and realize the 
benefits and limitations of different climate and environmental data sources including 
remotely sensed data, meteorological data and climate predictions. 
4.4.6. Lessons learned and the way forward 
As pointed out by the United Nations Task Team on Social Dimensions of Climate Change,  
“Global and regional one-size-fits-all climate analysis may not reflect the reality of a particular 
community or country and can under- or over-emphasize risks relevant to certain communities. The 
outcomes of downscaling should be incorporated where relevant and feasible, and combined with 
complementary mappings that may include social impact assessments and vulnerability maps, in 
order to identify social climate-induced hotspots (places where particularly severe problems may need 
to be addressed) and their intersection with other kinds of vulnerabilities such as lack of access to 
preventive and curative health services, that can reduce health vulnerability to climate change”71.  
Health sectors in countries need to possess tools to conduct climate change vulnerability and 
adaptation assessments. “The goal remains to better understand how climate variability and 
climate change can and do affect health risks today and in the future, in order to better inform policies 
and programmes that can protect public health”70. However, once there is motivation for action, 
“decision makers need to know the magnitude of potential risks and identify a range of options 
(including their feasibility, benefits, acceptability, effectiveness and costs); the availability of resources 
and their distribution across the population; and the structure of critical institutions, including the 
allocation of decision-making authority”72.  
The call for the production, availability, delivery and application of locally specific, science-
based climate and meteorological information is a fundamental requirement for improving 
the application of CRM to address health risks. Integration of this information with 
appropriate health information and data will provide an opportunity, but also a challenge, 
to health authorities to demonstrate leadership within and outside the sector on mitigation 
and adaptation to climate change in order to protect health. 
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5. Conclusions and recommendations  
From global to local levels, public and private sector institutions are seeking the tools and 
knowledge for CRM (including capacity building and adaptation). People require climate 
information over wide ranges of time and space scales for planning and operational 
purposes. It is imperative, therefore, to ensure that they have the highest quality and widest 
possible range of products, information (including about uncertainties), and guidance on 
how the information can be used to provide optimal results and ensure appropriate 
decisions are made.  
Effective CRM must be founded on scientifically sound risk assessment techniques that 
develop understanding, and where possible, quantification of the risks associated with 
natural hazards, socio-economic vulnerabilities and their impacts. Climate risk assessment, 
in turn, requires quality assured historical, real-time and future-projected data on climate-
related hazards and socio-economic vulnerabilities, with reliable regional detail. Changing 
patterns of climate hazards make those data needs even more imperative. Understanding 
the challenges posed by climate change to longer-term strategic planning and investments 
(e.g. infrastructure planning and retrofitting based on building codes as a 100 year flood 
may become a 30 year flood), would help providers frame future products and services, and 
users build resilience to future as well as current climate. To be effective, processes adopted 
for CRM must be perceived by individuals, communities and governments as providing real 
possibilities of improving their living standards through awareness, adaptation, prevention 
and increased resilience to climate impacts. If authorities set up sustainable, coherent and 
participative CRM plans that are ‘owned’ at local level, these will provide strong 
foundations for the development of successful adaptation strategies. 
5.1. Common constraints to Climate Risk Management 
A number of constraints limiting the use of climate information for decision-making by 
sectors have been discussed throughout this chapter. Some of the most common constraints 
to be addressed before implementation of sustainable CRM systems are: 
 Limited national capabilities for climate data processing, analysis, modeling and the 
generation of information and forecast services including sectoral applications in 
strategic sectors such as agriculture, health, water resources and others. 
 Lack of capacity to communicate information between NMHS and national agencies 
and authorities. 
 Limited capability of governmental institutions and sectoral institutions to identify their 
climate information requirements. 
 Limited coordination between local institutions and agencies. 
 Weak or non-existent planning of the investment budget for actions aimed at 
prevention of and preparedness for national disasters at the level of national and 
subnational governments. 
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 Weak or non-existent accountability system for encouraging and mandating use of 
available scientific information for appropriate risk reduction measures.  
 Limited involvement of the private sector to engage with stakeholders in the 
development of risk management measures. 
 Limited knowledge of climate and limited training in application and use of climate 
information and products by users in many sectors; 
 Problems in identifying threats to carry out works on risk reduction because of limited 
use of the necessary tools for assessment. 
 Limited synergy among national institutions to share climate and climate-relevant 
information at national level. 
 The absence of an efficient communication system on extreme climate events to 
disseminate information such as warnings and advisories. 
 Overly technical language in some climate information and products, making them 
difficult to understand by lay people. 
 The lack of a culture of prevention of damage and proper maintenance, supported by 
finances, for the vulnerable physical and social infrastructure. 
Even though climate scientific knowledge and probability modelling have advanced 
significantly over the last few past decades, especially with respect to the understanding of 
climate variability and change, the level of uncertainty inherent in probabilistic climate 
products has tended to make their communication by scientists for integration and 
understanding by users of the information more challenging. While the scientific 
community regards uncertainty as an inherent property of the climate system, which can be 
assessed through probability analysis, decision makers may consider uncertainty as a 
barrier to decision making, especially when other socio-economic and political variables also 
need to be considered. The result is a complex and confused integration situation among 
actors which requires careful communication to ensure the complex information is 
understood by all and appropriate decisions are made. To overcome this limitation, it is 
recommended that the climate scientific and stakeholder communities create an agenda 
sustained by the transfer of requirements, knowledge, tools and instruments allowing the 
formation of a community of practitioners with analytical skills and sharing basic 
agreements for action. To improve disaster and climate risk governance, it is proposed that 
decision-makers should also assume responsibilities concerning the understanding of risks 
within their sectors and regions, and consider the need to integrate DRR management and 
CRM using the wide range of currently available instruments and development 
mechanisms. 
The role of the NMHS is decisive within the national efforts to cope with the opportunities and 
impacts of climate variability and change and to encourage effective CRM. The activities of 
NMHS regarding climate observations, data management, analysis maintaining a ‘climate 
watch’ and forecasting are strictly necessary to estimate the “near climate change”, estimate 
indexes and provide local trends to be applied for risk management and development of 
adaptation plans. The nature of climate risks, including climate change implies accurate 
monitoring efforts under a rigorous methodology and standards that only NMHSs can 
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provide in a sustainable way. The current efforts of NMHSs in weather and climate forecasts, 
the analysis of extremes and other prediction services are valuable for CRM and consequently 
a solid basis to work on climate change estimations at local level where global projections are 
not necessary applicable. To encourage communities to engage with such climate services and 
to enhance the relationship with the vulnerable local populations, a number of 
recommendations, that will underpin a “new business model” for conducting effective CRM at 
local levels, are proposed for the operations of the NMHSs of the WMO. 
5.2. Recommendations for NMHSs for improving CRM at local level 
For improving CRM at local levels, it is recommended that NMHSs: 
1. Focus on users, and enhance collaborations with CRM communities in order to assess 
their needs and address these through provision of high quality and opportune climate 
services, including through organizing or participating in both face-to-face and on-line 
Regional and National Climate Outlook Forums which offer direct interaction with 
users including sectors and the media, and participate in capacity development of users 
through training in climate matters, adaptation and in the use of climate products. 
2. Tailor climate products for CRM end users, including planning departments, local 
authorities, government agencies involved in environment and risk management, based 
on their requirements. 
3. Monitor the climate and its evolution, conduct Climate Watch programmes, develop 
regular information for users on the past and current states of the climate, and couple 
these with reliable, user-friendly predictions for upcoming seasons, as part of a climate 
services culture. 
4. Build and sustain observing networks to provide the data needed for a range of climate 
services for CRM; conduct data rescue exercises to enhance digital climate databases. 
5. Promote training and development of their meteorological staff in diverse aspects of 
climatology and climate services and in CRM. 
6. Enhance climate research, development of climate indexes and other analysis, within 
their operational activities. 
7. Combine climate products with other geospatial information related to vulnerability 
derived from other institutions for development of more decision-ready, actionable 
products (this will require strategic alliances, in “win–win” relationships with co-benefits. 
8. Enhance the liaison with local communities, communitarian networks and local media 
for efficient dissemination of tailored products applicable for CRM.  
9. Seek and act on user’s feedback for product evolution and improvement. 
5.3. Moving forward with GFCS 
As previously noted, the WMO, along with partnering organizations and with the support 
of Member countries, has embarked on a new era for climate services, with the decision to 
implement the Global Framework for Climate Services (GFCS). This decision was reached in 
the full understanding that GFCS success will require strengthening of observations and 
monitoring, research, modeling and prediction, the Climate Services Information System 
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(the operational ‘engine’ of the GFCS which includes the NMHSs of WMO’s 189 Member 
countries), and much improved interaction with users. A great deal of capacity development 
will be required to ensure the capability of climate providers to deliver quality information 
and the ability of the users to take up and apply the information. Indeed, in many places this 
is already underway, such as the provision of climate services in developing countries via 
the Regional Climate Outlook Forum supported by the WMO Climate Information and 
Prediction Services (CLIPS) project (Semazzi, 2011)73.  
The curent effort of the CCl Task Team on CRM, which has provided the motivation for this 
chapter, marks the beginning of a new collaboration on CRM. As the GFCS is implemented 
and improves over time, much will be learned, and the concept of CRM, inter alia, will be 
tested and evolve, particularly with the cooperation of the organizations affiliating 
themselves with the GFCS. We hope this chapter provides techniques, case studies, good 
practices and guidelines that will be useful for this endeavour. 
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1. Introduction 
The Observatorio Latinoamericano de Eventos Extraordinarios (OLE2), or Latin American 
Observatory, is a regional collaborative network that, in addition to the existing 
infrastructure in each country, aims to ultimately increase the efficiency of the decision-
making processes, especially in terms of getting more accurate environmental information 
and exchanging experiences on data, methodologies and scientific products, all of which are 
done with a standardized methodology and a Web-sharing service.  
Present partners of this collaboration are national weather services, universities and research 
institutes of Central America, the Andean countries and from Southeast South America (see 
Figure 1). Nowadays, the Centro de Modelado Científico (CMC) of Universidad del Zulia, 
the founder of the initiative, regionally coordinates the OLE2. The coordinating role 
involves, among other tasks, the suggestion of (a) methodologies for the provision of 
scientifically based tools and products, (b) mechanisms for the successful use of the 
environmental information in the policy making process at the different levels (e.g. national 
and province governments, private sector), (c) facilitation of continuous and effective 
communication of the different partners and (d) the interchange of experiences and 
products (by means of the Observatory’s products web interface1, wiki page2, forum3 and 
email list4). For more information see references [1] and [2]. 
                                                                 
1 http://ole2.org 
2 http://mediawiki.cmc.org.ve 
3 http://laft.cmc.luz.edu.ve:8080/foro_ole2 
4 ole2@cmc.org.ve 
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The goal of the OLE2 is to monitor and forecast key environmental variables and develop 
accurate products based on different scientific tools in order to help decision makers 
improve risk management and set up efficient early warning systems. The Observatory 
provides several model outputs for meteorological, seasonal, and hydrological forecasts, 5-
day high-resolution oceanographic prediction for the eastern Pacific, droughts, fire and 
flood indices, ecosystem dynamics (like duckweed/algae occurrence in Lake Maracaibo), 
and climate and health applications (e.g., regarding malaria), among others. 
The Observatory is organized in interconnected working groups (WGs) or axes: namely, 
meteorology; climatology; hydrology; air quality; climate and health; and climate change 
and variability. Each WG has its own methodologies and products, but all of them exchange 
information and results with other axes and countries if necessary. It is also regionally 
divided in three branches: the Observatorio Andino, Observatorio Centroamericano and 
Observatorio del Sudeste de Sudamérica (Andean, Central American and the South Eastern 
South America Observatories). They operate using the infrastructure already in existence in 
the different regions by consolidating the collaboration networks through the recognition of 
common needs and the provision of interdependent solutions. The final products, be it a 
seasonal forecast or an early warning system for the last-mile user, is built between different 
partners by sharing their experiences and expertise on different fields. This has created a 
strong identification between the participating institutions and the Observatory’s products. 
This fact and the continuous need of collaboration to provide regionally successful decision-
making tools on time, have proven a natural way to guarantee the sustainability of the 
initiative, originated in 2007 in Venezuela as a national observatory.  
Advances and difficulties are shared and discussed through e-mail lists and 
videoconferences. The purpose of the videoconferences is to discuss the ongoing projects, 
products, and new methodologies, and to provide special assistance on models and several 
other technical issues.  
The Observatory has also provided a Grid Technology Infrastructure since 2010, known as 
AndesGrid [3] to help institutions with less computational power to increase their 
capabilities using other institutions’ available computer resources. The initiative enables the 
partners to share not only model outputs and, but also their local observations (e.g. rain 
gauge and temperatures) in “real time”. For additional details, see [3]. 
Of the OLE2’s main achievements in this period, the most important is the enhancement of 
the institutions’ human resources by means of continuous technical support for forecast, 
modeling, verification, risk assessment and management and many other issues, all of 
which is done in their native language. The project has also succeeded in standardizing 
forecasts, data formats, and methodologies, providing common models, tools, and 
procedures that are used on a daily basis in all the involved institutions. A key tool has been 
the wiki, which contains all of the needed steps for each task, which by itself is another of 
the most important elements for ensuring the long-term continuity of the OLE2. 
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Figure 1. The Observatorio Latinoamericano’s partners (as January 2012) are mainly national weather 
services, universities and research and development institutes. (The red line links the countries 
participating in the AndesGrid iniciative [3]. See main text). 
Among the different efforts, risk assessment and management are some of the most 
important tasks targeted by the Latin American Observatory partners. Even when a general 
framework is used by the OLE2 on this field, the different institutions develop tailored 
applications to take advantage of the local experience and mechanisms already in existence 
in their countries. However, the general framework closely follows the ideas discussed by 
Mora [4]. 
Risk management is from a wide perspective, a policy system that, among its components, 
permits stakeholders in several levels, to identify, analyze and quantify the probability of 
human, material and ecosystem losses, as well as to provide metrics and technical criteria 
for prevention, mitigation, reduction or transfer of risk [4]. A key idea to be still implemented 
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in most parts of the world is that risk management needs to be understood and addressed as 
an investment, not as a cost. [4] It is clear that nowadays the establishment of efficient risk 
reduction plans does not possess a real priority on the agenda of decision-makers and 
stakeholders, except a posteriori. This is especially true in most parts of Latin America, as is 
exposed in some case studies included in this chapter. Moreover, in general, there are no 
consolidated cultures incorporating risk management throughout decision-making 
processes for public and private investment and planning (see [4] and references therein). 
Also, private sector involvement in this process presents several unique challenges to be 
overcome [5].  
Since 1975 in Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC), the costs of losses attributable to 
major natural hazards have been estimated at around US$300 billion, with more than 
280,000 human deaths and affecting more than 160 million people [6-8]. Table 1 references 
the major natural disasters in LAC in the last three decades. 
 
Year Hazard/Event Countries 
1983 Floods Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru 
1983 Earthquake Chile, Colombia 
1985 Earthquake Mexico 
1998 Floods, landslides associated to 
hurricanes George and Mitch 
Central America and the Caribbean 
1999 Floods and landslides Venezuela (Vargas State) 
2005 Most active hurricane season 
recorded in history [8] 
Central America and the Caribbean 
2009 Drought (strong El Niño event) Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador 
2010 Earthquake Chile 
2010, 
2011 
Floods (strong La Niña event) Panama, Colombia and Venezuela 
Table 1. Major natural disasters in LAC between 1983 and 2011 [6-8]. 
Consequently, it has been an urgent need for the Latin American Observatory’s partners to 
address the establishment of effective policies for risk assessment and management in their 
respective countries. To this end, an implementation plan was suggested by CMC and this 
chapter presents briefly the adopted definitions and general ideas (sections 2-4), as well as 
case studies for different managerial sectors in Latin America (section 5) in order to discuss 
in some detail, present risk assessment/management policies and methodologies. Finally, we 
discuss the benefits of sharing experiences among different countries to address common 
problems in geographically complex regions, as well as how to achieve success in countries 
where the scarcity of economic and trained human resources imposes serious limitations on 
the effectiveness of risk management systems. 
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2. Risk definition and management 
In this and the next section the main definitions related to risk management, hazards and 
vulnerabilities are discussed in order to provide the foundations chosen by the Observatory 
in these matters. We don’t pretend to address all the details in this complex field, but to 
outline the main ideas for future reference. 
Different agents play a role in the occurrence of natural hazards, which derive from the 
damaging potential or a combination of them. These agents are frequently [4,6] classified in 
terms of their origin, namely 
 hydro-meteorology: both global and local processes (hurricanes, floods/droughts, 
weather extreme events) 
 internal geodynamics (seismicity and volcanism) 
 external geodynamics (landslides, intensive erosion, torrential debris flows). 
Following Mora [4], natural hazards (H) can be formally defined in terms of the probability 
that an event becomes so intense (a) within time and space frames that it produces 
significant damage (d). The intensity and damage definitions depend on the region and 
timescale under consideration. Vulnerability (V) can be associated with the probability that, 
according to the intensity of the natural event, damage might occur as a function of the 
degrees of exposure and fragility of the elements involved. Risk (R) therefore is the 
combined probability (convolution, *) that a hazard might cause significant damage, 
according to the following relationship: 
 
,
( ) ( ) * ( )
h d h d
p R da p H da p V da    (1) 
The probabilities are not, in general, constant, so the spatial and temporal variability must 
always be carefully considered. Moreover, V and H are not independent.  
Risk management involves not only the quantification of the probability of loss via equation 
(1) and the derived secondary effects, but also the generation and execution of policies for [4] 
 identification, analysis and quantification of risk 
 formulation and application of measures of prevention, reduction and mitigation of 
causes 
 financial, social and environmental protection 
 execution of related protocols (e.g. preparedness, response, rehabilitation, reconstruction). 
Efforts to foster these processes may include the establishment of adequate policies and 
protocols to incorporate stakeholders into risk management, improvement of the 
climate/geodynamic information available, identification of the different sources of 
vulnerability and their evolution in time, definition of “acceptable” risk levels and the 
establishment of early warning and monitor systems, and the adequate ways to 
communicate their products to the end-mile users. 
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Risk management policies foster and integrate strategically balanced processes capable of 
providing decision-making tools in a synergistic, decentralized and participative way. In the 
OLE2 this is a central philosophy, which also enables the treatment of risk in trans-boundary 
zones (e.g. the Observatory enabled the continuous exchange of climate services between 
the National Weather Services and decision makers during the 2010 floods that affected 
Panama, Colombia and Venezuela in similar ways).  
An important aspect of risk management is related to operative platforms that enable 
decision makers and users to interact and to obtain information useful to assess 
vulnerabilities, the impact of natural hazards and the risk probabilities for a certain region. 
This infrastructure is aimed at providing this kind of information ex ante, but it can also be 
used during or after an emergency. It usually includes  
 macro- and micro-zoning of hazards and vulnerability and its probable evolution in 
time (see section 4)  
 damage assessment 
 identification of priority areas of intervention 
 protocols for vulnerability reduction (hazards are not, in general, reducible)  
 instruments for financial strategy and budgetary allocations 
 identification of “risk bearers” and their responsibilities 
 administrative and legal information (e.g. design, operation, lease, transfer and 
reclamation contracts) 
 information on past events 
 areas of further investments to reduce future disasters. 
The implementation of these platforms in LAC is more advanced in a few countries (see 
section 5.1 for a Central American example). The Observatory’s partners are taking 
advantage of the experience developed by other members of the regional initiative to 
improve their own risk management infrastructure.  
Finally, but no less importantly, the Observatory is now committed to following the 
International Research Institute on Climate and Society’s (IRI) Four Pillars for Climate Risk 
Management [31], namely  
1. Identify vulnerabilities and potential opportunities due to climate variability/change 
for a given water, agriculture, or health system.  
2. Quantify uncertainties in "climate information" in order to reduce uncertainties in 
using that information.  
3. Identify technologies and practices that optimize results in normal or favorable years 
as well as technologies and practices that reduce vulnerabilities. 
4. Identify interventions, institutional arrangements and best practices that reduce 
exposure to climate vulnerabilities and enable the opportunistic exploitation of 
favorable climate conditions.  
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Figure 2. Benefit/cost (B/C) ratio defined as a function of damage expected without risk management 
(D), reduced by applying risk management (DRM) and the investment involved (IRM). (After Mora [4]) 
3. Benefits of risk management 
It is possible to use risk management as a tool for providing an idea of the economic value of 
potential damages caused by hazards and the actions undertaken to reduce vulnerabilities. 
Figure 2 sketches an accumulating damage curve D without risk management. If risk 
management policies are used, this same curve is reduced to a more optimistic distribution, 
DRM. The reduction of damage due to risk management is then  
 RMRD D D   (2) 
The associated investment (IRM) for such a reduction depends on both the hazard and 
vulnerability involved (which, again, are not independent). On the other hand, the 
Benefit/Cost (B/C) ratio allows for the finding of optimal levels of investment. It’s possible to 
show [4] that the net benefit of risk management is 
 ( )RM RM RMB D D I    (3) 
and the Benefit/Cost ratio can be defined as 
 / 1RM
RM
D DB C I
   (4) 
Having real distributions of the different quantities it might be possible to select optimal 
points (e.g. the saddle point named B/COPT in Figure 2) to limit profitable investments. See 
[4] and [6] for details. 
4. A Multi-scale approach for risk management 
The traditional approach to computing risk probabilities using equation (1) involves the 
consideration of static or, in the best-case scenario, long-term mean vulnerability maps of 
 
Risk Management – Current Issues and Challenges 540 
the associated hazards. Nonetheless, the probability density function associated with 
hazards in equation (1) is frequently computed from time series that may contain useful 
information at different time scales. Given the fact that a decision maker might be interested 
in a certain time scale (e.g. on the order of its own managerial period), a temporal 
decomposition of the original time series used to identify the hazard probability may be 
extremely helpful.  
For example, Figure 3 presents such time-scale decomposition for Southeast South America’s 
precipitation. The lower panels sketch the non-linear long-term trend (a proxy for climate 
change), and decadal and interannual variability time series [9]. The rationale is that in 
considering the interaction of the three climate signals (the explained variance being a way to 
ponder the specific weight of each one of them) it is possible to provide better climate services 
to decision-makers, that are more adequate for their scale of interest, e.g. next 10 years.  
 
Figure 3. Decomposition for Southeast South America’s precipitation (boxed region) for three different 
time scales: long-term trend (left panel), decadal variability (central panel) and interannual variability 
(right panel), with their respective explained variance (colors in the map and values in the bottom 
corner of each time series). Grid boxes in white are not statistically significant at a p-level=0.95. (After 
Goddard et al. [9]) 
As mentioned before, hazards and vulnerabilities are not independent. The latter 
encompasses exposure to hazards, sensitivity to these hazards and adaptive capacity. All of 
them, in fact, evolve in time. Therefore, a similar multi-scale time decomposition must also 
be done to correctly assess the related vulnerabilities. This provides a more realistic risk 
probability distribution, and thus better assessments and policies can be developed.  
 
Risk Management at the Latin American Observatory 541 
5. Cases of study 
In this section a few state-of-the-art examples of risk assessment and management in several 
countries in Latin America are briefly described. Signatory and participant institutions of 
the Latin American Observatory operate over these structures, providing tailored 
methodologies based on what has been explained in previous sections.  
5.1. Seasonal Climate outlooks applications for food security decision-making in 
Central America 
In Central America, seasonal climate outlooks turn into risk scenarios used by food-related 
sectors to help support their decisions and prevent food insecurity. This is a coordinated 
effort with specialized entities of the Central American Integration System. 
The Central American Climate Outlook Forum (CA-COF), coordinated by the Comité 
Regional de Recursos Hidráulicos (CRRH-SICA)5 (Regional Water Resources Committee), 
has consolidated a process to issue three seasonal outlooks per year, bringing together the 
capacities of all seven weather services in the region. The CA-COF takes advantage of 
international and global sources of information, which it analyzes along with its own 
sources and historical data to produce Climate Outlooks for the Central American region. 
Over the last decade the Forum has issued 38 regional climate outlooks.  
To facilitate the use of climate risk information for decision-making with the aim of reducing 
food insecurity risks, CRRH-SICA has fostered a mechanism over the past few years that 
turns the Outlook into risk scenarios for those sectors related to nutrition and food security, 
particularly agriculture, fisheries, potable water and public health, as well as cross-cutting 
areas like risk management and emergency response. These scenarios are used when 
deciding preventive measures to mitigate the impact of climate variability on food security.  
In a joint effort between the specialized agencies of the Central American Integration System 
(SICA) and the Regional Food Security Program (PRESANCA II) funded by the European 
Union, immediately after an Outlook is issued, a group of regional experts is convened to 
enhance the Outlook with information from the different sectors mentioned above, turning 
the product into sectoral climate risk scenarios that could guide early warnings of actual and 
potential hazards to food security. 
The working group, composed of CA-COF members and the experts, uses these scenarios to 
identify sector-specific preventive measures. The food security risk scenarios and the 
suggested measures are circulated among government entities and other organizations 
involved in addressing food and nutritional security through their own networks to ensure 
all this information reaches the most appropriate decision makers. 
                                                                 
5 CRRH is the technical Secretariat of the Central America Integration System, responsible for the coordination of 
activities related to weather forecast, climate, water resources and climate change assessments with Belize, Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panamá.  
 
Risk Management – Current Issues and Challenges 542 
This same method is used at the national level to produce specific recommendations for 
diverse sectors in each individual country. Those are then distributed among national 
authorities and stakeholders in private sector with the seasonal outlook map and lists of 
suggested prevention measures.  An example of the matrix of climate risk for agriculture is 
presented in Table 2. 
As part of the same, routine-specific measures are identified at a national level by similar 
working groups of climatologists and national experts, and suggested to authorities.  
A process is now underway to evaluate the use of outlooks and climate risk information 
directly with the beneficiaries, both for the private and the public sectors, to strengthen 
decision-making efforts.  
 
Climate Risk /potential damages for Main Crops. Quarter December 2011 -March 2012 
Crop Country 
  Belice Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Panama 
Maize Plantations in 
coastal areas 
likely to be 
affected by 
above-normal 
preci-pitation 
No risk  No risk  Risk of post-
harvest 
damages 
due to 
higher 
humidity 
associated 
with above-
normal 
rainfall. 
Increased 
cost of post-
crop 
product 
manage-
ment 
Risk in the 
Cari-bbean 
planting 
area due to 
above-
normal 
rainfall. 
Second 
planting 
season 
likely to be 
affected 
Second 
crop in the 
Atlantic 
Autonomo
us Regions 
likely to be 
affected by 
above-
normal 
rainfall. 
Exportation
s likely to 
be 
impacted 
Crop loss 
risk in 
Western 
Cari-bbean 
area. 
Posible 
impacts in 
food 
security of 
indi-genous 
population. 
Beans Plantations in 
coastal area 
likely to be 
affected by 
above-normal 
precipitation 
Risk  of 
crop 
damage for 
plantations 
in Northern 
Plains, 
Cari-bbean 
area and 
South 
Pacific  
No risk No risk Risk in the 
Cari-bbean 
planting 
area due to 
above-
normal 
rainfall. 
Second 
planting 
season 
likely to be 
affected 
Second 
crop in the 
Atlantic 
Autonomo
us Regions 
likely to be 
affected by 
above-
normal 
rainfall. 
Yield 
reduction 
may reach 
15% .  
Loss of crop 
risk in 
Western 
Caribbean 
area. 
Posible 
impacts on 
food 
security of 
indigenous 
popu-
lation. 
Table 2. Central American Climate Outlook Forum risk assessment for two crops (maize and beans), 
for December 2011-February 2012.  
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5.2. A flood early warning system for Vargas, Venezuela  
In Venezuela, heavy rains represent a significant problem for human populations, not only 
in rural areas where farms and crops are affected, but also in some urban settings where 
many inhabitants reside in poorly-constructed houses that are highly vulnerable to floods 
and landslides, or that are sometimes located on steep terrains and floodplains.  
 
Figure 4. Aerial view of Caraballeda, Vargas state (Venezuela), after mudslides and debris flows event 
on December 15 1999. 
On December 15, 1999, on the northern coast of Venezuela, torrential rains led to flash 
floods and debris flows that killed tens of thousands of people, destroyed thousands of 
households, and meant the complete collapse of the area's infrastructure (see Figure 4). The 
“Vargas disaster”, as it has been known ever since,, is considered the worst natural disaster 
in Venezuela’s last half century (Table 1). Even though flood prediction is an essential piece 
of Climate Risk Management, Venezuela did not have, at the time, a consolidated early 
warning system that could alert decision-makers and stakeholders about this extreme event. 
In this section, the implementation of an early warning flood system for Vargas state is 
described in some detail. It is a completely general methodology, so other regions in LAC 
can benefit from the experience described here. 
The Vargas disaster is also an important case study on flood prediction, not only because of 
its unusual rainfall amounts, but also for the nature of the terrain where it took place. The 
basin is located in a mountainous region of metamorphic rock, coarse soils and steep slopes, 
making the area highly vulnerable to floods and debris flows [10].  
The early warning system involves the estimation of vulnerabilities and probabilities related 
to heavy precipitations and mudslides. Guenni et al. [11] has computed the vulnerabilities 
using the total affected and exposed people, considering both the spatial and temporal 
variability, as discussed in section 4. As an example, Figure 5 presents a zoom-in for most 
parts of Venezuela showing months of rainfall exposure in colors and the population 
density as black pixels (for details see [11]). Regions near the Venezuelan coast are in general 
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more vulnerable (due to more population density and exposure). Using map algebra in a 
Geographical Information System (GIS), the map is then intersected with other maps 
containing information about the terrain (e.g. water holding capacity or mudslide 
probabilities). Following equation (1), the final map, in sketching homogeneous 
vulnerability zones, must be written in terms of probabilities for different hazard intensities.  
 
Figure 5. Map of exposition (in colors) and population density (pixels in black) for Venezuela. After 
Guenni et al. [11] 
On the other hand, in order to compute flood risk probabilities, hazard probability maps 
must be produced (also in terms of intensities). In this case, Torres and Muñoz [12,13] have 
suggested a methodology based on hindcasts involving an off-line coupling of a regional 
climate model, a process-based hydrological model and a routing model.  
The Climate Weather Research and Forecasting model (CWRF) was used to simulate 13 
years (1996-2008) of data, paying special attention to the Vargas disaster atmospheric 
conditions. Rainfall and maximum and minimum temperatures were bias corrected using 
observed values. Then they were used as input data along with soil properties and 
vegetation parameters for the Variable Infiltration Capacity model (VIC). This energy and 
mass balance model was finally coupled to the Lohmann routing model to produce realistic 
stream flows that adequately considered the local topography (for details about the different 
models and procedures see [2,12,13] and references therein). Simulation outputs were 
consistent with the flooding event of December 1999. The study was able to reproduce how 
long rains, along with low evapo-transpiration due to high cloudiness, contributed to 
saturate soil layers. Moreover, the study was able to identify critical values (see Figure 6) in 
order to establish “yellow” and “red” alerts in the Vargas flood early warning system, using 
the statistics obtained for the 13 years simulation and local stream flow data provided by the 
National Weather Service. Model outputs were then used to create hazard probability maps 
in terms of hazard intensity. 
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Figure 6. Caraballeda’s simulated runoff time series for the Vargas disaster event using CWRF, VIC 
and the Lohman routing model (see main text). The runoff has been normalized using the standard 
deviation. The critical day (December 19, 1999) corresponds to simulation day 62 in this plot. The 
yellow and red lines at 2 and 2.3, respectively, were defined as the “yellow” and “red” alerts in the 
designed early warning system. (After Torres and Muñoz [12,13]) 
As a final result,  series of maps are provided with the hazard’s probability of occurrence in 
terms of the hazard intensity. They are produced computing the convolution between the 
corresponding hazard and vulnerability maps, following equation (1). For additional details 
see [12,13]. 
This probabilistic approach has an important advantage: it takes into consideration the 
possible uncertainties related to each one of the processes involved in the final flood risk 
probability map.  
5.3. Bridging the gap between climate information and health services in 
Colombia and Ecuador  
Climatic factors play a significant role in the transmission dynamics of several infectious 
diseases [14]. Therefore it should be a critical priority to incorporate climate information into 
disease risk assessments and early warning and response systems. (See figure 7.) This, in 
fact, has been one of the goals of the Colombian and Ecuadorian meteorological and health 
services in recent years. In Colombia, in particular, the National Institute of Health (INS) 
recently teamed up with the Institute of Hydrology, Meteorology and Environmental 
Studies (IDEAM) and several universities and research centers to design and implement a 
proactive, collaborative, multidisciplinary, Integrated Surveillance and Control System – 
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ISCS [15,16]. This initiative is part of a set of measures and policy options that the 
Colombian adaptation strategy to climate change proposed for three areas of primary 
concern: the high-altitude Andean ecosystems, the insular and coastal areas, and human 
health (see Integrated National Adaptation Pilot [16]). 
 
Figure 7. Climate information and human health integrated surveillance and control systems. 
The aim of the adaptation strategy for the health sector is to have a better-prepared 
institutional arrangement for increased exposure to malaria and dengue fever, two climate-
sensitive, vector-borne diseases that are still considered human health burdens in Colombia 
[17]. According to the scientific literature, the potential increase in the incidence of these two 
diseases is likely to occur not only in the already endemic malaria and dengue fever prone 
areas, but also on the fringes with the Andean regions where local communities have not 
been exposed to pathogens before. Thus they lack the immunity against these 
microorganisms. The approach has been to assist the health sector to better cope with 
current climate variability and climate-related events, as a means to make it better prepared 
against future climatic conditions likely to be brought by the ongoing long-term global 
climate change. As a result, Colombia has been working on reducing people’s vulnerabilities 
to the negative impacts of malaria and dengue outbreaks, as well as developing an Early 
Warning System framework, supported by seasonal forecasting capabilities, weather and 
environmental monitoring, and statistical and dynamic models [18-23]. 
This effort required linking what had previously been two largely separate analytical 
domains: the field of public health, traditionally dominated by human health experts and 
practitioners; and weather and climate science, usually lead by meteorologists, 
climatologists, engineers, and environmental science experts. Several biologists, 
entomologists and social experts have also joined this collaborative, inter-institutional and 
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interdisciplinary effort. The implementation of the ISCS has required, among many other 
activities, analyzing the local eco-epidemiological settings of various malaria- and dengue 
fever-prone pilot sites, implementing process-based biological and statistical models, and 
strengthening the local capacity of health authorities. It has also required strengthening the 
IDEAM capability to routinely and systemically produce and disseminate, relevant, 
continuous, homogenous, and reliable climate information that could support the decision-
making process of health authorities. Such information includes ground-truth historical 
records, modeling simulation outputs, seasonal forecasts, El Niño Southern Oscillation 
forecasts, and climate change predictions. All this information, along with disease morbidity 
profiles, entomological conditions, socio-economic drivers, and impacts of interventions and 
control campaigns, is now steadily becoming a core part of routine activities and disease 
control plans of health services at regional, municipal and local levels, and is starting to 
facilitate a better allocation of health resources and more cost-effective preventive responses. 
On a broader scale, measures proposed as part of the adaptation plan have been 
mainstreamed into the Colombian political agenda to ensure their sustainability. They have 
reached, for instance, the 2010-2014 National Development Plan, the 2010-2014 Environmental 
Action Plan, the Colombia's Poverty Reduction Plan, and the Public Health National Plan. 
In Ecuador, in turn, the National Institute of Meteorology and Hydrology (INAMHI) has 
conducted various research activities [24,25] on the analysis of potential increases in the 
incidence of malaria and dengue fever in key lowland provinces. Activities have included the 
implementation and coupled analysis of the 30 km WRF (Weather Research and Forecasting), 
dynamic downscaling regional climate model, and the Ross-Macdonald malaria infectious 
disease process-based model, to reproduce the spatio-temporal variability of primary positive 
cases reported by the National Malaria Eradication Service over a recent 13-year historical 
period (see figure 8). They have also included a first design of an Early Warning System for 
malaria and dengue fever outbreaks, which is now developing into an integrated surveillance 
and climate modeling for malaria and dengue fever predictability in rural and urban settings. 
The INAMHI has also joined efforts with several research groups to broaden the 
understanding of the complex transmission dynamics (in both space and time) of these vector-
borne diseases, in order to improve decision-making processes in regional and local health 
authorities and, in a more general sense, to strengthen the already solid surveillance and 
control activities of infectious diseases conducted by the Ecuadorian health sector. 
5.4. Air quality risk assessment for Lima and El Callao (Peru) 
Poor air quality conditions can cause many respiratory problems including asthma and 
severe allergies and can also pose serious health problems such as cancer. In order to issue 
public warnings of high pollution episodes, the Peruvian National Service of Meteorology 
and Hydrology – SENAMHI is working on the design and implementation of an air quality 
forecast system for the cities of Lima and El Callao. The system maps out current and future 
ambient air quality conditions based on hindcast simulation runs of the BRAMS model and 
the Weather Research and Forecasting coupled with Chemistry (WRF-Chem) model (see 
figure 9), as well as on in situ measurements of main air pollutants, such as particulate  
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Figure 8. January Plasmodium vivax (left panel) and P. falciparum (right panel) basic reproductive rates 
on the Ecuadorian coast, simulated for the period 1996-2008 and for Anopheles albimanus mosquito 
species. (After Muñoz and Recalde [24]).  
 
Figure 9. 4-km spatial resolution hindcast WRF-Chem model simulation outputs of NOx concentration 
fluxes in the geographic domain 12°30’S – 11°30’S and 76°30’W – 77°30’W. Typical NOx concentration 
fluxes are expressed in thousand mol/km2/hr. The reference arrow represents wind speeds of 4 m/s. 
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Figure 10. 10 micrometer or less particulate matter (PM10) concentrations (right panel) gathered at the 
SENAMHI air-quality monitoring stations Ate, San Borja, Campo de Marte, Santa Anita, and Villa 
Maria del Triunfo (see locations in left panel) over the period spanning from December 30, 2011 through 
January 2, 2012. The red solid line depicts the health-based daily air quality standard concentration of 
150 µg/m3. The violet line depicts, in turn, the 250 µg/m3 daily concentration threshold above which 
high pollution episode warnings are issued. Air quality is considered ‘good’ when daily concentrations 
do not exceed 50 µg/m3. 
matter smaller than 10 and 5 micrometers (PM10 and PM5, respectively), nitrogen oxides 
(NOx) and ground-level ozone (O3). Modeling outputs and real-time information allow the 
SENAMHI to issue public warnings that could activate municipal plans to help keep pollution 
levels down and alert local residents in Lima districts to the potential health threats. 
Up to date, the air quality network includes five high-precision monitoring stations located 
in the surroundings of the aforementioned two densely populated cities. (See figure below.) 
High pollution episode warnings include events such as the one that took place in the 
localities of Ate and Villa María del Triunfo on January 1, 2012. In situ air quality 
measurements (figure 10) suggested that PM10 concentrations reached 295 and 290 µg/m3, 
respectively, which exceeded in 45 and 40 µg/m3 the 250 µg/m3 daily concentration 
threshold. In the monitoring station Santa Anita, in turn, the PM10 concentration reached 
199 µg/m3, also exceeding the health-based daily air quality standard concentration of 150 
µg/m3. The air quality stations San Borja and Campo de Marte reported moderate daily 
concentrations of about 78 and 54 µg/m3, respectively. 
5.5. The agrometeorological bulletin and improved decision-making processes in 
Paraguay 
Extreme weather events such as river floods, severe storms, droughts and below-freezing low 
temperatures are strongly linked to the onset of El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO). Extreme 
events primarily affect river streamflow and cause numerous direct and indirect impacts on 
many key sectors of the Paraguayan economy: agriculture, ground and river transportation, 
potable water, construction, electricity, and recreation. Several studies have demonstrated that 
the potential impacts of these extreme events and their economic consequences are directly 
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related to the magnitude of ENSO episodes. Historically, Paraguay has experienced above 
normal mean temperatures and rainfall amounts, as well as unusually heavy rainfall events, 
during El Niño (or ENSO positive phase) episodes. The resulting floods have affected 
thousands of individuals, damaged numerous houses, public buildings and highways, and 
submerged entire crops, cattle grasslands and livestock farms. Recent examples include the 
catastrophic events that took place in the Paraguay and Paraná rivers, particularly during the 
El Niño 1982-83, 1991-92 and 1997-98 years. In the flat Paraguayan savannahs, rainfall extreme 
events have also caused a proliferation of Aedes aegypti mosquito breeding sites, increasing the 
incidence of classic dengue fever. This has been particularly true in the central, northeastern 
and eastern portions of this country, where climatic conditions are suitable for the successful 
development of Aedes mosquitoes. During La Niña events (or ENSO negative phase), the 
country usually experiences the opposite (i.e. rainfall deficits and well below normal ambient 
temperatures). The concomitant droughts cause a decline in dairy production, an increase in 
the rate of desertification of arable land, and a rise in the occurrence of grassland and forest 
fires. They also decrease hydropower generation, increase the pollution of rivers and pools of 
stagnant water, and limit fluvial transportation, thereby increasing import/export transport 
fees and diminishing the trade of goods. Moreover, long dry spells affect sunflower, maize, 
soy, cotton, and wheat production, thus reducing the revenue from these key agricultural 
activities. All these impacts, although mainly the ones affecting the agriculture sector, 
prompted the creation of a multidisciplinary group led by the Paraguayan Meteorological and 
Hydrological Service, and the Risk Management Unit at the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Livestock Farming. Collaboratively, the group issues an agro-meteorological bulletin, every 
month or at other intervals depending on specific needs, following the approach presented in 
the decision-making information system below. Activities include (see Figure 11) the  
 
Figure 11. The Paraguayan monthly agrometeorological bulletin (available online at: 
http://www.meteorologia.gov.py/) and the decision-making information system.  
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assessment of available climate information, seasonal and ENSO forecasts, and medium- to 
long-term potential impacts on local agricultural production. Key information is then shared 
with local farmers and smallholders through technicians, advisors and on-the-ground 
experts. 
Up to date, the total number of end-users has reached over 2,000 local, regional and 
international groups including, among many others, the South American Common Market 
(MERCOSUR) and organizations in the United States of America, Canada and European 
countries. Numerous technicians, decision-makers, researchers, and students also use this 
sectoral information in their individual routine activities. 
5.6. Climate risk of droughts in Chile and its effect on agriculture 
In central Chile, the secano zone involves a total surface of 4.362 km2, and a human 
population of 54.450 habitants (6.25% of the regional population). Considered as a rural 
area, the modus vivendi depends basically on agriculture. In the coastal secano of the 
O´Higgins Region, the total surface designated to crops and plantations is on the order of 
22.800 hectares. The majority of this land possesses forage plants (27%), cereals –especially 
wheat- (21%), fruits (20%), vines and vineyards (25%), and in lesser proportion legumes 
(5%) and vegetables (2%) [26]. Presently, the cattle production is on the order of 536.170 
animals, most of them being sheep. 
The secano zone shows a dry season that varies between 6 and 8 months per year. 
Precipitations take place between April and September, with values around the 500-600 
mm/year [27]. Reports on droughts in Chile go back to the times before the Spanish 
Colonies, with a strong impact in the agriculture production throughout the history of the 
country [28]. In a period of 400 years, 25% has been reported as dry and half of them as 
extremely dry [29]. The mean probability is therefore on the order of one dry year every 4 
years. Quintana and Aceituno [30] have recently discussed trends of decrease in 
precipitation for central Chile of 10-30% for the second half of the XX century.  
Traditionally, the drought management in Chile has been contingent. Nonetheless, in the first 
decade of the XXI century, government actions in this regard have increased, orienting efforts 
towards an integrated management of extreme climate events. For example, this originated the 
National Plan for Civil Protection in 2002. The formal approval of the National Climate 
Change Strategy in 2006 and the respective Action Plan in 2008 have revealed the adaptation 
needs of the different productive sectors of Chile, but also the most vulnerable territories and 
populations. All this created a positive scenario for the establishment of improved policies for 
climate risk. Three important examples after the extreme drought of 2008 are the creation of 
the Comité Interministerial de Recursos Hídricos (Inter-ministry Water Resources Committee), 
the Comisión Nacional de Emergencias Agrícolas y Riesgos Agroclimáticos (National 
Committee for Agriculture Emergencies and Agro-Climate Risk) and the Sistema Nacional de 
Gestión del Riesgo Agroclimático (the National System for Agro-Climate Risk Management, 
found at http://www.minagri.gov.cl/agroclimatico/comision_nacional.php). 
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The public risk management initiatives implemented by the Chilean organizations involve 
one or several of the following mechanisms. While excellent initiatives, some of them can 
still be further improved. Some suggestions are pointed out in those cases. 
Early Warning System 
Chile possesses a modern early warning system that is able to detect and send alerts about 
natural disasters. It uses information produced by the Dirección Meteorológica de Chile 
(DMC), Dirección de Obras Hidráulicas (DOH), Dirección General de Aguas (DGA), 
Servicio Hidrográfico y Oceanográfico de la Armada (SHOA) and others. The Ministry of 
Agriculture via its Regional Centers for Agro-meteorological Information interacts with the 
climate information providers and generates tailored products for the corresponding sector. 
Nonetheless, these products do not always arrive on time to the farmers. 
Agriculture Emergency Announcements 
The Agriculture Emergency Zone (ZEA, in Spanish) announcements for droughts are fast 
and the corresponding institutional instances are efficient. However, the criteria used for 
announcing the ZEAs, which is based on the agriculture impact, may require modifications. 
The impacts are assessed in terms of a combination of factors: e.g. losses reported by a 
technical organism, request of a local authority and help requests from affected farmers. 
Specifically, ZEA announcements may require a criteria homogenization for both 
monitoring the evolution of the drought, as well as the emergency declaration itself. The 
announcement must adjust to regional realities and take into consideration the potable 
water supply and its effects on agriculture activities. 
Budget Availability for Emergencies 
Even when the budget allocation for emergencies is normally made through the utilization 
of funds already directed to other activities, in the last years, there has been an increasing 
amount of money in Chile properly directed to environmental emergencies. For instance, 
the emergency drought budget made available for the 2007-2008 case enabled the 
development of a higher number of implemented policies. In the Ministry of Agriculture, 
different mechanisms (e.g. emergency bonds, accident benefits, livestock health operations, 
agriculture emergency employment programs and a special incentive fund program for the 
recovery of degraded soils) were able to take care of around 161,000 beneficiaries.  
A final comment can be included here about the implementation of an additional system to 
monitor the success of the risk management process in Chile. Presently there is neither an 
evaluation of the loss levels associated with a drought, nor an ex post diagnostic of the 
implementation mechanisms. It is necessary to possess adequate metrics to assess the 
effectiveness of applied strategies and the recovery of the affected populations. It is 
important to develop and to implement a protocol for the evaluation of the impacts of 
droughts. In addition, this will help with emergency management policies and the 
development of ad hoc prevention and mitigation measures focused on the vulnerability 
reduction of certain territories. A continuously updated registration of the users and 
affected people during an emergency is also required; this information will help to project 
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estimates of the offer and demand under similar circumstances. The associated database will 
consolidate the emergency monitoring system and also will provide useful information for 
future studies and experience-sharing with other institutions. 
6. Discussion and concluding remarks 
The Latin American Observatory partnership has been able to improve several aspects of the 
way decision-making tools are created and provided to stakeholders and end-mile users in 
different institution of Latin America in the past years, increasing the dissemination of 
available services for assessing and –when possible- forecasting hazards and vulnerabilities. 
This allows advisement of authorities in taking the right course of action in order to protect 
human populations from the direct or indirect effects of hazards. 
In this chapter, we have presented the general methodologies that are used in the OLE2 for 
risk assessment and management, along with a few case studies for different countries. The 
main innovation is related to the way the partnership interacts to share data, products, 
experiences, helping institutions with lesser human resources and capacities to take 
advantage of the strengths of other partners, but also sharing efforts at a regional level so 
the work is divided among a greater number of experts, even when they don’t belong to a 
certain institute, or even when they are not present in the same country. This 
interdependence has proven a key component of the long-term sustainability of the 
Observatory. 
In terms of the methods employed, important learned lessons arise in relation to the use of 
probability maps when working with vulnerabilities, hazards and risk management. A 
probability approach involves the consideration of the related uncertainties of every step of 
the methodology, which are always present in this kind of analysis. This introduces an a 
priori spectrum of possible immediate actions to decision-makers, even if the real intensity of 
the hazard is not known until the moment of the emergency. The whole system is aimed at 
improving the response times and also benefit/cost ratios. 
Providing services that take into consideration different scales (e.g. interannual to decadal to 
climate change scales, as well as from basins to nation-wide to continental scales) and the 
evolution in time of both hazard and vulnerability probabilities has proven in our 
experience to be a more adequate practice when assessing and managing risk.  
The recognition of the local chains of dissemination of the information, institutional 
relationships and their adequate use and promotion instead of creating new ones is another 
lesson learned. The Observatory as a “boundary institution” is paying special attention to 
these issues and also to the importance of “translating” methods and products so the final 
services can not only be adequately understood but also be properly assimilated by 
decision-makers and stakeholders.  
Finally, there is an increasingly growing culture on risk assessment and management in 
LAC, but as Baethgen has pointed out recently [31], it is also important to consider the 
benefits that may arise if there is also preparedness to take advantage of probable “positive” 
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natural events (e.g. a natural event may be a hazard for certain sectors of production, but 
may be positive for others). The Observatory must therefore consider also Opportunity 
Assessment and Management policies in the near future to address such profitable 
scenarios.  
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1. Introduction 
Seasonal climate refers to average conditions in the atmosphere and ocean over time scales 
of the order of three months. When considering risks associated with seasonal climate we 
are concerned with deviations from normal conditions, or ‘climate anomalies’. Summers 
that are hotter than usual, extended drought conditions and exceptionally active tropical 
cyclone seasons are examples of seasonal climate anomalies.  
The countries of the Pacific Ocean are exposed to climate risk across a range of sectors, most 
notably in water resources, agriculture and disaster preparedness. In Fiji, the forestry 
industry is affected by an increased likelihood of fires in dry conditions and by access roads 
becoming too muddy to work on in wet conditions. In Samoa and Fiji the supply of 
hydroelectric power is vulnerable to rainfall deficiencies, as dams tend to be relatively small 
in comparison to average inflows. Extreme weather conditions threaten tourism revenue for 
islands such as Rarotonga in the Cook Islands. Seasonal variations of ocean temperatures, 
which can drive the migration of species such as Tuna and cause the bleaching of coral reefs 
in which fish spawn affect the productivity of fisheries which are an important economic 
resource for countries such as Kiribati. Seasonal variations in surface water and temperature 
can create more favourable conditions for host vectors of diseases such as malaria, 
increasing their prevalence. [1] 
While many climate anomalies are essentially chaotic and not predictable, there exists 
large-scale coupling (feedback) between the atmosphere and the ocean, which imparts a 
degree of predictability to variations of seasonal climate in the atmosphere-ocean-land 
surface system. The most significant manifestation of this coupling, and the physical 
source of much of this predictability is the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), a quasi-
periodic mode of variability of the equatorial Pacific Ocean [2]. The primary manifestation 
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of ENSO is in the patterns of sea surface and sub-surface temperature in the Pacific Ocean, 
with cooler than normal central equatorial Pacific sea surface temperatures termed ‘La 
Niña’ and warmer than normal temperatures termed ‘El Niño’. During La Niña and El 
Niño events, feedbacks between the ocean and atmosphere lead to changes in the 
dominant atmospheric patterns, which influence climatic conditions throughout the 
world. The ocean processes are slower and more predictable than the atmospheric 
processes responsible for weather, and their influence on the likelihood of atmospheric 
states can be used to make predictions, either through characterising this relationship 
empirically using historical data, or by using a physically motivated model of the coupled 
ocean-atmosphere system. 
 
 
Figure 1. Left: CCGM-based predictions (left) and analysis (right) of seasonal rainfall anomalies in 
millimetres in the tropical South Pacific region during 2011 for the four calendar seasons starting 
December-January-February (DJF). 
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The Tuvalu drought of 2011 provides an example of vulnerability to seasonal climate risk.  
 
Figure 2. Funafuti (Tuvalu) rainfall in millimetres, composite, during all years, El Niño / La Niña 
events. Analysis: A.Cottril, Data: Pacific Climate Change Science Project, Tuvalu Meteorological Service 
(http://informet.net/tuvmet/). 
Populations on low coral atolls such as Funafuti (located at 8 South, 179 East) rely heavily on 
rainwater harvesting for water resources as there are no natural streams or lakes. Rainfall 
from December 2010 to January 2011 was up to 600mm below normal levels for the western 
central Pacific region in which Funafuti is located (Figure 1)[3]. Long range rainfall outlooks 
for the March to May season forecast a continuation of the pattern of suppressed rainfall1. 
These outlooks turned out to be substantially correct, with analysed rainfall deficits of up to 
400mm in the region for the period March to May2. On the 28th of September 2011, critically 
low water supplies caused the government of Tuvalu to declare a state of emergency. In 
early October the governments of Australia, New Zealand, Korea and Japan began 
delivering fresh water supplies and portable desalination units.  
The physical cause of the lack of rainfall in Funafuti in 2011 was cooler than normal waters 
in the equatorial Pacific, associated with the strongest La Nina3 episode in recent recorded 
history, which peaked in the Southern Hemisphere summer of 2010-2011. La Niña events 
typically decay in Southern Hemisphere Autumn, but in this case the event weakened and 
then re-established itself in the second half of 2011. The cooler than normal waters in the 
region of Tuvalu suppressed the rainfall generating convection of moist air, which led to 
                                                                
1 Based on Island Climate Update, a monthly summary of seasonal climate monitoring and prediction in the tropical 
South Pacific Outlooks issued by the National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research 
(http://www.niwa.co.nz/climate/icu) and on seasonal outlooks issued for the region by the International Research 
Institute for Climate and Society (portal.iri.columbia.edu). 
2 CAMPS_OPI blended rainfall analysis data from the National Center for Environmental Prediction, Climate 
Prediction Center USA, http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/global_precip/html/wpage.cams_opi.html.   
3 The La Niña phase of ENSO is associated with cooler than normal equatorial Pacific waters and suppressed rainfall in 
this region. The 2012 La Niña saw record values of indices used to measure the strength of such events 
http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/current/statements/scs38.pdf 
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rainfall deficiencies over a sustained period. Figure 1 illustrates that seasonal outlooks based 
on dynamical models provided guidance anticipating the persistence of these rainfall 
deficiencies throughout 2011. The tendency towards suppressed rainfall at Funafuti during 
La Niña events is evident from the composite time series shown in Figure 2. This event 
illustrates the real nature of climate risk and that, for some phenomena, we now have the 
capability to predict the features of the earth system that are responsible well in advance.  
Many of the examples in this chapter will revolve around the island countries of the Pacific 
that are directly affected by ENSO and are able to benefit directly from advances in the 
ability to predict it. Routine seasonal outlooks are issued regularly by national 
meteorological agencies including the Australian Bureau of Meteorology and The United 
States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), as well as by 
organisations such as the International Research Institute for Climate and Society (IRI). The 
availability of seasonal outlooks for the coming seasons gives important information for 
governments and aid agencies to plan their assistance. 
Seasonal outlooks of the likelihood of extreme, synoptic timescale events such as tropical 
cyclones are also of use for planning disaster preparedness. Tropical cyclones are the most 
destructive weather systems that impact on coastal areas in the Pacific. While individual 
tropical cyclones are not predictable beyond timescales of the order of one day, the distribution 
of tropical cyclone activity is influenced by large-scale climatic features such as ENSO [4].  
Climate risk may be assessed in a historically averaged sense, by using the past distribution 
of extreme events such as droughts or tropical cyclones to give predictive probabilities of 
the events in the future. Climate change complicates this approach, because while observed 
changes in the mean state of the climate systems so far have been small, this small change in 
the mean state can lead to large changes in the frequency and magnitude of extreme 
events[5]. We refer to this as the influence of climate change on climate variability. The effect 
of climate change on weather patterns is likely to be considerably more complex than a 
simple shift of the existing probability distribution. As an example, a recently completed 
global analyses has found a near 50-fold increase in the frequency of extremely hot 
temperatures during the northern summer, meaning that the historical occurrence now 
greatly underestimates the risks of extremes[6]. It has been proposed that a change in 
climate forcing projects onto the existing modes of variability of the climate system, altering 
the frequencies and intensities of existing weather regimes[7] [8]. An example of such a 
mechanism is the prospect that global warming has intensified the hydrological cycle, 
causing more extreme flooding and droughts [9]. The current set of coarse resolution GCMs 
used to evaluate anthropogenic climate change may not be sufficiently detailed to capture 
such nuanced responses, and as such considerable uncertainties remain about the impact of 
climate change on weather events. In the face of these uncertainties, an effective and low 
cost option to reduced vulnerability to climate change is to improve the accuracy, 
availability and use of forecasts[10]. 
The aim of seasonal forecasting is to predict the average weather or aggregate weather over 
a long period, usually three months. By exploiting the relationship of weather systems with 
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large scale, long time-scale coupled ocean-atmosphere processes, probabilistic forecasts can 
be made of the likely tendency of conditions in the coming season. Seasonal predictions are 
not deterministic, in other words they do not make a prediction that a single outcome will or 
will not happen. Rather they give a statement of risk, typically about the likelihood of wetter 
than normal, or warmer than normal conditions. 
A range of potential applications for seasonal outlooks has been identified. As noted, in 
countries dependant on rainwater harvesting for water supplies, advance knowledge of 
drought conditions can allow pre-emptive water saving or water supply bolstering. 
Knowledge of the relative likelihood of fires or inaccessibility due to rainfall could be used 
to plan forestry activities. Rainfall outlooks can be used to estimate the availability of water 
for hydroelectric power generation, and to pre-emptively purchase fuel for backup 
generators, avoiding the payment of expensive spot rates for fuel. Tourism operators can 
develop forward plans that take into account changes in the likelihood of climatic 
disturbances. Reefs likely to suffer from elevated temperatures can be declared off-limits for 
fishing and tourism to reduce other sources of stress on corals [11]. Seasonal variations in 
surface water and temperature can increase the prevalence of certain diseases such as 
malaria by causing more or less favourable conditions for host vectors [1]. The beef industry 
in Vanuatu can benefit from forward estimates of how many head of cattle a pasture will be 
able to support. Seasonal forecasts have been shown to be of economic utility in the 
management of wheat farming in Australia by guiding changes in practice such as crop row 
spacing and fertilizer application [12]. 
2. The limitations of empirical models and the imperative for a 
dynamical model basis for seasonal forecasting 
Empirical models (or ‘statistical models’) are currently used by many meteorological 
services for seasonal climate outlooks. These models are based on empirical relationships, 
usually between ENSO based indices (‘the predictors’) and variables such as local rainfall 
and temperature (‘the predictands’). Using current observed values of ENSO indices these 
past relationships can be used to create forecasts [13].  
A warming of the climate system due to greenhouse gas forcing is predicted by theory, 
demonstrated by numerical predictions and has been observed over the course of the past 
century [14]. While the empirical relationships between climate predictors and predictands 
such as rainfall may be robust, in a warming climate, environmental indicators used as 
predictors are now frequently outside of the range of historical records, meaning that 
relationships are being assumed for events which do not have an historical analogue. In 
general, empirical models cannot reliably account for aspects of climate variability and 
change that are not represented in the historical record. Empirical forecasting usually 
depends on the assumption of stationary relationships between predictors and predictands. 
This also renders such schemes susceptible to periodic changes in these relationships due to 
decadal timescale variability.  
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For example, outlooks for tropical cyclone (TC) activity in the Australian region are based 
on a regression model using values indices representing major modes of variability in the 
ocean. The 2010-11 TC season featured to a very strong La Niña event with an unusually hot 
Indian Ocean, an event without historical precedent. In this case the statistical models 
significantly over-predicted the number of TCs that occurred in the Australian region. 
Analysis shows that the environmental indicators used for tropical cyclone seasonal 
outlooks for the Australian region in 2010-11 and 2011-12 are outliers in the predictor phase 
space, in other words, outside of the range of variability for which the model was tested and 
built. 
 
Figure 3. Time series for an Indian Ocean based climate index showing a trend. Such trends may 
reduce the efficacy of empirical prediction schemes. (Source: KNMI Climate Explorer: 
http://climexp.knmi.nl/). 
Inter-annual variability in the intensity and distribution of tropical cyclones is large, and 
presently greater than any trends that are ascribable to climate change. However climate 
change impacts our ability to make skilful predictions of tropical cyclone activity using 
empirical models, because in the warming environment predictors such as SSTs now 
frequently lie outside of the range of past variability. Improved empirical methods can be 
developed to adjust for this, by incorporating trends and by treating predictors that lie 
outside the observed range of variability more cautiously [15]. However it is widely 
considered that dynamical models provide the best prospects for improved seasonal 
forecasting in the future, either through providing long range forecasts of environments 
favorable to cyclo-genesis, or through high resolution models that can provide an estimate 
of the number of cyclones expected to form. 
2.1. Seasonal forecasting with dynamical models 
An alternative paradigm for seasonal prediction is the use of coupled ocean-atmosphere 
General Circulation Models (‘coupled models’ or GCMs). State of the art coupled models 
consist of a physically based model of the ocean, usually solved using a grid based 
scheme, coupled to a physically based atmospheric model, often solved using a spectral 
spatial discretisation [16]. GCMs solve a set of dynamical equations ('the primitive 
equations') to project the current analysed state of the ocean-atmosphere system into the 
future. The term ‘analysed’ here is used quite deliberately to describe methods used to 
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determine a global estimate of the state of the ocean and atmosphere based on the 
combination of available observations and using numerical methods based on a mix of 
physical and statistical relationships to infer the state of regions not subject to direct 
observation. The objective of the assimilation process is placing constraints on the 
observations to ensure they present a physically plausible set of initial conditions for the 
ocean-atmosphere simulation. 
A number of dynamical models are run at operational meteorological centres around the 
world. We briefly describe the main components here with reference to the model used 
operationally at the Australian Bureau of Meteorology for ocean temperature forecasts. The 
first component is an ocean data assimilation system, which provides an estimate of the 
state of the upper ocean based on an analysis of ocean observations. The observations of the 
ocean come from a variety of sources including satellite observations of sea surface 
temperature and sea level height, fixed, drifting and profiling buoys (such as the TOGA-
TAO array which provides real-time observations of the region of the Pacific Ocean central 
to ENSO) and observations taken from ships. 
This ocean assimilation system initialises an ocean model though a complex process which 
attempts to bring the model into a state consistent with the oceanic observations but also 
such that it is internally balanced to minimise so called ‘initialisation shock’. Ocean model 
resolution for the Bureau of Meteorology POAMA (Predictive Ocean Atmosphere Model for 
Australia) [17] is 2 degrees in longitude with a latitudinal resolution telescoping from 0.5 
degrees near the equator to 1.5 degrees near the poles. The model resolves 25 vertical levels. 
Specialised coupling software is used to transmit surface fluxes of heat and momentum 
between the ocean model and an atmospheric model. The POAMA atmospheric model has a 
spherical harmonic horizontal structure with triangular truncation at wave number 47 (grid 
cells of roughly 250km by 250km when transformed) and 17 pressure levels. The 
atmospheric model typically has its own assimilation system to ingest data from available 
observations of meteorological parameters including wind, pressure and temperature. 
Coupled assimilation, in which the ocean and atmosphere are initialised together to reduce 
initialisation shock is an area of current research. 
Processes with a spatial scale smaller than the model grid scale are ‘parameterised’, which 
means a statistical or process-based model is used to represent the average effect of this 
process on the sub-grid scale. Design and configuration of sub-grid scale processes is a 
specialised and active area of research, with current activity focussed on the use of 
stochastic models to better capture the uncertainty of the sub-grid processes.  
Seasonal climate prediction is inherently probabilistic because the evolution of the climate 
system is highly sensitive to initial conditions. Small difference or ‘errors’ in the description 
of the initial climate state grow with time leading to very different forecast outcomes. To 
estimate the range of physically plausible outcomes, GCMs are typically run as an ensemble, 
in which a number of simulations are performed with slightly different initial conditions. 
The initial conditions are perturbed to realistically sample the plausible range of initial 
climate states. 
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Ensemble strategies in theory allow for better estimation of the probability of extreme, or 
less likely events. The nonlinear nature of the coupled ocean-atmosphere system means that 
these probabilities may not be well estimated from a single ‘best guess’ deterministic 
forecast. Using simple decision models which will be discussed in more detail below, 
Palmer [18] demonstrated that the economic value of ensemble forecasts is greater than that 
of individual models or simple ensemble means. 
Because basic physics does not change under global warming, dynamical models are less 
compromised by climate change than statistical models. GCMs explicitly take into account 
climate processes that are important for seasonal climate prediction such as equatorial oceanic 
waves and atmospheric convection driven by ocean temperatures and are not constrained by 
what has occurred in the past. GCMs implicitly include the effects of a changing climate 
whatever its character or cause and can predict outcomes not seen previously. 
3. Model based forecast products 
Seasonal climate forecasts are inherently probabilistic due to imperfect model initialisation, 
instabilities in the modelled system, and model error. One approach to transform a GCM 
ensemble forecast into a probabilistic forecast is to define one or more event thresholds, and 
then take the fraction of ensemble members above this threshold as the probability forecast. 
This approach effectively takes the model ensemble distribution as a best guess of the 
probabilities of future states of the system. These can be referred to as ‘ensemble relative 
frequency’ or ‘perfect model’ probabilities, as they assume that the model ensemble is a 
perfect sample from possible futures consistent with the model initial conditions. This 
procedure does provide an adjustment for model biases, for example if the model tends to 
be biased towards warmer temperatures, because the ensemble distribution for a particular 
realization is measured against the model’s own climatological state. 
One event for which probabilities may be desired would be the occurrence of above median 
monthly rainfall over a region of interest. Figure 4 shows the POAMA hindcast ensemble for 
the year 1997 and its conversion to a probabilistic forecast of the event of monthly rainfall 
being above the long-term median in the Murray Darling Basin, a region of high agricultural 
importance [19]. This probability forecast was generated for retrospective seasonal forecasts 
generated with the POAMA 1.5 model for the period of 1980 to 2006. The individual 
ensemble members show that for each month a range of outcomes is possible including both 
above and below media rainfall. These retrospective forecasts are produced from the first 
season of model output, meaning there is no time elapsed between the model initialisation 
and the period being forecast for. 
4. Accounting for model error 
Uncertainty in probability forecasts can be divided into three distinct categories. The first 
category of prediction uncertainty is linked to the non-linearity of climate dynamics that 
causes a sensitivity to initial conditions. This is the so-called butterfly effect, which imposes  
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Figure 4. Retrospective forecasts of mean seasonal rainfall for the Murray Darling Basis produced using the 
POAMA 1.5 CGCM for 1997. Upper) Time series of the model ensemble rainfall anomaly (mm/day), Middle) 
Probability forecast derived from the number of ensemble members lying above the model median, Lower) 
Observed seasonal rainfall anomaly (mm/day), where E denotes the occurrence of the above-median event. 
hard limits on our ability to make deterministic predictions of nonlinear systems. The 
simple fact that we do not have infinite precision means that instabilities on scales smaller 
than the smallest resolved model scale inevitably grow and affect the larger scale until no 
predictive skill remains [20]. The ‘saturation time’ after which the system is effectively 
unpredictable is longer for the ocean than the atmosphere.  
The second major category of prediction uncertainty is the sparseness and imprecision of 
earth system observations. As discussed above, the analysed state of the atmosphere and 
ocean is necessarily different from its actual state, and as such model projections are 
projecting an imperfect estimate of the initial state forward in time. As such even with a 
perfect physical model, predictions would be imperfect. This source of error interacts with 
the first, because instabilities growing from initial conditions that are not present in nature 
may produce possible future states that are inconsistent with actual potential future states. 
Ensemble forecasting allows this initial condition uncertainty to be estimated and quantified 
by sampling the space of plausible initial conditions and projecting this sample forward in 
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time. These two kinds of uncertainty can be described as ’flow dependent’[21] because their 
rates of growth and magnitudes are sensitive to the stability of the point in phase space 
characterising the flow. 
The final category of uncertainty is model error, the fact that our mathematical idealisations 
of the climate system are not perfect. This includes errors due to imperfect physical 
parameterisations, errors due to unresolved processes at the sub-grid scale and differences 
between the mean state of the model and the true system. This class of error is widely 
studied and motivates research into better models with improved representation of physics, 
and model calibration techniques that can account for or correct the errors. 
Single model ensemble forecasts only capture the components of prediction uncertainty 
associated with uncertain initial conditions and model-captured instability, and these are 
only fully captured in the ideal case of an infinite ensemble that uniformly samples initial 
condition uncertainty. An ensemble of a single model provides no information about the 
model error component of prediction uncertainty (Stephenson, 2005), and models that are 
structurally similar will invariably share biases. 
4.1. Assessing forecast error 
Forecast validation is the process of measuring the correctness of a set of issued forecasts. It 
can be thought of as being distinct from model validation which is about determining 
whether a model correctly resolves physical processes [20].  
Here we give an example of forecast validation based on the definition of discrete events, for 
example the event of rainfall over a three month period exceeding a given threshold, and of 
categorical forecasts, for example low, medium and high probability of the event. For three 
forecast categories, the contingency table summarising the forecast- verification set has the form 
shown in Table 1, with forecast categories ଵ݂ǡ ଶ݂ǡ ଷ݂ counts of observed events ݋ଵǡ ݋ଶǡ ݋ଷ and 
counts of non-events ݊ଵǡ ݊ଶǡ ݊ଷ over each forecast. The ‘distributions oriented’ theory of forecast 
verification interprets the contingency table statistics in terms of the joint, marginal and 
conditional probability distributions of events and forecasts [22]. In this theory, the contingency 
table contains all the information required to generate a standard set of verification scores. 
 
Forecast Observed Events Observed Non Events 
ଵ݂ ݋ଵ ݊ଵ
ଶ݂ ݋ଶ ݊ଶ
ଷ݂ ݋ଷ ݊ଷ
Table 1. Contingency table for a binary event with three forecast categories. 
Forecast Events Observed Non Events Total 
Low 37 59 96 
Medium 67 70 137 
High 59 32 91 
Table 2. Contingency table for MDB seasonal monthly rainfall hindcasts from POAMA 1.5, all start months. 
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The joint distribution of the forecasts in one bin ��	and observed events � is		�(��, �) = 	 ���� 
where the total number of forecast-verification pairs is		� = ��� � ���. 
The calibration-refinement factorisation of the joint distribution for a particular forecast bin, 
�(��, �) = 	�(�|��)�(��), 
is composed of two factors: the true positive ratio �(�|��) and the marginal 
frequency	�(��) = (�� � ��)��, where 
�(�|��) =
��
(�� � ��)	. 
The true positive ratio �(�|��) is the conditional probability of the event given this particular 
forecast, while �(��) is the probability that the forecast system produces this category of 
forecasts, which indicates if the system is biased in one way or another. �(�|��) can be 
considered an estimate of the expected probability of the event of above median rainfall 
based on the information from the forecast and its verification. 
We apply this simple forecast validation scheme to the POAMA MDB rainfall forecasts 
discussed above. In order to compute meaningful statistics on these probability outlooks, 
three bins for the probability of rainfall exceeding the climatological median were used. A 
small number of forecast verification pairs in any particular bin reduces the statistical 
significance of results markedly. Larger probability bins can be used to mitigate this, but at 
the expense of forecast resolution and sharpness. The three bins translate into categorical 
forecasts of a low, medium and high probability of an above median rainfall event. The 
binned forecasts were verified against Australian rainfall data from the Australian Bureau of 
Meteorology National Climate Centre’s gridded atmospheric data set [23]. 
Table 2 shows these counts for the MDB rainfall forecasts described above for all months in 
the hindcast period.  
 
Forecast Mean Ensemble Frequency 
(Model probability) 
p(E|F) 90% Probability 
Interval of p(E|F) 
Low (0-33%) 0.21 0.39 0.31 - 0.47 
Medium (33-66%) 0.50 0.49 0.42 - 0.56 
High (66-100%) 0.80 0.65 0.56 - 0.73 
Table 3. Calibration table for GCM forecasts of above median seasonal rainfall, computed using data in 
table 2 with 90% probability interval. 
If the calibration distribution in each bin is assumed to be a Bernoulli distribution, 
probability intervals for the parameter can be generated for the forecasts by a permutation 
counting method. An alternative method for larger datasets for which permutation counting 
is prohibitive is to use percentiles of a normal posterior distribution. Table 3 gives the true 
positive ratio with a 90% probability interval for the data in Table 2. It can immediately be 
seen that the probability distribution implied by the model ensemble is not consistent with 
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the probability distribution implied by the verification of the forecasts. For example the 
mean probability for ‘low probability’ forecasts is 21%, but the event occurs 39% of the time 
for this forecast category. 
The earth system is very high dimensional and the procedure used here reduces the 
dimensionality of the problem. Such dimension reduction may result in a loss of 
information about the performance of the system – we are faced with a trade-off between 
information contained in the model-based forecasts, and seeking to extract information from 
the model-reforecast dataset. In this case simple binning is used, more sophisticated 
methods such as principal component analysis could also be employed. We will return to 
this point later in the chapter when calibration is discussed. 
 
Forecast Events Nonevents p(E|F) 90% Probability Interval 
Low (0-33%) 3 6 0.33 0.14 - .59 
Medium (33-66%) 1 3 0.25 0.4 - 0.63 
High (66-100%) 10 4 0.71 0.50 – 0.87 
Table 4. True positive ratio for POAMA MDB June-July-August rainfall. 
4.2. Assessment of probability forecasts 
In assessment of probability forecasts the two main aspects of performance are resolution 
and reliability. Reliability is defined as the degree to which the observed frequency of an 
event coincides with its forecast probability. Reliability does not guarantee useful skill, but 
forecasts that are not reliable cannot be taken at face value and must be adjusted, either 
implicitly as occurs when a verification plot demonstrating overconfidence is published next 
to a forecast or explicitly by downgrading probabilities that are not justified by model 
performance. The term 'well calibrated' is used to describe probability forecasts that are 
reliable. Resolution is defined as the frequency with which different observed outcomes 
follow different forecast categories, in other words the degree to which the forecast system 
can 'resolve' different outcomes.  
Figure 5 shows the reliability diagram for the POAMA 1.5 Murray Darling Basin Average 
monthly mean rainfall, for all months. The green bar marks the forecast 90% probability 
interval (ci), the purple bar marks the 90% probability interval for perfect forecasts with the 
same sample size. Reliability diagrams are plots of the true positive ratio (also known as the 
calibration function, observed relative frequency, likelihood and hit rate) against the mean 
probability of the forecasts in each bin. Reliability diagrams are used to assess the degree to 
which the model forecast probabilities agree with the observed frequencies, shown in figure 
5 with the probability intervals described above. The figure shows that even when small 
sample size is taken into account, the forecasts are overconfident. Resolution is represented 
by the spread of points on the reliability diagram in the vertical – it can be seen the model 
has some ability to resolve between the two outcomes. 
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Figure 5. Reliability diagram for Murray Darling Basin monthly rainfall forecasts. 
5. Understanding prediction utility: Simple decision models 
In order to begin to understand potential uses of seasonal forecasts it is instructive to study 
simple cost-loss decision models. Such simple models provide a framework to begin to 
quantify the potential value of forecasts. Before proceeding, we note that real-world 
decisions are typically made with far more parameters and subject to greater uncertainty 
regarding potential costs and payoffs than the simple models studied here.  
We first consider a simple binary event, binary decision model in which there are two 
possible outcomes – the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event - and the user makes a 
decision to protect, or not protect, against the event. Protection has a cost; failure to protect 
incurs a loss. The classic example is the decision to carry an umbrella to protect against the 
possibility of rain. A seasonal timescale example is the decision to apply fertiliser to a crop 
based on the likelihood of future rainfall over a season.  An early study of these issues was 
made by Anders Angstrom as documented by [24]. 
A failure to protect with cost C results in a loss L. In this framework it only makes sense to 
take action given the probability of the event P if P > CL. If it is not, then the expected loss is 
less than the cost of taking protective action. The combination of the joint distribution of 
forecasts and observations and the decision-makers cost function determines the potential 
economic value of the forecasts. (Table 5.) 
5.1. Adjusting model output: Introducing calibration 
Decisions about the use of GCMs for seasonal climate forecasting are usually based upon 
measures of model performance over a hind-cast (retrospective forecast) period. A natural 
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and popular extension of this idea is that GCM-based forecasts should be adjusted by this 
skill assessment. This motivates 'Model Output Statistics' methods[25] and ‘model 
calibration’ and has been widely adopted in medium range weather forecasting [26] and 
seasonal forecasting [27] [28] [29].  
In order to make rational decisions based on quantifiable costs, losses and probabilities the 
end user needs the calibrated forecast probabilities, and needs to know what their costs and 
losses are for each contingency. Given the calibrated forecast probabilities, with reliable 
confidence intervals, they are in a position to use these probabilities to determine the 
optimum course of action to follow for their unique cost function. Given information about 
climatology, a model and its verification, the calibrated model probability p(E|F) is this best 
estimate, subject to the assumptions made in determining the calibrated probability. 
As a simple example of calibration, consider the true positive ratio calculated above. While 
crude and subject to sampling error, this represents the conditional probability of the event 
given the model forecast category. The true positive ratio, proposed as the best estimate of 
the event probability from the POAMA MDB seasonal outlooks discussed above is a 
conditioning of probabilistic forecasts derived from the GCM ensemble upon probabilities 
obtained from comparison of the hindcast set with observations. These conditional 
probabilities are needed for users to make optimal decisions [30]. Skill for coupled models is 
commonly presented as correlation plots, mean error plots and sometimes more esoteric 
scores for probabilistic forecasts. While these scores are useful for model diagnostics, and 
can quantify potential forecast value, it is not obvious how users who need to make 
decisions based on forecasts should convert these measures into new estimates of 
probability. We note that some effort has been spent into developing verification measures 
that do have a direct relationship to economic value such the ROC (Receiver Operating 
Characteristic) score and the logarithmic score based on the information content of a 
forecast.  
Resolution can be degraded by calibration and it is expected that the application of 
calibration techniques will involve some trade-off in which resolution is traded for 
reliability. It is also the case that cross-validation methods used on the application of 
calibration in order to avoid ‘artificial skill’ can also result in artificial reduction in skill 
scores, and thus in the assessment of such methods it can be difficult to disentangle cross 
validation artefacts from true reduction of model skill due to calibration. 
This simple calibration framework can be extended: similar methods can be applied to 
parametric probability density functions [28]. Below we discuss different calibration 
methods, but first we turn to more sophisticated decision models. 
 
Event Action No Action 
Yes C L 
No C 0 
Table 5. Simple binary cost-loss model. 
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5.2. Extending the binary cost-loss model 
In the simple cost-loss model the cost of taking protective action is the same whether the 
event occurs or does not occur. While this may be true for many economic decisions, when 
social and political dimensions are considered there is a clear penalty, in terms of confidence 
in the forecasting system and reduced possibility of action in the future, for false alarms. The 
binary cost-loss model can be developed further to include such a false alarm or ‘cry wolf’ 
effect. Such an extension is effectively an adjustment for the deviation from perfect 
rationality of forecast users. 
The above model can also be extended to more sophisticated decisions based on event 
probability thresholds, with different actions to be taken at different probability thresholds, 
depending on the users attitude to risk. We present a hypothetical example of an 
agriculturalist making a decision about whether to apply additional fertilizer, at a cost, with 
a potential payoff depending on the probability of expected rainfall being above median. In 
this example 20% rainfall probability is the threshold at which the cost of applying fertilizer 
is less than the expected payoff (Table 6). The decision thresholds in Table 6 provide a way 
of mapping from a given forecast to an action, again in relation to a binary yes/no event. 
Such tables are dependent on the details of individual enterprises and must be determined 
with regard to their operating costs and potential losses. The premise for Table 6 is the 
decision by wheat farmers to apply top-dressed fertiliser in order to benefit from expected 
rainfall[12], however the numbers selected are arbitrary and shown for illustration. Another 
management decision that could be studied using this methodology is choice of cultivar, for 
example to decide whether to plant a drought tolerant strain of wheat or one with a higher 
potential yield in the event of good rains. 
 
Forecast Probability Action  Outcome if Sufficient 
Rainfall 
Outcome if 
Insufficient Rainfall 
0-20% No fertilizer 
application 
Missed profit Minimal loss 
20-70% Normal fertilizer 
application 
Normal profit Moderate loss 
70-100% Maximum fertilizer 
application 
Bumper crop Greatest loss 
Table 6. Example probability thresholds for a decision about whether to apply no fertilizer, a normal 
amount, or a maximum amount to take advantage of expected seasonal rainfall. 
Using the true positive ratio we calculated for our sample rainfall forecasts in Table 3, the 
farmer would find that the calibrated ‘low probability’ forecasts from POAMA are not 
sufficient to justify the ‘no fertilizer’ action, because the observed frequency of above 
median rainfall events is above the 20% threshold. In other words, while the forecast have 
skill they do not have value to this particular decision. 
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Another simple decision model is the theory of Kelley betting, which deals with cost-loss 
scenarios in the context of gambling. In this theory a gambler bets a fraction ��	of their 
wealth on an outcome �, where ∑ �� = 1� . The ratio of the gamblers post bet wealth to his pre 
bet wealth is �	 = 	∑ �� log� �����  where �� is the wealth multiplier, or odds, assigned to the 
outcome and �� is the event probability.[31] 
 
Figure 6. Posterior probability of above median seasonal rainfall for all forecasts (right) and June-July-
August forecasts (left) initialized at the end of March. 
5.3. Presenting probability outlooks 
We now turn our attention to ways of presenting information about forecasts and their skill-
based calibration. The actual contingency table (Table 2) has the advantage of containing 
almost all the usable information (assuming the stationarity of the marginal distributions), 
but the disadvantage of requiring knowledge of verification methods to translate it into 
usable probabilities. A plot of the actual ensemble of past forecasts (Figure 4) allows users to 
eyeball the agreement and spread between forecasts and observations. However it provides 
no quantitative information about how much credibility to assign to a particular forecast. 
The reliability diagram (Figure 5) provides this information, but it is not intuitive to 
interpret for most users. A simple pie chart can also be used to present relative probabilities. 
Figure 6 shows visually how the model forecast adjusts the model estimated probabilities, 
and what the credible intervals based on the size of the sample are. It shows the prior 
climatological probability of the event and the updated probabilities, with 90% credible 
intervals for each forecast category. This plot is designed to communicate to end users how 
much the forecast ought to affect their estimate of the event’s probability, based on the rate 
of event occurrence for previous forecasts.  
Coupled model skill varies strongly by month, but using the simple binning calibration 
method this information is difficult to resolve. Table 4 shows the contingency table and true 
positive ratio for June-July-August seasonal forecasts. The true positive ratio suggests that 
the forecasts have reasonable skill and that we ought to take the forecast of a high 
probability of above median rainfall as increased from a 50:50 climatological odds to 9:2 in 
favour of the event. Unfortunately the small sample size in each probability bin results in 
very large probability intervals as shown in Figure 6 (left). The wide probability intervals 
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around our estimate of skill by month are troubling, because we know that skill varies 
strongly by month but are unable to quantify this adequately for these forecasts. Pooling 
forecast-verification pairs in order to increase confidence is one way to increase sample size, 
by aggregating forecasts at different locations and times. Both procedures will reduce the 
size of our credible intervals, but risk increasing the autocorrelation of the forecast data. A 
similar sample size problem affects the statistical significance of attempts to calibrate 
forecasts for individual grid points. 
A question for forecast users is how the probability range should affect the decision. The 
wider the interval, the less evidence exists that the forecast probability corresponds to a 
repeatable relationship between model and reality. Decision makers may prefer to assume 
climatological probabilities until this information can be sharpened. Theoretical work or 
modeling could determine optimum forecasts for selected decision making cost functions. 
5.4. Adjusting for Model Error in Continuous Forecasts 
Calibration methods can be considered to adjust the probability distribution produced by 
the model by using information about its past performance, with the aim of providing 
unbiased and reliable forecasts. A straightforward approach to the generation of probability 
outlooks is to build a linear regression model for predictand � using the GCM ensemble 
mean � as a predictor: 
� = �� � � � � 
where � and � are regression coefficients which may be computed by the least-squares 
method such that � = �� ����� and � =
�
�∑� � ��, with correlation coefficient �. The random 
errors � are typically assumed to be normally distributed with a standard deviation equal to 
the mean of squared regression residuals �� = �� ∑(� � �� � �)�.  When applied to synthetic 
data it can be shown that this scheme produces probability forecasts that are reliable in the 
sense discussed above. A limitation of this method is that it assumes the data are normally 
distributed, significant deviations from normality may require that data are transformed or 
that different methods be chosen to compute the regression coefficients. Analytical methods 
can be used to assess the errors in the regression parameters but again these are usually 
based on distributional assumptions. 
Such regression-based approaches can be made more robust to small sample size using 
Bayesian methods in which model parameters θ are given by Bayes theorem as 
�(�|�� �) = ��(�� �|�)��(�� �) ��(�) 
with hindcast data H and observations O. The likelihood function �(�� �|�) estimates the 
probability of observing the hindcast-observation series given a set of model parameters. 
p(θ) is the prior probability for the model parameters. Probability density functions for 
model parameters θ can be determined using Markov Chain Monte-Carlo sampling [32]. 
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5.5. Variance inflation 
Johnson and Bowler (2009) outline a variance inflation technique which adjusts the 
ensemble forecast to meet two conditions: a) that ensemble members have the same variance 
as observations, and b) that the root-mean-square error of the ensemble mean be equal to 
the spread of the ensemble. A major difference between this and the previous method of 
linear regression with residual errors is that the ensemble spread remains a major 
determinant of forecast uncertainty. The first condition is designed to achieve the statistical 
indistinguishability of the first two moments between ensemble members and observations. 
The second condition is designed to ensure that the ensemble spread accounts for the 
expected model error. These conditions are achieved by increasing (or decreasing) the 
perturbations of the ensemble members from the mean while keeping the correlation 
between model and truth is unchanged (except in the case of a negative correlation between 
model and truth, in which case the sign of the correlation is reversed).  
 
 
Figure 7. Effect of calibration procedures on model time series. Left: A model grid point with high 
hindcast correlation. Right: A model grid point with low hindcast calibration. Black line: observations, 
blue solid line: model mean, blue dashed line: 10% and 90% model probability intervals. 
Given ensemble mean � ̅ and ensemble member perturbations ��, adjusted ensemble 
members ��	are constructed by 
�� � ��̅ � ��� 
Coefficients α and β are computed as 
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� = � ����̅
 
and 
�� = (� � ��)	��
�
��	�
		 
with observed variance ��, ensemble mean variance �	�� 	, correlation between observations 
and ensemble mean ρ and time average of ensemble variance ��. Leave-one-out cross 
validation is used for the calculation of correlation and standard deviation when 
constructing a calibrated hindcast set. Typically the time series for each GCM grid point is 
calibrated independently. Johnson and Bowler show that under the assumption of normally 
distributed model predictions and observations, this procedure minimises the root-mean-
square error. 
5.6. Regression estimate of event probability 
Another method of adjusting probability forecasts is to regress the forecast probabilities 
directly against the observed events/non-events frequencies. While having the drawback 
that it is computed directly on ensemble-derived probabilities, it has the advantage that it 
makes no distributional assumptions, and estimates only one parameter. 
5.7. General remarks on calibration 
In the case of overconfident forecasts, calibration procedures reduce the amplitude of the 
probabilities, adjusting for this overconfidence by reducing the resolution. Conceptually, 
this calibration step can be considered the application of a statistical model to the direct 
model output in which the forecasts are corrected for mean state bias and over-confidence in 
the ensemble distribution. Figure 7 presents the application of two calibration methods to 
model time series which exhibit a high and low correlation with the verifying observations 
respectively. The central panel demonstrates the effect of the variance inflation adjustment 
described above, while the lower panel shows a regression adjustment with Bayesian 
parameter estimates. 
It could be argued that such procedures degrade, or corrupt model outputs, because they 
make use of only limited information from the model reforecast set and available 
observations. This may be the case, but if such information can be specified it can be 
included in the calculation of calibration factors. If it cannot be specified and measured, then 
we are hardly in a position to use it to inform our estimates of future probabilities! 
In seasonal forecasting, calibration is complicated by the short length of the hindcast 
verification data set, typically 15 to 30 years, which imposes hard limits on how much 
information we can reliably say we have about the model. This paucity of data makes model 
skill assessments and model adjustment difficult because parameters calculated from the 
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verification dataset will necessarily have large sampling error. For this reason it is desirable 
that calibration models have a small number of parameters. 
The problem is even thornier, because some circulation regimes such as strong El Nino 
events are thought to be more predictable than others, so there is every chance other 
variables may be strongly related to the predicted accuracy of a given forecast. Indeed the 
practice of ensemble forecasting is designed to reflect such changes in potential 
predictability. For example the influence of strong El Niño and La Niña events leads to 
greater predictability of climate anomalies in affected regions during such events. Given this 
knowledge, information about the state of ENSO should in theory be used to estimate the 
certainty of seasonal outlooks. Empirical outlooks do just this, but schemes using this 
information for dynamical model based outlooks are not yet common. 
5.8. The multi-model approach 
Another approach to the quantification of model error is to combine forecasts from a 
number of different yet plausible dynamical models. Multi-model combination aims to 
benefit from a better representation of uncertainty in model physics, model configuration 
and initialisation strategy. The multi-model approach is widely used in operational weather 
prediction (out to 7 to 10 days ahead). Model combination is complicated by varying grid 
resolutions, ensemble sizes, different model skill and mean biases between models, as well 
as unresolved questions about model weighting. The multi-model approach has been 
criticized on the grounds that combining a forecast from a bad model with a forecast from a 
good model may result in a less skillful forecast if one does not weight models to reflect 
their level of skill. 
5.9. Downscaling 
Another family of model adjustments is motivated by the mismatch between the resolved 
scale of GCMs and the scale at which most decisions are made. GCMs can provide useful 
forecasts of atmospheric fields at seasonal timescales but are typically run at coarse spatial 
resolution such that the direct model output represents spatial averages over thousands of 
square kilometres (typically grid cells some 100 km in size). This coarse resolution poses a 
problem for applications that require forecasts at a finer spatial scale, especially in regions 
where the real topography causes local rainfall to diverge significantly from model grid 
averages. Where the errors to be corrected are primarily a result of the spatial scale of the 
GCM, the correction is called ‘downscaling’. Downscaling is desired for those Pacific islands 
where the interaction between the prevailing winds and local topography is a significant 
driver of variability, but the GCM does not resolve local topography. 
The primary goal of downscaling is to replace the large-scale grid box climate variable, in 
this case rainfall, with rainfall that is better representative of the local situation. One method 
of downscaling is that of meteorological analogues. In this approach, large-scale synoptic 
meteorological fields are used as predictors for small scale variables. The output of a 
 
Managing Climate Risk with Seasonal Forecasts 577 
seasonal timescale GCM is used to generate forecasts of the large-scale fields. The analogue 
methods has been shown has been shown to produce good results for Twentieth Century 
South Eastern Australian rainfall in the context of downscaling for climate change 
projections[33].  As with most statistical downscaling techniques, analogue downscaling is 
computationally cheap, in contrast to resource-intensive dynamical downscaling using 
nested atmospheric models. 
Figure 6 shows the topography resolved by a high-resolution numerical weather prediction 
model, and the topography resolved by a coarse resolution seasonal prediction model. 
 
Figure 8. Left: topography resolved in a high resolution weather model. Right: topography resolved in 
a coarse resolution seasonal prediction GCM. 
6. Software architecture: From models to systems 
The design of systems for the generation and distribution of GCM based outlooks is 
architecturally complex. It is here that the interdisciplinary nature of the seasonal 
forecasting activity becomes clear. In addition to more traditional earth system science 
involved in understanding coupled ocean-atmosphere processes, the tasks of data 
processing, data modelling and information system architecture require advanced 
computing skills. We now outline a general pattern for the design of systems for the 
delivery of seasonal forecasts to end users which is a generalisation of the implementation 
described above and in [34]. 
Four distinct layers can be defined as components of the overall process of turning the 
outputs of GCMs into seasonal outlooks suitable for use by decision-makers. 
The model layer comprises the GCM simulating the evolution of the coupled ocean-
atmosphere system. This component is a complex software system in itself, integrating the 
ingestion of data analyses (themselves based on multiple networks of observations), the 
assimilation of these observations into the model integration cycle, and the output of 
variables of interest. This layer is the domain of earth system scientists and experts in 
numerical computation. GCMs are typically the result of the combined efforts of a large 
number of such scientists and engineers working over a long period of time. 
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In the forecast generation layer, forecast products are generated from dynamical model output. 
This process involves statistical corrections for model biases and may involve the integration 
of outputs from a number of different models. Decisions about which model outputs to use 
will be based on the analysis of model performance over an historical period. The resulting 
derived forecast products are typically stored in self-describing files with additional metadata 
to support the clients that deliver the outlooks. By storing the generated forecasts in an 
accessible, metadata rich format they are easily ingestible by downstream clients, whether 
these are simple viewers or more complex models that use the calibrated model data as one 
input among many. GCM model outputs may be used to drive other models (for example 
hydrological models). In general metadata is preserved as data is processed and new metadata 
added to describe transformations. This enables downstream users of the data to understand 
its provenance. Metadata curation, while tedious, should be considered a best practice if data 
is to be made public and its use promoted. Practitioners in this domain will typically be data 
scientists, statisticians, and climate scientists who work closely with forecast users. 
At the data service layer forecast data is exposed via a data server, which makes the forecast 
data available using standard interfaces such as OPEnDAP[35]. At this stage, the generated 
outlooks are data products, not graphical products. The format of the output is not 
dependent on the particular dynamical model, or even that the model is dynamical: the 
forecast is simply a time series of gridded data with descriptive metadata. This layer is the 
domain of information architects and software engineers with expertise in moving data 
across networks efficiently. 
The product service layer provides the means for the majority of forecast users to access the 
products they require, typically in the form of maps and graphs presented as images, data 
tables and expert commentary. Such products are developed by climate scientists and 
associated professionals with expertise in data visualisation, usually in close consultation 
with forecast users. This layer may take the form of pre-generated images and tables, or of 
complex applications that obtain and process data directly from the data service layer using 
web services. 
The use of open standards, interoperable systems and simple, clean interfaces simplify the 
challenge of integrating data from multiple streams into usable seasonal forecasts. Systems 
need to be interoperable to reduce the cost of exporting and ingesting data, a procedure 
which is required at all stages of the process from the modelling (where analyses must be 
ingested for the initialisation of models) to the product services (where potentially large 
volumes of image and web page requests must be serviced). The use of open standards 
supports this interoperability. Open standards arise in communities of practice over periods 
of time, and generally become enshrined in documentation and formally supported by inter-
institutional bodies. They are to be preferred over the creation of new ad hoc formats and 
interfaces. Clean interfaces means that coupling between system modules should be kept to 
a minimum, and that system modules communicate with each other as far as possible using 
the standards described above. The integration of model outputs into arbitrary decision-
support systems and downstream models is supported by providing the model output, and 
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post-processed model-based forecasts in standard formats, and exposing web services that 
provide access to data and meta-data via clearly defined protocols. 
6.1. Designing seasonal outlook products and tools 
Agile software development methodologies allow technical development to proceed 
simultaneously with the gathering of user feedback and refinement of designs. They are 
characterised by short development cycles with clearly defined goals and sub goals. 
Beginning development early ensures technical issues are solved, avoiding delays if system 
requirements cannot be completely specified in advance, or scientific results that underpin 
the forecast products cannot be anticipated. More traditional software development 
lifecycles, such as the so-called ‘waterfall’ model, depend on system requirements and 
features being specified early and held static throughout the development period. 
In the agile model of software development, regular user testing takes place at each 
development increment with user feedback incorporated into the next iteration. A test 
system may be made available for the use of developers and other project team members. 
An agile approach suits small and specialised project teams, as the flexibility of the agile 
approach may hold management risks for a larger development group. This approach 
enables responsiveness to the requirements of the end users of the system. 
 
Figure 9. An example of a web-based tool providing seasonal climate forecasts. 
6.2. A case study: The pacific seasonal forecast portal 
The development of web based tools integrating model-based outlooks with climatological 
information and other contextual information is one means of communicating information 
about climate risk to end users. [36]  
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A system was developed to ingest output data from the Predictive Atmospheric-Ocean 
Model for Australia (POAMA) GCM [17]. A user-facing component was developed, based 
on a rich web-based interface that provides a one-stop shop for access to dynamical model-
based outlooks. The purpose of the tool is to provide a specialised point of access to CGCM 
based seasonal outlooks for the national meteorological services of Pacific Island countries. 
This project was supported by the Pacific Adaptation Strategy Assistance Program (PASAP), 
a component of the International Climate Change Adaptation Initiative - an Australian 
Government Initiative of $328 million over five years, 2008-2013 to assist with high priority 
climate adaptation needs in vulnerable countries in the Asia-Pacific region. As part of this 
program, the Australian Bureau of Meteorology lead a project to strengthen climate 
prediction capacities in the national meteorological and hydrological services of Pacific 
Island countries, including countries both north and south of the equator: Papua New 
Guinea, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, 
Nauru, Cook Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Niue, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and East Timor. A 
key element of this work was the development of a web-based application providing access 
to dynamical model-based seasonal outlooks. As previously described, one means to reduce 
vulnerability to climate change is by improve preparedness to anomalous climatic events. 
Graphical displays of seasonal forecasts of broad-scale, point and climate driver forecasts 
are generated with an example shown in Figure 9. The web application displays the 
contextual information provided as meta-data by the data service layer, consumes the 
outputs of web services that produce figures and tables. It displays model-based outlooks as 
overlays on dynamical maps using geospatial web services. Access is given not just to 
application graphics but also to outlook data. User-friendly options for data extraction from 
the web portal are provided to support users of the range of tools from Excel to R.  
An agile, iterative approach to the development of the web portal user interface (UI) 
included testing of early development versions of the portal with users at a project 
workshop, and in a series of country visits. These sessions validated the overall UI design 
and provided valuable feedback for improvements. 
While much work went into the web front end, an equal amount of work was spent 
ensuring that the forecast generation layer is decoupled from this specific client. The access 
to the data provided by the data service layer allows for the future design of web clients that 
perform computational value adding using processing services, for example the ingestion 
and subsequent combination and calibration of multiple selected models.  
The integration of data into a dynamical mapping tool provides opportunities for data 
mash-up in which data from different sources is displayed in composite. The provision of 
geospatial information in such a way that data from multiple sources can be integrated 
opens the way for new and interesting applications. For example, one potential future 
application for seasonal forecasting might be the display of agricultural or fishery yield data 
overlaid with outlook reliability data. 
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Over the course of the project several workshops were held bringing representatives of 
partner countries together with scientists and service developers. These workshops 
provided training in the use and interpretation of dynamical seasonal predictions and 
introduced the software tools developed to provide the seasonal outlooks. Communication 
and training are essential elements in the development of outlook products: producing well-
calibrated outlooks is not effective unless the end users are equipped to use them correctly. 
A particular challenge is that of communicating seasonal forecasts that are couched in terms 
of probabilities, and which may differ from model to model. Both formal and informal user 
assessment of outlooks must be carried out to ensuring that what the forecast provider 
thinks is being communicated is what is being communicated.  An iterative design process 
in which users are consulted early and often reduces the risk of miscommunication, and 
allows for learning to proceed over a period of time. 
In workshops scientists presented lectures on the physical basis of seasonal predictability; 
the historical skill of the POAMA GCM in predicting ocean and atmospheric conditions 
across the Pacific; software tools developed to provide access to the latest seasonal forecasts 
based on the coupled models. In one workshop participants also engaged in a series of 
exercises using the portal to generate seasonal outlooks for their local region which they 
described to the group in a series of successful presentations. Such hands on exercises are 
highly effective at developing skills in using seasonal forecasts and associated tools, in 
assessing the knowledge and level of engagement of participants, and in testing whether the 
tool works properly under realistic conditions. 
In discussions participants highlighted the importance of climate studies focused on 
improving the understanding of climate variability in Pacific Island Countries, noting that 
climate variability interacts with climate change leading to many of the first felt impacts of 
climate change. Improved knowledge of extreme climatic events, with the assistance of 
tailored forecast tools, will help enhance the resilience and adaptive capacity of 
communities affected by climate variability and change. 
7. Conclusion 
From the physical basis to the complexities of applications to specific industries and 
decisions it is clear that seasonal prediction is a large-scale enterprise requiring coordinated 
work across a range of scientific and technological disciplines. Steady improvements in 
GCM resolution and physics, coupled with ever increasing understanding of the physical 
mechanisms of predictability, will ensure that seasonal predictions become an important 
component of adaptation to a changing and more variable climate. 
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